


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THE SEVENTH  
UNITED STATES ARMY

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REPORT OF OPERATIONS



FRANCE AND GERMANY

1944-1945

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**REPORT OF OPERATIONS**

**THE SEVENTH**

**UNITED STATES ARMY**

**IN FRANCE AND GERMANY**

**1944-1945**

**THREE VOLUMES**



**RESTRICTED**

**VOLUME III**

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To the Officers and Enlisted Men of the  
Seventh United States Army who gave their  
lives this history is respectfully dedicated



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# ***VOLUME III***

















# THE SAAR PALATINATE TRIANGLE

## LEGEND:

-  Main Roads
-  Autobahn
-  Siegfried Line
-  Forests
-  International Boundary

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# CHAPTER XXVI

## *The Conquest of the Saar Palatinate*

March was a month of important developments for the western front, ending the winter stalemate. Early in the month, the Ninth Army had closed up to the Rhine near Duisberg. The First Army had taken Cologne and seized the Remagen bridgehead over the Rhine. The primary efforts of the armies under the command of General Eisenhower were being directed against the most important of Germany's industrial regions, the Ruhr. The Third Army had crashed through the Siegfried defenses near Bitburg and had raced to the Rhine above Coblenz.


The Third and Seventh Armies now confronted a triangular island, the Saar-Palatinate, bounded by the Rhine River on the east, the Moselle on the northwest, and the Lauter-Sarre River line on the south and west. This area had four major terrain features: the Rhine Valley, the Hardt Mountains, the Saarbruecken-Kaiserslautern-Worms Corridor, and the Hunsruck Mountains. It was also the second richest industrial region in front of the western Allied armies.

The Rhine Valley is flat bottom land, approximately 15 miles wide west of the river, with numerous east-west streams and wooded areas which could serve as obstacles to northward movement. The main north-south highway from Haguenau through Wissembourg to Landau lies at the foot of the Hardt Mountains which command the valley from heights up to 2,300 feet. The Hardt or Low Vosges Mountains are a northern continuation of the Vosges, a northeast-tending ridge, heavily forested, with steep east-west corridors. Movement north and south in



this sector is severely restricted by a limited road net, while the wooded nature of the terrain limits observation.

The Saarbruecken-Kaiserslautern-Worms Corridor follows the general northwest shoulder of the mountain chain. It is comparatively



#### OBER OTTERBACH IN THE HARDT MOUNTAINS

*"... The Hardt or Low Vosges Mountains are a northern continuation of the Vosges . . . heavily forested, with steep east-west corridors . . ."*

flat and moderately wooded. There is but one sizeable stream here, the Blies River. To the northwest the corridor opens on rolling and broken country. Separating this ground from the Hunsruck is the Nahe River, which might serve as a barrier to north-south movement and to lateral communication. The Hunsruck is a fairly high, rugged range of mountains extending northeast almost 60 miles between the Sarre River and the Rhine. It is a desolate region, partly under pasture and forest, but with large tracts of open waste.

The Saar-Palatinate and especially the basin of the Sarre River was of extraordinary economic significance to the enemy. The industrial

region itself stretches west to the French frontier, east to the valley of the Blies River, and on the Sarre River extends roughly from Sarreguemines to Merzig. The Saarland is one of the most highly industrialized sections of Germany, second only to the Ruhr as a center of heavy industry. Its growth is largely based on extensive coal fields and the nearby iron ore of Lorraine. Coal mining and iron and steel work are the main industrial occupations. The loss of this region would deprive Germany of 10 percent of its iron and steel capacity and a coal production of 7,000,000 tons annually. The main coal field, near Saarbruecken, is roughly oval in shape and approximately 25 miles long and 12 miles wide.

The basin of the Sarre River was not the only rich industrial prize in the triangle. Homburg had one of the comparatively few synthetic oil plants still in operation and some of the finest coal for steel making. At Ludwigshafen some 40 to 50 percent of the Reich's entire output of chemicals was centered in the I. G. Farben works. Kaiserslautern, next to Ludwigshafen, was the largest city in the Palatinate. It had considerable industry including several engineering plants and foundries, a number of textile works, and was an important railroad junction. Towns like Speyer and Worms were likewise important economically and were of great historical significance.

To defend the Saar-Palatinate, Germany had been busily engaged since the beginning of the year in making improvements on existing defenses. Enemy defensive preparations in and behind the Siegfried Line consisted of the digging of communication trenches between bunkers, the construction of firing positions adjacent to existing bunkers, the extension of existing antitank ditches and trenches, and the felling of trees to form roadblocks and obstacles. In general the enemy had prepared three phases of defense: first, between the line of contact and the Siegfried Line were roadblocks and trenches; second, the Siegfried Line itself, where communication trenches, firing positions, and obstacles were being added; third, a secondary line of defense behind the Siegfried Line, where field fortifications were hastily installed. Strong points of the enemy line were located at Saarbruecken in the area of the lower Blies River and on the plains of the Rhine Valley north

of Haguenau. These barriers guarded strategic approaches to the Palatinate.

The enemy confronting Seventh Army in March was not at peak strength. During the month of February the First German Army



#### ANTITANK DEFENSES

*"... the extension of existing antitank ditches and trenches, and the felling of trees to form roadblocks and obstacles ..."*

had given up seven divisions to sectors considered more vital, while only two of token strength were received in exchange. This exodus of units from the Saar-Palatinate had taken away the army's striking force, and since the end of January he had displayed a defensive attitude. The enemy's most apparent weakness was a lack of reserves. There were nine divisions of the German First Army from Oberhoffen on the Rhine west to Saarlautern. The equivalent strength of these divisions according to G-2 probably did not exceed 18 to 20 battalions of infantry with some 150 to 160 armored vehicles, mostly self-propelled guns.





As G-2 remarked on 7 March, the enemy had been presented with one crisis after another, each in turn more critical. Events in the north and on the eastern front directly affected the enemy's ability to fight in the Palatinate. The growing threat to the Ruhr and to Berlin



#### COMMUNICATION TRENCHES OF SIEGFRIED LINE

*" . . . where communication trenches, firing positions, and obstacles were being added . . . "*

and the likelihood that the west bank of the Moselle would soon be cleared by the Third Army made it likely that the enemy would be called upon to contribute still more units from the Palatinate defenses opposing Seventh Army. On the other hand, the loss of the Silesian coal and industrial area and the threat to the Ruhr might lend increasing importance to the industrial resources of the Saar-Palatinate. The terrain in the triangle had excellent defensive qualities which might justify an extended stay.

As the month of March progressed, the German situation in the north steadily grew worse. The demands of the Remagen bridgehead




and the threat to the Ruhr and Westphalia resulted in a situation where Army Group G, defending the Palatinate, became the only higher echelon with units on the west bank of the Rhine. On 10 March, Sixth Army Group predicted that the enemy could only hold temporarily on the Moselle and Siegfried Line because of the absolute dependence of these positions on each other for mutual support. The penetration of the one would leave forces on the other in the immediate danger of attack from the rear, if not of complete encirclement. In such an eventuality, the enemy must consider saving his troops, outweighing even the protection of the Saar-Palatinate. "If he wishes to live to fight another day, the enemy must choose to fight and run away", commented the weekly Intelligence Summary.

## Plans for the Army Offensive

In the two weeks before the March 15 offensive, Seventh Army was engaged in intensive planning for the coming operation. A tentative plan, *Yorktown*, for an offensive to breach the Siegfried Line had been abandoned by 4 March, when Operation Plan *Cleaver* was published by Seventh Army Headquarters. This plan was based upon the assumption that there would be eleven infantry and three armored divisions under Seventh Army control. At this time there were under Seventh Army command nine infantry and two armored divisions. However, it had already been announced on 2 March that the 71st Infantry Division upon its arrival was to be assigned to the army but employed exclusively in a defensive role to gain combat experience. It was hoped that one additional infantry division and one armored division, both experienced in combat, could be assigned to Seventh Army prior to the offensive. On 6 March Seventh Army's *Cleaver* plan was returned from Sixth Army Group approved. On 8 March the code name *Undertone* was substituted for *Cleaver*. Sixth Army Group was given permission to deal directly with the Third Army regarding coordination of operations south of the Moselle.

By 9 March it was understood that the 4th Infantry Division, and the 6th and 13th Armored Divisions would be added to Seventh Army





for proposed offensive operations. On 11 March, Field Order No. 10 was issued by Seventh Army Headquarters. At the same time boundaries between Seventh Army and the Third Army on its left and the First French Army on its right were restated. Late in February the First French Army had taken over responsibility for a narrow sector of northern Alsace between a line from Brumath to Oberhoffen to Soufflenheim to Lauterbourg and the Rhine. A new Seventh Army left flank boundary, which ran from Buss, across the Sarre River just north of Schaffhausen, northeast to Nohfelden, would give the army sufficient room to maneuver its forces. As stated in Field Order No. 10, the mission of Seventh Army, supported by the XII Tactical Air Command, was to attack from its present positions, break the Siegfried Line, destroy the enemy in zone, and seize the west bank of the Rhine.

The assault on D-Day would be made with three corps abreast, the main effort assigned to XV Corps along the Rimling-Zweibruecken axis in the center. The VI Corps on the right and the XXI Corps on the left were to assist the main effort. After penetration of the Siegfried Line, outflanking action to the right and left of the breakthrough would be relied upon to reduce German defenses. XV Corps was to continue the impetus of the main effort beyond Zweibruecken to Kaiserslautern and the Worms area, where a river crossing was to be effected. VI Corps was to uncover and penetrate the Siegfried defenses, capture the high ground east and northeast of Pirmasens, and take Landau and Neustadt. XXI Corps was to attack on the axis Sarreguemines-Neunkirchen to outflank the Saarbruecken defenses of the Siegfried Line from the east, exploit to the northeast, maintaining contact with Third Army on the left.

Both an intensive and extensive program of air support was drawn up to neutralize the enemy air effort and destroy enemy communications and supply facilities. Prior to D-Day the 42nd Wing and XII Tactical Air Command would be engaged in an interdiction campaign to block all rail lines leading out of the triangle, to destroy supplies, and to bomb enemy installations. On D-Day the Eighth Air Force would attack industrial and communication installations in Zweibruecken, Kaiserslautern, Homburg, and Neunkirchen. The 9th Bomb Division was to hit installations in Pirmasens, Neustadt, and Landau.

The 42nd Bombardment Wing would carpet-bomb defenses facing Seventh Army. XII Tactical Air Command, of which Brigadier General



BRIGADIER GENERAL GLENN  
O. BARCUS  
". . . XII Tactical Air  
Command . . ."

Glenn O. Barcus had recently become chief, replacing General Saville, was to render support with armed reconnaissance of the area Saarlautern-Ludwigshafen-Karlsruhe and would attack all known enemy army, corps and division command posts. The full air operation was to be executed without disclosing the assault area.

The supply build-up played a vital part in planning. From the time *Undertone* plan was conceived until its launching, more than 2,000 tons of ammunition per day and 130,000 troops had to be moved into Seventh Army area. This severely taxed both supply and transportation facilities of the army and the communication zone at its rear. Nevertheless only two minor units failed to close in the assault area in time for the operation.

G-2 sections made a continuous study of terrain and enemy defenses. Mines, roadblocks and demolitions had to be accurately located and the condition of roads, bridges, and streams ascertained. Photo interpretation teams studied current pictures to follow the German build-up of defenses. Interpretative studies pinpointed many gun locations and targets for air and artillery. Prisoners of war were interrogated to obtain a complete picture of the enemy order of battle.

During this defensive period there was constant patrolling activity, which gave new troops confidence to close with the enemy and assisted in the determination of enemy disposition. The accustomed tenseness that usually grips men before the jump-off was not too evident prior to D-Day. Allied successes along the western front lifted morale. The weather had moderated considerably. Points of attack and the routes of assembly were familiar.

## Plans for Crossing the Rhine

Since the expected success of the Saar-Palatinate offensive would close Seventh Army on the Rhine, it was necessary to plan concurrently for an immediate crossing. A Sixth Army Group estimate of the situation on 14 February had announced:

Current strategy will best be enhanced by passing to the offensive between the Moselle and the Rhine on or about 15 March with sufficient strength to close on the Rhine rapidly . . . threaten the German with an advance on Kassel and Munich, draw strength away from the main effort in the north as soon as possible and thus facilitate the capture of the Ruhr.

The Army Group ordered its joint planning staff on 17 February to outline such an offensive, including in its directive that "the plan should be sufficiently flexible to permit an immediate crossing of the Rhine in the Worms area or in the Speyer-Germersheim area." River crossing operations, however, were not to be undertaken against strong opposition until the Saar-Palatinate had been entirely cleared.

It has been mentioned that Seventh Army had made detailed plans and preparations, including the assembling of necessary equipment, for a Rhine crossing during the fall of 1944. When higher headquarters decided in November that Seventh Army would turn north rather than attempt a crossing, all amphibious equipment was numbered by truck-load and stored in the Forest of Mondon near Luneville, where it remained until March. Throughout the winter the equipment was serviced and kept ready for instant use. Fortunately the original crossing plans, which involved the Rastatt area, were adaptable with little change for the operation now under contemplation.

Two infantry divisions of long experience in combat and in amphibious technique, the 3rd and the 45th, were selected as assault divisions for the Rhine crossing. On 2 March both divisions received orders to initiate as soon as possible training in river crossing technique. An estimated ten days was available. Proposed mounting schedules, drawn up as a result of experiments at the Seventh Army river crossing schools in October 1944, were sent to both divisions. Both XV and VI



Corps were given plans, adapted from the October outline, for the two crossing areas originally considered in *Yorktown*.

The selected assault divisions sent tank crews to be trained to operate amphibious DD-Tanks at the amphibious tank school at Camp Valbonne on the Rhone River. On 4 March these crews from the 756th Tank Battalion and the 191st Tank Battalion were ordered to report there to attend a three-day period of instruction on DD tanks. The infantry divisions, meanwhile, were undergoing intensive training in amphibious operations. The 3rd on Lake Parroy and the 45th on Lake Gondrexange, both in the Luneville area, used the amphibious equipment which had been stored since November. Training with the 3rd Division was the 540th Engineer Combat Group, and with the 45th Division the 40th Engineer Combat Group, forming teams that would operate together in the actual crossing.

Both engineer combat groups had taken river crossing training in October. Formerly regiments, they had been redesignated engineer combat groups on 15 February. Infantry assault battalions were divided into five waves to cross in storm and assault boats. Because the landing craft would accomodate no complete infantry tactical unit, mounting schedules were drawn up and boat teams formed. Practice landings were made by daylight, in darkness, and under illumination of anti-aircraft artillery searchlights.

River crossing equipment had been broken down into regimental combat team sets, each capable of crossing one team on a two-battalion front, and the whole capable of crossing a corps on a two-division front. The nucleus of the sets consisted of 96 storm boats with outboard motors, 188 assault boats with outboard motors, six 25-ton ponton rafts, one heavy ponton bridge, and 150 DUKWs.

While in the training area engineers organized upstream patrols to provide protection against floating mines, enemy swimmers, and debris. A patrol assigned to each river crossing group consisted of one platoon of engineers to construct mine barriers, six searchlights, five DUKWs for bridge security, four 40mm anti-aircraft guns, four quadruple 50 caliber machine guns, and two M-4 tanks. An L-5 liaison

plane was assigned to the patrols and a radio net from plane to tank to DUKW was established. Engineer troops from heavy ponton battalions and camouflage troops were added to division assault teams.

While training continued, plans on a higher echelon were going forward. An air drop to support the operation was discussed with the First Allied Airborne Army on 6 March, but Seventh Army was told that the timing of operations in the north might disrupt plans for a drop in the Seventh Army zone. However, announcing a target date of 1 April, Seventh Army requested on 8 March that one airborne division be designated to plan operations in support of the crossing. On 9 March, XV Corps was designated the assault corps and was given a directive to plan a crossing of the Rhine River in the vicinity of Worms, to be submitted for approval by 14 March. In order to put all river crossing operations under a single command, the 40th and 540th Engineer Combat Groups were attached to XV Corps at 0600 hours on 15 March.

## D-Day for Operation Undertone

The offensive was launched on schedule on 15 March. The XXI Corps and the 3rd and 45th Divisions of the XV Corps jumped off at 0100 hours. The main body of the VI Corps attacked at 0645 hours and the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division, under the operational command of VI Corps, moved out along the Rhine at 0715 hours. On 11 March the 3rd Algerian Division and selected elements of the 5th French Armored Division had been attached to VI Corps for that part of the Seventh Army drive north which was to develop in the newly assigned sector of the First French Army reaching out to Lauterbourg on the Rhine. By the close of the first day of operation *Undertone* the VI Corps had taken 1,034 prisoners, the XV Corps 628 prisoners, and the XXI Corps 426 prisoners, for a total of 2,088 prisoners.

## XV Corps Advances the Army Center

The XV Corps was scheduled to play a central position in the Seventh Army assault and to make its main effort along the axis Rimling, Zweibruecken, Homburg, and Kaiserslautern. It also had as a sub-



sidiary and preliminary mission the capture of the Maginot fortress town



MAJOR GENERAL WILLARD  
G. WYMAN  
". . . 71st Infantry Division . . ."

of Bitche. The bulk of Seventh Army divisions had been assigned to XV Corps for the main offensive efforts. At the beginning of March XV Corps had had under its command only the 100th and 44th Infantry Divisions, the 106th Cavalry Group, and attached corps troops. By 8 March the advance detachment of the 71st Infantry Division, composed of the 5th, 14th and 66th Infantry Regiments and commanded by Major General Willard G. Wyman, had reported to XV Corps to which the division had been assigned; instructions were received at army headquarters on the same day that restrictions on the employment of this division had been lifted. When the 6th Armored Division, commanded by Major General Robert W. Grow, began to arrive on 9 March it also was attached to XV Corps. On 11 March the attachment of the 3rd and 45th Divisions to XV Corps was announced. The 3rd Division had just been released from SHAEF reserve, and the 45th Division had been released from army reserve.



MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT  
W. GROW  
". . . 6th Armored Division . . ."

At 0100 hours on 15 March XV Corps launched its offensive with a surprise night attack. The 45th Division on the corps left flank attacked through the 44th Division, which was holding the line and which on the following day was to revert to army reserve. The 45th Division launched its assault between Habkirchen and Obergailbach. The enemy had utilized his time in improving defenses behind the natural barrier of the Blies River. On D-Day the river was from 75 to 144 feet wide and had a depth of 10 to

15 feet. Before the assault, heavy bombers of the Royal Air Force had flown missions against Homburg and Zweibruecken. This bombing, together with the shelling of division artillery, disrupted enemy communications and silenced his artillery until after daylight.

Reconnaissance had been made the previous night for suitable footbridge and ferry sites, assault boats had been brought up, and the banks of the Blies had been cleared of mines. By 0235 hours four companies of infantrymen from the 180th Regiment had crossed the river in assault boats. By 0250 hours two footbridges had been completed by the 120th Engineer Battalion. Searchlights were used for illumination in the



#### OBERGAILBACH AREA

*"... The 45th Division launched its assault between Habkirchen and Obergailbach ..."*

assault. By daylight the 45th Division had penetrated forward positions of the enemy. The crossing of the Blies put the 45th Division once again in Germany. The enemy was apparently unable to recover from the blow dealt him the first day of the attack and withdrew to the concrete

and steel fortifications of the Siegfried Line. For delaying purposes the enemy employed demolitions, and tank-supported strongpoints. The 180th Infantry on the division left flank drove north along the west bank of the Blies River, and the 157th Infantry pushed forward on the right flank, while the 179th Infantry mopped up by-passed strongpoints. After pushing through mine-fields, road craters, and roadblocks, troops encountered the solid defenses of the Siegfried Line on 17 March near Blieskastel west of Zweibruecken.

To the right of the 45th Division, the 3rd Division had prepared a parallel thrust. In its operation plan, *Earthquake*, the 3rd Division was



HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY CROSSING THE BLIES RIVER

"... crossing the Blies put the 45th Division once again in Germany . . ."

to attack at H-Hour passing through elements of the 44th Division to drive to the Siegfried Line south of Zweibruecken, then to drive down the Zweibruecken-Kaiserslautern corridor. General O'Daniel had told his troops, "The attack will be pressed with the ruthless vigor that has

routed every enemy formation opposing the 3rd Division. All men will be brought to the highest possible offensive spirit prior to the jump-off. Bayonets will be sharpened." Without artillery preparation the 3rd Division launched its attack at 0100 hours on 15 March just south of the German border in the vicinity of Rimling. Within 30 minutes the border had been crossed, and the enemy's forward positions overrun.

Mines disabled several armored vehicles the first day of the assault, but though the mine-fields were dense they did not extend much beyond one mile. Only at Utweiler was there any serious attempt at resistance. Here the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Infantry received a counter-attack by a battalion of infantry supported by armor. It was completely surrounded until the 3rd Battalion attacked and relieved it from encirclement. Four enemy flakwagons and seven tank destroyers were destroyed by this effort. After two and a half days of fighting the 3rd Division succeeded in driving to the Siegfried Line at a point just south of Zweibruecken.

On the right flank of XV Corps the assault of 15 March was launched by the 100th Infantry Division which had held the corps line southwest of Bitche during the period of aggressive defense. The first mission assigned to the 100th Division in the Seventh Army offensive was the capture of the fortress town of Bitche. This division had fought over the same terrain and had besieged the same citadel in December. In the December fighting for Bitche the 3rd Battalion of the 398th Infantry had received recognition for its work in reducing Fort Schiesseck, overlooking Bitche from the north.

At 0500 hours on 15 March the three-regiment offensive of the 100th Division began. The 397th Infantry on the left flank poured out to capture the high ground north of the fortress and by noon had taken Schorbach. The 399th Infantry on the right flank attacked Reyersviller Ridge southeast of Bitche. The 398th Infantry in the center made a frontal assault and seized Fort Freudenberg and Fort Schiesseck.

Division engineers had done their demolition work well in December, and only small resistance was encountered near the blasted pillboxes. Mines were present in great numbers, however. A captured engineer map later revealed that there were 3,839 Schuh mines, S mines,

and antitank mines guarding the southwest approaches to Bitche. Tanks were used to help clear a narrow path through minefields.

On 16 March the 1st Battalion of the 398th Infantry captured Fort Otterbiel north of Bitche against heavy mortar, artillery, and small arms fire. The 2nd Battalion captured the town of Bitche, encountering little resistance, and occupied the northern half. The 3rd Battalion passed through the town to Camp de Bitche to the east and secured the area. Meanwhile, the 399th Infantry was cooperating in this "nutcracker squeeze" by clearing the southern half of Bitche and the College de Bitche. Company B captured 75 prisoners including the commander and staff of the battalion which was charged with defending the town.

The fortress town of Bitche capitulated as a result of the flanking movement executed by the 398th Infantry on the north and the 399th Infantry on the south. General Burress, commanding the division, was made the first citizen of honor in the town's history. The 100th Division now pushed to the north in an advance to the Siegfried Line, leaving the 71st Division to take over control of the Bitche area.

## The Clearing of Northern Alsace

On the Seventh Army right flank between XV Corps and the Rhine VI Corps had made preparations for its mission to clear northern Alsace and to drive through the Wissembourg-Bergzabern-Landau-Neustadt Gap along the Rhine Valley. With four infantry divisions abreast, the 42nd, the 103rd, the 36th, and the 3rd Algerian from west to east, the VI Corps attacked early on 15 March across the Rothbach and Moder Rivers. The 14th Armored Division gave the corps its armored support. Prisoner of war statements showed that tactical surprise had been achieved and that enemy communications had been disrupted early. Progress was hampered somewhat by extensive minefields. Corps artillery fired almost at will on enemy vehicles, guns, tanks, and personnel with excellent results.

On the left flank of the VI Corps the 42nd Division had been holding a sector of the line in the Low Vosges. At 0645 hours on 15 March the division attacked from the general line Althorn-Reipertswiller







and drove into German mountain defenses. All units, moving along the ridges, deliberately avoided the roads which were mined and blocked. Supplies were brought up by pack mules. The 242nd Infantry attacking



#### HIGH GROUND OVERLOOKING BAERENTHAL

*"... The 242nd Infantry attacking on the left reached high ground overlooking Baerenthal and cut the Mouterhouse-Baerenthal road . . ."*

on the left reached high ground overlooking Baerenthal and cut the Mouterhouse-Baerenthal road. The 222nd Infantry on the right attacked northeast across the Rothbach River. The 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron maintained contact with the 100th Division on the left.

The division continued its attack northeast on 16 March. A breakthrough near Baerenthal lessened organized enemy resistance. Heavily wooded and steeply ridged terrain and abatis over the restricted road net were the chief obstacles. The enemy was constantly upset and forced to change his plans by the speed with which elements of the 42nd Division seized and exploited high ground, forcing German holding forces to pull back to avoid being completely encircled and cut off.



On 17 March, all regiments advanced up to six miles against little opposition. The 242nd Infantry cleared Bannstein and moved to Sturzelbronn. The 232nd Infantry captured Baerenthal, Philippsbourg, Dambach, and Neunhoffen, while the 222nd Infantry continued on to Niedersteinbach. The 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron cleared Mouterhouse. The 42nd Division crossed the border into Germany on 18 March and reached the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line. The 242nd Regiment crossed the border near Ludwigswinkel. The 222nd Regiment advanced to seize high ground northeast of Schoenau against the German defense wall. The 232nd Infantry moved up the center of the division sector and halted at the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line. In three and a half days of assault, the division had advanced over 16 miles of mountainous terrain and was the first VI Corps unit to reenter Germany.

To the right of the 42nd Division, the 410th and 411th Regiments of the 103rd Division had at 0645 hours on 15 March attacked from positions southwest of the Rothbach River. The assault was preceded by artillery preparation, and by 0800 hours three battalions had crossed the river. The 411th Infantry in a two-pronged attack had made good progress. A western column by-passed Rothbach and reached a point south of Zinswiller. An eastern column attacked northeast through a wooded area near Uhrwiller, reaching a long line of well-camouflaged bunkers. On the division right flank the 410th Infantry seized Uttenhoffen but was forced to withdraw under heavy fire. Task Force Cactus, the 3rd Battalion of the 409th Infantry reinforced, prepared to attack toward Climbach and Bobenthal in the event of a breakthrough.

On 16 March the 103rd Division renewed its attack in spite of the determined stand by the enemy from prepared dug-in positions along the Zintzel River and other strongpoints. Zinswiller and Oberbronn were cleared, and the outskirts of Reichshoffen were reached. Only light resistance was encountered on 17 March as the enemy withdrew to the Siegfried Line. Niederbronn, Reichshoffen, and Woerth were taken in the advance. The 103rd Division moved approximately 8 miles northeast on 18 March to cross the German border. The 411th Infantry crossed

the frontier and seized Bobenthal. Two American-built bridges constructed in mid-December 1944 over the Lauter River at Bobenthal, were captured intact although prepared for demolition. Contact with the enemy was established south of Niederschlettenbach where there were pillboxes and trenches.

Farther east on the VI Corps front the 36th Division had been given the focal mission of forcing the Wissembourg Gap and uncovering the Siegfried Line beyond. The plan was that the 141st Infantry would thrust north from Haguenau on the right, while the 143rd Infantry on the left would make a sweeping end run from the division left to Gunstett, northwest of Haguenau Forest. The 142nd Regiment was to hold a central position and capture the road junction and town of Mertzwiller. The division's main axis of advance would be Haguenau-Soultz-Wissembourg-Bergzabern.

At 0100 hours on 15 March the 143rd and 142nd Regiments had attacked from the La Walck-Ueberach area southwest of Haguenau Forest. Before the enemy could assemble his reserves the 143rd Infantry had penetrated his main line of resistance along the Moder River. Bitschhoffen had been thoroughly prepared for defense with dug-in machine gun positions, prearranged mortar and artillery concentrations, and minefields. Although it was important to the enemy to hold this town, since it controlled a vital communications route, by 1045 hours on D-Day the town had fallen. On 16 March the 1st Battalion of the 143rd Infantry, reinforced, was organized into a motorized column and moved out to break through to Soultz. It was stopped south of Eberbach. The next day these motorized troops found that the enemy had withdrawn, blowing a bridge spanning the Bieberbach River just west of Gunstett. High velocity weapons and machine guns were zeroed in on the crossing site from heights nearby. During the night a bridge was completed and on the next day Dieffenbach was taken. The regiment had now opened a vital communications route for exploitation by armored forces.

The 142nd Infantry had jumped off in the attack to the right of the 143rd Infantry and at the same hour. After crossing the Moder River on two footbridges constructed by the engineers, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions had run into enemy machine gun fire from the bunkers and

trench positions in the Haguenau Forest. Point blank fire forced the Germans out of dugouts. Prisoners reported that the enemy was attempting to fall back upon a defensive line at the Zintzel River. The 142nd Infantry pointed the attack at Mertzwiller.

On 16 March five battalions of artillery massed for a preparatory fire of 900 rounds in five minutes. At 0430 hours Companies A and B crossed the Zintzel River by ford and rubber boat. A Bailey bridge was completed for the passage of armor. Overrun, the enemy suffered heavy losses. The regiment took 303 prisoners. After Mertzwiller was cleared, the 142nd Infantry was ordered to follow the drive of the 143rd Regiment at the left with a motorized column. It was now evident that the Germans had withdrawn to a considerable distance, probably to the Siegfried Line. Wissembourg was the next objective. A patrol from the 3rd Battalion of the 142nd Infantry going forward from Rott to investigate Wissembourg to the northeast drew machine gun and self-propelled fire.

In the morning of 19 March the 2nd Battalion left its bivouac to pass through the 3rd Battalion and attack Wissembourg. Some resistance was encountered at a road block and 50 prisoners were taken. The 2nd Battalion soon reached Wissembourg at the same time as the 1st Battalion which had advanced on the regimental right flank. The 1st Battalion was ordered on to Bergzabern with a platoon from the 36th Reconnaissance Troop to precede the column. The 1st Battalion moved into Germany and reached Ober Otterbach beyond Wissembourg without contact. But within the next hour German guns pounded the 1st Battalion, shelled Wissembourg, and covered the roads from Wissembourg to Ober Otterbach.

On the right flank of the 36th Division the 141st Infantry had had as a mission the clearance of the main road running northeast through Haguenau Forest to be used as a supply route for VI Corps. Bridges were to be built as quickly as possible across the Moder to support armor and troops. At 0300 hours on 15 March regimental troops had crossed the Moder River, and by 0720 hours had begun to move north on the Haguenau-Surbourg road through the Haguenau Forest. Felled trees and mines slowed progress. On 18 March the 1st Battalion entered Surbourg from the west, and the 3rd Battalion moved into the southern

portion of the town against no active enemy resistance. By 1900 hours on 19 March the 2nd Battalion of the 141st Infantry had reached a line directly east of Ober Otterbach, where troops of the 142nd Regiment had been stopped by enemy artillery. A two-company attack was launched at 2000 hours to see if there were any enemy personnel in the dragon's teeth and pillboxes of the Siegfried Line immediately in front of the 2nd Battalion of the 141st Infantry. Troops were fired on by 15 well-hidden machine guns.


On the VI Corps right flank the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division reinforced by elements of the 5th French Armored Division, having served with the II French Corps but having been attached to VI Corps for the Seventh Army offensive, was to attack along the axis Bischwiller-Lauterbourg, to capture Lauterbourg, and to secure crossings over the Lauter River into Germany. After a 30 minute artillery preparation the main attack had been launched north from Oberhoffen at 0715 hours on 15 March. Its advance towards Camp Oberhoffen was stopped by heavy fire. Farther east from Oberhoffen to the Rhine troops pushed out to the northeast. Under cover of darkness on 16 March the enemy withdrew, and the 3rd Algerian Division followed with gains up to 2 miles. On 18 March division units raced north on the western side of the Rhine to within a mile of the German frontier, as the enemy disengaged.

Original instructions to the 3rd Algerian Division had been that it was to revert to First French Army upon reaching and securing Lauter River crossings. This meant that it would revert at the same time to an inactive, defensive status, guarding the Rhine flank. To enable the French to participate in the offensive beyond the French frontier, these instructions were changed on 18 March to organize from the reinforced Algerian Division a special task force, or groupement, under General Monsabert. Effective 1800 hours on 19 March, Groupement Monsabert was created, and these troops continued to operate under the control of Seventh Army until the task force should reach the Erlen River almost midway between Lauterbourg and Speyer.

On 19 March Algerian infantrymen attacked north over the Lauter River, while French armor took Scheibenhart and Lauterbourg without active opposition. Against stiffening resistance on 20 March

Groupement Monsabert pushed additional elements over the Lauter River and gained between one and two miles. An armored column attacked through the Bien Wald to Buechelberg. Infantry troops occupied Berg; and night patrols operated as far as Neuburg, which was found to be flooded. On 20 March firm contact was made with Siegfried positions along the entire front.

The 14th Armored Division, which was to provide the drive for a VI Corps breakthrough, had been instructed to pass through the 36th Division, moving from Hagenau and Mertzwiller to seize crossings over the Lauter River and drive north to Landau and Neustadt. Before




COMMUNICATION TRENCHES BEHIND DRAGON'S TEETH  
OF SIEGFRIED LINE

*"... advanced to Steinfeld and reached the Siegfried Line ..."*

daylight on 18 March the 14th Armored Division had moved up to points within sight of the German border without opposition. On 19 March elements of Combat Command A crossed the Lauter River northeast of







Schleithal against moderate resistance. A bridge over the Lauter River had been found blown, but a nearby ford was located and filled in to allow tanks and infantry to cross. On 20 March elements of the 14th Armored Division found Schweighofen and Kapsweyer clear, advanced to Steinfeld and reached the Siegfried Line.

During the first five days of the Seventh Army March offensive, VI Corps units on the army right flank covered the greatest distance of any army divisions. In this period they moved more than 20 miles from the Moder River line near Haguenau across the Franco-German border against only isolated and ineffective enemy resistance, as German troops withdrew to Siegfried Line fortifications. The Seventh Army line, which on 15 March had run from an area west of Saarbruecken almost directly southeast through Haguenau, was being swung on a pivot near Saarbruecken to a west-east line, as the Seventh Army pushed all its divisions to that part of the German West Wall which was actually a defense against penetration from the south. At the same time that this new west-east line was being formed, divisions on the Seventh Army left flank under XXI and XV Corps were breaking their way through Siegfried defenses. As the line formed, it dissolved; and Seventh Army divisions in the west raced through the Saar-Palatinate to the Rhine.

The first days of the army offensive had meant almost no progress at all in distance for divisions under XXI Corps, which at the opening of the offensive were already at the Siegfried Line. These days had been spent by XXI Corps in forcing an opening through the steel and concrete enemy defenses.

## The Capture of Saarbruecken

At the opening of the 15 March offensive XXI Corps on the left flank of the Seventh Army had been poised for an assault on the Saarland. Its specific mission was to capture Saarbruecken, Neunkirchen, and St. Wendel, then to advance northeast to the Rhine. The 70th Division had been given the objective Saarbruecken, industrial heart of the Saar region, while the 63rd Division to its right was to penetrate the Siegfried Line.



At 0100 hours on 15 March the assault began. The 63rd Division jumped off to uncover the Siegfried defenses, while the 12th Armored Division was alerted to pour through any opening and exploit to the north and northeast. On the corps left flank the 70th Division and the 101st Cavalry Group were to hold the enemy in place, patrol across the Sarre River, and cross if possible. The rapid advance of the 63rd Division, when it came after three days of pounding the line, necessitated the use of the cavalry group as flank protection; and the 70th Division took over its sector. The Third Army, meanwhile, was making great progress in its push east. On 17 March the 12th Armored Division was detached from the XXI Corps and was attached to the XX Corps of the Third Army. Two days later Combat Command A of the 6th Armored Division was attached to the 63rd Division to take over the armored mission.

The 70th Division was situated south of Saarbruecken and engaged in preparatory action at the opening of the offensive. German counter attacks delayed the planned assault. At 1510 hours on 15 March five battalions of American artillery began firing a 20 minute preparation. The fire was lifted for ten minutes and another 20 minute preparation was fired. Smoke signals shifted the fire 600 yards to the north and another 20 minute preparation was fired. The 1st Battalion of the 274th Infantry, supported by two platoons of tanks and a platoon of tank destroyers, started an advance at 1610 hours towards fortifications in the area south of Saarbruecken. The terrain offered little cover and concealment. All approaches were covered by interlocking bands of fire from enemy pillboxes and bunkers. After several hundred yards were won, the advance was halted.

For the next few days there was vigorous patrolling of the southern bank of the Sarre. Division artillery and tank destroyers fired hundreds of missions and expended 5,000 rounds neutralizing enemy gun batteries. Bunkers and pillboxes were subjected to intense high-explosive armor-piercing shell fire. On 18 March word was received from XXI Corps Headquarters that Third Army had penetrated far into the rear of the Saar region and was at St. Wendel. The division was put on the alert for an enemy withdrawal.

The 70th Division was instructed that on 19 March it was to attack and establish a bridgehead over the Sarre River and to be prepared to exploit to the north or to reduce Saarbruecken. For the crossing of the Sarre River all available fire power was brought to bear on the enemy. The 433rd Anti-Aircraft Battalion had 40mm anti-aircraft guns and M51 anti-aircraft machine guns used as ground support weapons which helped to neutralize pillboxes. All visible pillboxes were engaged and buttoned up. The assault met with immediate enemy resistance. Machine guns were fired from the apertures in the pillboxes, and enemy mortars and artillery covered the approaches. However, aerial observers reported that enemy troops and civilians were withdrawing. Large motor convoys moving eastward were observed deep in the Saar region. Bridges were being demolished.

At 2230 hours on 19 March a patrol from the 276th Infantry crossed the Sarre River without opposition in the vicinity of Hostenbach on the extreme army west flank. There were extensive minefields on the opposite bank, and an anti-mine platoon was sent to clear a path. Pillboxes were found empty. At noon on 20 March the 276th Infantry began an advance upon Saarbruecken, the 2nd Battalion moving through St. Arnual, while the 1st and 3rd Battalions moved along the main Forbach-Saarbruecken highway into the city. By 1800 hours the 275th Infantry had established itself on the south bank of the Sarre River and in Saarbruecken. No opposition other than ground obstacles was encountered. The city fell without the loss of one American soldier.

East of Saarbruecken, in the meantime, the 63rd Infantry Division had on D-Day secured advantageous positions for the assault on the Siegfried Line. In the attack which began at 0100 hours on 15 March the 253rd Infantry had seized Fechingen, the 254th Infantry had taken Eschringen and Ensheim. The advance had been made against enemy artillery and mortar fire and anti-personnel mines. The division plan now was to uncover the main Siegfried defenses, to drive for Hassel, and to turn to the left to assist the 70th Division if help was needed in the capture of Saarbruecken. During the next two days, 16 and 17 March, the division maintained pressure against the Siegfried Line in its zone and withstood heavy counterattacks by tank-supported enemy infantry,

while final preparations were made by division engineer troops to blow apart enemy fortifications. By this time XXI Corps was in the process of completing its mission in the Seventh Army March offensive.



SIEGFRIED LINE NORTH OF ENSHEIM IN THE TOWN  
OF HECKENDAHLHEIM

*"... The division plan now was to uncover the main Siegfried defenses ..."*

### Liaison with the Third Army

A significant problem in the conquest of the Saar-Palatinate was that of liaison between the Seventh and Third Armies. On 14 March at 0200 hours the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions of the XII Corps, Third Army, had launched an attack southeast to cross the Moselle and enter the Moselle-Rhine-Siegfried triangle. By 17 March XII Corps tanks of the 4th Armored Division had reached and crossed the Nahe River; the XX Corps, attacking east and southeast, had approached Merzig; and near the Rhine the VIII Corps had crossed the Moselle and was advancing on Coblenz.



**GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER**  
*" . . . Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force . . . "*

On 17 March General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, arrived at Seventh Army Headquarters in Luneville. Arriving with him by plane was Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Commanding General of the Third Army. They were met at Luneville airport by General Patch and General Devers.

In substance General Eisenhower asked the following question: Did General Patch personally object to Third Army being assigned objectives in the zone of the Seventh Army and attacking perpendicularly to the Seventh Army direction of attack? General Patch replied that "we are all in the same army" and that the objective was to destroy the German army. He said that he felt sure that Seventh Army and Third Army staffs would have no difficulty in coordinating mutual moves. General Eisenhower mentioned instances in the African campaign when faulty liaison between Allied armies allowed the enemy a chance to escape and suggested that Seventh Army and Third Army establish extremely close liaison, even to the point of merging command posts if necessary. General Patch replied he could reach General Patton by phone as easily as he could reach the corps commanders. The Supreme Commander was assured that Third and Seventh Army moves would be closely coordinated.

The overall situation in the Saar-Palatinate at this time was not one to give comfort to the enemy. Sixth Army Group's Weekly Intelligence Summary issued on 17 March pointed out that the time remaining to Army Group G for its tenure in the Saar-Palatinate was rapidly diminishing as a result of deep penetrations southward from the Moselle River by Third Army units. German First Army troops facing Seventh Army made obvious the lack of defense in depth by withdrawing into the Siegfried Line with the mission of maintaining a secure left flank to preserve possible crossing sites for withdrawal over the Rhine. "There is no doubt that the enemy will eventually be forced across the Rhine if only because of his inability to reinforce present positions. General Hausser, Commander of Army Group G, can decide only how many Germans he wishes to leave in our hands west of the Rhine."


General Hausser himself, in an interview after the war, declared that he recognized the threat of the lower Moselle crossing. The river with its many bends was not adapted to defense. Since there were no rear defenses in the Hunsruck sector, a Third Army thrust via Bad Kreuznach into the Rhine Plain was a probability. Such a thrust would make the defense of the Saar-Palatinate impossible. General Hausser claimed that he had favored a withdrawal of Army Group G so as to take over the defense of the Rhine in full combat strength. But economic considerations such as the coal deposits near Saarbruecken demanded that this area be held as long as possible. Higher headquarters ordered that the sector be held, but with the reservation that encirclement of any large groups be prevented.

The Third Army G-2, in an analysis of the enemy situation, believed on 16 March that the Third Army's sweep across the enemy rear in the Palatinate triangle was creating a situation analagous to the Falaise pocket in northwest France, with the enemy facing envelopment. It was probable that with lines of communication in a turmoil as a result of Allied advances, the Germans did not have a clear picture of the danger of their own troops. The enemy was estimated to have some 36,000 combat effectives in the Palatinate triangle, equivalent to 40 percent of his fighting forces in the west. If he was to make an effective stand east of the Rhine, he would have to extricate the bulk of his army from the Palatinate.

## XXI Corps Breaches the Siegfried Line

At the 17 March meeting in Luneville, General Eisenhower had asked General Patch where and when he expected to achieve a breakthrough of the Siegfried Line. General Patch had replied that he could not state when a breakthrough would occur but that he would rather expect it in the zone of the XV Corps and perhaps to the right of the XXI Corps before the 63rd Infantry Division. It was just three days later, on 20 March, that the full penetration was achieved; and three divisions, the 63rd, the 45th, and the 3rd, each separately succeeded in breaching the Siegfried defenses.

The Siegfried Line along the Seventh Army front included a belt of dragon's teeth, which were three staggered rows of concrete pyramids about three feet high. Behind this there were usually two antitank ditches, each eight feet deep and 12 feet wide. On every



#### DRAGON'S TEETH OF SIEGFRIED LINE

*"... The Siegfried Line ... included a belt of dragon's teeth ..."*

knoll and through all paths of the woods were concrete pillboxes so situated that each one was supported by fire from one or more of the others. For every three to six pillboxes, there was a key or central pillbox, which contained a control point for the other casemates. The line itself was about 500 yards in depth, though well camouflaged pillboxes in secondary positions dotted knolls and rises for miles. Most of the fortifications were covered with earth and overgrown with vegetation. Entrances were usually in the rear as much as 150 yards from the pillbox and access was by tunnel. The line, in short, was a "mass of reinforced concrete pillboxes with interlocking fields of fire, wire entangle-

ments, entrenchments, deep antitank ditches, and heavy dragon's teeth obstacles."

Engineer troops were to play a major part in the 63rd Division assault on the Siegfried Line. One company of the 263rd Combat



#### EARTH COVERED FORTIFICATIONS

*"...Most of the fortifications were covered with earth and overgrown with vegetation..."*

Engineer Battalion was placed in direct support of each of the infantry regiments. Fifty tons of explosives were requested from Seventh Army, and engineers began a stockpiling of explosives one mile south of the initial Siegfried positions. Arrangements were made for treadway bridging material to cross antitank ditches and craters. Primacord ropes were prepared to breach a pattern for foot troops through minefields. Infantry assault teams were given pole and satchel charges of TNT to aid in the reduction of bunkers and pillboxes.

A study of aerial photographs indicated that the best location for a breach through the dragon's teeth was 50 yards east of the main



north and south road north of Ensheim. The road here was blocked by the demolition of a timber bridge over an antitank ditch immediately in the rear of the teeth. In the early morning hours of 18 March, after several attempts, the engineers succeeded in reaching the dragon's teeth just north of Ensheim. The advance to the teeth was over flat and open terrain, which the enemy was covering with fire. At 0130 hours, the gap was blown: 1,500 pounds of TNT carried to the site on packboards had been used.

At 1400 hours on 18 March a provisional task force of five tanks, four tank destroyers, a platoon of infantry, a platoon of engineers, and a tank dozer were moved to the blown gap. The engineer platoon swept a path free of mines, operating from a kneeling position because of intense mortar, artillery, and small arms fire. When the path through the field was swept, a tank dozer was used to fill a crater left by demolition charges.

In the eastern sector of the division area, north of Ommersheim, similar operations were being conducted. After repeated attempts under fire a group of engineer volunteers successfully breached a gap in the dragon's teeth at 2200 hours on 18 March. First a pillbox covering a steel gate-type roadblock in front of the teeth had to be eliminated.

Each day the division increased pressure on the Siegfried Line, methodically eliminating pillboxes. On 19 March 48 pillboxes were eliminated and on the next day complete penetration of the line was effected. The 254th Infantry reached Ober-Wurzbach north of Ommersheim and beyond the Siegfried Line, the first regiment to achieve a breakthrough. The 255th Infantry likewise made a successful penetration near Nieder-Wurzbach and along the road to Hassel. The significance of the penetration was quickly recognized. Several messages of congratulations were received by regimental and division commanders. General Milburn, Commanding XXI Corps, wrote to General Hibbs, commanding the 63rd Division: "It is my desire to commend you and the officers and enlisted men under your command on the proud accomplishment of being the first division of Seventh Army to effect a complete breakthrough of the stubborn defenses of the Siegfried Line."

To prevent infiltration and reoccupation of the pillboxes by the enemy, these fortifications had to be destroyed immediately. Most of the pillboxes were of the two-story type with a fire room above the living quarters. Engineers used 150 pounds of TNT in the fire room and 250 pounds in the living quarters, fired simultaneously to accomplish demolition. Once penetration of the line had been effected, division elements moved into Hassel and St. Ingbert without pause. A fanning out now took place to the right and left. Combat Command A of the 6th Armored Division, attached to the 63rd Division, poured through the breach and proceeded to Homburg, where it made contact with the XV Corps. A new Task Force Harris, the 3rd Battalion of the 254th Infantry reinforced, was created to seize and hold objectives in the vicinity of Neunkirchen and soon gained contact with elements of the XX Corps, Third Army.

Meanwhile on the corps left flank the 70th Division, having taken Saarbruecken, pushed north and likewise made contact with Third Army units. The 65th Division was met at Holz, the XX Corps at St. Wendel, and the 26th Division near Ottweiler.

On 21 March Task Force Harris, spearheading the advance of the 63rd Division, cleared the Neunkirchen area, taking 1,000 German prisoners and liberating 2,000 Allied prisoners and forced laborers. All organized resistance collapsed. Division elements followed behind the task force to mop up. Combat Command A of the 6th Armored Division continued its rapid advance east. By 1200 hours it had reached Rhein-Durkheim on the west bank of the Rhine. Patrols entered Worms to meet elements of the Third Army.

On 21 March XXI Corps, in compliance with Operations Instructions No. 99 issued by Seventh Army, relinquished command of the 63rd Infantry Division, which passed to the control of XV Corps and was at that time in an area generally northwest of Homburg. Combat Command A of the 6th Armored Division also passed once again to the command of XV Corps. The 70th Infantry Division reverted to army reserve. XXI Corps had fulfilled its initial mission in the Seventh Army offensive, which had made sufficient progress so that the Seventh Army command post followed up its troops on 21 March, opening at Sarre-

guemines after having operated at Luneville for almost three months of defensive warfare. On 22 March XXI Corps assumed command of the 71st and 100th Divisions in the Bitche area. These divisions, after release by XV Corps, advanced north through the Siegfried defenses and turned east toward the Rhine. Against light opposition they moved by motor to the Landau-Neustadt-Germersheim area. The new mission of XXI Corps was to cover the right flank of XV Corps in the advance to the Rhine.

## **XV Corps Breaks Through Siegfried Defenses**

Along the Blies River Valley the 45th Division was achieving its penetration of the Siegfried Line at the same time that the 63rd Division on its left pushed through to Hassel and St. Ingbert. On 18 March supporting artillery had registered on emplacements lying in front of 45th Division troops. At 1230 hours, artillery began a 30 minute concentration of fire upon the pillboxes. Two hours later, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 157th Infantry jumped off to begin the initial attack. Advance troops passed through the outer ring of dragon's teeth and, supported by a company of medium tanks, assaulted the pillboxes and bunkers. Tanks moved up to the dragon's teeth and directed fire upon the ports and apertures of the casemates. Infantry and demolition teams from the engineers then blew a path for vehicles to move through. Direct tank fire demolished one pillbox and eight fell to infantry assault teams. The Siegfried drive on the XV Corps left flank was in full progress.

On 19 March the 45th Division captured or destroyed 86 pillboxes and bunkers and took the key towns of Alschbach, Blieskastel, and Webenheim. The enemy made a few last counterattacks to cover his withdrawal. These were easily repulsed. In the rapidity of the advance, a pillbox in which a German switchboard was still in full operation was captured. Two interrogation lieutenants were sent by the S-2 of the 157th Infantry to listen in to conversation. An SS Captain was overheard issuing orders to troops to destroy all telephones in the bunkers and get ready to withdraw to Landstuhl. This was reported to air liaison. Night fighters were sent out and plastered a German convoy of vehicles extending three abreast for miles.

Original XV Corps orders had given the 45th Division the mission of breaching the Siegfried Line and capturing Homburg. Both missions were accomplished on 20 March. During the night the enemy



#### TROOPS PASSING THROUGH THE SIEGFRIED LINE

*"... Advanced troops passed through the outer ring of dragon's teeth ... supported by a company of medium tanks ..."*

had withdrawn the bulk of his troops. Early in the morning the division renewed the attack, brushed aside a delaying force, and pursued the enemy. Large columns of troops and vehicles were caught on the roads leading out of the sector. By nightfall demoralization and complete disorganization prevailed among the enemy forces. German soldiers roamed over the entire area in small groups attempting to escape. Homburg, the divisional objective, was taken by the 179th Infantry which had advanced up the Blies River against weak enemy resistance. The serious plight of enemy communications was evidenced by the panic-stricken troops who attempted to move east through the city after it was captured.

Troops of the 157th Infantry, moving east of Homburg, found new spirit in a virtually unopposed advance and in the conviction that damage now inflicted "hurt the right people." Hundreds of German prisoners filed back to the rear for processing, some riding in crowded trucks while others walked. They surrendered in groups and in many instances appeared disappointed because advancing troops paid little attention to them. Straggling Germans, still wearing their grey-green uniforms, wandered aimlessly about, watching in dazed amazement the flood of troops, supplies, and equipment sweeping past them toward the west bank of the Rhine River.

On 21 March the 45th Division continued to mop-up the enemy. Elements of the Third Army which had been attacking southeast, cutting across the deep rear of enemy communications, were met. The division took 2,055 prisoners during the day. The 179th Infantry followed the advance of Combat Command A of the 6th Armored Division and reached the high ground north of Kaiserslautern. On the next day the division continued east to the Rhine.

Farther east on the right flank of the 45th Division and on the same day, 20 March, the 3rd Division had broken through the Siegfried Line southeast of Zweibruecken. Careful engineering preparations had been made for the assault. Companies A and B of the 10th Combat Engineer Battalion had been attached respectively to the 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments. Each engineer company was organized so that two platoons would serve as demolition squads and one platoon would be prepared for gapping missions. Company C was to destroy pillboxes that were passed in the advance. A supply of bangalore torpedoes, 40 and 10 pound cone charges, TNT, and mines was accumulated for the assault. At 0545 hours on 18 March, following a 25,000 round artillery preparation, the 7th and 15th Regiments had jumped off in the attack. The 7th Infantry on the left made slow progress against enemy pillboxes and fortifications. The 15th Infantry on the right met furious resistance, as it endeavored to penetrate the dragon's teeth. By noon on 19 March the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantry had reached a point 2,000 yards southeast of Contwig. Hundreds of mines hampered the advance. Every bridge in the area had been blown.

Both the air corps and artillery pounded positions, as various branches of the service assisted the attacking infantrymen. Engineers cleared gaps. Tank destroyers supported the infantry by direct fire,



#### DESTROYED ENEMY FORTIFICATION

*"... completely destroying many small pillboxes and machine gun emplacements ..."*

completely destroying many small pillboxes and machine gun emplacements. To effect penetration of larger pillboxes tank men used 76mm ammunition, alternating high-explosive and armor-piercing at the same point on the box. Fighting continued all night on 19 March, but on the following day the breakthrough was effected. The 30th Infantry passed through the other two regiments to enter the city of Zweibruecken. Bridges over the river flowing through the town were seized intact.

Captured Germans stated that they had little confidence in the Siegfried Line after they had a closeup view of it. Although the mission of the troops manning the pillboxes was to fight from the trenches around the emplacements, the majority withdrew inside at the first opportunity.

Once inside, they developed claustrophobia. White phosphorous shells fired by American troops were effective against at least one pillbox. One of the Germans had shouted "gas" whereupon the entire crew left the pillbox and surrendered.

In the afternoon of 20 March the 6th Armored Division passed through the 3rd Division to exploit the breakthrough to the Rhine. The 30th Infantry was motorized and left Zweibruecken at 0700 hours on 22 March to follow the armored advance. As the momentum of the offensive increased, the toll of enemy materiel became tremendous. All units overran large quantities of guns, ammunition, explosives, and equipment. By midnight on 23 March the 3rd Division was assembled on the edge of the Rhine Plain south of Worms. XV Corps, with the 45th and 3rd Divisions on the west bank of the river, began to prepare for an immediate crossing of the Rhine.

## The XV Corps Completes its Drive

On the right flank of the Seventh Army front the enemy held on to Siegfried defenses as long as possible to prevent his escape route across the Rhine from being sealed. The VI Corps, with the 42nd, the 103rd, the 36th Infantry Divisions, and Groupement Monsabert on the line from west to east, and with the 14th Armored Division in support, continued the offensive which had begun on 15 March.

Along the ridge of the Hardt or Low Vosges Mountains and on the corps left flank, the 42nd Division attempted to push through the Siegfried Line from Ludwigswinkel northeast toward Dahn. Attacks on 19 and 20 March made almost no progress under intense fire from Siegfried positions and against two heavy enemy counterattacks. On 20 March plans were drawn up for a new assault on the line.

The attack began at 1900 hours on 21 March when close air support planes dive bombed and strafed fortifications in front of the 222nd Infantry. This was followed by a half hour artillery preparation. The 222nd Infantry moved out against light opposition. Pillboxes on the first line were found to be unoccupied. The 242nd Infantry, attacking farther west, advanced at 0430 hours the next morning. By 1045 hours the regiment had entered the secondary defenses of the Siegfried Line.

These were likewise found unoccupied. The attack now moved directly northeast, as the regiment reached out to take high ground north of Dahn. Dahn was cleared against light resistance by the 58th Tank Battalion, while the 232nd Infantry came up to take high ground south of the town. It was evident that the enemy had withdrawn in the sector of the 42nd Division. Teams were sent out to blow Siegfried pillboxes and to comb the area for the enemy hiding in the hills.

Clearing the eastern foothills of the Hardt Mountains in the meantime was the 103rd Division, which on 19 March had been in positions northwest of Wissembourg. Heavy fighting took place as the 411th and 409th Infantry Regiments reached out to the approaches to the Siegfried strongholds of Nieder Schlettenbach and Reisdorf. On 20 March, as leading elements began to penetrate defenses, enemy units withdrew in the night to high ground farther north. With air, artillery, and mortar support the 411th Regiment seized Nieder Schlettenbach, as the 409th Infantry continued to fire into the fortifications at Reisdorf. Late in the afternoon of 21 March, Task Force Rhine, formed from the 2nd Battalion of the 409th Infantry and units of the 761st Tank Battalion with the mission of exploiting any breakthrough and advancing in the direction of Landau-Germersheim, succeeded in forcing its way into Reisdorf.

The enemy in front of the 103rd Division began to show signs of disintegration and disorganization on 22 March. Prisoners disclosed that some units had been told to fight a delaying action until dusk and then retire to the Rhine for reorganization. Other units had been told to fight to the last man. Elements of the Third Army, meanwhile, were rapidly outflanking the last remaining Siegfried defenses, the 10th Armored Division driving south to Annweiler and threatening all enemy troops in the Landau sector. At the end of 22 March the 410th Infantry had captured Silz; and Task Force Rhine had reached Klingenuenster, where contact was established with the 10th Armored Division. Enemy escape routes to Landau and the Rhine had been cut off. American artillery and the air corps pounded enemy columns northeast of Klingenuenster, destroying hundreds of vehicles and at least 15 artillery pieces and five pieces of armor.



On 23 March, enemy defenses continued to disintegrate so rapidly that contact was gained only at widely scattered points. By nightfall mass enemy surrender brought 1,321 prisoners to the 103rd Division during the one day. The next day 2,230 prisoners were taken in mopping-up activities. The 409th and 411th Regiments assembled in strategic locations north and south of Klingenmuenster to pick up enemy troops moving to the Rhineland from mountain passes.

Farther to the right on the VI Corps front the 36th Division on 19 March had been in heavy contact with Siegfried Line defenses in the Wissembourg Gap. Attacks launched during the next two days by the



**SIEGFRIED LINE NEAR WISSEMBOURG GAP**

*"... 36th Division . . had been in heavy contact with the Siegfried Line defenses in the Wissembourg Gap . . ."*

141st Infantry on the division right flank north of Kapsweyer were unsuccessful in the face of intense enemy fire. It was evident that the Siegfried Line was heavily concentrated and in great depth in the low flat land between the Bien Wald and the Hardt Mountains.

Attacking northwest of Ober Otterbach on the division left flank, the 142nd Infantry on 20 March had pushed through the hills and had driven a wedge in the enemy lines. It forced its way on to Dorrenbach in a slugging match against pillboxes. On 21 March eight enemy strongpoints were overrun. All but two of the fortresses buttoned up and refused appeals to surrender that were called to them through open ports and air vents. Hand grenades, bazookas, and burning gasoline had little effect against the fortifications. There was no surrender until engineer and infantry teams detonated special explosive charges known as beehives on roofs, apertures, and at doorways. To add additional weight to the drive of the 142nd Regiment the 1st Battalion of the 143rd Infantry was moved up from its assembly at Wissembourg. Heavy resistance, machine gun fire from well concealed pillboxes, self-propelled fire, and pre-arranged artillery and nebelwerfer concentrations, made the advance slow. The battalion wedged its way forward, by-passing some enemy positions and destroying others which impeded its advance. On the morning of 22 March the battalion came up to the fortifications at Dorrenbach. Meanwhile, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 143rd Infantry were being brought forward from Wissembourg to aid in the final assault.

At 0900 hours on 22 March the 2nd Battalion of the 143rd Infantry entered Dorrenbach and pushed on to cut the road into Bergzabern and set up ambush stations in the woods. Preceded by a 30 minute artillery preparation firing high explosive and smoke shells against enemy strongpoints, the 3rd Battalion attacked towards Bergzabern. By dusk the entire regiment was closing in on the town. Enemy opposition was stubborn. By the close of the day the division had destroyed some 200 pillboxes.

The outer defenses of Bergzabern crumbled on 23 March, as the 143rd Infantry swept through the town and mopped up at dawn. During the same morning a provisional motorized task force was sent east of Bergzabern toward the Rhine, to trap enemy troops moving north from the French sector and to secure intact all floating equipment located in the 36th Division zone along the river. By the close of the day troops were mopping-up enemy groups in west bank towns on the Rhine. On

24 March the 2nd Battalion of the 143rd Infantry seized Leimersheim, as the 3rd Battalion secured ferry sites and fanned out to establish outposts along the river. The 36th Division took 2,500 prisoners during the day. Its mission in the VI Corps drive through the Siegfried line had been accomplished.

The 14th Armored Division, which was to exploit any breakthrough in the VI Corps area, had directed its main effort along the Wissembourg-Steinfeld-Kandel highway, while other of its units supported the drives of divisions on the VI Corps left flank. By 20 March, Combat Command A had advanced to Steinfeld where it came up against the main defenses of the Siegfried Line. A 12-foot gap was blown in the dragon's teeth, and a hold was secured on the western portion of Steinfeld. The 68th Armored Infantry Battalion probed the Siegfried Line inside the first band of dragon's teeth. Patrols in the Bien Wald, south of Steinfeld, encountered extensive engineering obstacles on the roads. On 21 March Combat Commands A and R succeeded in taking two thirds of the town and in repelling three enemy counterattacks. On the next day Steinfeld was finally taken by the 68th Armored Infantry Battalion, as the 25th Tank Battalion, attacking northeast from Steinfeld, reached the western outskirts of Schaidt.

Meanwhile other elements of the 14th Armored Division were operating on the corps left flank. The 48th Tank Battalion had been ordered to support the advance of the 42nd Infantry Division between Ludwigswinkel and Dahn. On 22 March Combat Command B had prepared to move via Wissembourg to Klingenstein to exploit a breakthrough to the Rhine in the 103rd Division sector, and on the following day it had reached Herxheim east of Klingenstein against only scattered resistance. Here it met bunker fire, but by the end of the day elements of its armor had reached out to Germersheim. Also on 23 March Combat Command A, attacking at Schaidt, seized the town and began an exploitation to the east.

On the extreme right flank of VI Corps during the period 20-24 March Groupement Monsabert had been engaged in clearing out the Bien Wald. Its drive north had been impeded by many obstacles. Its main attack against the Siegfried Line on 23 March resulted in some

advances but severe casualties. By late afternoon the enemy was disengaging. The weight of General Monsabert's tanks, attached from the 5th French Armored Division, followed the American route far on the left flank of the groupement via Steinfeld and Schaidt to Kandel. On 24 March French armor cleared Kandel and the towns of Rheinzabern and Neupfotz on the Erlen River. Late in the afternoon elements of the French armored division moved south along the Bien Wald in coordination with an attack to the north to reduce the enemy bridgehead at Maximiliansau. This was accomplished on 25 March.

By 25 March all three corps of the Seventh Army, in cooperation with the drive of the Third Army from the north, had completely overrun the triangle of the Saar-Palatinate. Not only had Germany lost an industrial region of great importance, but in a ten day campaign German troops which might have been used for defense on the east bank of the Rhine had been decimated. The Saar-Palatinate had been so quickly overrun that the German High Command had been forced to abandon both men and materiel.

## Aftermath in the Palatinate

Troops penetrating the Palatinate found conditions "chaotic" in most of the cities. In Zweibruecken, taken by the 3rd Division, the entire business district was razed and practically all other parts of the city had suffered severe damage from bombing and artillery. About 5,000 of the normal population of 37,000 remained in the city, and they were hiding in cellars and caves. There was no water and the city was burning. The streets were filled with rubble and craters. All civic officials had fled and there was no government. Thousands of released prisoners and forced workers were streaming into the city.

Homburg, captured by the 45th Division, was in an even worse condition than Zweibruecken. Dead horses and human corpses were common throughout the business district. Fires still raged in the city. Wholesale looting and pillage was being carried on, and there were several minor riots.

Bad Durkheim, overrun by units of the XXI Corps, had been a wine and liquor center; and the problem of drunkenness was added to

that of pillage and looting. Just prior to the occupation, the town had sustained a severe bombing, and it was estimated that over 400 civilian dead were buried in the town debris. The Bad Durkheim-Kaiserslautern road was littered with hundreds of dead horses.

Under supervision of the Army G-5, Military Government was set up as rapidly as the combat situation would permit. Teams operating at Army and Corps level screened burgomeisters and, if not acceptable due to Nazi affiliations, replaced them. For early control, orders were issued through available channels requiring all civilians to remain indoors, to display white flags, to turn in all weapons, and to report the presence of any soldiers. Anti-aircraft troops were brought in for security purposes and to halt looting. Captured foodstuffs were made available to feed displaced persons. Roadblocks played an important part in keeping military routes clear and in screening personnel. Civilians were organized into working parties to clear debris and dead bodies from the streets.

Now that Seventh Army had entered Germany proper, the responsibility for feeding, transporting and housing large numbers of displaced persons and recovered Allied prisoners of war posed problems which continued throughout the war. It would obviously be no simple matter to organize, properly care for, and eventually to repatriate the hordes of foreign workers brought into Germany by the Nazi State.

German civilians in general were found to be subdued and in a state of terror. It took about two days for them to regain their composure. "It was found", reports the 15th Infantry Journal, "that in towns where artillery has been fired prior to entry, the civilians are more cooperative than in towns which have been entered with no resistance." Another journal remarks that, "it is surprising to see with what willingness and eagerness German policemen strictly enforce American laws."

Throughout the Palatinate large numbers of German soldiers had changed to civilian clothes to avoid capture. To deal with this problem burgomeisters were informed that German soldiers must present themselves at the town hall at a specified time if they expected to be treated as prisoners of war. Others would be considered spies.

In Volkssturm units few fanatics were found. Except in a few cases the Volkssturm had offered negligible resistance. They had received training during only one day a week, usually Sunday, and during some afternoons and evenings. Volkssturm personnel had been poorly equipped with a miscellany of weapons. Prisoners stated that they had to sign the following order by Hitler, "Any man who is captured without being wounded or having fought to the last, will be disgraced and his family will be cut off from all government support."

Disappointment was often expressed over the Siegfried defenses. Germans had been told that the line was strong enough to hold up any attacking forces. Men who saw the line talked of its poor construction, because of political corruption at the time the line was built. Men did not expect, for example, that machine gun turrets would be vulnerable to tank fire. Some prisoners justified the line's apparent weakness by saying that it had been built in the period 1936 to 1939 and since then assault weapons had improved.

The collapse of the Germans in the Palatinate was so nearly complete that it is significant to seek its causes. For the initial victories of D-Day General Patch emphasized the following factors: Tactical surprise, attack without artillery preparation, launching the attack during the hours of darkness, and withholding information relative to D-Day and H-Hour from division and lower commanders until the last possible moment.

The role of the Third Army in crossing the Moselle and striking the Wehrmacht where its defenses were weakest has already been mentioned. On 18 March the XX Corps driving from the west had reached Birkenfeld, north of St. Wendel. The XII Corps driving from the north had exploited an armored penetration to the south and was mopping up Bad Kreuznach. The VII Corps had captured three-quarters of Coblenz at the northeastern tip of the triangle. By 21 March XX Corps had captured Kaiserslautern and Neustadt and reached the Rhine River in the vicinity of Ludwigshafen. On 22 March Landau was reached by the 10th Armored Division which made contact with the 100th and 103rd Divisions. Speyer fell on 24 March. It is thus apparent that many of the

original Seventh Army objectives were captured by Third Army, while Seventh Army was engaged in its assault on the Siegfried Line.

Excellent air support by the XII Tactical Air Command played a vital part in the sweeping victory. As the Commanding General of the 45th Division mentioned in a message to General Barcus, Commander of the XII Tactical Air Command:

It is difficult to describe the destruction which . . . fighter bombers have wrought. So intense has been the attack that scarcely a man made thing exists in our wake; it is even difficult to find buildings suitable for CP's: this is the scorched earth . . . The ground forces have come to think of the destruction of towns and the softening up of strong-points by bombing and strafing as a necessary part of any attack.

The German First and Seventh Armies had been defeated before but not quite so badly as in the debacle of the Saar-Palatinate. On 27 March prisoners alone numbered nearly 100,000 and were still coming in. No count was made of enemy losses in materiel, but it was estimated that the majority of his artillery had been left on the west side of the Rhine. Prior to the opening of the offensive, these two German armies controlled 23 divisions. In less than two weeks the enemy lost 75 to 80 percent of his infantry, and the majority of his divisions were left in staff or cadre form only.

Short of manpower, short of materiel, taken by surprise with its rear and right flank fatally exposed, the German First Army facing the American Seventh had but one brief stand to its credit. This was the short but stubborn defense of the Siegfried fortifications in the western Rhine Valley covering the escape routes across the river.

The two German armies liquidated were components of Army Group G. After the end of the war the commander of Army Group G, General Paul Hausser, was questioned by Seventh Army interrogators about his defeat. He blamed the disaster on the policy dictated to him from higher headquarters of holding and fighting to the last man. He said he appreciated the vulnerability of his position and his lack of troops in the Saar-Moselle sector, but his suggestion of shortening the line was rejected by a higher command. When the Remagen bridgehead was established, he recommended withdrawal to the Rhine. Again he was

refused. In speaking of Hitler, General Hausser expressed the highest esteem for the Führer's abilities as a strategist — except that he was usually too late in ordering withdrawals. On 4 April General Hausser relinquished command of Army Group G. He felt that his release was "caused most likely by differences of opinion concerning the conduct of the defense."





# CHAPTER XXVII

## *The Rhine Crossing*

The day after Seventh Army launched its offensive against the Siegfried Line a conference at SHAEF announced that plans were being made to drop the 13th Airborne Division just east of the Rhine and northeast of Worms prior to the crossing of the ground forces, with the mission of securing the east bank of the Rhine in the crossing area and protecting the flanks of the bridgehead. On 18 March, however, it was found that the 13th Airborne Division would not be available before 28 March. In a letter to General Haislip, Commanding the XV Corps, General Patch announced that XV Corps would definitely have available only four infantry divisions and one armored division for the bridgehead. Although the crossing site was more or less definitely fixed in the Worms area, to anticipate any contingency XXI Corps and VI Corps were directed to plan for a crossing in the Speyer-Germersheim area as an alternate thrust across the Rhine.

### **Troops Move Into Position**

On 22 March the 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions were ordered to halt the bulk of their troops west of the line Alzey-Gruenstadt-Wachenheim and reconnoiter for crossing sites. To prepare for the operation XV Corps was ordered on 23 March to relieve all Third Army units holding the west bank of the Rhine in its zone. This was accomplished by reserve regiments of the 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions prepared for imminent attack. During the few days available, boat lists were revised and vehicle crossing priority lists prepared. Storm and

assault boats were not yet available. Training was carried on by outlining the craft on the ground with engineer tape and assigning new men their proper positions in the boats in that manner. As the motor columns of the two engineer river crossing groups, each about 35 miles long, rumbled toward the Worms area, the infantry divisions inched forward toward the Rhine River, making their later moves under the cover of darkness as they approached the west bank.

The 45th Division had been assigned a zone on the left flank of XV Corps and on 23 March had given the 157th Infantry the mission of patrolling the west bank of the river in its zone. The 179th and the 180th Infantries as the assault regiments remained farther to the rear and carried on their training. Farther south the 3rd Division likewise employed the 15th Infantry for patrol activities, while the 7th and 30th Regiments prepared for the attack.

## The Problem of the Weirs

It has been mentioned that Seventh Army's actual crossing was based on a revision of plans drawn up by Seventh Army in October of 1944. These plans included not only a scheme of maneuver and troop lists applicable in their main characteristics to nearly any portion of the Rhine, but also detailed engineer studies on the physical problems involved. Not the least interesting of these was the German capability of interfering with a crossing effort by tampering with dams upstream.

The power of the Rhine is harnessed by nine dams on the Rhine itself and on its tributaries. A manipulation of the weir gates or the total destruction of the dams would release approximately 6,240 million cubic feet of water to form a powerful German weapon of desperation that would sweep bridges from the Rhine and inundate Swiss, French, and German lowlands.

The possibility of an artificial flood to hamper operations had been first mentioned on 19 September in an engineer study which stated that the opening of the Rhine River power wiers at intervals of four or five hours would cause flood waves and endanger downstream bridges.

Operation of the weir gates is undoubtedly under agreement between Germany and Switzerland, the engineer study concluded; and a diplomatic approach to Switzerland was therefore suggested by Seventh Army. Sixth Army Group recommended to SHAEF that, if enemy manipulation of the weirs could not be stopped, quick counter-measures by the Swiss could minimize the flood.

The Rhine crossing planning board had also touched on the problem when it reported:

Consideration should be given to the establishment of a flood warning system as far upstream as possible. This will entail coordination with French First Army or with agents in Switzerland. Should flood waves be created artificially the only hope of protecting the floating bridges is by breaking and securing them to the river banks. This would require considerable time . . . .

In response to the Allied request G-2 of Seventh Army on 12 October was informed by the United States Military Attache in Switzerland that “. . . chances are favorable for positive action.” Nevertheless, the problem of millions of tons of water behind German-controlled dams ready to sweep down the Rhine, wash out Seventh Army bridges, and strand assault troops on the far shore continued to cause concern. On 17 November it was suggested that power installations and dams on the Schwarzen River in the Black Forest be destroyed by bombing, unless the Swiss Government guaranteed absolute control of the weir gates to prevent their use to cause flood waves in the Rhine River. No action however, was taken. At that time G-2 and G-3 were of the opinion that the Germans would not destroy the weirs because of their need for power.

Word was received on 18 November that the matter had been more satisfactorily negotiated through diplomatic channels when Brigadier General B. R. Legge, United States Military Attache, Berne, Switzerland, informed Seventh Army that indications were the Swiss Government would take necessary action to guard the weirs in the Rhine River between Lake Constance and Basel, Switzerland. During the fall of 1944 the dam at Kembs had been bombed by specially trained Royal Air Force crews which earlier had destroyed large dams in the Ruhr. The Kembs Dam had been breached and part of Alsace flooded.

## Engineer Training for the Rhine Crossing

Because the wide, swift Rhine River presented previously unencountered engineer obstacles for both the assault phase and later bridging operations, the two previously mentioned river crossing schools for Seventh Army units at Dole and Camp De Valbonne had been established on 26 September. One battalion each, from the 40th Engineer Combat Regiment and the 540th Engineer Combat Regiment attended the nine-day course. The schools had trained engineers in the operation of assault and storm boats, the construction and operation of rafts and ferries, and the construction of ponton bridges. Results of their experiments in means of crossing personnel, vehicles, and supplies over a river approximating the conditions to be found at the Rhine River in the Seventh Army projected zone were now available.

The two types of craft to be employed to carry assault waves across the river were the storm boat, the spearhead of the assault because of its high speed, and the assault boat. Two companies of each engineer regiment were trained in storm and assault boat operation and in raft and ferry construction and operation, while a third company was trained in floating bridge construction. Storm and assault boat and ferry operators spent five days at Dole and four days in the swifter current school at Valbonne, and the bridging school was conducted entirely on the swift Rhone River.

Seventy-two two-man crews per battalion were trained in storm boat operation. Boatmen and motor operators received identical instruction, producing a total of 144 trained storm boat operators per battalion; and, in addition, 100 operators of 22-horsepower motors per battalion were trained for work with assault boats. Each motor operator and assistant received approximately 20 hours training in the water. The remaining men in the two companies studied the construction of rafts and worked as cable handlers and boatmen, and floating mine carriers.

When the schools had completed their mission, the Seventh Army had river crossing equipment and trained engineer personnel ready to force the Rhine River.

## XV Corps Makes Final Preparations

XV Corps Field Order No. 23, issued at 2400 hours on 24-25 March, ordered the attack for which no D-Day or H-Hour had at that time been assigned. The 45th Division was to force a crossing of the Rhine north of Worms while the 3rd Division was to cross south of Worms. The initial objective of the divisions was to cut the Gernsheim-Mannheim railroad line with the Jaegersburger Wald and the Lorscher Wald as the second objective. Both divisions were to attack east into the Odenwald on corps order.

Follow-up troops to cross as soon as practicable after the assault divisions were the 63rd and 44th Infantry Divisions. On the left the 63rd Division was to attack in conjunction with the 45th Division on corps order, and the 44th Division on the right was given the same mission in the zone of the 3rd Division. The 106th Cavalry Group was later attached to the 3rd Division. The proposed air drop east of the Rhine was no longer considered necessary and was cancelled on 24 March.

By this time the Seventh Army zone west of the Rhine had been cleared of enemy except for a small pocket in the southwest portion of Ludwigshafen, which was being taken care of by XXI Corps troops, and isolated resistance in the VI Corps zone. During the night of 24-25 March the assault elements of XV Corps crept toward the Rhine until they were assembled two to three miles from the river. Conditions were such that regimental, and battalion, and many company commanders had been able to reconnoiter thoroughly the crossing sites on the near shore between 23 and 25 March. Liaison planes were employed in shifts allowing commanders of all echelons to view first hand the terrain over which they were to attack, although the enemy was sensitive and retaliated with heavy flak when the craft came within range. Cautiously, the near shore was investigated on foot.

From personal observation and from maps and G-2 data commanders determined that the Rhine in the selected area was approximately 1,000 feet wide, and 17 feet deep, flowing swiftly between revetted banks. The terrain on both shores is flat and sparsely wooded near the river. Therefore all concentration of personnel and equipment

had to be accomplished during darkness. The Rhine Valley, densely populated, is crosshatched with roads which were thought capable of supporting the operation.

Paralleling the Rhine in the crossing area and some eight miles east of the river are the Odenwald Mountains, roughly 40 miles long and



#### RHINE RIVER NEAR BOBENHEIM, GERMANY

*"... approximately 1,000 feet wide, and 17 feet deep, flowing swiftly between revetted banks . . ."*

32 miles wide, rising sharply out of the Rhine Plain. An exploitation in the Worms area, although not hampered in its initial stages by the Odenwald, was threatened by its presence because the enemy possibly could make a stand there and contain the bridgehead. The Worms area had been selected not because of the advantageous terrain but because operations there and the Third Army bridgehead to the north would be mutually supporting.

No accurate diagnosis of the enemy strength opposing XV Corps on the far bank of the Rhine was possible. The utter confusion in







which the German First and Seventh Armies of Army Group G had retreated before the west bank assaults of the American Seventh and Third Armies precluded any intelligent surmise of the units to oppose the bridgehead. It was probable that the Germans themselves did not at that time know their own order of battle. Remnants of 22 divisions were believed to have escaped across the river in the XV Corps zone, but the effective strength of the divisions could not be estimated. It was believed, however, that the average strength to oppose the initial assault would not be more than 50 men per river front kilometer. Based on experiences at Strasbourg and Colmar, it was believed that the enemy had no large guns permanently emplaced east of the Rhine and that the only enemy artillery support would come from organic division and corps artillery.

To oppose the Seventh Army bridgehead the enemy would probably make a determined but unsuccessful effort to resist the crossing. His opposition was likely to prove less a hindrance than the current, the river banks, and other technical difficulties. A first hand study of the far shore was made by the battalion commander of the 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry, who with three men paddled across the Rhine in a rubber boat at about 2400 hours on 24-25 March and reconnoitered for nearly half an hour after landing in the Altrhein Canal. The patrol found no mines, no wire, and no emplacements. Although the four men saw several enemy and were positive that they, in turn, were seen, they were not fired upon and returned safely. D-Day was announced as 26 March and H-Hour at 0230 by Operations Instructions No. 111, Seventh Army, on 25 March.

## The Attack

Under a cloud-obscured moon that did little to relieve the darkness, engineers began preparation of the near shore approaches on the revetted banks of the wide, rapidly flowing Rhine River. Nervously alert, the enemy 1,000 feet across the stream heard activity in the 3rd Division zone; and engineers worked under steady mortar and artillery fire. Perhaps the enemy was especially jumpy because of two feints

made across the Rhine in the Speyer-Germersheim area earlier in the evening.

Thirty-eight minutes before H-Hour the occasional crunch of an artillery shell deepened into a roar. All guns and howitzers in the 3rd Division zone, where surprise had already been lost to the alertness of the enemy, opened up to saturate the far shore with 12,000 rounds directed on known anti-aircraft artillery emplacements and possible defensive positions. The 45th Division, north of the 3rd Division had received no undue amount of enemy fire; and its guns remained silent to maintain the secrecy of the operation in that zone.

While the artillery preparation continued, the first wave of the five that were to make the assault moved from the assembly areas to the dark river, carrying storm boats or pulling them on small carts. At H-Hour the stillness that followed half an hour of artillery was broken by the roar of nearly 100 fifty-horsepower motors. With storm boats approximately 50 yards apart to allow maneuver room, the initial wave swept across in less than 30 seconds, each of four regiments making a bridgehead along a nine-mile stretch of the Rhine River. The 7th Infantry had jumped the gun, and one of its battalions made the crossing safely four minutes before H-Hour, taking advantage of the heavy artillery fire.

On the left of the bridgehead the 45th Division crossed with the 179th Infantry on the left near Hamm and the 180th Infantry in the vicinity of Rhein Durkheim. Both assault regiments came under flak, small arms, and scattered mortar fire on the water, and met strong initial resistance on the river bank from anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, and small arms fire. The crossing of the 180th Regiment seemed to come as a surprise to the enemy, and the first wave met relatively slight resistance on the water that stiffened as the troops swarmed ashore. The initial shock wore off rapidly, however; and nearly half the assault craft in subsequent waves were sunk in this zone by mortar, flak, and artillery fire.

Once on the river bank the two assault battalions of each regiment battled fiercely for a foothold and then began to fan out. All assault elements of the 179th Infantry were over and moving inland by 0315 hours. Resistance deteriorated rapidly; small towns in the bridgehead

area offered opposition but were quickly flanked and subdued. The 3rd Battalion of the 180th Infantry met and overcame strong resistance in Biblis in front of the division objective. By 0800 hours the division had



**LOADED WITH INFANTRY FIRST WAVE STORM BOATS LEAVE WEST BANK OF RHINE RIVER**

*"... With storm boats approximately 50 yards apart to allow maneuver room, the initial wave swept across in less than 30 seconds ..."*

reached the railroad line and had begun its drive through the Jaegersburger Wald to the corps bridgehead line, the autobahn in the eastern edge of the woods. Early in the day the 179th Regiment secured contact with elements of the Third Army on the left, and the 180th Infantry made contact with northern elements of the 3rd Division after some difficulty. The 3rd Division had met stiff resistance before reaching that far inland. Overcoming blocks on the roads in the Jaegersburg Wald, the 45th Division had reached the corps bridgehead line across its entire front by 1720 hours, after the 180th Infantry had called on 24 planes to soften the strongly resisting town of Gros Hausen. At 1100 hours the

157th Infantry, in reserve, had begun to cross and had closed on the far shore by 2000 hours.

The 3rd Division crossing, on the right of the Seventh Army bridgehead, was made to the shore line against slight opposition, which increased as the troops drove inland. The 30th Infantry on the left crossed near Worms against sporadic machine gun, flak, and mortar fire; and both assault battalions were over by 0300 hours, fanning out to secure the crossing site. Troops met opposition not only from 88mm anti-aircraft guns but from machine guns emplaced in fox-holes, and resistance increased as the division moved eastward. Advancing slowly, the 2nd Battalion on the left attacked Burstadt, where fierce fire from automatic weapons, tanks, and mortars met its assault. While American units were driving inland, enemy leaders had effected a semblance of organization among troops withdrawing from the overrun defenses of the river line. The Germans counterattacked Burstadt with armor and flak wagon support at 1027 hours. With bazookas, rifle grenades, and antitank guns, the 2nd Battalion turned the attack and knocked it out. Farther south at approximately 1200 hours the enemy used the same tactics against the 3rd Battalion as it battled for Lampertheim. The town was cleared after the counterattack was repulsed. During this time the 1st Battalion, in reserve, crossed, cleared snipers from the bridge sites, and took Bobstadt on the regimental left flank by encirclement.

To the right of the 30th Regiment, the 7th Infantry had crossed north of Mannheim against slight initial resistance. By 0340 hours both assault battalions were across; and the 1st Battalion on the right drove into Sandhofen, where it fought from house-to-house the remainder of the day against strong small arms and artillery fire. The 3rd Battalion met only slight resistance as it passed on the left of the regimental line to reach the railroad line. The 2nd Battalion crossed at 1100 hours and was committed to the fight in Sandhofen.


Meanwhile, fire from machine guns and anti-aircraft weapons on the island in the Rhine, midway between the two bridgeheads of the 3rd Division, hindered the work on bridges. Here enemy weapons fired across flat ground directly into both crossing sites. At 0900 hours the 3rd Battalion of the 15th Infantry crossed the Rhine and recrossed to clear





the island by 1200 hours. By this time the remainder of the regiment had crossed the river and attacked in conjunction with the 7th Infantry toward the eastern edge of the Loracher Wald. By midnight of D-Day the 3rd Division was moving rapidly through the woods against slackening resistance toward the corps bridgehead line on the autobahn.

Opposition to the 45th Division operation had been moderately strong on the beach but had proved to be only a hard shell shielding a soft interior. The thrust inland was only lightly opposed once the shell had been pierced. Shortly after the initial penetration was made, guns firing into the crossing area were overrun; and the operation continued




**A DD TANK ENTERS THE WATERS OF THE RHINE**  
*"... All 14 DD tanks in the 45th Division zone crossed safely . . ."*

with a minimum of difficulty. In the zone of the 3rd Division, however, the situation was reversed. Resistance on the banks of the river had been slight, testifying to the efficacy of 12,000 rounds of artillery; but tough pockets developed in the bridgehead area and by-passed enemy continued



to fight after the division had taken its initial objective. Although smoke was available to both assault teams, only the 3rd Division chose to employ it. The 3rd Division crossing sites and bridges were smoked continuously for three days, beginning the morning of D-Day.

While assault elements were driving east, activity on the river went ahead under artillery fire that at times was intense. All 14 DD tanks in the 45th Division zone crossed safely, although those attached to the 179th Infantry were forced by muddy banks to cross farther south in the divisional zone. Ten of the 14 amphibious tanks assigned to the 3rd Division reached the far shore. No maneuver cable had been



**MEN OF THE 540TH ENGINEER COMBAT GROUP BEGIN CONSTRUCTION  
OF TREADWAY BRIDGE ASSEMBLY**

*"... Engineers in both assault zones began construction of floating bridges as soon as small arms fire ceased to harass the sites ..."*

constructed and the tanks crossed by "free float." Three sank as a result of enemy action in the zone of the 7th Infantry, and one was hit and destroyed on the far shore. Six tanks crossed in the zone of the 30th

Infantry, and one sank. All DD tanks were relieved on 27 March by armor which had crossed on bridges and rafts.

Engineers in both assault zones began construction of floating bridges as soon as small arms fire ceased to harass the sites. Under heavy artillery and mortar fire the 540th Engineer Combat Group supported the advance of the 3rd Division by constructing and operating two heavy ponton rafts and two infantry support rafts. By the end of the day on 26 March, the group had completed a 948 foot treadway bridge and a 1,040 foot heavy ponton bridge. The latter had been constructed in nine hours and 12 minutes. Badly needed transportation rolled across the



#### DUKW'S — GOING AND COMING

*"... Evacuation was by DUKW and ferry, as all bridges were one way ..."*

two bridges. Two heavy ponton rafts and two infantry support rafts operated by the 40th Engineer Combat Group had supported the 45th Division. At the end of 26 March a heavy ponton bridge and a floating treadway bridge were nearing completion in that zone.

The first field artillery battalion crossed the river three and

one half hours after H-Hour, and all artillery normally supporting the four assault regiments was across six hours later. During the first 24 hours of raft operation over 1,000 vehicles were ferried. Evacuation was by DUKW and ferry, as all bridges were one way. By 27 March it was believed that the enemy was making a break for the rear to establish a defensive line on the Main River. Resistance, even in the strongly defended 3rd Division zone, had become negligible except for scattered pockets. Both divisions exploited their successes by mounting troops on tanks and tank destroyers and on trucks to sweep into the Odenwald to overtake the retreating enemy before he had time to consolidate his defense. German trucks, captured the previous day, supplemented American vehicles which were being brought over the newly-built bridges.

The 45th Division continued its attack on 27 March to the northeast with three regiments abreast, one battalion of each in reserve, and moved ahead without significant hindrance. The enemy showed the effects of the mauling he had received, and the best opposition he could offer was mediocre small arms and machine gun fire in two towns. Elsewhere the division met only uncoordinated and disorganized attempts to delay its advance. The 157th Infantry on the left flank shot forward 16 miles and patrolled 11 miles farther to the Main River. The other two regiments made almost equally good progress.

On 27 March the 3rd Division also met sporadic resistance, as it expanded its bridgehead on the army right flank. During the day the enemy broke into by-passed Sandhofen, and the 7th Infantry was relieved here by the 44th Division. The forward elements of the 3rd Division, mounted on armor and trucks, advanced over multiple routes into the Odenwald, striving to catch the retreating enemy before he reached the Main River.

Because of the uncoordinated and rapidly deteriorating opposition, the bridgehead could be considered secure on 27 March, although the army bridgehead line had not been reached at all points. On 26 March 2,462 prisoners of war had been taken, and 1,369 were captured on the following day. Three American infantry divisions, one armored division, and many corps and army troops were safely across the Rhine River. The 44th Division on 27 March had secured without opposition

the army right flank, and the 12th Armored Division had crossed on the same day.

Although an army bridgehead line had been designated, it proved to be only a mark on a map, for the army did not halt its advance there. Customarily, a unit making an amphibious operation fights to reach a bridgehead line which has been selected to give the greatest protection to the crossing area. Supplies and build-up troops are then crossed until sufficient force is available to launch a break-out attack. But this procedure was not followed in the Rhine operation; the opposition did not warrant a halt in the advance.

To oppose expansion of the bridgehead the Germans had only a miscellany of stop-gap units. Burden for defense fell on elements of more than 40 anti-aircraft battalions, who first used their guns as ground support weapons and then fought as infantry when the guns were destroyed. Service and guard units were also committed to support combat divisions, which were unable to provide more than 15 percent of the combat effectives met during the first few weeks east of the river. Immediately after the bridgehead was launched, the enemy's capabilities were rapidly coming to be based on Allied logistics. It was not believed that the enemy would divert troops from the northern fronts to stop the Seventh Army thrust, because the Ruhr area was so much more valuable to the enemy than the Frankfurt-Mannheim area.

The two remaining corps of Seventh Army crossed the Rhine over bridges in the XV Corps assault zone during the last days of March. The 63rd Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division of XXI Corps were east of the Rhine by 29 March, and the 4th and 42nd Divisions crossed on the last day of the month. On 30 March VI Corps was ordered to cross the Rhine over the Worms and Mannheim bridges. The corps secured the east bank of the Rhine as far south as the Seventh Army right boundary with little enemy hindrance.

## Bridges and Troops

The long term logistical support of Seventh Army after a successful crossing of the Rhine River was the responsibility of the army engineer insofar as road and rail maintenance was concerned, and

a long term bridge building plan was necessary. When a crossing of the Rhine had first been contemplated in the fall of 1944, plans for semi-permanent bridges had been drawn and submitted. Procurement of all supplies available locally was begun. Contracts were let to civilian firms for fir piling. Seventh Army engineers also hauled logs from the forest, supervised the operation of the mills, and moved timber from the mills to the railheads. During the six week period required to produce sufficient piling the daily output of the mills was increased approximately 500 percent.

Bridge designs were adapted to utilize prefabricated, drop-center, lattice girders for stringers which were produced in French civilian machine shops according to Seventh Army engineer specifications. Since November, plans, material, equipment, and troops were available to construct semi-permanent bridges across the Rhine.

Alerted on 26 March, the 343rd and 344th Engineer Regiments moved forward to begin construction of semi-permanent bridges. The first highway span, begun on D plus 3, was completed on D plus 13, a total construction time of ten days. It was a 1,048 foot, two-way Class 70, timber pile bent, steel stringer bridge built entirely of materials procured locally. Three hundred and forty piles and 280 lattice girders went into its construction, after materials had been moved from an assembly area 85 miles to the rear. As an interim measure between light floating bridges and fixed, semi-permanent bridges, construction of a Bailey bridge on barges had been approved on 19 March. Orders had been issued by Seventh Army that commanders were to secure intact all floating equipment including barges and tugs which could be found in their respective areas. The necessary craft had been located in aerial photographs. However, by the time the river had been reached and construction of the bridge was considered feasible, it was discovered that many of the barges had been sunk or damaged. It was at that time thought more profitable to utilize the smoldering remains of a German military bridge north of Mannheim. Work was begun on D plus 2 and completed on D plus 13, placing in commission an 820 foot, Bailey bridge built on the wreckage of the enemy span. The first railroad bridge was built at Mannheim, the second completed at Karlsruhe.

During the period of the river crossing and the consolidation of its territorial gains Seventh Army was making the necessary adjustments in the composition of its corps and supporting troops. The advance had been so rapid since the breakthrough into the Saar-Palatinate that army planning had had to be flexible. On 26 March, as its troops crossed the Rhine, the Seventh Army command post closed at Sarreguemines and reopened at Kaiserslautern in Germany.

As early as 9 March it had been anticipated that the 4th Infantry Division and the 13th Armored Division would be added to Seventh Army troops for offensive operations in Germany. By 19 March the 4th Infantry Division commanded by Brigadier General Harold W. Blakely and composed of the 8th, 12th, and 22nd Infantry Regiments, had been directed to assemble and move to the VI Corps area. On 25 March VI Corps passed the 4th and 42nd Divisions to the control of XXI Corps and assumed control of the 71st and 100th Divisions together with the responsibility for the west bank of the Rhine River. Major General John B. Wogan commanding general of the 13th Armored Division had reported to Seventh Army Headquarters on 17 March. This division upon its arrival in the army area was placed in army reserve. In Operations Instructions No. 107 issued by Seventh Army on 24 March both the 70th Infantry and the 13th Armored Divisions were directed to continue army reserve missions. Two days later both



**BRIGADIER GENERAL  
HAROLD W. BLAKELY**  
*"...the 4th Infantry Division..."*



**MAJOR GENERAL JOHN  
B. WOGAN**  
*"...commanding general of the  
13th Armored Division..."*

divisions were placed in SHAEF reserve to be employed with limitations by Seventh Army.

On 23 March the 6th Armored Division had been relieved of attachment to XV Corps and Seventh Army and was returned to the Third Army. At the same time the 12th Armored Division, which had served with the XX Corps of Third Army since 16 March, was returned to Seventh Army and attached to XXI Corps. These changes in assignment were restated on the following day to the same purpose. Two days later the 12th Armored Division was transferred from XXI to XV Corps and the 63rd Infantry Division from XV to XXI Corps. On 23 March the 10th Armored Division, which had formerly served with Seventh Army at the end of January and the beginning of February, had been attached to Seventh Army from Third Army for operational purposes only. Six days later XXI Corps had directed the 10th Armored Division to pass through elements of the 3rd and 44th Divisions east of the Rhine prepared to advance on corps order south of the Neckar River.

By the time it had established its bridgehead east of the Rhine Seventh Army had under its control ten infantry divisions, three armored divisions, and two cavalry groups which had been reallocated to the three corps under its command. Two divisions, the 13th Armored and the 70th Infantry, under army command as SHAEF reserve were to be used west of the Rhine on occupational duties. By 28 March XV Corps, with the 3rd, 45th, and 44th Infantry Divisions, with the 12th Armored Division and the 106th Cavalry Group, was advancing into the Odenwald beyond bridgehead lines. The XXI Corps, with the 4th, 42nd, and 63rd Infantry Divisions, with the 10th Armored Division and the 101st Cavalry Group, had started its movement across the Rhine prepared to advance on the right flank of XV Corps. The VI Corps, with the 36th, 71st, 100th, and 103rd Infantry Divisions and the 14th Armored Division, held the west bank of the Rhine and prepared to cross the river to its position on the extreme army right flank.







# CHAPTER XXVIII

## *The April Offensive*

**I**n the four weeks which followed the establishment of the bridgehead across the Rhine, that is, from 28 March to 23 April, Seventh Army drove rapidly and deeply into southern Germany: 120 miles northeast to clear the Hohe Rhon hill mass, 120 miles east as far as Nuremberg, and 100 miles southeast to the Danube. Most of the time it was a "blitzkrieg." The three corps followed the spearheads of three armored divisions, one of which penetrated so far into the enemy lines that it had to be resupplied by air. Some 20,000 Allied prisoners of war were liberated, as well as many thousands of forced European laborers.

Although the German army rallied from the confusion which the March campaign had created and managed to put up a series of bitter defenses, by the end of the period it was a broken army; and it fled without hope across the Danube toward Austria. During these four weeks it surrendered more than 120,000 men to Seventh Army, which was more than 40 percent of the total number of prisoners taken by Seventh Army in its 34 weeks of operations in France and Germany. By 25 April Seventh Army had taken since the invasion of southern France 291,866 German prisoners, a figure which includes 49,150 taken by the First French Army when it was under Seventh Army command, 3,692 taken by the 1st Airborne Task Force, 379 taken by the 1st Special Service Force prior to 15 September, and 3,765 taken by the 2nd French Armored Division from 29 September to 5 December.

When, on 28 March, the army launched its attack out of the bridgehead, it was opposed by an enemy who showed no signs of being able to brace himself for another stand. He had probably no more than

6,000 combat effectives on the Seventh Army front and was apparently confused as to the exact location of all his units. It seemed impossible that the enemy could stop a thrust northeast from the bridgehead, for



MASS OF HUMANITY — AERIAL VIEW OF THE PW STOCKADE  
IN WORMS, GERMANY

*"... by 25 April Seventh Army had taken since the invasion of southern France 291,866  
German prisoners . . ."*

that would mean diverting troops from the Ruhr, which he evidently intended to defend. Yet failure to stop such a thrust would further endanger the Ruhr, and it might lead to a separation of northern and southern Germany.

Facing Seventh Army's advance was the abrupt and heavily wooded western face of the Odenwald hills. The enemy could expect an attack northeast around the Odenwald toward Frankfurt, the Main Valley, and the Fulda Pass; or east through the Odenwald to the Main Plains; or southeast through the 30-mile wide valley, called the Kraichgau Gate, between the Odenwald and the Black Forest. Although during

the early part of the period Seventh Army made its primary effort on the left through the Odenwald, still it believed that eventually it would find greater resistance and its primary mission to the southeast.



#### THE MAIN RIVER VALLEY

*"... The enemy could expect an attack . . toward Frankfurt and the Main Valley . . ."*

On 25 March G-2 issued a "Study of the German National Redoubt" in which he estimated that the enemy would continue a defense of the area he now held, give ground or counterattack when necessary, and, when forced, abandon northern Germany and the Ruhr to retire to the Alps for a last stand. The enemy must realize, G-2 wrote, that the Alps as a redoubt center "is the only truly defensible area left to him." Troops from the eastern, Italian, and western fronts might find a way back to this most precipitously rugged terrain of all Europe. German communication lines would aid the withdrawal; the road and rail nets of southern Germany run generally north and south and a series of autobahnen or improved speedways run south to the Alps from

Frankfurt, Heilbronn, and Nuremberg. It might be that the enemy was already preparing elaborate fortifications in the redoubt, storing materials, and coordinating plans for withdrawing some 200,000 to 300,000 loyal Nazi troops, who would fight there under the leadership of Hitler and Himmler, "to the last man."

The study went on to describe the outer defenses of that area presently held by the Germans in which the enemy would probably try to stand before withdrawing to the Alps. The outermost line ran east of the Rhine from the Swiss border up through the Black Forest, across the Kraichgau Valley, and then bent northeast through the hills of the Odenwald, the Spessart Mountains, and the Hohe Rhon. This was the German left flank. The right flank to be held against the Russian armies ran southeast from the meeting point of the Hohe Rhon hill mass and the Thuringer Wald, through the Thuringer Wald and the Franconian Alps. With the exception of the Kraichgau Valley the terrain favored the Germans.

If the left flank of this outer line should fail to hold, G-2 estimated that the enemy could fall back, pivoting on the Black Forest, to the Swabian Alps and the Franconian Heights. Between these first two lines there appeared to be little likelihood of a strong defense. Through the Kraichgau Gate Seventh Army could enter the relatively flat and open Neckar and Main Plains. Once across the Neckar and Main Rivers, it could probably advance rapidly; its chief obstacles would be lesser rivers, the Franconian Heights, and strategic cities.

On 31 March in Paris SHAEF stated that it expected Sixth Army Group to launch a strong offensive on its right toward the Redoubt Center, but only after the Ruhr pocket had been reduced and the German army in western and central Germany had been defeated. In the beginning, when the isolation of the Ruhr was still the main objective of Allied armies, Seventh Army was to make its main effort on the left, to relieve elements of Third Army south of the Main River, and to drive northeast to protect Third Army's right flank as far north as the Hohe Rhon. On 27 March Seventh Army had been warned that it might have to release one or two divisions to Twelfth Army Group, which had priority over Sixth Army Group, on SHAEF orders. From as far back





as 11 March Seventh Army had expected to make its first main effort across the Rhine to the northeast; and on 29 March it issued its Field Order No. 11, which gave this mission to XV Corps. The Seventh Army direction of advance had swung from the north into the Palatinate, to the east, and again to the northeast. Reflecting changes in high level planning as a result of the siege and capture of the Ruhr farther north, Seventh Army's changes in direction were dictated by higher headquarters and necessitated numerous crossings and recrossings of both the Main and Neckar Rivers as Seventh Army divisions advanced.

## The Drive to the Northeast

After the Rhine bridgehead had been secured, the XV Corps offensive had jumped off on 28 March. The 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions attacked northeast toward the Hohe Rhon hill mass, while the 12th Armored Division passed through the right flank of the 3rd Division to clear the Odenwald. The 44th Division attacked south along the Rhine and across the Neckar River toward Mannheim and Heidelberg. On the right of the XV Corps point of advance the 12th Armored Division pushed through roadblocks and lightly defended towns as it advanced through the Odenwald. By 30 March the division had cleared the major portion of the mountains, and on 31 March it passed to the control of XXI Corps.

The 44th Infantry Division, ordered to drive south to expand the bridgehead, advanced on Mannheim from the north and northeast. The city fell easily. The acting burgomeister from a civilian phone called the division at the command post of the attached 937th Field Artillery Battalion during the afternoon of 28 March, saying that all German troops had left and that the city would surrender. Negotiations were carried forward, and a place and time were set for a meeting. But when the assistant commander of the 44th Division arrived on time at the designated place, he was met by a mortar barrage. The burgomeister, to maintain faith with the Americans with whom he still had intentions of dealing, had called a few minutes before time for the meeting with the information that the German soldiers had not left and that they would not let him surrender. The next morning the phone rang again and the



burgomeister successfully capitulated, the German troops having withdrawn during the night. The city was occupied on 29 March. On 30 March the 44th Division was relieved by the 63rd Division of XXI




AERIAL VIEW OF MANNHEIM AFTER BOMBARDMENT

*"... advance on Mannheim from the north and northeast ..."*

Corps, which passed through it. The 44th Division then moved to the north flank of XV Corps in reserve and later reverted to Seventh Army reserve.

On the XV Corps left flank the 3rd and 45th Divisions advanced swiftly until they reached the Main River on 28-29 March. After clearing Woerth on 29 March the 30th Infantry crossed the Main and held a bridgehead, through which the 7th and 15th Infantries attacked the following day. On the left of the 3rd Division the 45th Division on 28 March reached and crossed the Main River over a railroad bridge which had been captured intact approximately a mile south of Aschaffenburg and plunged northeast into the Spessart Mountains.





Although the actual crossing had been made by the 157th Infantry against little opposition, trouble developed with the enlargement of the bridgehead on 29 March. All three regiments, advancing



#### BATTERED RAILROAD YARDS AT ASCHAFFENBURG

*"... Aschaffenburg, east of the Main River . . . resisted the attack of the 157th Regiment furiously for six days . . ."*

abreast, with the 157th, 179th and 180th from left to right, met the first genuine German stand east of the Rhine. Resistance, extremely strong on the left flank, tapered off toward the right; and the 180th Infantry was able to advance against only moderate opposition. The 179th Infantry in the center met strong small arms, mortar, and self-propelled artillery fire from dug-in positions generally east of the Main River and was forced to commit all three battalions to the advance. After a day's hard fighting this part of the enemy stand broke, and the regiment moved rapidly on.

On the division left flank the 157th Infantry fought from house-to-house in the vicinity of Aschaffenburg. Aschaffenburg, east of the


Main River between the Odenwald and the Spessart Mountains, resisted the attack of the 157th Regiment furiously for six days, while the other two regiments advanced 25 miles. The commander of the 157th Infantry had originally attempted to by-pass the city and to maneuver a portion of his forces to high ground to the northeast to form a pincers on the city; but fanatical resistance in Schweinheim, a southeastern suburb, frustrated the move temporarily. The regiment, as an alternative, battled into the city frontally. Because civilians without armbands fought as fiercely as did uniformed soldiers, the regiment was compelled to search every house as it advanced. Enemy reinforcements arrived steadily; many of them were 16 and 17 year old Nazis who refused to surrender and had to be killed in their foxholes and trenches.

Against this opposition the regiment kept punching deeper into the city and continued to fight its way to the east through Schweinheim, still intent upon reaching the commanding ground to the northeast of Aschaffenburg. On 30 March Schweinheim was cleared with bayonet and hand grenade, allowing the 1st Battalion to begin anew its drive to reach the hills. Pushing against continued, though weaker, resistance it succeeded in securing the commanding terrain on 1 April and so out-flanked the city.

Air missions in the meantime pounded the city. Supported by intense artillery preparations, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions continued their grim push deep into Aschaffenburg from the south. Heavily supplied with ammunition, the defenders on 31 March dropped between 1,300 and 1,500 mortar rounds on the attackers, in addition to artillery concentrations, shells from flak guns, and nebelwerfer fire. The enemy persistently infiltrated behind the advance, forcing the regiment to re-clear areas many times; counterattacks came daily and were repulsed with stiff fighting.

The 1st Battalion from the high ground in the northeast swung southwest into the city on 2 April and cut the enemy's last escape route. Continuing to inch forward through piles of rubble, the 2nd Battalion called upon self-propelled 155mm guns to batter buildings, and the two elements of the regiment pushed closer to each other. The battle continued intensely on 3 April until 0700 hours, when the commandant





of the city, who had hanged several German soldiers and civilians for advocating surrender, sent a message that he no longer cared to resist. He surrendered himself at 0900 hours at the 2nd Battalion command post. The final mopping up was completed by 1300 hours.

In his first determined stand east of the Rhine River the enemy had employed elements of the 256th, 36th, and 416th Infantry Divisions, several miscellaneous battle groups, and fanatical civilians under the control of the garrison commander of the town. The defense had cost the enemy innumerable lives and had made a rubble heap of Aschaffenburg.


By nightfall on 3 April, the 157th Infantry had moved by truck from the smoking, battered city, to the east in division reserve. During the battle on its left flank the rest of the corps had continued its northeast drive against occasional roadblocks and had cleared the major portion of the Spessart Mountains. The withdrawing enemy offered only token opposition, and the time was believed to be ripe for an armored thrust to speed the movement into the Hohe Rhon hill mass. The 14th Armored Division, attached to XV Corps on 1 April, had been directed to attack from the vicinity of Darmstadt on the north flank of the corps to the northeast, to cross the Main River, and to advance through the 3rd and 45th Divisions over multiple routes to seize the high ground in the vicinity of Neustadt on the Saale River and Ostheim, then to conduct a reconnaissance to the line Ilmenau-Coburg-Bamberg, prepared to move east or southeast on corps order.

Combat Commands B and R crossed the Main and moved east of Aschaffenburg to take Lohr on the corps right flank on 3 April, while Combat Command A advanced northeast on the corps left flank. Combat Command B continued its advance against slight opposition and reached the western outskirts of Gemuenden on 4 April, where the enemy put up a determined fight. The 2nd Battalion of the 7th Infantry twice recrossed the Main River without enemy interference and on 5 April attacked Gemuenden from the southeast. The two forces, infantry and armor, met in the town and cleared it. By 6 April both Combat Commands B and R had fanned out on the right flank, where they made slow advances on 7 April. Meanwhile Combat Command A continued to advance to the northeast against sporadic resistance and on 7 April



occupied one of the division objectives, Neustadt, on the Saale River, encountering only sniper fire.

The 45th and 3rd Infantry Divisions had continued to clear their mountainous zones, opposed only by occasional enemy strongpoints.




#### INFANTRY AWAITING TO ATTACK GEMUENDEN

*" . . . on 5 April attacked Gemuenden from the southeast . . . "*

They experienced considerable difficulty, however, in moving over a road net limited at best, and now choked with supply trains and maintenance vehicles of the armored division. The terrain, mountainous and cut by steep valleys, was veined with rivers and streams where bridges had been blown by the retreating enemy.

The 14th Armored Division was ordered to clear all roads by 0600 hours on 8 April to allow the 3rd and 45th Divisions to pass through the front lines. With the removal of the armored columns which had monopolized the narrow trails, the infantry divisions surged ahead to reach the central portion of the Hohe Rhon hills, cleared it by 9 April,





and mopped up by-passed enemy in rear areas. XV Corps had completed its mission. It had cleared the Hohe Rhon hill mass except for the small northeastern tip in the Third Army zone, and it had maneuvered into position to attack to the southeast in a zone assigned to it on 4 April. While waiting for Third Army on the left to push off, the divisions and the corps cavalry reconnoitered to the southeast on 10 April. XV Corps was now poised for an assault toward Nuremberg.

At the same time that XV Corps was attacking northeast through the Spessart Mountains, XXI Corps assumed command of the zone on its right. The 12th Armored Division in the Odenwald, which had passed to XXI Corps on 31 March, attacked to the east, followed by the 42nd Infantry Division on the left and the 4th Infantry Division on the right. The corps objective, as assigned by Seventh Army, was the Wuerzburg-Schweinfurt-Kitzingen area on the great bend of the Main River south of the Hohe Rhon Mountains. To reach this objective the corps moved without much difficulty through the low eastern foothills of the Odenwald. As it approached its objective, opposition stiffened and became consolidated.

The first seriously contested enemy strongpoint to be met by XXI Corps east of the Rhine was Wuerzburg, a large, densely populated, and much bombed city on the northeast bank of the Main. To take this city the 42nd Division crossed the Main River and launched a frontal assault directly into the built-up area. The initial crossing was made by surprise in two canoes the morning of 3 April by elements of the 2nd Battalion, 222nd Infantry, and was immediately followed by the entire battalion in small river craft and assault boats. The battalion hewed out a 42-block bridgehead in the city, which was further exploited by the remainder of the regiment and by the 232nd Infantry.

While the 242nd Infantry patrolled the banks of the Main River ten miles northwest of Wuerzburg, the 222nd and 232nd Infantries methodically wiped out resistance in the city. The 222nd Regiment pushed off to the south from its bridgehead and with excellent artillery support drove the strongly resisting enemy from block to block. The 232nd Infantry pushed north out of the bridgehead, supported by tank

destroyers on the west bank of the river and by artillery, then turned to the east. Civilians, city police, and firemen joined enemy soldiers in defense of the battered buildings, retreating to tunnels when overrun



#### INFANTRYMEN MOVING THROUGH RUBBLE OF WUERZBURG

*"... with excellent artillery support drove the strongly resisting enemy from block to block ..."*

and reappearing again in the rear of attacking forces, utilizing bomb shattered buildings and rubble piles as defenses.

While the attack was in progress two bridges were thrown across the Main River, and the supporting armor of the 42nd Division crossed to hasten the end of the battle. The final spasm of resistance before all defenders had been killed or captured was a 200-man counter-attack launched the morning of 5 April from the northern section of the city. It reached to within 100 yards of the northern bridge before it was snuffed out by the 232nd Infantry. There was no mass surrender. The city of Wuerzburg fell on 5 April after the last defender had been liquidated.





Originally the XXI Corps plan had been for the 42nd Division to assume the main effort in the reduction of Schweinfurt, northeast of Wuerzburg, with the assistance of one combat command of the 12th Armored Division; and on 3 April Combat Command A was ordered to attack on the Wuerzburg-Schweinfurt axis with that mission. This plan, however, was changed because of the strong opposition met by the infantry in Wuerzburg and the realization that several days must elapse before the 42nd Division would be in a position to concentrate on Schweinfurt. Accordingly Combat Command A alone was given Schweinfurt as its objective and was ordered to swing southeast of Wuerzburg, by-pass that city, and attack toward Schweinfurt.

Exceedingly strong defenses and delaying actions throughout the area between Wuerzburg and Schweinfurt, however, delayed the swing of armor to the northeast, and the day after the fall of Wuerzburg elements of the 42nd Division overtook the armored attack. With infantry now available, strategy was again changed on 7 April and Combat Command A was attached to the 42nd Division for the attack against Schweinfurt. The ball-bearing manufacturing center of Schweinfurt lies on a bend of the Main River where it begins a long sweep to the southeast before turning north again to Wuerzburg. The strategy of attack called for a bridgehead to be established across the Main below Schweinfurt, and a subsequent advance northeast along both banks of the river. The objective of the attack on the west bank was to secure the dominating ground north of Schweinfurt and the city itself, while the attack on the east bank, when it had reached a position to recross the Main River, was to cut the Bamberg-Schweinfurt highway.

The 222nd Infantry, with some difficulty, established a bridgehead across the Main River some 15 miles south of Schweinfurt on 7 April, while the other two regiments attacked northeast into stiffening resistance. To carry out the maneuver west of the river the 232nd Infantry on the left made a wide sweep into the XV Corps zone and then swung south to take the high ground overlooking Schweinfurt from the north. Meanwhile, the 242nd Infantry attacked along the west bank of the Main, then moved north in a smaller circle inside the large envelopment of the 232nd Infantry. The 222nd Regiment, after its bridge-



head had been exploited by armor, pulled back and took up the attack on the river's west bank. On 9 April Combat Command A had crossed the Main River at the point of the 222nd Infantry bridgehead to attack northeast to cut the Schweinfurt-Bamberg highway.

As the city had been an important manufacturing center and a target for air raids, it was strongly defended by anti-aircraft guns, which were now turned on the ground attackers. Each small town in the path of the 42nd Division was held as a fortress, and hills and wooded areas were stubbornly defended. Youths not more than 17 years old fanatically contested each inch of ground, as the division moved day and night to positions from which to attack the city.

The push into the city itself, however, was no more strongly contested than had been the moves of the division as it shifted into position. When high ground above the city had been taken, all three regiments on 11 April drove into Schweinfurt from the north and west. On the next day the city fell. It had been pounded day after day by flights of medium bombers and by division artillery and the artillery of two corps, with XV Corps guns and howitzers in the north complementing those of XXI Corps. Farther east, Combat Command A cut the Schweinfurt-Bamberg highway on 12 April, too late effectively to seal it off as an escape route.

The boundary of XXI Corps had been changed on 6 April to bend the attack to the southeast inside the turn made by XV Corps, in accord with the general plan of Seventh Army to attack to the southeast. The corps swung the turn after taking Schweinfurt, generally keeping abreast of the right flank of XV Corps. By 14 April it had advanced to the Aisch River, where a nebulous German line was reported to be developing.

Pulling the pivot of the turn on the XXI Corps right flank was the 4th Infantry Division, which had met stiff opposition as it moved slowly to allow the outer elements of the corps to wheel to the southeast. While the corps main effort was being directed against Wuerzburg and Schweinfurt, the 4th Division and two combat commands of the 12th Armored Division had encountered determined resistance on the corps right flank in the Koenigshofen-Ochsenfurt area. One of the columns





of Combat Command R met considerable opposition when it bridged the Main River at the bottom of its southern loop at Ochsenfurt on 1 April. Another column was prevented by a counterattack from entering the Tauber River town of Koenigshofen on the corps right rear until 2 April.

The 4th Infantry Division finally cleared Koenigshofen with two regiments on 6 April. The remaining regiment crossed the Main in the Ochsenfurt bridgehead and aided the 12th Armored Division in clearing by-passed enemy from the pocket formed by the loop of the Main River as it swings from Kitzingen to Wuerzburg. On 7 April elements of the 4th Division took Bad Mergentheim. After 7 April the corps right flank moved slowly southeast, marking time to pull the pivot for the remainder of the corps.

## The Expansion of the Bridgehead in the South

While the XV and XXI Corps attacked northeastward on the army left flank, the VI Corps attacked southeastward on the right through the Krichgau Gate. On the army right flank the First French Army crossed the Rhine near Speyer to attack southward into the Black Forest. SHAEF had ordered Sixth Army Group to make a strong secondary effort on its right for the purpose of protecting the northeast drive of XV and XXI Corps and as a preparation for the eventual blow in force to be struck to the south. Once the Ruhr had been reduced and more forces were available to Seventh Army, it was expected that a powerful blow would be struck by Sixth Army Group to cut off the German Nineteenth Army in the Black Forest and to drive rapidly south toward the Redoubt Center.

On 31 March the 100th Division of VI Corps crossed the Rhine near Mannheim. On 1 April the 10th Armored and 63rd Divisions joined the corps; and the attack jumped off along both sides of the Neckar River, the weight of the attack to the southeast. The city of Heidelberg surrendered without a fight. Spearheaded by the 10th Armored Division, which was followed on the left by the 63rd and on the right by the 100th Division, the corps made rapid progress for three days against only



isolated and small, although sometimes stubborn, delaying parties. Three combat commands led the advance.

On the corps left flank Combat Command R and reconnaissance troops drove through the hills of the lower Odenwald up the Neckar River Valley to the vicinity of Mosbach some 15 miles above Heilbronn. They then turned southeast and against resistance that grew markedly stiffer approached on 2 and 3 April the Jagst River, which flows into the Neckar from the northeast seven miles north of Heilbronn. They found all bridges blown as they reconnoitered the river from its confluence with the Neckar some 40 miles to the northeast. Part of Combat Command R blocked in the northeast while the cavalry maintained contact with the enemy on the high southern bank by observation.

The 63rd Division had followed Combat Command R. Although it too ran into increasingly stubborn delaying parties as it moved through the Neckar Valley, it cleared them up and spread its three regiments along the north bank of the Jagst. By 4 April it had secured the country north of the river as far as Bad Mergentheim and the bend of the Jagst at Dorzbach. Heilbronn was outflanked on the north, and the forces of XXI Corps battering at the Tauber River defenses were supported on their right. The 63rd Division was ready to attack across the Jagst to the southeast.

While this maneuver on the corps left flank had been progressing, in the corps center, Combat Command A of the 10th Armored Division, followed by elements of the 100th Division, had been driving straight from Heidelberg toward Heilbronn. This force also met increasing resistance on 2 and 3 April, as it once again came up to the Neckar River where it flows from south to north before turning west through the Odenwald. But by the night of 3 April it had cleared enough of the western bank before Heilbronn to plan a crossing to take the city on the following day.

On the corps right flank Combat Command B, followed by the 399th Infantry of the 100th Division, had driven south along the Rhine. As it approached Bruchsal on 2 April, it was heavily counterattacked by infantry and armor. It repelled the enemy, took 300 prisoners, and swung east to come up to the Neckar just south of Heilbronn. On the VI

Corps right flank were elements of the II French Corps. On 5 April one team of Combat Command B made a contact with forward elements of the French near Lauffen, a town on the Neckar five miles south of Heilbronn, where both forces were looking for an intact bridge.

The French had been ordered to send a corps across the Rhine in the Speyer area, to drive south between the Neckar and the Rhine, to seize Karlsruhe, Pforzheim, and Stuttgart. General de Lattre took advantage of the fact that German forces were being pulled out of defensive positions along the Rhine to meet the threat of the imminent VI Corps advance, and crossed on the morning of 31 March to take by surprise what few Germans remained in the area. The main force immediately began the southern drive, while one column drove eastward to the Neckar to protect the VI Corps right flank. Now with forces up against the Neckar and Jagst Rivers at the Heilbronn arc, it was planned that, while the French attacked southward, VI Corps would cross both rivers and drive swiftly southeast.

So far the going had been fast and comparatively easy, similar in pace to the northeast drive of XV Corps. Against delaying parties in towns, and against demolitions, roadblocks, and minefields, VI Corps had moved so fast that the infantry divisions were pressed to keep up with the armored division. All infantry divisions in Seventh Army during the month of April were forced to regard mobility of troops as their major problem. In the 63rd Division, for example, under conditions of rapid advance one battalion from each regiment in contact was motorized and sent forward to maintain the pursuit. The other battalions advanced on foot, mopping-up and consolidating by-passed areas. Motorized battalions were transported not only in organic vehicles but in trucks borrowed from division artillery. Tanks of the attached armored units also carried infantrymen at the head of motorized columns during relatively uncontested advances.

Maintenance of communications was also difficult. Often it was impracticable to lay wire. Consequently most messages were sent by radio, and to handle the increased volume of radio traffic a special priority system was developed. Frequently during the month of April, advancing columns were stopped at rivers where the bridges had been

blown, and it was necessary to ferry foot troops across in assault boats. They then established a large enough bridgehead to protect the engineers who were putting in bridges, after which armor crossed and the column continued to press forward. Many times the advance was so rapid that lead infantry as well as armored units by-passed enemy strongpoints, leaving them for later elements to mop up. During the first days of April, the Seventh Army front had had a mushroom growth east of the Rhine. On 2 April the army command post opened at Darmstadt east of the river.

## The Enemy Rallies

This rapid advance was, on the VI Corps front, brought to a sudden halt on 4 April. The enemy reformed and built up a strong crescent-shaped defense line, which ran from its anchor at Heilbronn north along the Neckar, then northeast along the Jagst to its southward bend. This the enemy managed to do in spite of the shattered condition of his units, his acute need for more troops, and the diminished power of both artillery and air force.

During the first seven days of the advance from the bridgehead, 28 March to 3 April, the enemy had failed to put up more than isolated delaying actions; and only a few of these had shown signs of strength. His armies were apparently unable to coordinate their forces to establish a line. The German Nineteenth Army in the Siegfried Line along the Rhine and in the Black Forest was threatened with being outflanked by the French and American drive. It had, it was estimated, only 10,500 combat effectives available. The German Seventh Army was falling back in confusion before the attack of the American Third Army and the XV Corps; its combat strength was estimated at only 4,000. Facing VI and XXI Corps was the German First Army with an estimated 7,500 combat effectives. Drastically weakened, each of these armies needed replacements at a time when the highest priority for reserves went to the eastern front, and when it was impossible to extricate divisions from the now practically encircled Ruhr.

The enemy was forced to improvise and make economical use of what divisional strength he had and what replacements were available

in southern Germany. The replacement and training camps were combed for men, as was every other available source: induction center detachments, barrage balloon battalions, maintenance groups, horse pack companies, air signal regiments, airport general detachments, labor battalions, and the Volkssturm. These men were thrown into already organized divisions or were placed in battle groups, which were given temporary missions, then perhaps to be disbanded. Survivors of one operation might turn up as stragglers at the next point to be defended; there they would be reorganized into a new battle group named after the officer in command. Besides remnants of divisional units and these small battle groups, ranging from company to battalion size, the German army also organized several quickly-formed name divisions: Divisions Alpen, and later, Donau and Bayern. These were simply large battle groups, given names for morale purposes, and as quickly formed and disbanded as their smaller counterparts. With such forces the enemy formed his defense line on the Jagst and Neckar Rivers.

The enemy made as economical a use of his remaining armor and artillery and air power as he did of his manpower. Small groups of tanks appeared at the most heavily defended strongpoints, after the infantry and artillery had checked the American advance. With his artillery the enemy chose to defend only certain sensitive areas. For close-in support he used light pieces, anti-aircraft guns, and nebelwerfers firing on infantry. The Panzerfaust, or German bazooka, was distributed widely and sometimes seemed as common as the machine pistol. During the period from 2 to 8 April the German air effort was "greater than anything that the Army has seen since its entry into France," according to Seventh Army intelligence. Thirty-three missions were flown by German aircraft against carefully selected targets. Possible explanation for this rejuvenation of the Luftwaffe was that the German High Command preferred to expend its planes and its available fuel rather than to have them captured or destroyed. This seemed to be the only alternative.

It had been expected that the German leaders in the last days of the war would resort to terror to keep their war-weary people in line and to harass the advancing Allied forces in the rear. In Lohr on the



Main River, an area taken over by XXI Corps, SS men hanged six of the town's most influential citizens, whom they suspected of "defeatism." There was, however, some evidence of German opposition to the terrorists. In Ansbach, southeast of Lohr, a copy of the following leaflet was found on a man who had been hanged in the square:

Citizens of Ansbach

Defense of the city spells your complete destruction. Our city is one of the few places in the Reich which is relatively not destroyed. We want to keep it for ourselves. Resistance cannot halt the Americans; it can bring our doom. Put aside the tank obstacles; hinder the defense. Let us save the city and life for ourselves and Germany.

In many towns the terrorists were able to keep the civilian population under control, but only for short periods of time. On the night of 1 April the German radio had summoned all German men, women, and children to become "Werewolves", to sabotage the Allied armies and murder its soldiers, and to wreak vengeance on defeatist Germans. But except for a few initial acts, the Werewolf threat came to nothing more than propaganda.

In spite of the weakness of its entire defensive structure, the German command during the early days of April was able to establish defensive positions that resembled a coordinated front line. Because the German leaders were especially sensitive to the threat poised against Bavaria and Upper Austria, which now constituted the larger part of the dwindling Reich, it was in the zone of the German First Army that they concentrated their efforts to reform a front. In the XXI Corps zone the formation of a line was slower and less successful than in the VI Corps zone, where the German 246th, 198th, and 553rd Divisions, elements of the 17th SS Division and the 2nd Mountain Division, and numerous miscellaneous battle groups were dug in as early as 4 April. Together they stopped the VI Corps advance for nine days. The defensive positions of these German units did not form a gapless line, but rather a series of coordinated strongpoints that ran from their anchor in the city of Heilbronn north along the Neckar River, then northeast along the high and rugged southern bank of the Jagst River. They extended more than 40





miles to the bend of the Jagst at Dorzbach and beyond to elements of the German 9th Division which were fighting the 4th Division of XXI Corps at the Tauber River.

On 4 April Sixth Army Group issued a directive which ordered that the main bridgehead forces of its armies were not to advance beyond the line Karlsruhe-Heilbronn-Kitzingen-Schweinfurt-Koenigshofen-Meiningen until such time as those orders might be changed. Beyond this line only ground reconnaissance would be pushed. The directive had this significance: the XV and XXI Corps would advance only in their support of Third Army; and VI Corps, although it would continue to press its immediate attacks, would not as yet make its anticipated assault in force to the south, for adequate forces were not as yet available.

## The VI Corps Attack at the Neckar and Jagst Rivers

VI Corps had not anticipated a long delay at the Neckar and Jagst Rivers. On 3 April it issued orders for the 10th Armored Division and the 100th Division to seize Heilbronn and continue east. One battalion of the 100th Division, the 3rd Battalion of the 398th Infantry, was temporarily attached to Combat Command A to assist it in the capture of Heilbronn.

Heilbronn lies on the eastern bank of the Neckar, doubly protected by a high ridge of hills on its eastern outskirts and by the river, on which all bridges had been blown. Before daylight on 4 April the 3rd Battalion of the 398th Regiment crossed the river in assault boats, two miles north of Heilbronn, with orders to seize the factory district, which forms the northern half of the city, and the hills in the east. When the bridgehead was large enough, a treadway bridge was to be built over the river for the supporting armor. At first the battalion attack went smoothly, apparently taking the enemy by surprise. But at 0900 hours, when at least a battalion of enemy infantry suddenly counterattacked the 3rd Battalion from the north, the east, and the south, it became sharply clear that the enemy meant to make a strong defense of Heilbronn. The 3rd Battalion was thrown back with heavy losses, and only with great effort managed to attack again to establish a

line 1,000 yards from the river. Two platoons were cut off and captured in the German counterattack, one in the factory district and one on the hill to the east. The hills remained firmly in German hands.



#### RESULTS OF AERIAL ATTACK ON HEILBRONN

*" . . . Heilbronn lies on the eastern bank of the Neckar . . . "*

Now that the strength of the enemy forces was revealed, VI Corps changed its plans. The 100th Division, as a unit, was to take Heilbronn, while the weight of the 10th Armored Division was to swing northeast, pass in the rear of the 63rd Division's Jagst River lines, and then drive southeast 25 miles between the Jagst and Tauber Rivers to Crailsheim. Once Crailsheim had fallen, the 10th Armored Division was to cut back west to deliver a supporting attack at the rear of Heilbronn and to pocket the enemy forces resisting the 63rd Division. Thus VI Corps became engaged in a three-part operation: one infantry division attacking Heilbronn, another hammering at the Jagst line, while the 10th Armored Division made a wide and daring hook to support them both.

From 4 to 8 April the attack against Heilbronn made slow and bitter progress. Every morning before dawn the Germans counter-attacked the slowly expanding bridgehead of the 100th Division. The



#### HEILBRONN - AN IMPORTANT RAIL COMMUNICATIONS TOWN

*" . . . Two platoons were cut off and captured . . one in the factory district and one on the hill to the east . . . "*

2nd Battalion of the 397th Infantry crossed the Neckar in assault boats on the afternoon of 4 April to attack south into the factory district on the right flank of the 3rd Battalion, 398th Regiment. Its first attack that night was driven back with heavy losses. The following morning division mortar fire drove 37 fourteen to seventeen year old Hitler Jugend soldiers out of the northern edge of the factory district to surrender. They came running and screaming, fired at by their officers, broken in nerve. Throughout the nine days of the bitter house-to-house fighting in Heilbronn, the 100th Division encountered many of the Hitler Jugend, who had been in training in the city and had been organized into battle groups. For a time they fought savagely, then broke under the strain.

On the afternoon of 5 April, the 3rd Battalion of the 397th Infantry also crossed the river. After a heavy artillery preparation the two battalions of the 397th Infantry attacked the factory district. During the next three days, while the 3rd Battalion of the 398th Regiment held in the north, these two battalions advanced 1,500 yards to the south, crossing railroad yards and open fields to secure buildings which out-flanked enemy strongpoints and then assaulting these strongpoints. After each assault the enemy managed to reform battle groups for renewed defense. The four American companies leading the attack had no heavy direct fire support and no armor, because enemy artillery directed from the hills had prevented the construction of a bridge over the Neckar and had destroyed one completed ferry. Two DD tanks floundered on the river banks as they tried to cross.

On 3 April, it was decided that the current attack would not reduce Heilbronn quickly enough, and a plan was devised to establish a second bridgehead in the southern part of the city, to expand both bridgeheads, and to join them in a pincers. The 1st Battalion of the 397th Infantry crossed the river two miles to the south in assault boats on the night of 5 April and on the following day began to attack north into the heart of the city and east toward the residential section. The enemy defended from cellars of bombed-out houses and piles of rubble. He launched small counterattacks with four heavy tanks, which retreated after each sally. Air-directed artillery knocked out two of them on 6 April. The bridgehead expanded gradually to the east. Company A was harassed by counterattacks and unable to move ahead in its attempt to join the northern bridgehead. Assault troops still had no armored support. On the afternoon of 7 April, German artillery scored a direct hit on the treadway bridge which the 31st Engineer Battalion had almost put over to the southern bridgehead. Enemy replacements came in as fast as prisoners were taken. Against an enemy force which never during the nine days of the battle dropped below about 1,000 men the 100th Division continued the fight with two isolated, slowly expanding bridgeheads.

The supporting operation of the 10th Armored Division made initially much better progress. The area between Bad Mergentheim

and the Jagst River had been cleared by the 254th Infantry of the 63rd Division and the 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. Two days after leaving the 100th Division near Heilbronn, Combat Command A had passed through this area and had driven, against surprisingly little opposition, 30 miles southeast to Crailsheim, which it entered on 7 April against only scattered and disorganized small arms fire. Combat Command R blocked the shoulder of the thrust in the Mergentheim area, while one task force of Combat Command A held Crailsheim and two others attacked to the west in an attempt to carry out the division mission. On 7 and 8 April these two task forces advanced west of the Jagst River approximately 12 miles to Ilshofen and Kirchberd.

An enemy counterattack, again indicating concern over the threat to southern Germany, struck at the main supply route which ran down from Bad Mergentheim, some 30 miles to Crailsheim, and at Crailsheim itself. The main supply route was a secondary road which ran through the heavily wooded hills of the Franconian Heights. During the night of 6-7 April, strong German patrols infiltrated through the woods on both sides of the road which they cut temporarily at several points. It was necessary the next morning for the commander of Combat Command A to fly to Crailsheim to rejoin his organization. As Combat Command R moved south to Crailsheim, it was attacked at several points by patrols in the woods, firing panzerfaust and machine guns; and it was bombed and strafed by several German planes. On 8 April the corridor was definitely closed when the enemy succeeded in blocking it at two points. German planes and artillery continued to harass the road, and it was impossible to get either support or supplies through to Combat Command A.

On 8 April Combat Command B rejoined the 10th Armored Division from corps reserve. Together with the 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron it attempted to reopen the road. Clearing minefields and roadblocks and flushing the woods, it managed to get through to Crailsheim with supplies on the morning of 9 April. The enemy continued to infiltrate, to lay mines, and to harass clearing patrols. The 44th Division, which on 7 April had been transferred from XV Corps reserve to Seventh Army reserve was directed to send the 324th Regimental



Combat Team to be attached to the 10th Armored Division. After coming into the line the 324th Infantry drove along the main supply route into Crailsheim, clearing the towns and the woods on either side. It engaged in heavy fighting against determined isolated groups of enemy.

By the night of 9 April the road was open but still threatened by ambush and it was necessary to resupply Combat Command A in Crailsheim by air. Sixty C-47's of the 441st Group, 50th Wing, 9th Troop Carrier Command, protected by fighters of the XII Tactical Air Command, landed on the captured airfield at Crailsheim between 1700 and 1900 hours that night delivering supplies and removing a large number of wounded. During the operation enemy planes dove in under the fighter cover to bomb and strafe the field. On the morning of 10 April another resupply mission was flown, and on that day the main supply route was effectively secured.


The enemy had during this time been attacking the town of Crailsheim as well as the main supply route. Early in the morning of 8 April some 400 to 700 SS troops had penetrated the town from three directions. German artillery and aircraft harassed it on the following day. On 10 April some 600 enemy infantry again drove deeply into the heart of the town.

All these efforts of the enemy to squeeze off the Crailsheim salient were overcome, but at a heavy cost in casualties and time. On 8 April the 10th Armored Division had begun to change its plan. The division ordered the two task forces of Combat Command A which had been attacking west from Crailsheim to change their course and, instead of driving west toward the 100th Division at Heilbronn, to move northwest toward the 63rd Division. On 10 April contact with the 63rd Division was established by advance armor. It was then thought that the Crailsheim salient was not worth the effort to hold. The 10th Armored Division was ordered to withdraw to an assembly area behind the lines of the 63rd Division, preparatory to an attack southwest through those lines. The withdrawal was carried out effectively.

The successful evacuation of Crailsheim probably would not have been possible without the air re-supply operation carried out by

the 441st Group, 50th Wing, 9th Troop Carrier Command. The superb fighter screen maintained by the XII Tactical Air Command was also a decisive factor. For its handling of this mission, the Troop Carrier Group was later awarded a Presidential Unit Citation.

By this time the 63rd Division attack had crossed the Jagst River and had driven some three or four miles south along its 27-mile front. The infantry division was ready with the help of armor to cross the Kocher River which ran south of and parallel to the Jagst. The pressure which the 63rd Division had been exerting on the northern flank of the enemy line had proved effective, but the advance had been



#### CROSSING THE KOCHER RIVER IN ASSAULT BOATS

*" . . . The infantry division was ready with the help of armor to cross the Kocher River which ran south of and parallel to the Jagst . . . "*

slow. The wooded hills between the Jagst and Kocher Rivers had been bitterly defended in the western zone by troops of the 17th SS Division.

On 4 April it had been discovered that the troops of this German division had moved north to defend the Jagst line, and on 5

April VI Corps had ordered an attack to the south instead of the advance east. The 63rd Division regrouped its forces for a coordinated attack. The 254th Infantry took the left of the line facing south, the 255th the center, and the 253rd the right; the 100th Division sent the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 398th Infantry to support the attack of the 63rd Division on its right.

The attack of the 254th Infantry on the left jumped off on 6 April from the region adjacent to the shoulder of the Crailsheim salient and reached the northern bank of the Jagst with little difficulty. From 7 to 10 April it drove across the Jagst River on both sides of Dorzbach and advanced six miles south to the Kocher River. The regiment started across the Kocher on 11 April, its progress impeded only by the delaying actions of weakened Volks Grenadier battle groups.

To the west, however, the advance against SS troops, who resisted fiercely, had been slower and more difficult. The westernmost flank of the Jagst River line had been taken over by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 398th Infantry, whose mission was to attack to join the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment north of Heilbronn. These troops crossed the Jagst in assault boats on 5 and 6 April and advanced southwest. The 2nd Battalion fought bitterly for four days from 6 to 9 April to take Jagstfeld, the town at the junction of the Neckar and the Jagst and the keystone of the Neckar-Jagst defenses. One factory had to be shelled for an hour before it could be taken; upon entering it, troops found the scorched bodies of 58 SS troopers.

On the left flank of the 2nd Battalion, the 1st Battalion fought for five days, from 7 to 11 April, to break the German stand on the hills between the Jagst and Kocher Rivers. The XII Tactical Air Command bombed enemy positions but failed to reduce them. Tanks coming up to support the infantry were driven back by enemy artillery. The 1st Battalion never took these hill positions, for it was moved to another area on 11 April. On 11 April the Germans also withdrew. On the same day the 2nd Battalion of the 398th Infantry crossed the Kocher River; and on the following day it met the 3rd Battalion in the town of Neckarsulm on the Neckar, midway between Jagstfeld and Heilbronn. The SS troops in the Neckar-Jagst corner had fled.

The routing of the rest of the SS troops in the center positions of the Jagst line required an enveloping maneuver by elements of both the 253rd and 255th Infantry Regiments. The 253rd Regiment, on the flank of the 398th Infantry, sent two of its battalions across the Jagst on 4 April. After crossing, they turned east and attempted to enter the Hardihauser Wald, a large forest seven miles long and four miles wide which rises in the center to form a broken plateau. The forest lies under a sharp northern loop of the Jagst River below the town of Moeckmuehl. The 3rd Battalion fought for two days to drive the enemy out of Moeckmuehl and then joined the other battalions below the river in their fiercely resisted penetration of the forest. The regiment made very slow progress.

Farther east the 255th Infantry had been attacking strongly held towns and hills on the northern bank of the Jagst. On 7 April the regiment crossed the Jagst seven miles east of Moeckmuehl and expanded its bridgeheads to flank the Hardihauser Wald on the east. On 9 April the 3rd Battalion attacked southwest into the forest, while the 253rd Infantry with three battalions abreast moved into the western half of the forest. From the squeeze of this coordinated pincers the enemy fled southward, and forces of the two regiments meeting in the center of the forest turned their attack south toward the Kocher River.

The reduction of the Hardihauser Wald, together with the attacks of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 398th Infantry to the west, forced the 17th SS Division troops to retreat south of the Kocher River. In the evening of 9 April the 255th Infantry established a bridgehead over the Kocher at Weissbach seven miles east of the Hardihauser Wald. On 11 April, when Combat Command A of the 10th Armored Division passed through the bridgehead to attack southwest toward Heilbronn, the final phase in the reduction of the German Neckar-Jagst line began.

Two task forces of Combat Command A attacked south, seven miles, to the towns of Neuenstein and Ochringen, which fell only after heavy shelling and repeated armored attacks. SS troops infiltrated back into the towns after initial attacks had cleared them, and in Neuenstein they came back in civilian clothes. By the night of 13 April both towns were finally clear. The 63rd Division followed the armor which now

attacked southeast and southwest and mopped up what little enemy resistance remained. On 14 April elements of the 10th Armored Division driving southwest finally made contact with the 100th Division, as had been planned ten days previously.

Another reason for the disintegration of the German Neckar-Jagst line was the dislodging of its anchor at Heilbronn by the 100th Division. After 8 April the battle for the city went forward more rapidly, even though resistance continued strong up to the fall of the city on 12 April. On the morning of 8 April armored support reached the infantry on the southern bridgehead, over a treadway bridge which



TREADWAY BRIDGE OVER THE NECKAR RIVER AT HEILBRONN

*" . . . It too was sunk at noon by enemy artillery . . . "*

the 31st Engineer Battalion kept in operation throughout the morning. It too was sunk at noon by enemy artillery. The armor that got across enabled Company A of the 397th Infantry to clear a large part of the city's factory district. During the night of 10 April it joined the 2nd





and 3rd Battalions, which had been trying to cross the railroad tracks that separate the factory district from the city itself. Once the two bridgeheads had been joined, the enemy began his withdrawal from Heilbronn. After seven days of trying to break fanatically-held strong-points 100th Division infantrymen found themselves resisted only by rearguards.

The division forces in the city, now augmented in the south by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 399th Infantry, regrouped and drove the enemy out of towns north and south of Heilbronn and out of the hills to the east, which had served the Germans as an amphitheater for artillery observation. On 13 April the 3rd Battalion of the 398th Infantry joined the other two battalions of the regiment in Neckarsulm; and on the following day, as the regiment drove east, it met advance elements of the 10th Armored Division. During the battle for Heilbronn the 100th Division had taken over 1,500 prisoners, had suffered relatively light casualties, and had reduced the anchor of the strongest line which the enemy was able to make during the last month of the war.

On 13 April VI Corps was ordered by Seventh Army to attack south into the Lowenstein Hills. It was to maintain contact with the First French Army on the right which was advancing south between the Rhine and the Neckar, and to be prepared to assist the French in the capture of Stuttgart. The 10th Armored Division went into temporary reserve, to regroup and repair equipment. The 63rd Division on the corps left flank and the 100th Division on the right advanced to the south. The VI Corps advance met no such coordinated line of defense as it had at Heilbronn and along the Jagst River, but it was slowed down by mine-fields, roadblocks, steep ascents along narrow roads, and by stubborn delaying parties in towns.

## Nuremberg

In the period 13 to 20 April the First German Army managed to maintain coordination among the fragmentary units and battle groups which stretched along a line from the Lowenstein Hills to Nuremberg. Piece-meal and fluid as this line was, it was nevertheless the only "front line" remaining on the western front; and it was defended by an



estimated 15,000 infantry combat effectives, 20 artillery battalions, and 100 tanks or self-propelled guns. On 14 April there was no firm evidence of a thoroughly planned defense in the Redoubt Center, but it was estimated that the Germans were withdrawing slowly to concentrate all their resources in southeastern Germany. It was up to the Seventh Army to pierce the German line and to beat the German Army before it reached the Austrian Alps. By 23 April Seventh Army had struck three crucial blows, which cut the line to shreds and drove what remained of the German army in broken rout to the south. The first blow to fall was the attack on Nuremberg, which the Germans had decided to defend "to the last man", perhaps as much for political as for tactical reasons. It stood as the eastern anchor of the line opposing Seventh Army; it was a communications center through which North-South railways, autobahnen and principal highways pass, especially those from Berlin to Munich; and it was also the shrine of the Nazi Party.

After XV Corps had reached its objective in the Hohe Rhon hill mass, it began to prepare for a drive that would take it to Nuremberg. On 9-10 April it shifted Combat Command A to the corps left flank, leaving Combat Command B on the right to maintain contact with XXI Corps. The 106th Cavalry Group was free to reconnoiter southeast toward Bamberg and toward Coburg. Waiting for orders to continue its attack to the southeast, the XV Corps maintained its positions on the Hohe Rhon Mountains and patrolled vigorously in the direction of its anticipated thrust.

Already reaching far forward with strong patrols, the XV Corps moved out at 1500 hours on 11 April, when it was ordered to advance in conjunction with the right flank of Third Army. The 45th Division on the left and the 3rd Division on the right followed the cavalry. The corps swept rapidly to the south using floodlights to continue the advance at night.

Flights of fighter bombers and tactical reconnaissance aircraft spread searching fingers in front of the advance. P-51's operating in pairs reported by radio to the corps controller who gave them a reconnaissance mission and laid out a route for them to follow. Moving low to the ground, the pilots reported their observations by radio directly to the

corps controller, who relayed information on roads, bridges, streams, river banks, enemy troop locations, and friendly front lines. P-51 pilots also directed artillery fire, guided flights of fighter-bombers to profitable targets, and, on request, photographed emplacements, troop concentrations, or terrain. The negatives were flown back to the base, processed, and dropped at the corps command post. Reconnaissance aircraft were dispatched to a division controller when their corps mission was completed.

To feel out the advance on the ground, the 106th Cavalry Group on 12 April was ordered to reconnoiter to the Nuremberg-



#### GERMAN PRISONERS LEAVE ISLAND IN BAMBERG BY FOOT BRIDGE

*" . . . Bamberg, lying in the broad valley at the junction of the Regnitz and Main Rivers, was nearly on the boundary between the two divisions . . . "*

Bayreuth autobahn. The 3rd and 45th Divisions, at the same time, were ordered to take Bamberg and the high ground on either flank. Bamberg, lying in the broad valley at the junction of the Regnitz and Main Rivers,

was nearly on the boundary between the two divisions; and a combined attack presented no special problems. The 180th Infantry of the 45th Division on the left drove into Bamberg on 13 April from the north, while on the right the 3rd Division dispatched the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantry to clear that portion of the city southwest of the Regnitz River. During the day the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 180th Infantry attacked abreast and met moderate small arms and self-propelled fire as they cleared the northeast part of the city. The same type of resistance met 3rd Division troops, and by the end of the day the city had been taken except for an island in the center. It was cleared the next day by the 3rd Battalion of the 180th Regiment which crossed on a foot-bridge to dislodge snipers.

While Bamberg was under assault other elements of both divisions pushed 15 miles southeast, and Combat Command B rejoined the 14th Armored Division on the corps left flank. After Bamberg had fallen, XV Corps was to continue south to cut the autobahn between Bayreuth and Nuremberg and to capture Nuremberg. The 14th Armored Division cut the autobahn, while the 45th and 3rd Divisions advanced on a broad front toward Nuremberg.

Nuremberg lies in a broad valley veined with natural and artificial waterways and at the center of a spiderweb of roads and railroads. From Nuremberg north the Regnitz River and Ludwig's Canal flow parallel to each other. Ludwig's Canal extends through Nuremberg to the southeast. The Rednitz River flowing from the south and the Pegnitz River from the east join west of Nuremberg and north of the suburb of Fuerth to form the Regnitz River. A little more than one-third of Nuremberg lies north of the curve formed by the Pegnitz River, which provided an excellent tactical boundary to aid in apportionment of the conquest of the city.

The plan for the the taking of Nuremberg was an envelopment. The 3rd Division on the right was ordered to continue southeast to cross the Regnitz River and Ludwig's Canal, then to strike south and clear that portion of Nuremberg north of the Pegnitz River. Meanwhile, the 45th Division advancing farther to the left was directed to continue to the southeast, cross the Rednitz River, and attack the city from the south





and southeast. Seventh Army stated that elements of XXI Corps on the right of XV Corps were to assist in the capture of Nuremberg. To shield operations in the city, which would engage the full attention of both assaulting divisions, the 14th Armored Division was ordered to maintain its position on the corps left and swing south of Nuremberg to screen the city at a distance of about 15 miles. The 106th Cavalry Group was directed to perform a similar mission to the south and southwest. The XXI Corps advance on the right would provide additional protection on the same flank.

On 15 April the 3rd Division crossed the Regnitz River and Ludwig's Canal some 15 miles north of Nuremberg in position to attack due south into the city. The 30th Infantry on the division right made the crossing after it had advanced southeast during the day against scattered resistance in the small towns that dot the rolling terrain. The crossing was made without opposition by the 3rd Battalion, and immediately the 7th Infantry followed in division reserve. All combat elements of the division were over on the following day, and the troops drove to within five miles of Nuremberg.

On the corps left flank the 45th Division struck south of the Pegnitz River over a bridge captured intact by the 157th Infantry. Opposition on the river line was negligible, but several defended road-blocks were encountered as the troops continued to expand the bridge-head. By 16 April the attacking divisions had formed a two-pronged pincers on Nuremberg, one point having already penetrated the northern outskirts and the other in the southeastern suburbs. The 14th Armored Division and the 106th Cavalry Group encountered but little opposition as they moved to form a protecting screen to the east, south, and southwest.

Nuremberg resisted furiously. Fighting continued day and night, during the nights under artificial moonlight furnished by American anti-aircraft searchlight battalions. The city was surrounded by enemy anti-aircraft positions, armed with 88mm flak guns, which were used against the assaulting infantry with grim effect. As the troops of both divisions broadened their fronts on 17 April and pulled the noose tighter on the city, resistance increased in intensity.

The 3rd Division attacked south with the 15th Infantry on the left and the 7th Infantry on the right, elements of which reached into the outskirts of Nuremberg on 17 April. Both regiments overran



#### RESULTS OF ALLIED AIR ATTACK ON NUREMBERG

*" . . . Nuremberg resisted furiously . . . "*

many anti-aircraft artillery emplacements, but flak guns scattered through the city and manned by determined defenders caused many casualties. Increasingly strong 88mm flak fire met the 45th Division as elements of all three regiments attacked from the south and southeast. Five battalions pushed into the defenses of the city.

XV Corps medium and heavy artillery supplemented the weapons of the divisions by firing into the progressively smaller target area; and air missions throughout daylight hours bombed, strafed, and rocketted the defenders. By midnight of 17 April the attackers had cleared nearly two-thirds of Nuremberg in house-to-house battles, although anti-aircraft artillery batteries, sited in parks and squares farther within the city, continued to blast the infantrymen and tankers.

The 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry joined the assault on 18 April. It attacked on the left and advanced the next day to seize the north gate to the medieval walled city in the heart of Nuremberg. This it held as a bridgehead while the 2nd Battalion pushed through and continued the punishing battle to the south. Meanwhile the remainder of the division had crept slowly through smashed and burning buildings toward the Pegnitz River. The enemy resisted from fox-holes in parks, from flak artillery emplacements, and from basements. Unless buildings were cleared room-by-room, there was always the threat of enemy to the rear. The 7th Infantry, on the right of the division assault, reached the inner city on 19 April. The 15th Infantry, after a bloody fight in the division center during which its armor was attacked by civilians as well as by uniformed enemy, moved late in the day to push through the gate captured by the 30th Regiment.

Resistance to the 45th Division assault in the south was at a fever pitch as the division drove deeper into the city; and fanatical small arms, rifle grenade, bazooka, and panzerfaust fire met attackers who cleared five square miles of the city and reached the medieval walls in the heart of Nuremberg on 19 April. The 180th Infantry assaulted the walls and forced an entrance to continue its attack within the ancient bastion. The 179th Regiment, having been pulled out, blocked to the rear and cleared by-passed areas.

West of Nuremberg lies the suburb of Fuerth, which was in the XXI Corps zone until 19 April, when the 42nd Division, already in position to attack the town, was attached to XV Corps. The whole Nuremberg area came under one command. The 42nd Division on 18 April had been ordered by XV Corps to take Fuerth and early the next day jumped off across the Rednitz River and met moderate resistance as it cleared the town.

Hitler's 56th birthday was on 20 April, and the Gauleiter of Nuremberg had sent a "battle vow" to his Fuehrer:

My Fuehrer: The final struggle for the town of the Party rallies has begun. The soldiers are fighting bravely, and the population is proud and strong. I shall remain in this most German of all towns to fight and to die. In these hours my heart beats more than ever in Love



and Faith for the wonderful German Reich and its people. The National Socialist idea shall win and conquer all diabolic schemes. Greetings from the National Socialists of the Gau Franconia who are faithful to Germany.

KARL HOLZ

The Fuehrer had replied:

. . . I wish to thank you for your exemplary conduct. You are thereby bolstering the spirit not only of the people in your own Gau, to whom you are such a familiar figure, but also of millions of Germans. Now starts that fervent struggle which recalls our original struggle for power. However great the enemy's superiority may be at the present moment, it will still crumble in the end — just as it has done before. I wish to show my appreciation and my sincere gratitude for your heroic actions by awarding you the Golden Cross of the German Order.

ADOLPH HITLER

But on 20 April Nuremberg fell.

As the size of the enemy-held area of Nuremberg decreased, the intense concentrations of anti-aircraft artillery fire slackened because most of the guns had been overrun. The 7th Infantry forced the walls of the inner city in its zone by 1100 hours and attacked south against decreasing opposition. The enemy began to capitulate in large numbers to the 15th Infantry. The 30th Infantry with two battalions abreast drove south and cleared the area north of the Pegnitz by 1400 hours. Stronger opposition met the 45th Division, as it drove up from the south; but by 1600 hours the two assault regiments had eliminated all but 200 defenders in an underground passage, who were finally routed out by 2250 hours. The Gauleiter was found dead in a cellar after the battle. There had been no fight to the last man, for during the five days of the battle more than 17,000 of the defenders had surrendered. On 21 April, the day after Hitler's birthday, XV Corps commemorated its capture of Nuremberg with a ceremony in Adolph Hitler Platz. Representative units of XV Corps, including infantry, artillery, engineers, tanks, and tank destroyers, paraded before General Patch and General Haislip. Fighter-bomber aircraft joined the review by covering the formation from the air.

While the celebration was in progress, XV Corps was re-grouping for further attack. Seventh Army Field Order No. 12, which was

issued on 17 April, had confirmed arrangements that had been in progress to shift the direction of the army attack from southeast to south and had announced that Third Army would relieve XV Corps east of the line Wuerzburg-Ansbach. The consequent regrouping was carried out with little delay to XV Corps advance. Third Army moved in behind the corps; the 3rd Division stayed behind to garrison Nuremberg; the XV Corps advanced south toward Munich. There was only one complication. The 14th Armored Division was engaged on the left, but by mutual agreement it was reassigned on 23 April to Third Army in zone. In its place the 20th Armored Division, commanded by Major General Orlando Ward, was assigned to Seventh Army and sent to the XV Corps. The 20th Armored Division, in the lead, was followed on the left by the 45th Division and on the right by the 42nd Division. It met only scattered opposition in towns and at roadblocks, as the enemy retreated in confusion. The battle of Nuremberg had broken the right of his line.



MAJOR GENERAL ORLANDO  
WARD

*"... commanding the 20th  
Armored Division ..."*

## The Stuttgart Operation

While the battle for Nuremberg was still being waged, another blow was delivered on the enemy left flank. The German 17th SS Division and 2nd Mountain Division had been pulled out of the line and rushed to the Nuremberg front. The 2nd Mountain Division fought near Ansbach southwest of Nuremberg, but the 17th SS troops after racing to Nuremberg got there too late to fight inside the city. Although it fought against the flank of the XV Corps enveloping forces, it could not effectively delay Nuremberg's fall.

Lack of adequate forces and orders to make its main effort on the left in support of Third Army had kept Seventh Army from launching in force its anticipated offensive to the south. Its advance

during March and early April had been so extended as to necessitate leaving three divisions behind to occupy captured territory: the 44th, the 103rd, and the 36th, the last of which was west of the Rhine. The 103rd and the 36th Divisions had been earmarked as SHAEF reserve on 30 March, since which time they had been used as occupation forces. At the end of March the 70th Infantry Division and the 13th Armored Division, which had been in SHAEF reserve under Seventh Army control, were being prepared for transfer to the Twelfth Army Group. This transfer was effective on 1 and 2 April, and both divisions within a short time were sent to the Third Army zone. By 8 April both the 4th Infantry and 10th Armored Divisions, attached to Seventh Army for operations, were assigned to Seventh Army.

By 17 April SHAEF had lifted some of the restrictions on the use by Seventh Army of its divisions in reserve, the 36th and 103rd, and had responded to General Patch's request that the 36th Division west of the Rhine be presently relieved by units of the Fifteenth Army. Representatives from the Fifteenth and Seventh American Armies had been working together since 3 April in close liaison preparatory to the assumption of occupation duties by Fifteenth Army in the Saar-Palatinate west of the Rhine. Also on 17 April notification was received that the 101st Airborne Division was to return to Seventh Army, replacing the 103rd Division in SHAEF reserve and taking over the Darmstadt-Ansbach-Heilbronn area. Both the 36th Infantry and 101st Airborne Divisions would not be required to perform occupational duties after 21 April.

Now Seventh Army had greater hitting power and greater depth for its offensive. By the middle of April, Third Army had been turned south and the direction of Seventh Army advance was also turned south. The relief of Seventh Army units in the east by elements of Third Army narrowed its prospective front by about 25 percent. It became less of an adjunct to Third Army and freer to strike out independently in its own zone. General Patch's Command Post, which had moved from Darmstadt to Kitzingen on 16 April, was off-center for the new zone, especially when the army's main effort was to be made on the right. Plans were made to move it southwest and on 27 April, after the offen-

sive had made good progress, the Seventh Army Command Post opened in Schwaebisch Gmuend.

With the Ruhr pocket effectively reduced (it was declared wiped out on 19 April) and with the Third Army drive speeding toward Salzburg, General Eisenhower told General Devers on 15 April that the time had come for the Sixth Army Group to push the offensive to the south. The initial objective of the offensive was the capture of Stuttgart and the cutting off and destruction of the Nineteenth German Army in the Black Forest. VI Corps, coordinating its advance with the First French Army, was to envelop Stuttgart, seize the communications



STUTTGART, GERMANY

*"... seize the communications centers south of Stuttgart ..."*

centers south of Stuttgart in the area of Tübingen, Balingen, and Sigmaringen, between Stuttgart and the Swiss border, up to which the corps was then to exploit in order to block the Nineteenth Army in the Black Forest while the French destroyed it.

An Airborne operation for the planned offensive which had been designated *Effective* was contemplated for the taking of the communications centers south of Stuttgart, an important target also because a number of scientific laboratories and factories were situated there. Plans had been made to use the 13th Airborne Division in this maneuver, but this operation was cancelled on 20 April as being no longer necessary. Sixth Army Group had warned that, in order to prevent the German Nineteenth Army from escaping from the Black Forest southeast into the Swabian Alps, careful timing would be necessary in the French and VI Corps envelopment of Stuttgart. The French were instructed specifically to avoid attacking Stuttgart prematurely.

Since 13 April VI Corps had been pushing south into the Lowenstein Hills, which stretched between Heilbronn and Schwaebisch Gmuend. On 16 April the 10th Armored Division was taken out of reserve and passed through the 63rd Division on the corps left flank. Combat Command B, supported by the 2nd Battalion of the 254th Infantry, fought for two days to take on 18 April the town of Hall on the Kocher River. On the corps right flank the enemy indicated acute sensitivity to the 100th Division approach toward Stuttgart, when he counterattacked fiercely near the town of Beilstein, about 20 miles north and a little east of Stuttgart. The 3rd Battalion of the 399th Infantry approached a hill just north of Beilstein on the morning of 18 April. Forward elements crossed the open draw below the hill, climbed its open northern face, and reached the wooded crest. The rest of the battalion was still climbing out of the draw when German mortars and artillery opened up on them. Seventeen were killed and 101 wounded. When the battalion had once gained the top of the hill, it was counterattacked for an hour by some 60 Germans who climbed the southern slope, heedless of the fire that met them. The rest of the way through the Lowenstein Hills was relatively easy for VI Corps. On 18 April the rapid drive south began, as elements of the 10th Armored Division on the Corps left flank advanced nine miles.

On 19 April the 44th Division, attached to VI Corps two days before, moved through the 63rd Division to follow the advance of the





**10th Armored.** The 63rd Division passed to XXI Corps and continued its attack to the southeast. The 103rd Division, attached to VI Corps after its release from SHAEF reserve, was ordered to attack between the 10th Armored and the 100th Division on the right, which was moving slowly because of stiff resistance to its approach to Stuttgart.

During the morning of 19 April the advance of the 10th Armored Division was held up by steep hills and boggy valleys, but in the afternoon it raced ahead for a gain of 17 miles which brought it to the Rems River. Holding in the Lowenstein Hills on the south, Combat Command B seized two bridges intact just west of Schwaebisch Gmuend, which it by-passed, and crossed the river. Farther west Combat Command A, carrying a power saw to clear roadblocks, had been hitting a 40 mile an hour pace. That afternoon it seized another bridge over the Rems intact at Lorch, five miles west of Gmuend. Combat Command A came so suddenly into Lorch that it scared away an enemy plane and an enemy train that were just pulling into town. It took prisoners the astonished Volkssturm who had been left behind as a rearguard. The 44th Division, whose task it was to protect the exposed flanks of the 10th Armored Division as well as to mop up in the rear, reached the Rems the same day and blocked at the bridges to permit the armor to lunge ahead southwest to the Fils River, which runs parallel to the Rems some six miles to the south. Combat Command A captured intact a bridge over the Fils at Faurndau near Goeppingen.

On 20 April, while Combat Command R and the 114th Infantry of the 44th Division mopped up in the by-passed Gmuend area, Combat Commands A and B crossed the Fils River and drove, still southwest, to the town of Kirchheim. The town fell easily to the two enveloping columns. The 114th Infantry blocked on the left of the armored spearhead, while the 324th Infantry blocked on the right. Several energetic enemy attempts near Schwaebisch Gmuend to cut through the main supply route of the extended salient were repulsed. Early in the morning of 21 April, elements of Combat Command R, which had come down to Kirchheim, cut the autobahn just south of the city, reaching the first objective of the division. The enemy had been fleeing from Stuttgart and the Black Forest down the autobahn to the Swabian



Alps. The XII Tactical Air Command had been bombing and strafing columns for several days. Now the enemy was forced to use secondary roads to the south. On 22 April the 10th Armored Division was ordered to swing southeast to pursue the fleeing enemy to the Danube. The 44th Division was to continue to follow the armor, mopping up and guarding its flanks.

When forces of the 10th Armored Division reached Kirchheim, they had come within 15 miles of French forces which had swept south-east to Reutlingen below the autobahn. Stuttgart was virtually encircled; the corridor of escape was narrowed and attacked on the ground and from the air. The breakthrough of the 10th Armored Division formed the first and outer arm to reach out to pocket the fleeing Nineteenth Army. Meanwhile within that arm the 103rd Division on the right flank of the armored division and the 100th Division along the Neckar, each pressed in on the escape corridor.

After 18 April resistance to the 100th Division advance decreased as the enemy fled from the Stuttgart area. Against minefields, roadblocks, and panzerfaust-armed delaying parties, the division made steady progress. On 22 April it captured 1,000 prisoners in the pocket formed by the Neckar north and east of Stuttgart, and it made contact with the French just across the river from the city. On 23 April the division captured an equal number of prisoners as it drove to the east bend of the Neckar River below Stuttgart where it is joined by the Fils. One battalion of the 397th Infantry moved south of the Neckar River to cut the autobahn below Esslingen.

The 103rd Division, between the 10th Armored and the 100th Divisions, ran into bitter fighting on 23 April as it hit the most sensitive part of the escape corridor below the autobahn. It had joined the VI Corps attack on 20 April, and against only moderate resistance it had swung down through the lanes that tanks had cleared across the Rems and Fils River. On 22 April it drove southwest from Kirchheim, some five miles south of the autobahn, where it threw back a counterattack. The next day its attack was to the south toward the Metzingen-Muensingen road which runs through the Swabian Alps, now the most important remaining escape route for the Nineteenth German Army. In

the hills that shield the road on its northern side, the 103rd Division met desperate opposition. Here the 2nd Battalion of the 410th Infantry attacked the town of Erkenbrechtsweiler, which lies on top of a broad plateau. After G Company had taken two-thirds of the northern part of the town and had lost 17 men as prisoners, an SS officer marched down the main street carrying a white flag, accompanied by a captured American infantryman. He presented an ultimatum to the company commander: surrender or panzerfausts will wipe you out. At the time, the entire 2nd Battalion, the other elements of which were fighting in the woods outside the town, was believed surrounded by five German infantry regiments and miscellaneous troops. The fighting continued and by evening the town was cleared of the enemy. The next morning the surrounding German troops had disappeared in flight. The 103rd Division pressed on to the Metzingen-Muensingen road and drove to Reutlingen to join up with French Forces.

On 23 April the Stuttgart corridor was closed. On the same day the city of Stuttgart fell to the French. French forces continued to mop up numerous enemy pockets in the Black Forest, and VI Corps turned southeast toward Ulm and the Danube in pursuit of the broken columns of the German Nineteenth Army. On 22 April the main effort of Seventh Army was directed southeast toward Ulm, and a new boundary was set between the French First and American Seventh Armies.

Because the rapid drive of the French below Stuttgart had extended so far east of the Neckar River, which had been the boundary between the armies, and because there was a danger of French and American units becoming entangled, General de Lattre and General Patch had agreed on 21 April on a new boundary between Reutlingen and Sigmaringen. It then was decided by Sixth Army Group that when Stuttgart had fallen and the VI Corps attack had turned southeast, the boundary would run along the Metzingen-Muensingen-Ehingen road. This would leave to the French the area south of Stuttgart to be mopped up and would presumably keep French forces from becoming entangled with the VI Corps attack toward Ulm and the Danube.

This last boundary change also provided that American forces would occupy Stuttgart after the French had taken it. On 26 April the

100th Division, having been relieved from line duty on 24 April, moved into Stuttgart. The French 3rd Algerian Infantry Division was still there.

When on 27 April General Devers, accompanied by General Patch, visited Stuttgart and ordered that French forces evacuate the city, the local French commander replied that he was under orders to remain. News reports linked the Stuttgart question with the larger question of French participation in the assignment of occupation zones. The matter, which had obviously become one for consideration at a higher level, passed amicably and without incident. On 30 April the 100th Division left the city to the French and moved to another area. It had been determined by this time by Army Group liaison that many reports of disorders by French troops in Stuttgart had been exaggerated and that they could be attributed largely to displaced persons and the "native criminal element", and to the fact that French procedure in occupying a German city is traditionally different from that of American forces.

## The Breakthrough in the Army Center

Shortly after the enemy right and left flank had given way, his center weakened under the pressure of the XXI Corps attack and was pierced by the breakthrough of the 12th Armored Division in the Franconian Heights. As the XXI Corps had swept southeast from the Main to the Aisch River, it had been deployed across a broad front with the 42nd Division on the left, the 4th Division on the right, and the 12th Armored attacking in columns interspersed across the front.

At the Aisch River the Germans had made only a minor delaying stand. The 42nd Division, in whose zone the major portion of the river line was located, had pushed across the stream at Neustadt on 16 April, after a prior reconnaissance to feel out weak points. The division had continued its rapid advance southeast, veering toward Fuerth, which it had been directed to take to assist in the XV Corps capture of Nuremberg. When it had come into position to attack Fuerth, the 42nd Division had passed to control of XV Corps on 19 April to place the Nuremberg operation under a unified command. At the same





time, XXI Corps assumed command of the 63rd Division from VI Corps on the right flank of the 45th Division.

The 4th Division, initially on the corps right flank, had driven southeast against only weak delaying actions, and the columns of the 12th Armored Division had met the same type of opposition. The advance surged forward day and night between 18 and 20 April. The 12th Armored Division took Ansbach and Feuchtwangen. The 4th Infantry Division retook Crailsheim, which VI Corps had earlier yielded, against only sporadic resistance. On the new corps right flank, the 63rd Division pushed southeast, reached Schwaebisch Gmuend, and set up roadblocks to protect the corps flank.

XXI Corps was now well within the low hills of the Franconian Heights. Prisoner interrogation revealed that enemy units larger than battalions were the exception. Hastily organized groups of stragglers were thrown into the line to do what they could to delay the advance. XXI Corps was engaged in what SHAEF termed, "the disarming, by battle, of the German armies."

With the passage of the 42nd Division to XV Corps and the taking over of the 63rd Division, the corps left boundary had been shifted to the line Ansbach-Noerdlingen, and XXI Corps attacked directly south toward the Danube river with the mission of crossing it. Meanwhile its positions west of Nuremberg had shielded that city while it was being assaulted by XV Corps. When Nuremberg had been taken, XXI Corps began in earnest its drive south. The 12th Armored Division had been given a zone on the left flank of the corps; and it was here that the greatest advances were made, although the remainder of the front moved rapidly.


The 12th Armored Division launched a spearhead from Feuchtwangen toward the Danube River on 20 April, and in two days it pierced 40 miles to capture and cross the 600-foot bridge over the river at Dillingen. Reinforcements were poured across the river, and the bridgehead was held against only slight opposition. Moving rapidly, the 4th and 63rd Divisions reached the Danube and bridged it on 25 April, the 4th against slight resistance at Laningen and the 63rd with stronger op-

position at Guenzburg, both west and south of Dillingen. One battalion of the 63rd Division stopped on the way to eliminate a pocket of some 600 SS troops.

With the enemy's last line broken at both flanks and in the center, Seventh Army continued south on its next mission: to block the passes into Austria and to seize the Innsbruck-Brenner Pass area. The Wehrmacht fled without hope before its advance. The German Nineteenth Army was practically destroyed; the First and Seventh German Armies were torn by American armored breakthroughs. Enemy troops in pockets of resistance surrendered in mass; commanders issued discharges to their men by the hundreds. On 21 April word was received at Seventh U.S. Army Headquarters that the German government had agreed to leave in their present camps all Allied prisoners of war and not to try any longer to evacuate them in the retreat. Seventh Army advanced beyond the Danube, to the last natural defense line before the Redoubt Center.







# CHAPTER XXIX

## *The Myth of the National Redoubt*

The catastrophe which had finally overtaken the German military forces was almost complete. When the city of Nuremberg fell to the Seventh Army on 20 April, it had become clear that the war was entering its last stages. An intelligence report from General Eisenhower's headquarters issued on 15 April stated the case:

From every viewpoint it is only a matter of time before the organized resistance in Hitlerite Germany collapses completely . . . . Nothing can alter the inescapable fact the enemy is on the verge of a defeat. Nothing now can rectify the mistakes of Hitler and his staff officers in order to prolong the war or even partially retrieve the situation. Enemy capabilities are in fact nil. No steps he can take with the present means of conducting warfare are such that they will influence and hardly delay the outcome . . . .

Nor was the intelligence that the war was lost unavailable to the highest German command. In the early evening of 22 April, according to various accounts of the briefing in the *Fuehrerhauptquartier*, Adolph Hitler became convinced that the end was near and that all hope was to be abandoned. Several diary entries picture the situation:

The Fuehrer has collapsed; he considers further resistance useless, refuses to leave . . . All present (Keitel, Jodl, Bormann, Himmler, Goebbels, and the Grand Admiral over the phone) have tried to sway the Fuehrer . . . . Everything was in vain . . . . He now speaks of treason from all sides, of failure, corruption, and that the SS is now lying to him. . . the troops are not fighting, the roadblocks are opened and are not being defended . . . soon we will have no ammunition and gasoline . . . The Fuehrer has given no orders, he only said the others should go wherever they please . .

This abdication of the high command in late April coincided with the disintegration of centralized enemy combat leadership. Along the Seventh Army front General Paul Hausser had been relieved from command of German Army Group G, which had been cut and virtually destroyed by General Patch's divisions on both sides of the Rhine. His new assignment was the consolidation of staffs fleeing south, the organization of battle-groups from among surviving remnants. More than a dozen divisions were identified in the sectors of the American VI, XXI, and XV Corps; but their numbers were little more than a bookkeeping convenience. They were wanting in infantry, in artillery, and in armor. They were in receipt of no coordinated orders and were committed to defensive positions which formed no semblance of a front line. Thousands of troops were disappearing, redeploying themselves as self-discharged veterans; and as one German division commander confessed, "everybody was highly sensitive to any report which held any inkling of the words 'clearing out' . . . ."

This battered and hopeless enemy force, consisting of the First and Nineteenth German Armies, withdrew in almost total confusion before the onslaughts of Seventh Army. General Patton's Third Army, which had been driving due east toward Prague and Dresden, had begun to change direction to move down the Danube River for a junction with the Russians. General Patch, accordingly, instituted a general swing of the army toward the heart of Bavaria and the Tyrol. With General Brooks' VI Corps on the right, General Milburn's XXI Corps in the center, and General Haislip's XV Corps on the left, Seventh Army was to strike quickly over the Danube and into the Bavarian foreland making decisive southern thrusts for the Alpine routes into the Inn River Valley and to the Brenner Pass. What little order General Hausser, now operating from Field Marshal Kesselring's headquarters, could fashion from the chaos of the German army was not to be given an opportunity to recover combat efficiency for the defense of mountain positions in the so-called "National Redoubt." The hope was to dissolve the projected ultimate concentration area before it could be used. It was also hoped to uncover quickly the infamous German concentration camps which lay in the path of Seventh Army.

## The Redoubt: Myth and Mystery

Whether the German High Command or the Fuehrer's inner circle ever believed in the Redoubt Center or in some fortress of the Alps is a question. There appears to be no evidence that any substantial planning or serious preparations were made for an historic last stand. The *Alpenstellung* or *Gebirgstellung*, which in American documents became "redoubt" from the French intelligence about the *reduit*, was less a military stratagem than a piece of political propaganda. It did not revive much hope or morale, but it perhaps gave some geographic point to all the frantic movements of overrun German elements.



BAVARIAN ALPS

*" . . . The Alpine high ground loomed as the last battlefield . . . "*

During the Rhine-crossing period Seventh Army G-2 had, as aforementioned, issued a long range study of the German National Redoubt, reviewing the factors involved in a formidable defense of

mountainous pockets in the area of common German, Austrian, and Italian frontiers. The Alpine high ground loomed as the last battlefield. The extreme Bavarian relief, with narrow abrupt valleys and sheer winding roads, was admirable for a determined defense by a minimum force well-armed with modern equipment. It was suspected that considerable stockpiles of arms, munitions, and rations, and even underground industrial facilities, had been prepared; and a new elite force was envisioned, comprising hundreds of thousands of SS and mountain troops, well-equipped, trained for mountain warfare, and thoroughly imbued with the Nazi spirit. At the source of this estimate of enemy capabilities were two reasons: First, that the Nazi elements which controlled Germany had the will and imperative need to continue to resist; second, that the German army and people, incapable of disobedience, would follow Nazi orders.

Happily, the army estimate of the enemy's military and political strength was a cautious one. The three Seventh Army corps were prepared for the worst contingency; but, less than two weeks after the outer ring of the Redoubt had been penetrated at the Danube, the National Socialist regime had been destroyed. The American assault could not be contained or even delayed. The German will to resistance was broken. Flagrant violations of discipline disorganized the military from within, and there were many instances of widespread and extensive civil disobedience.

By 21 April Seventh Army had completed its turning movement for the campaign against the redoubt. Before it was the Danube River, and a long, wide flatland which stretched to the mountains. Within two weeks Seventh Army had driven into the mountains, had broken through the effective wall across southern Germany, and had seized control of the Inn and Salzach Valleys. VI Corps, on the right, held the massive lateral terraces from Innsbruck to the Brenner Pass. XV Corps, on the left, had overrun the Salzburg-Berchtesgaden area. XXI Corps, in the middle, dominated Kufstein and the central Alpine positions. The National Redoubt was no longer a mystery.

## The Fall of Ulm

The main effort of Seventh Army was to be made on the right. Within 48 hours the breakthrough which VI Corps had achieved near Lorch on the Rems River on 19 April had assumed major proportions. Two combat commands of the 10th Armored Division were "running wild", and at times the armor was hitting a 40-mile-per-hour pace. Behind the tanks moved the infantry of the 44th and 103rd Divisions, straining to keep up with the tempo of the motorized advance, to clear by-passed pockets of resistance, and to prevent infiltration behind the speeding combat commands.

The Stuttgart-Ulm autobahn had already been cut and troops blocking to the west were still picking up miscellaneous groups trying



### TANKDOZER GOES TO WORK ON A ROADBLOCK

*"... Principal obstacles were engineer-contrived, roadblocks and minefields ..."*

to escape the Stuttgart pocket. Opposition along the whole front was spotty and disorganized, although battle groups continued to fight

moderate delaying actions. Principal obstacles were engineer-contrived, roadblocks and minefields, covered by fire from infantry trying to make strongpoints of towns and favorable terrain. The armor, for the most part, avoided such points. "Keep on going" General Brooks had instructed General Morris, commanding the 10th Armored Division, "don't fight with them as there will be plenty of infantry behind you . . ." The tanks were racing for the Danube and all possible intact crossings between Ehingen and Ulm.

The city of Ulm on the Danube River appeared to be the next concentration point for the haphazard improvised defensive efforts of General Foertsch's First Army. The river line itself was possibly the best available position in the so-called "final defense" area before the redoubt; and, more than that, the Himmler-Keitel-Bormann decree which had dictated the fanatical defense of Nuremberg would probably prompt the same type of resistance in this traditional Danube Valley bastion. The directive from the German High Command had been unequivocal:

Cities are situated at important traffic junctions. Therefore, they must be defended and be held to the utmost, no matter what promises or threats are carried . . . . For the execution of this command the Battle Commanders appointed in every town are personally responsible. Should they disobey this soldierly duty and task, they will be sentenced to death like all civilian officials who try to prevent the Battle Commander from doing his duty or even hinder him while fulfilling his tasks . . . .

The signature indicated the support of the army, the party, and the Gestapo.

The army decision to attack Ulm involved a complete change in plan on the corps level. VI Corps was now to be turned off to the southeast instead of the southwest, which had been the course dictated by developments in the Stuttgart operation. A considerable portion of the German Nineteenth Army had eluded the Stuttgart trap and had hastily made its escape to the southeast; and Seventh Army troops, forced to move in quickly to stop the Kirchheim corridor, became entangled with the French. Elements of the 100th Division and the 103rd Division were committed in this action. Early on 23 April, as a result of the

change in VI Corps plans, the 44th Division on the corps left flank was directed to follow the armor to Ehingen and at the same time, "spill over in the direction of Ulm . . . ."

On 22 April both Seventh Army and the First French Army had reached the Danube River. The French I Corps made several crossings in zone and took the town of Sigmaringen from the south. Elements of the 10th Armored and 44th Infantry Divisions farther north had established an American bridgehead in the Ehingen area, and by morning armor was across the river moving into Berg.

French advance elements were out of communication with their commanders and were pursuing down all routes. Moreover certain commanders among the French desired the prestige of capturing Ulm because of its Napoleonic tradition. This caused some infiltrations across the Seventh Army boundary, and at Berg the 44th Division became involved with French columns moving northeast from Sigmaringen. A principal factor in the slowdown of advancing forces at this time was the shortage of gasoline, which was coming in almost exclusively by air transport to the nearest available fields.

The boundary difficulties were settled with expedition and affected the progress of the operation very little, if at all. For reasons of prestige, the French were permitted to maintain a guard of honor in Ulm for a period after its capture.

On 24 April Seventh Army troops struck for Ulm. Two regiments of the 44th Division, combined with elements of the 10th Armored Division, moved northeast along the Danube. The 324th Infantry advanced on the north bank; and the 71st Infantry, which had previously made an assault boat crossing and had erected a treadway bridge downstream from Ehingen, moved along the river on the southern or right bank. The troops met moderate to heavy resistance, facing considerable small-arms and sniper fire, artillery, flak, and 88mm shelling. Some infantry made their way riding on tanks and trucks; others dismounted and fought through the streets of Ulm. Between the 71st Regiment and Neu-Ulm ran the swift and not inconsequential Iller River, running north and into the Danube which bisects Ulm. The Germans held the east bank of the Iller from its confluence with the



Danube south to a small bridgehead held by American armor at Voehringen, then south to another bridgehead held by armor at Illertissen.

By the afternoon of 24 April the American forces, assisted by elements of the First French Armored Division which had appeared, were cleaning out the last remnants of opposition in old Ulm. By evening the 71st Infantry was making its crossings of the Iller for the assault on Neu-Ulm. The current was too swift and boats turned over. One company crossed on cables, hand over hand. Progress by hand-spans continued, while heavy logs were thrown across blown bridges for catwalk crossings. In general, the Germans conducted an organized defense east of the Iller River and a disorganized withdrawal west of the river. Pockets and columns of the enemy were trapped in the rear, and one group even attempted to cross the Iller at one of the 10th Armored Division crossing sites. On 25 April the artillery, mortars, and self-propelled guns were silenced. The city of Ulm had fallen. It was completely desolate; the medieval buildings that once had crowded around the cathedral and stretches of the city beyond them had been bombed to ruins.

The fall of the historic city of Ulm prompted a special message from General De Lattre, Commander of the First French Army.

It is my desire to express to you the joy we feel in returning in brotherly union with your army to Ulm which is so full of historical memories particularly precious to French soldiers. I wish to express my feelings at this moment when armored detachments of First French Army, in liaison with their Seventh Army comrades, are reaching this town. It is my wish to renew the expression of my most friendly and faithful combat comradeship to you.

## The Danube Front

The Danube River front in the Seventh Army Zone wound its way northeast for some 80 miles from Ehingen to Neuburg, just west of Ingolstadt, which fell to the Third Army's III Corps on 26 April. The break in the Danube line at Ulm was matched by another deep and decisive penetration in the central sector. By 22 April both the 10th and 12th Armored Divisions were at the Danube River. In front of XXI





Corps, Combat Command "A" of the 12th Armored Division, far in front of the infantry divisions, seized a bridgehead at Dillingen. The day before, 21 April, a long German horse-drawn column had been overrun. As American forces reached the Danube River, bridges were being blown. The 600-foot Dillingen bridge was captured intact at noon on 22 April. Bombs in and around the structure were deactivated; and by early afternoon elements were across the Danube extending the bridgehead to Fristingen, less than 20 miles northwest of Augsburg, against disorganized opposition.

Seventh Army exploitation of the Dillingen bridgehead was rapid and immediate. The 4th and 63rd Infantry Divisions, on the left and right respectively of the armor's shifting advance, were ordered to move with all possible speed to the Danube and secure the river crossing. The 3rd Division, which had been garrisoning Nuremberg, was attached to XXI Corps, ordered to cross at Dillingen through the other two divisions and strike for Augsburg. The rout into which the enemy had been thrown by the advance of armored spearheads was apparent to the infantry moving up behind. Withdrawal everywhere was chaotic, and there was no determined attempt to make a stand. The 3rd Division was involved only in brief fire fights in towns and villages, with only scattered contact elsewhere at roadblocks and with by-passed groups. The difficulties of the 63rd Division amounted to delays of its motorized columns by mines and abatis. The 4th Division ran into snipers but no enemy front lines. On 25 April the 4th Division reached the Danube and caught up to the armor at Gundelfingen five miles southwest of Dillingen. Farther south and west along the river the 63rd Division had moved into the Guenzburg-Leipheim area to establish its own bridgehead.

The desperate character of the First German Army's plight was revealed in its own field order, later captured, which dictated all-out defensive efforts to hold both flanks simultaneously. The right army boundary held by the 17th SS and Division Nibelungen was to be reinforced in the Regensburg zone; at the same time General Foertsch's troops were to "prevent the enemy by repeated attacks of mobile battle groups against his flanks from further penetrations in the Dillingen area." On the nights of 22 and 24 April, out of sight of the Allied air

force which had long since converted daylight movements into suicide maneuvers, the prospective battle groups scrambled across the Danube. This evacuation from the Heidenheim vicinity was protected somewhat by the block at Neu-Ulm along the Iller line. Division trains made their way across the river, first, according to the German traffic control officer, the 553rd Volks Grenadier Division with 1,500 men, then the Volks Grenadier 19th Division with 1,500 men, the 198th Infantry Division with between 800 and 1,000 men, and the 168th Infantry Division with 1,200 men. The enemy had managed a skillful withdrawal in an apparent effort to delay the American forces at the river and regroup scattered elements for a stand before Augsburg or Munich.

The German reaction to the assault on the Danube was sharpest in the central sector of the Seventh Army advance. The Luftwaffe reappeared on 24 April, and some 15 to 25 planes in eight separate attacks struck at the Dillingen bridge. The mission of the 553rd Volks Grenadier Division, in conjunction with the German aerial blows, was to make flanking attacks from the southwest to push the American forces back to the north bank of the river. At Guenzburg the 63rd Division had found a bridge intact, and one platoon had raced into Leipheim before the bridge was blown. The demolition was incomplete and the advance was continued over boards on the remaining uprights. Most of these elements from the 254th Regiment, however, were caught across the Danube without heavy weapons and were hit by a number of heavy German counterattacks all of which were finally repulsed.

All American bridgeheads expanded rapidly; and the German losses in killed, wounded, and captured mounted. Only the 168th Infantry Division and the 19th Volks Grenadier Division withdrew according to plan to escape encirclement. They were considered by the German command as essential for the defense of Augsburg and Munich. Garrisons stationed at both cities had been seriously depleted. Further defensive efforts could be based only on the strength of troop collecting points and the fanaticism of town commanders who were authorized to gather all stragglers for the formation of alarm defense units. Many of these units were already giving up in surrender to Seventh Army. In several cases commitment became capitulation when it developed that the battle staffs

had withdrawn from their own sacrifice orders. In others, an entire group simply gave itself up in spite of the German secret order that all deserters were to be hanged publicly on all roads leading to the rear.

With the XV Corps turn in the Seventh Army pivot, the 42nd and 45th Divisions, which had moved almost directly south of Ansbach, began their drives southeast to the Danube River on a wide front. The army front was now oriented for the assault of the outer redoubt ring. German resistance was for the most part confined to a passive defense by preparing roadblocks and blowing bridges, but generally the enemy was somewhat less disorganized in this sector than in others. He succeeded at times in controlling sufficient infantry, supported by a limited amount of artillery and antitank guns, to withdraw behind effective delaying actions. The 2nd SS Mountain Division used mines, and defended roadblocks and strongpoints on key terrain features and villages. In places the 45th Division ran into strong and stubborn resistance. In Monheim a quick thrust had intercepted an enemy artillery tank convoy and the Germans were forced to stand and fight. A six-hour battle resulted. In most of the villages, too, there were sharp fights; but these isolated small-unit actions against the overwhelming American force were ineffective. By 25 April the 45th Division, and the 42nd Division on its right, had closed to the north bank of the Danube.

The river line in this sector of the Seventh Army zone constituted an effective barrier only for the briefest period. Donauworth, the river valley's key defensive city since the days of the Roman Empire, proved to be the main delaying obstacle. The bridges across the Danube were blown some five minutes before a column of tanks and infantry of the 42nd Division reached the shore; and the trapped German units fought fanatically in the city, holding up the progress of special task forces by a house-to-house defense. When Donauworth was finally cleared after a six-hour fight only 16 of the 700 defenders had been taken prisoner.

On 26 April two infantry regiments of the 42nd Division crossed to the south banks of the Danube just east of Donauworth. They made the crossing before daylight in assault boats and DUKWs against resistance that varied from moderate to slight, expanded their bridge-



head, and by the close of the period had crossed the Lech River from west to east. At 0045 hours the 242nd Infantry had moved across at Schaefstall, suffering difficulty only with the swift current. To the east of this crossing the 232nd Infantry pushed out from Altisheim; and with the aid of the 142nd Engineer Combat Battalion, which crossed with the assault waves and constructed an improvised wooden span across the Lech, the regiment continued its progress.

What few heavy weapons the German troops had managed to salvage remained concentrated in front of the 45th Division on the XV Corps left flank. Three regiments abreast had closed to the Danube on 26 April



#### CROSSING OF THE DANUBE

*" . . . Boats were capsized and swept downstream by the swift current . . . "*

between the confluence of the Lech and Neuburg Rivers, but throughout the morning and most of the afternoon were held to the northern bank by a combination of obstacles: the unsuspected bridging difficulties; the surprising amount of coordinated fire which included nebelwerfers,

20mm flak guns, and even effective counter-battery; and the confused pockets of stranded enemy units cut off by the demolition of the Neuburg bridge late on the previous day. Boats were capsized and swept downstream by the swift current, floats were damaged and broken, cables snapped. The project for the construction of footbridges was abandoned, but hopes for a treadway bridge were hardly more certain for the current, which was found to be as high as 12 miles per hour, far exceeded what is considered maximum for treadway bridging. Sufficient troops, however, made their way over the Danube between 1500 hours and nightfall to establish and expand bridgeheads across the river from Marxheim. The swift current had caused footbridge equipment to disintegrate even though secured by cable, and made the operation of infantry support raft impracticable and the use of assault boats and DUKWs extremely difficult. The crossing was attended by heavy losses of equipment as well as some loss of personnel; but by midnight, after extensive shuttling with high-powered motor boats, the 45th Division had eight battalions of infantry across and had secured its bridgehead about two miles deep on a 12 mile front.

Seventh Army had now completed its assault of the Danube River; and XV Corps, like XXI and VI Corps on its right, prepared for what was hoped to be the ultimate drive across the Bavarian foreland to the mountains. Armor was to succeed mechanized cavalry patrols in running the gauntlet of medium and long-range sniper fire and setting the pace of the offensive. The 20th Armored Division, which had taken the place of the 14th Armored Division in XV Corps, began its move into the redoubt operation on 23 April, but it was almost a full week before it was in position to be committed in accordance with plans for a coordinated large-scale tank-infantry assault. It had assembly difficulties, aggravated by long marches in the rain and mud over poor road nets. On 27 April XV Corps issued instructions for the entrance of the armor into the thrust for Munich. The 45th and 42nd Divisions were to continue their present missions of clearing routes of advance for the 20th Armored Division. Each division was to be prepared to follow the armor closely with one motorized regimental combat team when passed through. The next day Combat Commands A and B moved over the



Danube, made their way through elements of the infantry, and were ready for the advance on a broad front generally between the two great autobahns converging on the city of Munich.

## The Road to Austria

Unlike the positional warfare encountered in France, where front lines existed and most of the enemy regarded the issue as not yet settled, the fighting which involved Seventh Army in Bavaria had taken on a new form — that of isolated groups, scattered and without organization, fighting with varying degrees of resistance. Inadequate distribution of what remained of his troops and scarcity of transportation forced the enemy to defend fiercely at points where he could organize, leaving other and sometimes more important points lightly held. The result was armored spearheads slashing deep into the enemy's rear through these lightly-held corridors and the formation of more pincer movements than he could ever conceivably contain. Infantry on tanks and behind tanks and the mopping-up of small by-passed units characterized the advance. As a report of the 10th Armored Division put it,

Consecutive front line overlays . . . had the appearance of an irresistible molten mass spreading southward over the maps. Armored rivulets moved ahead suddenly, were slowed and outdistanced by other rivulets with which they joined. Pockets of resistance were left in the armored wake and overrun . . . .

Following receipt of gasoline stocks and the disentanglement of American and French elements at Ulm, there was little delay in bringing the bulk of VI Corps armored and infantry forces across the Danube toward the Tyrolean Alps and the Brenner Pass. From the river line south to the passes into the mountains, tank columns of the 10th Armored Division, followed by the 44th Division on the left and the 103rd Division on the right, roared along, striking at will, breaking up the last cadres of General Brandenburg's Nineteenth Army.

Forward American elements moved out of Ulm quickly, leaving behind wild, disorderly celebrations by Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons, and the usual civilian rumors that the Nazis would

return to complete the destruction of the area with Luftwaffe and SS troops because the people had displayed white flags. By 26 April, three armored spearheads were making their thrust toward the Memmingen-Mindelheim-Landsberg line. Infantry elements were being motorized and kept moving throughout the night to close up on the armor. As General Brooks, commanding VI Corps, told his division commanders, "push on and push hard, . . . this is a pursuit, not an attack."

At times the pursuit seemed more like a fantasy of violence and speed and extravagant incident. Armored columns were rolling 20 and 30 miles a day. Weakly-manned strong points were destroyed by



#### GERMAN JET PLANES ALONG AUTOBAHN USED AS AN AIRFIELD

*" . . . One tank column ran across a large camouflaged airfield and engaged in target practice on jet planes getting ready to take off . . . "*

fire and huge enemy groups shipped to the rear in bulk prisoner formations. Task forces wreaked havoc on German vehicles and personnel. One tank column ran across a large camouflaged airfield and engaged

in target practice on jet planes getting ready to take off. Dug-in enemy infantry offered feeble or no resistance; one patrol of the 103rd Division reported: "they have women with them, evidently in their holes, our machine guns opened up on them and we dropped a little artillery, and they ran from their holes dragging the girls by the hand after them . . ."

The assault sped through little countryside villages which, according to orders, were taken under fire if there were no white flags flying. When evidence was found of civilian sniping and of German soldiers who had changed into civilian clothes, the town was destroyed. The orders had been: "If you run into any resistance in the towns, particularly the big ones, I don't want you to take casualties. Use phosphorous, TDs and everything else and chew them to pieces. . . ." Little resistance was encountered. This was very far from General Jodl's dream of a hinterland possessed with a fanatical will to fight. The troops ran into burning concentration camps, with smouldering corpses, caches of gold dental fillings, a synagogue crowded with airplane motor parts, American secret agents, who a short while before had been parachuted deep into the redoubt lines and now found themselves in prisoner of war cages. An infantry school, which had been training recruits with sticks for rifle drill and water cans to simulate the noise of machine gun fire, was overrun; and the commandant formally surrendered his entire command of 200 students, insisting that his sabre be kept as a token of the surrender. A civilian telephone exchange was captured intact, and a call was put through to Innsbruck offering surrender or destruction.

Armor in multiple columns moved down to dominate the road-nets, with Combat Command B into Memmingen, Combat Command A in the center into Mindelheim, and Combat Command R on the left lunging for Landsberg. Infantrymen followed closely to eliminate small and disorganized pockets and round up hordes of prisoners. In the evening of 26 April the 411th Regiment of the 103rd Division entered Landsberg. Tanks had already passed through the town, but the enemy had not been cleared out and remained entrenched on the east side of the Lech River which divides the city. The bridge crossing had been destroyed, and from the east shore came heavy sniper fire. The next morning 103rd Division troops were across the river and the eastern

half of Landsberg was cleared. A garrison of Hungarian troops was discovered by one platoon which found the entire command of some 918 officers and men lined up formally. The garrison commander called his troops to attention, did an about-face, and surrendered his men. The garrison, fearful that it might be fired upon, had stacked all weapons prior to the arrival of the American troops.

The fall of Landsberg was not without its larger political significance. It was in the local prison-fortress that Adolph Hitler served his sentence following his failure in the Munich Putsch. American troops moving through added to their collection of war trophies a huge Nazi



LANDSBERG CONCENTRATION CAMP. BURNED WHEN  
NAZIS RETREATED

*"... It was in the local prison-fortress that Adolf Hitler served his sentence following his failure in the Munich Putsch . . ."*

memorial flag and a bronze plaque which read: "Here a system without honor kept Germany's greatest son a prisoner from 11 November 1923 to 20 December 1924. In this cell Adolph Hitler wrote the book of the

National Socialist Revolution MEIN KAMPF." On the route out of the city a concentration camp was overrun. Some Barracks were on fire and shriveled smoking corpses were lying about. Thousands of prisoners, mostly Jews from various European countries, were found herded in huts, weak and emaciated and in a state of almost complete physical and mental degeneration.

The armored thrust for Memmingen reached south on both sides of the Iller River. The German forces which had been committed to hold some kind of organized line to the west were upset and had to face attacks from three directions. West of the Iller, disorganized, trapped troops were quickly mopped up. On the east bank, the enemy opposed the advance with fire from small arms, antitank weapons, and occasionally some artillery. Each town became briefly a strongpoint, and panzerfaust and artillery fire was taking its toll of the tanks of Combat Command B. More rapid and cheaper successes were achieved by playing for surrender rather than by direct simple assault. Local burgomeisters were dispatched ahead to convey issued ultimata, and leaflets were prepared and dropped. The seizure of Memmingen was practically complete some two hours before the columns rolled through the streets.

The surrender was effected by the chief medical officer of the garrison. The city was clear of German troops, but in the surrounding hills there were troops who had already refused to obey cease-fire orders. The officials of the city requested another hour to permit them to apprehend the fanatics who refused to abide by surrender terms. After some delay the commander of Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division, sent his final message to the mayor of Memmingen through an interpreter. He stated that his troops would march into town immediately, that they would be met by the mayor, that there would be white flags over all the big buildings in town including the church and the city hall, and that there was to be no firing of any kind. In the event of any opposition or fire it was promised that tanks and artillery aided by bombers would destroy the city. There was no resistance in Memmingen. All defending forces had withdrawn.

The assault continued without pause, as Seventh Army columns ranged southward over successive approach lines to the mountain re-

doubt: Kempten-Kaufbeuren-Schongau, Immenstadt-Fuessen-Oberammergau, and finally Landeck-Imst-Innsbruck. This last line brought army troops up to the Resia, Fern, and Brenner Passes. The armor and the infantry moved down together in the very model of *blitzkrieg* tactics. On 27 April Kempten surrendered without a fight. On 28 April Schongau was taken. The tactical problems involved in the critical bridging of the Lech and Ammer Rivers were solved to the mutual satisfaction of tank and foot soldier. Task forces, made up of about one-half a combat command followed by a battalion of infantry, kept supporting troops together during river crossings. These columns continued to push through a chaos of destroyed German positions, by-passing burning vehicles and scattered pockets of resistance. Troops of the 44th and 103rd Divisions followed in the rain, cold, and snow of late April, sometimes on trucks, more often on foot, flushing the towns, cleaning out the countryside.

On 29 April Seventh Army encountered its first Alpine difficulties. General Patch's instructions had been to take Innsbruck with all possible speed, but speed and even movement became a serious problem. Early that morning the VI Corps Commander discussed the



**BRIGADIER GENERAL  
WILLIAM F. DEAN**

"... new commander of the 44th  
Infantry Division ..."

situation with General Morris, commanding the 10th Armored Division, whose offensive had come to a halt on the approaches to Austria. A blown bridge over a swift-rushing mountain stream was a more serious obstacle than it would have represented on the flatlands of Bavaria. Here the road-net was extremely limited. Enemy troops on top of the hills above the road, although they were few, could hold up an armored advance by well-directed bazooka fire. This they did. It became necessary to wait for sufficient infantry troops coming up behind the armor to clear the Germans from the high ground. Both Generals Dean and McAuliffe, of

the 44th and 103rd Divisions, were given instructions to make certain

that, whenever the movement of armor was checked by enemy from high ground, infantry troops were to move out and clean it up fast. General Brooks had told them, "I want to make speed today. The armor will take care of the roads and you take care of the hills when they are a bother." However, the advance was comparatively slow that day, 29 April, and the next. Elements of the 44th Division ran out of gas. Resistance was organized at strategically centered roadblocks studded along the main road nets. Armored and infantry columns were forced to move along the steep and narrow snow-dotted Alpine passes, constantly coping with craters, minefields, overturned vehicles, blown bridges, and



#### INFANTRYMEN IN AUSTRIAN MOUNTAINS

*"... soon reached terrain which prevented further vehicular advance ..."*

at one point a 200-yard man-made avalanche. In the mountainous defiles the tanks became perfect crawling targets. The supporting troops routed the Germans directing protecting fire on the obstacles from the overlooking heights; but the armor, having sped more than 100 miles in less

than five days, soon reached terrain which prevented further vehicular advance.

Combat Command A, driving east from Partenkirchen, ran into a large crater which completely obstructed the road. The crater was filled in by a tank dozer, and a short distance beyond a 50-foot bridge over a gorge was found blown. This was by-passed by the tanks which then ran into a mine belt protected by sniper fire with more blown bridges ahead. Combat Command B was halted at a hairpin curve where a road-block, consisting of an avalanche of boulders, gravel, and logs extending for some 200 yards, proved to be a formidable barrier.

At this point Seventh Army forces had already reached into Austria. The 71st Infantry of the 44th Division captured Fuessen on the Lech River where the glacier-fed stream emerges through a gorge from the Austrian Tyrol. Across the river from the lower slopes of the great mountains of the old German border looked down the imposing castles of Bavarian royalty, Neuschwanstein and Hohenschwangau. The blown bridge across the Lech prompted a maneuver to the southwest over steep and densely-wooded terrain to enter Vila in Austria. Then the infantry moved down again to seize the road nets at Reutte and Lermoos.

By 30 April the proportions of the traffic crisis along the winding mountain roads and narrow ravines had become quite clear. The armor had stopped rolling and the infantry was blocked up behind. At noon the 44th Division was calling corps to find out if the 10th Armored Division could not be moved from out in front of its troops. Terrain made the further advance of armor impracticable. By late afternoon, orders were issued to assemble the armor in place. Its mission to clear the Garmisch-Lermoos road was completed, and the division was to move to the Garmisch-Partenkirchen area with the least possible interference with leading advance elements. The end of April saw the dropping of the armor and the entrance of infantry laterals across the Alpine passes into the Inn River Valley from Landeck to Innsbruck.

## Augsburg and Dachau

The capitulation of Augsburg in the central sector of Seventh Army's final Bavarian operations was one of the strangest stories of the



advance through Germany. The city was situated directly in the path of General Milburn's XXI Corps assault, and the 3rd Division was specifically committed from Nuremberg via Dillingen for its seizure. It lies at the confluence of the Lech and Wertach Rivers on a broad cultivated valley floor. Its urban pattern is crowded with canal spans and innumerable small bridges the destruction of which would have constituted a considerable barrier. On the whole, however, its importance as a military target was comparatively slight. The large Messerschmitt factories in the southern suburb of Haunstetten had been demolished by Allied air raids. There remained in Augsburg a large number of hospitalized German army troops. Augsburg was saved from the utter devastation which had come to Aschaffenburg, Wuerzburg, Heilbronn, Nuremberg, and Ulm, largely because of a unique subversive movement which facilitated the entrance of American troops.

Seventh Army negotiated the approaches to the Augsburg area without notable difficulty. One night a convoy of trucks took a wrong turn and was demolished at an enemy roadblock; the 12th Armored Division quickly made an attack in this sector to recover what was left. The next morning artillery fire from guns somewhere around the city came into play to support resistance in settlements along the lines of advance. Nevertheless, General O'Daniel of the 3rd Division issued orders to hold up artillery and counter-battery fire: "I don't want you to fire at all into Augsburg unless it is actually observed firing, . . . . Keep your eyes open for white flags or other signs of surrender as we have had many indications . . . ." Early on the morning of 27 April the 4th Division had reported that two industrialists had come through to Horgau to make arrangements for capitulation and the sparing of the city. Along the roads and in the fields 88's were found with white handkerchiefs and pillowcases fluttering.

A few German troops who had retreated all the way from the Danube had the mission of holding Augsburg. No orders had been given them to retreat to any other defensive line. However, of an estimated 5,000 enemy soldiers in front of the 3rd Division, about 4,000 of them had been taken prisoner before the division had reached the outskirts of Augsburg.

Both the Augsburg battle staff and the high command were aware of this critical situation. By 25 April they had seen that no reinforcements were available and understood that a defense with the forces at hand was impossible. Still, planning and preparation for resistance went ahead, based on 350 men of various army units plus 300 to 400 men of the Volkssturm. At this point, pressure from the citizens began to make its disruptive influence felt. With the Americans at Dillingen and already beyond the Danube, alarm spread among the civilian population. Representatives of churches, business, and art all tried to prevail upon General Fehn, who was in command of the Augsburg defenses, to surrender the city. Underground groups began to organize their elements for a military or political coup. On the morning of 28 April, General Fehn, as he himself later confessed, had a force not in excess of 80 men. The German 27th Artillery Replacement Regiment, which was to be committed as infantry, had vanished; other units were out of contact; the roadblocks were not manned; the bridges were only partly prepared for demolition. But General Fehn was an old army man of 41 years service, and he had as yet heard nothing from higher headquarters countermanding his original orders.

The 3rd Division struck at Augsburg in multiple columns. The 30th Infantry moved in from the northwest to the autobahn and across the Lech river in the vicinity of Gersthofen. The 7th Infantry attacked from the west, its battalions deployed south of the autobahn toward Steppach and Kriegshaber in the city's outskirts. Late in the evening of 27 April, Colonel Edson, commanding the 15th Infantry, received word from his 1st Battalion: "Just got a phone call from Augsburg. People called. Call themselves the 'Freedom Party of Augsburg.' Want to surrender the city. City in dissension . . . ." The 1st Battalion proceeded to attack Goeggingen, and the 3rd Battalion was quickly organized as a task force to push through the 7th Infantry in Kriegshaber and sweep into the heart of Augsburg. Tank-infantry teams were moving toward the city in a wide arc, and spearheads were making their appearances in all the suburbs.

Within Augsburg itself, the unrest had come to a focus. Various isolated underground groups discovered each other and joined forces.

Real military strength was lacking, however. A friendly battalion of troops in the Pfersee Kaserne west of the city had been transferred at the last moment. Revolutionary tactics were improvised. Early on 28 April, agents were dispatched to spread the news that the city had surrendered and that white flags should be flown everywhere. The appeal was circulated from house to house. Patrols were sent out to meet elements of the American assault and guide them quickly into the town. The 3rd Battalion commander was led up Karolinenstrasse to the command post pill-box of General Fehn, who was given five minutes to surrender. General Fehn made an attempt to call for SS reinforcements south of Augsburg. The deputy Gauleiter committed suicide. His telephone and pistol both forcibly removed, the General was escorted out of his pillbox; and he stared with surprise at the dozen-odd men in three jeeps, a tank, and a reconnaissance car. A white flag was flying from the tower of St. Ulrich, the highest point in Augsburg. The city had fallen. Dismounted and motorized security patrols arrived to roam the streets, clear underground shelter tunnels, buildings, and sidealleys. Mop-up details were accompanied by armor and loud-speakers. The people complied with the order to open all windows and to display white flags. American troops then cut away to the east toward the Munich autobahn with orders to "barrel down the big highway."

To the right of the 3rd Division, which was to return as the right flank of XV Corps for the attack on Munich, the 4th Division crossed the Lech River and was making steady progress in its zone. The 36th Division, which was attached to XXI Corps to relieve the 63rd Division, attacked south and southeast from the vicinity of Landsberg, mopping up behind 12th Armored tanks. Task forces were blocking the northern approaches to the Bavarian Alps and cutting the road net extending southeast from Munich. According to Seventh Army intentions, the infantry was to be prepared to move into the Inn River Valley, the armor, with one Combat Command of the 2nd French Armored Division attached, was directed toward the Brenner Pass. VI Corps was striking from Schongau and XXI Corps from Weilheim. It *was* understood in forward headquarters that the corps which hit the road

junction at Mittenwald first would drive on through Innsbruck. XXI Corps moved along sweeping the Ammersee-Wuermsee area; there were no enemy front lines with which troops were in contact. The terrain, blown bridges, a few defended roadblocks formed the principal obstacles to progress. The countryside roads were choked with masses of unescorted captured German prisoners and lines of Allied liberated personnel.

North of the Augsburg-Munich autobahn Seventh Army elements were driving for the capital city of Bavaria. In the center of the XV Corps zone, troops of the 42nd and 45th Infantry Divisions moved consistently forward despite enemy delaying actions. Before them lay the 2nd Mountain Division, retreating cleverly, the 17th SS and 25th SS Divisions, always protected by withdrawal orders which guaranteed them security for a day or two. Also in front lay the town of Dachau. In Dachau the Nazi regime had established its first and largest concentration camp; and on Sunday afternoon, 29 April, when the first American soldier broke through the gates there were more than 30,000 prisoners of every nationality, religion, and political allegiance.

Dachau was entered by both the 42nd and 45th Divisions. It was reported that I Company of the 222nd Regiment entered the camp at 1313 hours, and that the 2nd Battalion of the 157th Infantry entered the camp at 1445 hours and cleared it at 1705 hours. The first entry was made by a special forward patrol, led by General Linden, assistant commander of the 42nd Division. It was met only by some SS sniper fire. General Linden reported,

It was unbelievable. Freight cars full of piled cadavers no more than bones covered with skin, bloody heaps at the rail car doors where weakened prisoners, trying to get out, were machine-gunned to death by the SS . . . rooms stacked almost to the ceilings high with tangled human bodies adjoining the cremation furnaces . . . rooms where lay the dying survivors of the horror train, limp under filthy blankets, laying in human excreta, trying to salute our officers with broomstick arms, only to fall back . . .


Some two weeks before, in reply to the Dachau commandant's request that the camp be turned over to the Allies, Heinrich Himmler had

written that such a procedure was not to be considered. The camp was to be evacuated immediately and no prisoner allowed to fall into Allied hands alive. Himmler, who signed himself as SS Reichsfuehrer, warned that prisoners had behaved barbarously to the civilian population at Buchenwald. In spite of these orders, only one large-scale transport leaving Dachau was organized before American troops overran the area.

According to the account of the 157th Regiment, which was attacking past Dachau on the divisional boundary line, a German woman cycling north on the road was stopped for questioning and revealed that she had just come from Munich, crossing a bridge in the town of Dachau itself. Company L mounted tanks and raced for Dachau. The armored column sped into town. When the lead tank reached a point just 20 yards from the bridge, the structure blew up raining debris on all the riders. Reconnaissance located a nearby footbridge, and the concentration camp was assaulted. The battle was a singular encounter with the SS, who had previously been held as a threat and never committed. Some 300 guards and troops were eliminated after a stiff fire fight.

The prisoners were overcome with joy. Some had rushed the electrically charged wires for their freedom. Many were electrocuted, but others got through to hunt down their wardens and beat them with fists and stones. They even seized weapons and shot many guards to death. Prisoners identified SS men masquerading in prisoners clothing and killed them. Violence threatened to get out of hand, and eventually infantrymen had to fire over inmates' heads to quiet them down. Guarding the typhus-infested camp, became an important military task. But the hysteria soon subsided. Flags and colors, which had been improvised from sheets and scraps of cloth and buried in barracks and rafters, were raised throughout Dachau. Men sang songs of their homelands; others danced; and others wept. A few, whose spirits had been broken by long years of imprisonment, stood petrified and stonefaced. The camp underground, an "International Prisoners' Committee", assisted in the maintenance of order; and the combat troops moved forward to participate in the four-division assault of Munich.





## The End of Nazi Munich

Seventh Army had its entire left flank in motion for the drive on Munich, Germany's third largest city. With a population of three-quarters of a million, Munich ranked after Berlin and Hamburg; it was also the political, administrative, and cultural center of Bavaria. Armor moved out in front during the night of 27-28 April. All three regiments of the 45th Division were completely motorized in order to follow closely the advances of the 20th Armored Division. The 106th Cavalry Group was attached to give the infantry more mobility and striking power. The 42nd Division, farther west, was closing in behind the armor in its zone.



ST. PAUL'S CHURCH IN MUNICH

*"... With a population of three-quarters of a million Munich ranked after Berlin and Hamburg ..."*

Following the capture of Augsburg, the 3rd Division, on the XV Corps right flank, moved out along the autobahn, and Highway 2 south of the autobahn, driving motorized columns through roadblocks and scattered



German bands. Continuous truck convoys were scarcely enough to keep supplies available for the speeding offensive, and in the next few days an airborne load of some 400,000 gallons of gasoline was landed, and managed to relieve the major shortages.

There was no little rivalry and competition among Seventh Army forces for the prize of the city of Munich. Just east of Augsburg, in Friedberg, which was surrendered by the burgomeister without a fight, General O'Daniel had issued orders to push toward Munich as fast as possible. It was reported that a Freedom Movement had sprung up within the city, and that along the autobahn between Augsburg and



#### INFANTRYMEN SURROUNDING FRIEDBERG

*" . . . Friedberg was surrendered by the burgomeister without a fight . . . "*

Munich there were only a few troops with perhaps roadblocks and blown bridges. When intelligence of the internal dissension in Munich reached headquarters of the 12th Armored Division, a squadron of the 101st

Cavalry Group was moved around the southern tip of the Ammersee and up Highway 12 to the northeast toward Munich.

General White, Army Chief of Staff, informed the units under army command that Seventh Army had received a delegation from Munich which expressed a desire to have Munich spared in the same way as Augsburg. Three infantry divisions were converging on the city. The 42nd Division was making a relatively slow advance. Blown bridges were in its way, and armor crowded all the roads. Infantry troops were banked up waiting for the traffic confusion ahead to clear, when finally General Collin's request for a clear passage was answered with the removal of all elements of the 20th Armored Division. Late on 28 April, General O'Daniel indicated his concern that some other division might reach Munich first, if his units did not put out the necessary speed. When at long last the city of Munich fell during the next two days, three infantry divisions, two armored divisions, and a cavalry group all claimed the prize and submitted reports of early entries and special agreements with the mayor, the governor, and private revolutionary groups.

Within the city itself there had been a limited civil war. These last days of April were an opportunity for the German underground to express itself in action. The rapid advance of American troops, the helplessness of the German army, and the growing disaffection of whole sections of the civilian population created a revolutionary situation. As Seventh Army approached Munich, plans to strike a blow against the Nazi regime were made by a variety of groups ranging from sincere anti-Nazi underground workers to war-weary burghers and common opportunists. Some of them were coordinated by a centralizing leadership; others worked alone and were caught up in the natural course of the violence which broke out during the night of 27-28 April. The simultaneity of the little revolts and rebellions in the city of Munich and throughout the Bavarian countryside gave a formal appearance of unified direction to what was really a number of disconnected events.

The armed cadre of the Munich Putsch consisted of three platoons of the *Dolmetscher Kompanie* (Interpreter Company) of Wehrkreis VII, commanded by Captain Rupprecht Gerngross. A substantial auxiliary force to this group was supplied by a panzer replacement bat-

talion stationed at Freising and nearby units with sympathetic infantry personnel. The Putsch had a limited, temporary success. The Nazi Governor of Bavaria, General Ritter von Epp, was taken into custody; and the Munich radio station was seized and converted into an anti-Nazi propaganda agency. But the main assaults proved inadequate, and with the failure to take the offices of the party in the city and the army headquarters at Pullach, the rebellion began to lose ground. Although the word had been spread sufficiently to touch off independent street activity, the signal for the revolt had been issued too soon for it to be effectively coordinated with the American offensive. Nevertheless, when elements of Seventh Army made their way into the city some 48 hours later, they could report that the anti-Nazi underground movement was of considerable help in the taking of Munich and that all bridges were intact.

The half-encirclement of Munich by the 45th Division moving in from the north, the 42nd Division from the northwest, and the 3rd Division along the Isar River from the south was almost complete on 29 April, although it was not until the next day that the city was wholly clear. Some time before noon on 30 April forward troops of the 3rd and 42nd Divisions poured into the metropolitan area, meeting no resistance, only small groups of cheering civilians waving both white and Bavarian flags. The 45th Division met a less friendly reception. Some resistance was contributed by several SS battalions entrenched in prepared defensive positions centered around their college and barracks in the northern outskirts of the city, known in the Hitler era as the *Hauptstadt der Bewegung*.

The 45th Division had been moving forward with three regiments abreast. On 29 April the 180th Infantry, following the armor, had attacked toward Munich at 0630 hours. Enemy fire at the railroad underpass north of Schleissheim stopped the tanks to the immediate front of the infantry. Dismounted troops proceeded to reduce the resistance and cross the Schleissheimer Canal. The 179th Infantry had cut its way to the Ingolstadt-Munich autobahn, but its advance was halted abruptly when strong artillery and small arms fire opened up on Garching. One company was forced to withdraw. Air strikes were requested but denied because of inclement weather and other employ-

ment. Early plans for a task-force coup, involving a German-American commando seizure of the SS staff, fell through.

Finally, the Division organized its three-pronged assault which carried it into the heart of the city. The 157th Infantry attacked from Dachau at 0700 hours on 30 April, uncovered another concentration camp, and moved through light opposition to reach the Isar River and secure the bridges. The 179th Infantry cleared Garching house by house, and sped down into the city to the river. In the middle, the 180th Regiment still found determined and coordinated resistance on the part of SS troops. Enemy activity was being slowly snuffed out by barrages from 240mm howitzers. Infantry companies, however, were forced to advance under the cover of smoke screens; and one battalion attacked and withdrew three times across open ground burning with intense flak, mortar, and machine gun fire. During the assault, white flags were going up. One command post reported that there was a large white streamer on top of the biggest building in Munich. The SS troops remained to be driven out window by window and wall by wall. The purging of the SS college and barracks was complete by 1500 hours, and before midnight all the battalions had closed to the final phase line along the Isar.

On 1 May, General Eisenhower, in a special order of the day, wrote: "The whole Allied Expeditionary Force congratulates the Seventh Army on the seizure of Munich, the cradle of the Nazi beast." General Patch detailed the 45th Division to garrison the city, which was little more than a massive shell, and instructed XV Corps to prepare for further action after a two-day rest period. VI Corps was faced only with Innsbruck and Landeck, and the Brenner and Resia Passes, deep in Austria. XXI Corps was about to enter the Inn River Valley. The feeling was widespread that the war was almost over, the campaign against Germany drawing to a close. The Seventh Army G-3 noted, "there is a growing need for maps of the Pacific area . . ."



# CHAPTER XXX

## *Last Days*

On 1 May Seventh Army faced an enemy force scattered from Innsbruck to Salzburg in an arc of confusion. General Foertsch's First German Army had no semblance of organization. Some eleven of its divisions, which included six Volks Grenadier, two Infantry, and the 2nd Mountain, had been destroyed, their ranks decimated to less than 500 combat infantry effectives. The SS troops alone were in a position or a condition to hold. The 38th SS Grenadier Division, under LXXXII Corps, was responsible for the right flank, and on the left, under the XIII SS Corps, the 407th Mobilization Division and the 17th SS were making organized withdrawals, still threatening to commit their combat infantry strength which amounted to about 7,000. Farther west new elements, including the 1st Indian Legion, were being absorbed by General Brandenburg's Nineteenth Army. For a long period the Twenty-Fourth German Army had been guarding the Swiss frontier east of Basel against the eventuality of an Allied thrust; but this was only a skeleton force of low-grade miscellaneous outfits, most of which the German Command had always been wary of committing to action. General Brandenburg himself had not a single division capable of effective defensive combat. The total strength of the 47th, 189th, 246th, 257th and 559th Volks Grenadier, plus the 465th Mobilization Division, came to 3,000 men.

The enemy facing Seventh Army had neither an order of battle nor a front line. A top-secret telegram which ordered the assumption of the Befehlshaber Nord command by General Jaschke was the last instance of coordinated defensive instructions. His primary mission, as stated, was to occupy the north front of the Alps fortress and to block the entrance to the mountains as a main effort. Fortification of strong-

points was to be carried out with the utmost effort using unarmed soldiers of dissolved units. Very few of the commanders and Gauleiters to whom the directive was addressed ever received it. By 2 May the picture of dissolution was clear. At noon on that day the surrender of the German forces in Italy became effective.

## Into the Valley

The Inn Valley is isolated from Bavaria on the north and from Italy on the south by two great ranges of precipitous mountains which



### THE INN VALLEY IN THE BAVARIAN ALPS

*"... The Inn Valley is isolated from Bavaria ... by two great ranges of precipitous mountains ..."*

constitute the classic Alpine block of difficult military terrain. The parallel ranges run roughly northeast-southwest; and the walls are pierced by a number of roads leading to the water-shed of the Inn River, which flows out of Switzerland through the heart of the Austrian Tyrol

past Innsbruck, the Tyrolese capital and age-old cross-roads of commerce. These entrances, however, scarcely formed effective avenues of approach, subject as they were to commanding ground on front and flanks.

These almost prohibitive conditions of combat had stopped the 10th Armored Division in its headlong advance; vehicles had been bottlenecked, and the terrain precluded the maneuver necessary for the proper employment of armor. Infantry patrols alone proved able to manage, and the 44th and 103rd Divisions proceeded to push toward VI Corps objectives on the Seventh Army right flank, the passes into and out of Austria. The almost vertical walls of the valleys, rising in forested slopes to the bare, solid rock of the peaks above, crowded invading troops into corridors served only by narrow, twisting roads. The few springlike days of the last week in April had given way to a return of winter. Snow and sleet were falling, while heavy clouds filled the narrow valleys and canyons from wall to wall, "like the ceiling of a room." To the west the First French Army was fighting south into the Austrian province of Vorarlberg. On the VI Corps front the 44th Division reached out toward the Fern and Resia Passes via Imst and Landeck, while farther east the 103rd Division approached the Inn Valley through the Mittenwald Pass in its zone. To the south the Fifth Army was moving up through the Italian Tyrol for a junction of American forces.

For the infantry of the 44th Division the first days of May were a series of engagements for key mountain passes. The tortuous terrain rendered by-passing tactics almost impossible, requiring the search for additional axes along which to press the attack and avoid road-blocked defiles. German resistance centered at the Fern Pass, the better of the two passes in the division zone leading into the Inn watershed. The fire-fight at this point lasted for 48 hours on 1 and 2 May before positions were overpowered by a well-executed envelopment of the rear. The out-flanking movement to the east cut the road behind the Germans and linked up American forces for the final drive on Imst and Landeck.

For a day and a night the 71st Infantry had made no progress against several hundred entrenched enemy employing small arms, machine guns, mortars, and panzerfaust fire to cover the series of road



craters in the vicinity of Fern. One battalion had fought past a landslide and a road-block to face the last holding force at the pass itself, when another battalion advancing in the rear was approached by a band of mountaineers. This party of five, an officer and four enlisted men of an Austrian partisan organization, offered to guide the Americans over the mountains. There was apparently a little-known route to the east of and around the pass to Fernstein, lying just to the south at a point where a deep gorge was bridged. The offer was accepted, and while the battle to the north continued, Fernstein to the south was secured. Elements moved up the highway to take the defenders from the rear by surprise.

The drive was resumed, but not without further resistance from natural obstacles. Huge snow banks blocked the roads, and troops were



#### INFANTRYMEN ON ROAD LEADING TO RESIA PASS

*" . . . Landeck ahead and the Resia Pass beyond were the final objectives . . . "*

exposed to freezing weather. The war, however, was now simply a matter of a few more uncomfortable hours; and when news of the end





came at 1705 hours on 5 May the keeper of the 71st Regimental Journal scrawled the entry, "all hostilities will cease" and added in the margin, "about time!" On 4 May the 44th Division had cleared Imst and had come into sight of Landeck. The troops moved on toward the little town of Mils where the division fought its last battle.

Landeck ahead and the Resia Pass beyond were the final objectives, and both now were American targets. The town of Mils was left burning; and in the local truce arrangements made with Nineteenth Army commanders, represented by several colonels from the 257th German Infantry Division, a withdrawal to a line south of Landeck was agreed upon. By 1900 hours on 5 May the city of Landeck was occupied by American forces who now awaited news of the larger developments involving surrender and peace.

Farther east on the VI Corps front the 103rd Division had faced the city of Innsbruck, Seventh Army's primary objective in the Tyrol. Operations Instructions to the division had made clear its responsibility for spearheading through the Inn Valley to the Brenner Pass. General Brooks had told General McAuliffe on 1 May:

All my chips are on you now. The other people have run into a 500 foot chunk of blown road on the side of a cliff and it will practically stymie them . . . so we have got to do it with you. So drive hard and toss your blocks out on all these roads that you pass.

By the end of the day one regiment was out beyond Mittenwald and had practically cleared the Scharnitz-Seefeld highway. But it was not before evening on 3 May that troops entered Innsbruck, and only on the next morning that formal surrender of the city was taken.

Moving through Scharnitz, division intelligence discovered that the local commercial telephone exchange still had communications with German-held territories to the south. A call was put through and conversations were begun with the Innsbruck military command, which seemed anxious to negotiate. At some time during the four hours given the Germans to consider the demand for surrender the telephone lines went out. There was, however, every indication that resistance was crumbling and that enemy commanders were in a receptive mood for

any kind of ultimatum. One commander had come forward under a white flag and proposed an armistice pending the completion of negotiations one way or the other. The American battalion commander



#### FIRE FIGHT NEAR SCHARNITZ, AUSTRIA

*" . . . One regiment . . . had practically cleared the Scharnitz-Seefeld highway . . . "*

refused the request. His orders had been to continue the attack. Fighting was resumed in the vicinity of Seefeld and Reith.

Further threats to the German command, the immediate aerial and artillery destruction of the city of Innsbruck, brought agreement to capitulation. Papers were prepared for the surrender of the entire Tyrol-Vorarlberg area, and *parliamentaires* were dispatched for American emissaries passing through the lines. Blindfolded, and carrying white flags, the American mission climbed eight miles down the mountain from Reith into the Inn Valley. Members of the surrender party arrived at the headquarters to find themselves prisoners. The German Army negotiator was seized and told that armed Austrians had taken over the town and

were in control everywhere. That afternoon the underground resistance movement had managed a successful coup.

This new complication proved to be very confusing. There were at that time other resistance groups in the area, as well as groups of fanatical German defenders whose sniper fire from the Alpine heights slowed down the infantry advance. Nevertheless, the issue was only a matter of hours, or a day; and General McAuliffe on his own responsibility called off the scheduled destruction of Innsbruck.

The Tyrolean resistance movement was of the same partisan cut as the forces which had sabotaged the German defense in Augsburg and Munich. Here in Austria there was an additional nationalist factor, and this served further to divide the loyalty of the troops at the disposal of the Gauleiter. Most of the main targets of the partisan putsch had been seized during the afternoon and evening of 2 May. The Gestapo camp and archives, the barracks of an SS Kaserne, the gendarmerie and police barracks, the local concentration camp, and the German Army headquarters were all taken, although not without a number of sharp fire-fights. An American impression of the Innsbruck revolution had

heavily-armed Austrians swarming all over the place, and the whole set-up looked like a Class C Hollywood movie . . . . Some were in German uniform, some in civilian clothing, all wearing the white and red arm-band of the resistance movement. They all seemed excited and keyed up . . . Their attitude was very friendly . . . The halls were stacked with cases of MG and SA ammunition, and there were long rows of panzerfaust layed out. The men were loaded with 2 or 3 weapons each and had hand grenades stuck in their belts . . . all seemed excited and apprehensive that SS troops were coming in.

According to information received by 103rd Division intelligence, the partisan chief had about 800 armed men at his disposal, 300 from a battalion of Wehrmacht troops and 500 armed civilians. They had not only taken over most of the military installations but were preparing to take over the city's radio station. Threatened by SS troops east of Innsbruck, they had requested the entry of American troops as soon as possible. Unfortunately resistance forces had no control over the enemy still fighting against the 103rd Division north and west of the city.

During the morning of 3 May the 409th Regiment continued its attack from Seefeld. One battalion moved out to the west toward Telfs; another advanced to clear Reith and Zirl in the face of some small arms and mortar fire. The intelligence filtered through that Innsbruck was an "open city;" and tank-mounted infantry moved east from Zirl, found the highway clear of all obstacles, and entered the city of Innsbruck late in the afternoon. By 1945 hours Americans had crossed the Inn River bridges and were moving through the Tyrolean capital. The weather was bitter cold with swirling snow; but there were crowds everywhere wildly cheering, waving red and white banners. People clogged the streets and held up military traffic along the Maria-Theresien Strasse.

For the troops, however, there was time for neither politics nor liberation ceremonies. VI Corps, its objective the Brenner Pass, urged the division on. That night Seventh Army's last combat mission on this front was dispatched. The 411th Regiment, motorized, moved



#### BRENNER PASS

*" . . . VI Corps, its objective the Brenner Pass, urged the division on . . . "*

out to race for the Italian border. With full head-lights shining brilliantly, the column made for the Brenner Pass. The full illumination was to increase the speed of the advance; lessen danger from mines and curving, slippery, mountain roads; and also to disconcert whatever enemy there might be. Peace rumors were abroad everywhere, and the long, lighted, 175-vehicle column might be deceptive. Brenner was taken at 0150 hours on 4 May. Later in the morning, at a point between Colle Isarco and Vipiteno in Italy, advance parties of General Patch's Seventh Army and General Truscott's Fifth Army met and joined. The task forces, which included a handful of jeeps, tanks, and armored cars, were from the 103rd Division's 411th Regiment, and the 88th Division's cavalry reconnaissance. The junction of American forces from Germany and Italy was completed on the highway where Mussolini and Hitler had met in former days.

After futile efforts to arrange some kind of official large-scale surrender, the American mission with its white flags and *parliamentaires* carrying it safely back and forth over friendly, allied, and enemy lines, found its way to Hall, a short distance down the Inn Valley. There Major West, G-2 of the 103rd Division located Gauleiter Hofer, Reichskommissar for the defense of the entire area and governor of Tyrol-Vorarlberg. Whatever hopes there were for a surrender agreement were precluded by the news that Hofer had been stripped of his military responsibilities the day before. A telegraphic message had been received from Kesselring, dated 2 May, specifically excluding Gauleiter interference in the further conduct of the war. This apparently was the Field Marshal's own preparation for surrender maneuvers. Hofer confessed that there were neither organized bodies of Wehrmacht or SS troops in the area, that there were no defenses from Innsbruck to Brenner and to Salzburg, and that the Redoubt or *innerfestung* was a dream. Of his own Standschutzen forces which had numbered 56 battalions, only three were left and he was no longer in touch with them. He denied that he had weapons in his home; a search revealed 3 high-powered rifles with telescopic sights, 3 pistols, a short-wave radio. Gauleiter Hofer was removed as a prisoner, and he bade goodbye to his household with a Nazi salute and a "Heil Hitler!"



## The Surrender of Tyrol-Vorarlberg

At the conclusion of the Innsbruck incident, the surrender of the German forces facing Seventh Army in west Austria proceeded according to a detailed "scenario." According to a VI Corps memorandum of 4 May on the ceremony for surrender, there was to be a motor escort, a guard with flags and colors, and a time schedule with all participants to be at their posts at 1130 hours on 5 May and the German commander to arrive at 1200 hours. The conference room was to be set up around a long table in accord with an appended diagram, specifying flags and positions of orderlies, interpreters, generals, and the German delegation.

Published plans detailed the development of events from the meeting of the escort with the German commander at the edge of town to the coming to attention of the guards and the dismounting, including the procession to the conference hall. No salutes were to be given or returned. The occasions for standing were listed, as were the order to be seated and the identification procedures. Then there was the reading of the terms of surrender. Germans were permitted to enter a side room for discussion among themselves if they so desired. Then came the signing of the documents; a total of 12 copies, 1 copy each in English, French, and German, distribution to the Sixth Army Group, Seventh Army, the First French Army, and VI Corps. Finally, the German delegation was to leave with no handshaking, no returning of salutes. The guard was to come to attention and present arms to the Commanding General, VI Corps; and finally there was to be the playing of the Marseillaise and the Star Spangled Banner.

There were only insignificant departures from the script. Lieutenant General Erich Brandenburg, Commanding General of the Nineteenth German Army, motored into Innsbruck from the Brenner Pass road, arriving at the Landsrat building in Innsbruck at 1320 hours, a little late. The prepared drafts of unconditional surrender were read. A few problems were raised. Obviously the effective hour of surrender was dependent upon radio communication facilities. The Innsbruck radio was operational; and the scattered remnants of the Nazi army could, thus, be organized. A request was presented to allow the arming of German guards, necessary for the effective protection of dumps and

other installations. This was granted. A request that the draft of surrender be further modified to allow German general officers to retain their arms was refused. The rest was less significant. The Commanding General of the Nineteenth Army objected to the reference to him in the French translation of the surrender papers as a *Lieutenant General*, asserting that the equivalent in the French Army is *General*. The German emissaries were directed to present themselves without further delay. At 1500 hours General Brandenburg, with aides, returned to the conference hall. Present among others were General Brooks, General McAuliffe, General Morris, and General Dean. The unconditional surrender of the German troops was taken. Hostilities, for the United States VI Corps, and for the First French Army were over.

According to the Innsbruck surrender terms, all forces, including para-military forces would cease unconditionally all acts of



#### GERMAN NINETEENTH ARMY MEN LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS

"... Arms, weapons, ammunition were to be collected at dumps; and all military equipment, telephones, radios, vehicles, and all movable military impedimenta were to be assembled ..."

hostility toward forces of the United Nations not later than 1800 hours, 5 May 1945. The Germans were to disarm themselves and remain in their present areas; the concentration of all equipment and personnel was required. Arms, weapons, and ammunition were to be collected at dumps; and all military equipment, telephones, radios, vehicles, and all movable military impedimenta were to be assembled. A troop list and a detailed catalog of minefield information was to be prepared. Instructions for the surrender of prisoners of war, political prisoners, hostages, and deportees were to be complied with immediately. The display or wearing of Nazi party badges, brassards, flags, and decorations was strictly prohibited. The Waffen SS was segregated from the Wehrmacht.

There was still anxiety over the possibility of a guerrilla resistance. Disorganized bands of enemy, well armed, were still roaming the mountains. Members of Nazi organizations, high and low ranking, were at large. The heights teemed with displaced persons of many nations. Seventh Army units moved out quickly to complete the occupation of assigned areas. Troops moved up the mountain valleys, town by town, village by village, until they reached the mountain walls and glaciers that marked the limits of human habitation. Patrols penetrated even into the snowfields in these fastnesses, seeking the hiders-out in lonely huts of German Alpine clubs. Roadblocks and check stations were set up at strategic points along the roads. VI Corps, which at the end of operations found itself back in Italy where it had fought on the beaches of Anzio some twelve months before, completed the occupation of its zone as far south as the Austro-Swiss and the Austro-Italian frontiers. Contact was maintained with elements of the Fifth United States Army at Brenner Pass and at Resia Pass where American elements met on 7 May. German commanders proceeded with the disarmament and administration of their units, and no incidents were reported during any of the security and police missions.

To the west in Vorarlberg, French and German troops became involved in a new burst of hostilities after the Innsbruck surrender. The difficulty apparently was that General Schmidt, commanding the Twenty-fourth German Army, had originally made contact with the First French Army. A truce had been arranged, but General Schmidt

never appeared at the French headquarters and the Twenty-Fourth Army had at the last moment been attached to the Nineteenth German Army.

General De Lattre in a message to General Devers objected strongly to the fact that General Schmidt had surrendered his forces to the Americans with those of the Nineteenth German Army. The French commander requested that General Schmidt and his staff be turned over to French authorities for disposition. The request was disapproved by the Sixth Army Group Commander. A new cease fire order was issued on 7 May and fighting ended shortly thereafter.

Officially, however, all resistance along the VI Corps front west of Imst ceased at 1800 hours on 5 May in accordance with the negotiations for unconditional surrender by the Nineteenth German Army. It had been learned that negotiations were in progress with General Foertsch for the surrender of the entire German Army Group G, and that General Patch, concerned to prevent further casualties, had ordered Seventh Army troops frozen in place. Intelligence was immediately dispatched that VI Corps occupational task forces were already moving into their assigned places on the right flank. The Army commander's approval was passed to VI Corps through General White, his Chief of Staff, and the separate arrangements made by VI Corps were credited and approved within the framework of the larger negotiations with Army Group G.

The final touch to the surrender of Tyrol-Vorarlberg was this coordination with the surrender schedule which had been completed by representatives of XV Corps, Seventh Army, and Sixth Army Group in the Salzburg-Munich sector. General Brooks was advised by General Barr, Sixth Army Group Chief of Staff, that the surrender to VI Corps, effective 1800 hours on 5 May, gave an advantage over the army group surrender, effective 1200 hours on 6 May and that he should insist upon compliance with the extra 18-hour deadline. General Barr added: "I think everything is in the bag. General Devers and General Patch were working with XV Corps." By the end of the day there was peace on the Seventh Army front.

## To Salzburg and Berchtesgaden

Final movements on the Seventh Army center and left flank remain to be considered. The Inn River flows east in the Tyrol and curves gently north to the frontier to emerge out of Austria into Germany. Between the Inn River and the Austro-German border stand great ranges of Alpine mountains which are best approached from the north-east in a southwesterly direction. In the middle of the Seventh Army front General Milburn's XXI Corps was attacking from the northwest in a southeasterly direction. These central forces were thus denied easy access to the Inn Valley by rugged mountains running parallel with the river. The 36th and 4th Infantry Divisions struck directly at the valley objectives; the 12th Armored Division moved east and around to seek natural entrances.

This swinging movement in the center unbalanced the course of the Seventh Army offensive. XXI Corps pushed over on the line of advance of XV Corps, which, on the army left flank, was now no longer facing south but pointed directly at the Salzburg Gap. The city of Salzburg itself was in the zone of the Third Army; and General Patton, because of his long, exposed, lightly-held left flank, was unprepared to advance on the Salzach River corridor until sufficient infantry had been brought up to assist and protect adequately his armor. There was considerable anxiety over the possibility that German troops, fleeing in front of the Third Army, might pour into the Alpine Redoubt area through the Salzburg Pass. The zones were quickly changed. General Patch was to strike for the city of Salzburg. The whole transaction, which involved among others General Devers, General Bradley, and General Eisenhower, was handled over the secret telephone, and some of the final details were expedited by plane. The major decision was cleared within twenty-four hours. In the opinion of Sixth Army Group, the decision which gave the Salzburg area to Seventh Army probably brought about the collapse of forces in South Germany. General Milburn and General Haislip were able to move into the former zone of the Third Army by an open flank and get to Salzburg with no loss of time.

As of 1 May General Patch had halted all units on the left flank for an estimated two-day rest. The 45th Division was left to garrison

the city of Munich. Cavalry units were ordered to reconnoiter; and elements of the 3rd and 42nd Infantry and 20th Armored Divisions were to do no more than send patrols out to the front and flanks. Troop commanders, however, had difficulty slowing down the combat momentum which the April offensive had accumulated. By noon of 2 May all SHAEF approvals had been received for the drive to Salzburg. In telephone conversations that afternoon General Haislip relayed the information to his commanders.

Seventh Army troops sped for Salzburg and Berchtesgaden with enthusiasm and incidental confusion. One report of a traffic jam had five individual columns trying to get through a single by-pass. Light resistance in wooded areas, mostly from boys, was brushed aside. In the city of Rosenheim a few platoons slipped through some four battalions of enemy and secured a pair of bridges over which both XXI and XV Corps were to pass. The German regiment in Rosenheim, prematurely celebrating the end of the war with the news of Hitler's death, was effectively bluffed; and an American company commander accepted the surrender of the garrison. Counter-bluffs on the part of the enemy failed to bring him any advantage. One German colonel came through under a flag of truce and threatened resistance in his poison-gas dump area, unless he was given 24 hours to evacuate. The advance continued without regard for the threat. In the early evening of 2 May elements of the 106th Cavalry Group took the surrender of General Ferenc-Loskaz and some 8,000 men and officers of the Hungarian Army's 9th Infantry Division.

Villages and towns all along the route of the Seventh Army attack were flying white flags; only a few bursts of machine-gun fire were needed to prompt the display. Individual task forces moved with such rapidity that they sometimes found themselves isolated. The 17th Armored Infantry Battalion of Combat Command R, 12th Armored Division, had jumped off from Starnberg on the Wurm See at 0645 hours on 2 May. At 1550 hours the armored infantry, whose half-tracks travelled two abreast down the Salzburg autobahn, halted their column beyond Pfraundorf some 60 miles away. Behind these spearheads of Combat Command R, SS engineers blew up a large autobahn bridge.

Hour by hour the main roads became increasingly choked by the mass formations of surrendering Germans and their straggling columns of motor and horsedrawn vehicles.

American armor and infantry were striking freely in every sector of the mountain area. The 103rd Division, moving toward Innsbruck and the Brenner Pass, sent another force some 30 miles down the Inn River valley to make contact with XXI Corps, now dominating the Kaiser-Gebirge and the Kitzbuehler Alps. XV Corps, operating with the 20th Armored Division and the 106th Cavalry Group, the 3rd, the 42nd, and the 86th Infantry Divisions, swept through the autobahn area over Wasserburg and Rosenheim around both sides of the Chiem See and toward the Salzach River. The 86th Division, picked up from the Third Army flank, had been attached to Seventh Army effective 1900 hours on 2 May.



MAJOR GENERAL HARRIS  
M. MELASKY

*"... commanding the 86th  
Infantry Division ..."*

The attack on the city of Salzburg was less a combat problem than a motor march. The prize was not only Salzburg but Berchtesgaden, the retreat of Adolph Hitler lying in the shadow of the Obersalzberg mountain. There was virtually no resistance en route; and the long lanes of the autobahn, conceived as great strips for Nazi military maneuver, served the American Army well.

The German forces were without transport, without armor, and, since the loss of the Munich positions, without artillery. A few rounds of small-arms fire defended an occasional road-block. American divisions, which had seized everything on wheels for rapid movement, including all the trucks of the unemployed supporting artillery battalions, rolled out of Bavaria. There were some difficulties in Rosenheim as civilian riots broke out. There was no trouble before Salzburg. The city was being shelled when the garrison commander dispatched a delegation which crossed the space between on foot and offered unconditional surrender to elements of a

cavalry squadron. General O'Daniel authorized the 106th Cavalry Group to accept the surrender. General Haislip then authorized General O'Daniel, upon his request, to accept the surrender in the name of the 3rd Division. This was on the morning of 4 May; the countryside was being blanketed by a post-seasonal snow, as a cold, damp wind whipped up and across the highways from the Tyrolean Alps. XV Corps troops now hooked back into Germany through the Salzburg pass toward Berchtesgaden, some 10 to 15 miles south and a little west.

General Milburn had already committed elements of both the 101st Airborne Division and General Leclerc's 2nd French Armored Division to a XXI Corps lunge for Berchtesgaden. The 2nd French Armored Division, which had been a part of Seventh Army operations at various times since its first assignment with XV Corps in the Luneville sector, had rejoined the army for its final drive after operations against the Germans pockets on the French Atlantic coast.

During the night of 3-4 May, however, General Patch, cutting in on the wires of a telephone conversation between Generals Haislip and O'Daniel, found immediate capture of Berchtesgaden as feasible as it was desirable and gave the go-ahead signal to the 3rd Division. The progress toward the "eagle's nest" on Obersalzberg was closely watched from the new Seventh Army Command Post, which had opened in Augsburg at 1200 hours on 3 May, the last of its moves from the beginning of Operation *DRAGOON* to victory in Europe. Early in the afternoon of 4 May 3rd Division elements were reported about two and a half miles from Berchtesgaden. Plans were made to turn searchlights and headlights on for a night march. The 3rd Division was, of course, entirely out of zone, to which XXI Corps called attention. The reply was that the Army Commander had personally directed the capture of that area and it would be turned over shortly.

The Obersalzberg mountain was still smoking and smouldering from Allied bombing missions of the preceding days and from local fires started by desperate SS guards. The difficulty in closing into Berchtesgaden was due largely to the clogged condition of the roads. As one message reported, "everybody and his brother are trying to get into the town." Motorized task forces entered the mountain hide-out at 1558



hours on 4 May. During the night the 7th Regiment came, then the rest of the 3rd Division, tank columns of the 2nd French Armored Division, and patrols of the 101st Airborne Division. The next day American troops were tearing down banners and insignia. A ceremony attended the raising of the American flag. Airborne patrols were moving in, trying to establish law and order. The mountain retreat which Adolph Hitler had built was now destroyed.

## The Surrender of Army Group G

After the capitulation in Italy, Field Marshal Kesselring had asked General Wolff, who was in command of the surrendering SS troops in North Italy, to find out with whom he should deal regarding his own capitulation. The information was forwarded. SHAEF informed General Devers of Kesselring's request, and through AFHQ the German High



### GERMANS SURRENDER GROUP "G" TO SIXTH ARMY GROUP

*"... the surrender delegation headed by General Foertsch, First Army Commander, acting for General Schulz of Army Group G ..."*

Command headquarters learned that a conference with Sixth Army Group would be arranged. Instructions were included as to how the enemy representatives were to approach American lines and where they might come through. During the night of 3-4 May drafts of surrender terms were being drawn up in American command posts.

Seventh Army units in the Salzburg sector were alerted for the approach of the Kesselring party. The emissaries were to arrive in a vehicle with a white covering over the hood and a white flag displayed four feet over the frame. During the night of 4-5 May the 3rd Infantry Division made contact with the surrender delegation headed by General Foertsch, First Army Commander, acting for General Schulz of Army Group G. The plenipotentiaries were brought to a large estate near Munich, where on a grey, rainy Saturday in May the terms of unconditional surrender for the German armies on the southern front were dictated.



#### SURRENDER TERMS

*" . . . General Devers waited with General Patch, General Haislip . . . "*

The Thorak Estate at Haar was a formidable gray stone structure with granite steps, marble floors, and massive doors and windows. The large rooms of the studio-mansion were crowded with white plaster statues and nude figures on horse-back. On one side the Germans had their own conference room. On the other at the far end of the table and facing the door, General Devers waited with General Patch, General Haislip, and the various staffs. The two parties had met in the courtyard. The Germans came to attention. No salutes were exchanged. Only a small number of details remained to be settled and incorporated in the final draft. At noon, as Lieutenant Colonel Henry Cabot Lodge, of Sixth Army Group, has recorded, General Foertsch

mounted the few polished black marble steps and stood in the open door. He wore the polished black boots and light field grey uniform of the German Army. Around his neck was the Iron Cross . . . . He was followed by the officers of his party, similarly dressed, although with less ornamentation . . . . General Menoher (XV Corps Chief of Staff) presented General Foertsch to General Devers and General Foertsch in turn presented his officers, each of whom stood and bowed when his name was called . . . .

General Foertsch began to speak, taking up the paragraphs of the surrender document one by one. He spoke in a clear deep voice, very slowly and distinctly, so that every word could be understood by anyone having even a smattering of German. He never argued. He knew, of course, that he was beaten. He would often begin his statements with the sentence: "I deem it my duty to point out . . . ." and then would show, for example, that the German troops were so scattered that it would take more than the contemplated number of hours to get the news to them. Or else, coming to the dumps of German weapons which were to be established, he asked that they be guarded by armed men, lest disorderly elements in the country steal the weapons and thereby threaten law and order. He hoped that officers and military police could keep sidearms in order to maintain tranquility. His suggestions were all of that type. He stressed the number of refugees and the lack of food in his area.

General Devers would respond, asking questions and giving his views. After brief discussions, each point in turn was taken up. Boundaries were settled, the time schedule was established. General Devers was insistent that there be no misunderstanding on the big points — there was to be no 'armistice' — this was unconditional surrender . . . .

The point had to be made quite clear. At the will of the Allies all commissioned and enlisted personnel of Army Group G, including General Foertsch and General Schulz, would become prisoners of war. Foertsch sat stiffly at attention. It was a full minute before he said anything. The man was manifestly suffering from the impact of emotion of the most violent character. Finally he bowed his head slightly, flushing a little, and replied, "I understand it. I have no choice. I have no power to do otherwise . . . ."

There was perhaps no choice, but throughout these last days there was another alternative, and the German General Staff was anxious to have the issue settled. "Does the American High Command intend," Foertsch inquired at one stage, "to hand over any prisoners made by the American troops to Soviet Russia?" The answer was noncommittal. The enemy apparently considered the point significant. It had become increasingly clear that the German High Command wished to accomplish the maximum degree of surrender to the western allies before acknowledging the simultaneous victory of the Red Army. The few days' lapse between local surrenders in the west, and the final conclusive capitulation to all the Allies, enabled many German troops to move westward and give themselves up to Britons or Americans rather than to Russians.

The meeting was adjourned at 1430 hours. An hour or so later the surrender document was complete with the signatures of General Devers and General Foertsch, General Patch and General Haislip. Effective at 1200 hours on 6 May 1945 all German military and para-military forces under the command of Army Group G were to cease unconditionally all acts of hostilities toward forces of the United Nations. All enemy elements were to disarm themselves immediately, remain in their present areas, retaining all mess and transportation equipment, food and forage necessary for self-maintenance and subsistence. All equipment and personnel were to be concentrated. The terms, or "specifications" which were found to be semantically preferable since the Germans found an implication of "conditions" in the word "terms", detailed the requirements for such enemy elements as were to remain armed, the technical disposition of weapons and ammunition, the

character of necessary troop lists, and minefield markings. The German army relinquished nearly 100,000 square miles of territory, south of Allied lines to the Swiss and Italian borders and from the Rhine eastward to about 20 miles beyond Salzburg.

The surrender proceedings at Haar were clipped and systematic, businesslike, and military according to the book but there was little order or arrangement by map on the front lines. Even the formalities of the capitulation were not without their measures of confusion. It has been stated that on 5 May General Brooks of VI Corps was completing negotiations with representatives of the German Nineteenth Army at Innsbruck to accomplish the surrender of the enemy in Tyrol and Vorarlberg. The instrument of surrender of the Nineteenth Army, in fact, was signed after General Foertsch had already surrendered the entire Army Group G to General Devers.

Neither side had been able to maintain full liaison. Communications between the German Group G and its component armies had broken down completely. American commanders, too, in the rapid pace of the final offensive became separated one from the other for short periods of time. In the mountains some Seventh Army divisions became engaged in protracted negotiations with isolated enemy units, and the local proceedings were not without interest. The SS apparently considered itself divorced from any commitments the Wehrmacht command might register, and German surrender delegations found SS troops uncooperative. Representatives of Army Group G passed back through the American lines after the surrender at Haar but could get no German safe conduct. SS patrols blew a crater in front of the delegation, and established two roadblocks behind it. General Foertsch went on ahead alone and managed to get through. The others turned back and found their way to the 3d Division command post some time during the night of 6-7 May.

In the meantime high in the mountains some enemy troops were surrendering, some were fighting on, and in a castle near Woerl a minor civil war broke out. The Itter castle, situated on a high knoll, was the prison of Edouard Daladier and Paul Reynaud, former premiers of France; Generals Maurice Gamelin and Maxim Weygand; a sister of General DeGaulle and a son of Georges Clemenceau. The original capitu-

lation of the garrison by the German commander was nullified by an unexpected onslaught from SS formations. Within the castle American and German soldiers fought side by side. The SS troops were trapped and the German defenders helped eliminate them. The German garrison commander was killed.

A message from General Patch, as of the afternoon of 5 May, had read: "All troops of German Army Group which oppose the Seventh Army have been ordered by their commander to surrender at 061200B. Forward units of Seventh Army are directed to remain in place and cease further combat at once." Still there was firing in the hills, although American patrols tried the public-address system and a distribution of peace pamphlets. Late at night on 6-7 May three American paratroopers, wandering around their motor pool and barracks area, were seized by German patrols and taken prisoner. In the morning they were dispatched back to Berchtesgaden with the request to return with officer representatives for surrender. SS units were beginning their own series of capitulations.

There was some lingering lower-echelon fanaticism; in one sector two German officers were killed for bringing American emissaries through. But on the instructions of General Telsdorf patrols were escorted through roadblocks, passed mined cliffs, and snipers in position. Arrangements were made for the surrender of the LXXXII SS Corps. Points were designated for the disposition of arms and ammunition, effective the next day, 8 May. That day, too, on the main highway a little south of Marquartstein American elements were halted by an SS officer. He bore a flag of truce but insisted that the *Schutz-Staffel* was not under the command of Army Group G and was therefore not bound by the terms of surrender. The intelligence was forwarded that Obergruppenfuehrer and Waffen-SS General Gottlieb Berger, second only to Heinrich Himmler in SS rank, wished to negotiate for the capitulation of his forces. Berger commanded a Battle-Group comprising General Max Simon's XIII SS Corps with remnants of the 17th SS, the 35th SS (Nibelungen), and the 2d Mountain Divisions. General Berger's surrender was accepted by the 101st Airborne Division. The last enemy formation had now disintegrated.

## Transition

During the last days of the campaign in Europe the attention of Seventh Army was directed both toward mopping-up operations and toward preparations for occupation. The end for the Seventh Army was also a beginning. Detailed planning for occupational duties had been in progress at the headquarters since January, although prior to its execution Operations Plan ECLIPSE went through rather far-reaching modifications. The second draft of plan ECLIPSE, published by Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group on 27 February, had indicated that Seventh Army would initiate the organization, occupation, and military government of the Eastern Military District comprising the state of Bavaria. Elaborate planning and research had been carried through by army on this basis, particularly by the G-2 staff.


On or about 11 April rumors reached the Seventh Army command post that ECLIPSE plans were being changed to give Bavaria to Third Army and Wuertemberg, or the Western Military District, to Seventh Army. High level occupational planning was being carried on by Twelfth Army Group. Seventh Army pointed out through an intermediary, Sixth Army Group, that the change would involve a loss of three months planning and would entail a complete readjustment. The decision was that Seventh Army would occupy the Western Military District. Hence on 8 May the Army was far to the east of its occupational zone.

Adjustments were being made from the command post at Augsburg during the last days of the war. Of the 14 Divisions under army command at the close of the campaign some had been designated as occupational troops, others were scheduled for immediate or eventual redeployment to the Pacific Theater. The 4th Infantry Division had been sent to Third Army on 4 May in exchange for the 86th Division which had been received. Two divisions, the 63rd and 100th, were garrisoning rear areas in army reserve; and on 3 May the 12th Armored Division had also been ordered to army reserve. The other 11 divisions were in corps areas.

During the eventful period from 5 through 8 May, the attention of units in the line was given not only to their own occupational or







redeployment problems but to the personalities of World War II who remained in their sectors to be liberated or to be apprehended as prisoners. A dragnet was stretched across southern Germany.

By 8 May Generals von Runstedt, von Leeb, and von List had already been seized by Seventh Army troops; and the French political and military prisoners of prestige, who had been held in the castle near Woergl, had been liberated. On 7 May the 106th Cavalry Group with its command post in Salzburg had sent out reconnaissance to the east. Troops reached the villages of Strobl and St. Wolfgang on the Wolfgang See to discover that King Leopold of Belgium was under guard in a villa near Strobl. Unresisting guards were disarmed by the reconnaissance party; and on the day before victory in Europe Leopold, King of the Belgians, was liberated. The hunt continued, however, for such individuals as Field-Marshal Hermann Goering, and Baron Oshima and his Japanese Embassy staff. There was also a systematic search for the treasures in looted art, jewels, and gold that the Germans had cached away in the Tyrol. SHAEF had cabled questions regarding the Goering collection of emeralds. Some 25 Hungarian freight cars were taken in the Seventh Army area, containing a staggering fortune in oriental and persian rugs, oil paintings, tapestries, and cases of gold and diamond jewelry. The search was persistent.

Cavalry patrols combed the mountains seeking out high-ranking German officers. Field-Marshal Kesselring turned up at the headquarters of the 101st Airborne Division and there, through General Winter, made clear that he could scarcely be expected to hold conferences with some local commander. Through 3rd Division communication facilities he announced himself to the Supreme Allied Commander. "Besides my activity as Commander-in-Chief West I am also, as ranking General, Feldmarschall of the Southern District at the disposal of the High Command of the Wehrmacht which authorized the staff with the command of the Southern District . . ." He was anxious to facilitate an easy settlement of all questions. On 10 May Admiral Doenitz and General Jodl requested an American plane for Kesselring. It was refused. A few hours later he was removed from command of the southern armies. A few days later he was placed under arrest.

After his capture Goering was under guard of the 36th Division. On the morning of 8 May Colonel von Brauchitsch, his aide de camp, had presented two letters from Goering to the command post in Kufstein. They constituted offers of surrender, and pleas to the Supreme Commander for an interview in which they could talk "as one soldier to another." The letters declared:

I request of you to grant me free passage . . . and to place my entourage and family under American protection. I make it, remembering the time when the aged Marshal of France, Petain, in a situation equally difficult for his country, asked me for a similar interview which then actually took place . . . . Your Excellency will understand how I feel in this my most difficult hour, and how much I have suffered through my disability, due to my arrest, to do everything possible a long time ago in order to prevent further bloodshed in a hopeless situation . . . .


The word went out to pick up Goering. He was not in his castle, which was guarded by fully armed SS troops of the "Florian Geyer" Division. Brigadier General R. I. Stack, of the 36th Division, found the whole Goering convoy parked along a road a few miles from Radstadt, Austria. The party proceeded out of the German sector into the American lines. One of the SS officers became unmanageable and had to be shot. Goering was affable.

The war in Europe was over. At 0816 hours on 7 May Seventh Army received the message:

1. A representative of the German High Command signed the unconditional surrender of all German land, sea, and air forces in Europe to the Allied Expeditionary Force and simultaneously to the Soviet High Command at 0141 hours Central European time, 7 May, under which all forces will cease active operations 0001B hours 9 May.
- 2., Effective immediately all offensive operations by Allied Expeditionary Force will cease and troops will remain in present positions . .

Divisions again listed care and cleaning of equipment, calisthenics, and close-order drill in the day's program. The elaborate machinery of simultaneous redeployment and occupation had begun to function before the firing was over. The news of the cessation of hostilities came as no great surprise and consequently was not the occasion for hilarious celebration.





Officially 8 May was the day of victory in Europe. General Patch issued an order of the day on Thursday, 10 May 1945, in which the Commanding General of Seventh Army expressed his praise and appreciation to the troops under his command:

1. I have just received the following cable from the Secretary of War: "I join a grateful nation in applauding the heroic part you and your men have taken in our triumph. Each soldier of the Seventh Army shares in congratulations for success gained through magnificent courage at the front. You can be proud of a distinguished accomplishment."
2. Observe, you glorious men of the Seventh Army, our efforts and exploits are not unrecognized in our country. To you who have done the fighting I send my deepest and most patriotic thanks.

ALEXANDER M. PATCH  
Lieutenant General  
United States Army  
Commanding





# CHAPTER XXXI

## *Support for the Drive into Germany*

**A**lthough this narrative has placed emphasis upon the operations and intelligence sections of the Seventh Army staff, and upon the combat units, it must be borne in mind that the other staff sections and the services of supply had an equally vital role in the success of the campaign.

One of the most important army functions, particularly after the entry into Germany, was the prompt release of combat units from responsibility for newly acquired territory, its administration and its use as a base for operations. The job of infantry and armored divisions and reconnaissance troops was to speed the advance. The job of controlling and managing to the military advantage of the army the territory which had been won was the responsibility of G-5, Civil Affairs and Military Government.

### **Civil Affairs**

During the Seventh Army advance through southern and eastern France problems of civil administration were normally controlled by the French themselves. The Civil Affairs Staff was concerned primarily with liaison, with giving aid and supplies to the local governments, and in guaranteeing tight civilian control in the army area for reasons of military security and the expedition of military operations. When the Seventh Army reached the approaches to Germany in Alsace, it was necessary for Civil Affairs to exercise stricter supervision of all civilian activities. There were of course, large numbers of German nationals who had to be interned as a security precaution. Refugees and displaced persons became a problem.



In the months of readjustment on the Seventh Army's Sarre and northern Alsace front the responsibilities of Civil Affairs increased. It was important that withdrawal and limited advance be made without violating security or precipitating a mass exodus. The strength and deployment of units might have been readily revealed to the enemy by permitting uncontrolled civilian circulation. In January there were 29 Civil Affairs detachments operated by army, more than double the number required in November.

As Seventh Army crossed the German border, Civil Affairs became Military Government. Divisions and corps took the first steps toward setting up military government. Initial proclamations and primary regulations were posted and enforced. Army military government detachments closely followed the tactical units. With the aid of counter-intelligence each detachment sought the immediate removal of Nazis from public office. It concerned itself with the protection and support of Allied nationals and displaced persons, the reestablishment of services and facilities to the extent necessary for Allied forces, the locating and safeguarding of supply stocks and sources, and in general the relief of tactical units from the responsibility for civilian problems. The first step was for the detachment commander to appoint or confirm as burgo-meister a non-Nazi. The rest of the administration stemmed from him under the supervision of military government.

One of the major problems was the control, housing, and feeding of large numbers of displaced persons in each area. Health conditions required particular attention. The ideal DP camp organization included a military government detachment, a welfare team of five, a doctor, and a liaison officer of the nationality of the personnel to be handled. Displaced persons were diverted to collecting points and thence to camps, disinfected, given medical attention, and organized for camp administration. The provision of shelter, and a daily ration of 2,000 calories gradually reduced foraging expeditions. Every effort was made to speed repatriation, especially of French and other western Europeans whose homelands were readily accessible.

In all operations military government detachments were handicapped by small size and the lack of functional specialists who were to

come later with regional groups. The important job of keeping order and guarding installations was done initially by the 36th Division west of the Rhine and by the 103d Division east of the Rhine. In view of the anticipated critical food shortage among civilians, local military governments encouraged farming and made available agricultural machinery.

During the last month of the war military government officers tapped some anti-Nazi sentiment which was of help in administration. In Starnberg a delegation of prominent professors and scientists called on the detachment, denounced the burgomeister, and offered themselves as anti-Nazis willing to help in any way. The government was built around this group. In other areas some 20 Nazi burgomeisters had been replaced in the last days of the war. Resistance leaders in Austria, as representatives of the Free Austria movement, made determined efforts to assist military government officials.

Most of the German civilians were obedient and docile, so well-disciplined and regimented that they responded to orders without question. Publication of sentences to individuals who violated curfew and other restrictions had a salutary effect. Public relations improved as the war came to a close. Civilians, particularly women, became convinced that the war would soon be over; and they did not want their town devastated. No important evidence of subversive or "werewolf" activities came to light.

Tactical units continued a policy of screening the population to uncover German soldiers, suspects, civilians without proper identification papers, and firearms. New police were located, screened, and given armbands. Looting became the chief problem in the preservation of order. Large concentration camps containing political prisoners were uncovered in the army area: Keisheim, Aicbach, Harlaching, Dittersheim and Dachau. These camps had close to 50,000 inmates at the time of liberation.

Only those German industries of primary importance to military and civilian needs were permitted to continue operations. Sabotage of power installations was small, with civilians in some cases refusing to carry out the orders of the retreating German army. Railroad rehabilitation was made difficult by the large numbers of Nazis among

workers. Stern measures and a strict screening process eliminated subversive employees. The banking situation was satisfactory, records and cash in most buildings intact. All wages and prices were frozen at pre-occupation levels, but a small black market did exist in food and clothing.

Mimeographed news bulletins, improvised loud speakers, newspapers published by Army Group, and radio stations disseminated information on the progress of the war. Clergymen were asked to encourage food production to prevent shortages during the coming winter. The synagogue at Augsburg was reconditioned and services held. Works of art were sought out; important collections found at Heilbronn, Kockendorf, Fuessen, and elsewhere; and military protection given them.

At the close of the war military government turned its attention from the problems of following up the rapid tactical advance. Better integration was secured in the removal of Nazi officials. The surrender of German forces brought a notable release of tension in the relationships between civilians and the American forces.

## Personnel and Liaison

Other army functions which had become accentuated in the final campaign against Germany were those of personnel and liaison. In January and February the problem of securing infantry replacements or reinforcements was still acute. At least three of the infantry divisions under Seventh Army command, the 42nd, 63rd, and 70th, had been milked of their personnel for infantry replacements to be sent to units on the Ardennes front. Even the acquisition of new men would not solve their personnel problems completely, since team-work has to be built up over a period of time. Messages to higher headquarters emphasized Seventh Army's need in the request to reconsider allocation of reinforcements. One such message stated:

As of 2359 (hours), 10 January, Seventh Army shortages totaled 508 officers and 15,104 enlisted men, of which 343 officers and 12,098 enlisted men are infantry. Battle and non-battle casualties are now running in excess of 1,000 per day. We need help if we are to maintain efficiency of fighting units.

After the crossing of the Rhine the Seventh Army casualty rate dropped considerably, and the need for infantry reinforcements became

less acute. During the month of April, however, the army was confronted with a shortage of armored replacements. The Seventh Army G-1 was instructed to investigate together with armored divisions and reinforcement depots the possibility of requisitioning men of other military branches for "on the job" training with divisions. Armored Force officers at this time could be secured only by combat appointments.

During the winter and spring months of 1945 it became particularly important to provide rest centers, recreation, and leave for the troops who had been in the line so long that they were close to combat fatigue. Leave quotas to the United Kingdom were secured and administered by G-1. Rest and recreational centers were set up at Grenoble, Lyon, Cannes, Nice, Nancy, and Vittel. Rest Areas were variously assigned to corps, and the opportunity for a "break" in continuous combat became a significant morale factor.

Among the many problems which confronted army administration and personnel policy were those connected with German prisoners of war and the increasingly large number of liberated Allied prisoners. At Homburg, for example, a Russian prisoner of war camp was overrun. Every attempt was made to evacuate and repatriate Allied prisoners as rapidly as possible. As the war in Europe moved into its final stages, redeployment became the most significant and far-reaching problem. By 24 April discussions were under way with War Department G-1 representatives. Closely connected with redeployment were the requirements for adequate occupational personnel.

The efficient functioning of liaison sections within the structure of Seventh Army under G-3 supervision gave added force and coordination to the army's combat operations. The closest communication and representation by qualified liaison personnel was maintained with all units under and adjacent to Seventh Army. Particularly significant in the combined operations of Seventh Army and the First French Army was the early establishment and efficient operating procedure of the French Mission at Seventh Army Headquarters. The French Mission was headed during most of the campaign by Colonel Jean L. Petit, who periodically brought back from First French Army Headquarters last minute information on location of troops and future plans. Liaison

officers from subordinate and adjacent units briefed the Commanding General at 1800 hours daily during the period of combat operations.

In army support of front line operations one of the most significant functions was bringing up to the line the supplies to be consumed there, the vehicles, the guns to be turned against the enemy. Supply operations fell into these general divisions during the final phase: (1) the retrograde movement, (2) the period of supply build-up, (3) the offensive. The first period was relieved during the last week in January when it became apparent that the German drive had been blunted. The completion of operations in the Colmar pocket area on 9 February marked the beginning of a static period along the army front that lasted until 15 March, when the build-up of supplies was termed adequate to support the offensive operation. The third period that began with the offensive and included the crossing of the Rhine found Seventh Army contending with ever-lengthening supply lines that stretched deep into and across Southern Germany. The final period ended with the cessation of hostilities on the Seventh Army front.

## Supply During Defensive Operations

In the opening days of 1945 Seventh Army supply installations effected a retrograde movement anticipated in the latter part of December. Personnel had been alerted and dumps prepared for quick evacuation in the event of a strong and successful enemy drive. When the attack broke on the army's northern front on New Year's Eve, a rearward movement of supply positions had already begun. This was to mean an increase in the hauling distance between installations and using troops.

Since the middle of October supply had kept pace with tactical moves, maintaining a minimum distance between divisions on the line and main supply points. Rail transportation had been advanced to points beyond Haguenau and included a line from Saverne through Strasbourg to Molsheim. Third Army rail facilities from Nancy had been coordinated to deliver supplies to the Seventh Army left flank along Chateau-Salins, Hampont, and Haboudange. Main supply routes emanated from Epinal, Luneville, and Sarrebourg and were correlated for a minimum of traffic

confusion in moving balanced tonnage to division supply dumps in the Vosges Mountains.

Inventories had been reduced in the forward supply dumps to the lowest possible level commensurate with evacuation should the retrograde movement be ordered. A strain was placed on transportation to accomplish the safeguarding movement to the rear. How successful the move was, may be judged by the fact that no supply installations of an echelon higher than division level were lost to enemy action.

In returning the main supply points to the rear Seventh Army was forced to substitute a safety factor for flexibility. Selection of the previously used installations in Epinal and Luneville outweighed the distance factor, since covered storage space was not to be found in other areas. The intermediate points of Sarrebourg and Saverne were utilized as forward supply points with the bulk of forward stocks of food, gasoline, and ammunition carried in the Saverne installations. Bad weather and enemy action made it extremely difficult for the supply services to maintain a balanced flow of supply and equipment. The addition of supporting divisions combined with the high rate of expenditure in Seventh Army defensive action increased the amount of supplies needed and made balanced tonnage essential. However, receipt was not entirely satisfactory. Delay of rail shipments by the weather, unbalanced tonnage from Continental Advance Base Section, and a high rate of attrition of equipment in combat combined to make the supply picture critical during the month of January.

At the division level, the 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions described the month of January as the most difficult and critical for supply of any they had experienced. Lack of ammunition in the division dumps forced regiments on the line to re-supply from the basic load of the regiment in reserve. Specifically short were mortar and machine gun ammunition. During one period in the early part of January the forward army supply point was without 60 mm mortar and .30 caliber machine gun ammunition for a period of 24 hours, and other small arms ammunition was critically short for a period of four days.

Another major supply shortage occurred during January in gasoline. This was caused by several factors including heavy troop move-

ment, cold weather, and the fact that available stocks were spread thinly over six main distributing points to cover the wide front. To offset the deficiency, rationing was put into effect on 7 January which limited units to 75 per cent of their drawings of 5 January. Units forward of corps boundaries, however, could exceed this limitation under operational necessity. The reserve supply was considered inadequate to cover any sudden change in the tactical situation, particularly sudden moves of armored divisions. Base Section responded with immediate shipments of gasoline to army and increased daily issues to permit the build-up of a more nearly adequate reserve.

The issue of rations and availability of food stocks appeared satisfactory on paper with better than half the authorized supply in army dumps. But most of this percentage was of the hard ration variety, and the issue was predominantly B rations. Cold weather caused a loss in certain items due to freezing in transit. Shipments of fresh potatoes and fruit became impracticable because shipments had to be made in unprotected boxcars that resulted in a loss as high as 50 percent of perishable items.

Thus the supply services of Seventh Army entered the final phase of the campaign with the three "must" items of rations, gasoline, and ammunition in a status of unpredictable availability. Termed critical by the individual supplying services, shortages did not remain in the acute stage for more than short periods. Necessary expedients were initiated to relieve the most acute conditions, and readjustments were made whenever necessary to insure the flow of supply.

Availability was dependent on Base Section's ability to supply and transportation's ability to deliver. Base Section was responsible for transportation to the rear of army dumps. As a result of a recognized German concentration on the Seventh Army left flank during the latter part of December, a command decision was made involving the shortening of army lines. This necessitated a reversal of the flow of supplies after a virtual three-day cessation in movements. At the time of the expected German attack the reverse flow was already in effect. However, the limitations of rail transport made it necessary to coordinate the withdrawal of supplies from the forward supply points with in-

coming shipments already consigned to go forward. Supplies coming back and those coming forward congested in the army area. Although the supplies were still needed, there was insufficient storage and manpower to handle the incoming flow of supplies from CONAD and the returning flow of supplies from forward installations that were being closed.

The necessity of using engineer regiments and battalions as combat troops had stopped work on nearly all railway bridge repairs during January. One exception was the bridge south of Saverne, the completion of which opened the route from Saverne to Molsheim on 15 January. This eliminated the necessity of routing trains from Saverne to Molsheim through Strasbourg. The heavy troop movements in the latter part of January, as well as heavy snowfalls, taxed the rail facilities and tied-up equipment that normally would have been used to move supplies. Representatives of all supply services of Seventh Army met on 19 January to devise means of alleviating the situation. Certain remedial efforts were to be put into effect, including a 24-hour unloading limit for cars at railheads, the use of four trains daily split between rations and gasoline, and only one-tenth of the ten-day allocation of ammunition to be moved each day.

Weather created unforeseen delays, stalling trains in deep mountain passes and backing up supplies. Seventh Army and Military Railway Service personnel worked long hours to open the tracks, and railroads were finally able to render some form of normal service. Truck shipments, however, served as the bulk carriers of supply during this period. Within army boundaries it had been necessary on 7 January to establish a reserve pool of 175 trucks near Saverne under the control of VI Corps. At times this left a large number of trucks idle, but it was considered an operational necessity in order to coordinate the tactical movements which depended largely on speed in execution for success. By 23 January it was possible to disband the pool.

To keep motor transportation moving it was necessary to emphasize preventive maintenance. But ordnance units in division and army levels performed more work in January than in any previous period. The scarcity of major assemblies and replacement motors dead-



lined a large number of vehicles at a time when they were badly needed. In the 3rd Infantry Division during the middle of January the ordnance record showed 120 two and one-half ton trucks deadlined. The supply routes from Epinal and Luneville to Saverne were the main routes travelled by trucks and, added to rail deliveries, supplied ten reinforced divisions. The forward installations in Saverne issued the bulk of supply. Sarrebourg was the forward point for certain quartermaster items and toward the end of January was also a ration and gasoline point.

In the operation to clean out the Colmar Pocket, Divisions from SHAEF reserve were attached to Seventh Army and XXI Corps, which was placed under the operational control of the First French Army. However, the supply of these divisions remained the responsibility of Seventh Army. To decrease the long supply haul between Epinal and Luneville and the new sector of XXI Corps an intermediate installation was put into St. Die for rations and gasoline. Ammunition was still drawn from the army supply point at Bayon with lesser draws from Saverne. Both points involved a 200 mile turn-around for the transporting units.

The shortage of gasoline during most of January was relieved by the return to more normal rail operations. But there were periods during the month when the level of available stocks in army dumps was extremely low.

On 13 January, gasoline on hand in army was totaled at 1.1 days of supply as compared to the authorized level of seven days. During the first two weeks of January issues were consistently greater than the receipts from Base Section. During this time Seventh Army consumed an average daily gallonage of 363,678, but receipts averaged only 335,678 gallons. Heavy troop movements and increased use of armored divisions accounted for army's high rate of consumption and prevented buildup of a reserve. Pipelines were not operational to Sarrebourg during January, although preliminary work had been completed. By 20 February a 2,000,000-gallon storage tank was operational in Sarrebourg. This was part of the pipeline project and materially aided army's attempt to establish a large reserve for future operations.

Need for winter clothing was intensified by the addition of SHAEF reserve divisions to Seventh Army command and by the loss of considerable organizational equipment in the Bitche sector. Supplies



**EMPTYING BULK GASOLINE DRUMS PRIOR TO FILLING 5 GALLON CANS**

*"... Seventh Army consumed an average daily gallonage of 363,678 ..."*

were short. Temporary relief was obtained from stocks under control of ETOUSA. Local procurement of white cloth was initiated by the quartermaster for use as material for camouflage. Seventh Army received an allocation of 6,000 snow suits which were distributed among front line divisions.

Other shortages were felt during January, particularly in engineer and signal equipment. Plans for defensive positions increased requirements for engineer field fortification material, including wire, pickets, and concertina. By the end of January it was estimated that only 20 percent of the demand was available. Strict rationing of field wire needed by combat units to maintain communications created some difficulty. The ordinary requirements of 250 miles of wire per day for

each division had to be satisfied by a quota of less than 30 miles per day. Only by rigid economy and recovery of wire were divisions able to maintain their communications.

The shortage of combat radio sets was not relieved until late in January, and tended to reduce the efficiency of special units, such as engineer battalions which had been committed as infantry. The long distance from front lines to the signal depot at Thaon made it advisable to open a forward depot on 27 January in Heming, which facilitated supply to divisions. A critical shortage of signal personnel occurred with the addition of XXI Corps. As a result of the transfer of units, Task Force Herren was at one time temporarily without signal contact with army.

During January approximately 20,000 long tons of supplies were moved in the Seventh Army area each week. With this flow of materiel, normal though it was for the increased size of Seventh Army, the number of supply installations had to be held to an absolute minimum to insure the maximum effective use of available supplies. The coordination of supply services to give the greatest possible support to the divisions fighting under the uncertain conditions of defensive warfare was a Seventh Army responsibility fulfilled by the quartermaster, engineer, signal, medical, and ordnance sections. Increased use of civilian labor facilitated to some extent the work of these special staff sections.

## Ammunition and Ordnance

The supply of ammunition and maintenance of ordnance strength constituted what was probably the most serious service problem confronted by Seventh Army during January and early February. Bad weather and heavy fighting, together with the closing of forward supply points, complicated both the supply and issue of ordnance materiel. Close coordination between transportation and army and division ammunition officers was necessary to insure that available stocks would be readily accessible to the units. This was essential because of abnormally high expenditures by all troops. For example, expenditures of machine gun ammunition, increased from 200,000 rounds per day to

approximately 600,000 rounds per day. To take care of immediate needs of Seventh Army, trucks were dispatched to supply points of the First French Army and the Third Army. Inter-army cooperation of this nature relieved shortages until Base Section could make delivery. New allocation systems by SHAEF and Sixth Army Group were developed to cover the deficiencies of Seventh Army ammunition supply.

A specific illustration of ammunition expenditures in Seventh Army may be shown by examination of a VI Corps action. As a result of heavy engagements on this front, more ammunition was expended in January by VI Corps artillery than by either XV or XXI Corps. Expenditure for all weapons was heavy: that for the 105mm howitzer, for example, reached 35 rounds per day, or five rounds over the SHAEF rate. Although there were single periods of action when the rate of expenditure exceeded the allocation, such as one artillery battalion using 18 day's allowance in one 48-hour period, firing was controlled to such an extent that the monthly expenditures did not constitute a dangerous excess. At the end of January Seventh Army was supplying 18 divisions.

Losses in ordnance were heavy during January. Top priority was given to the repair of items in maintenance, both in army and in base section shops. The extent of loss in the first week of January in VI Corps, the army's most active front, was especially heavy: 12 armored reconnaissance vehicles, 35 half-tracks, 68 jeeps, 6 light tanks, 13 trucks, and 38 trailers. Losses in medium tanks for the first 18 days of January in VI Corps were 83 with 22 replacements received. There were 319 operational tanks in the corps as of 18 January, and an additional two days of operations reduced this to 309. By the end of the month, medium tanks operational had dropped to 271.

Army reserve of major items for an authorized 15 day level was based on the total quantity on hand times one-half of the latest War Department monthly replacement factor. Besides losses due to enemy action, the arrival of a number of divisions from SHAEF reserve, plus supporting troops, and the necessary re-equipping of those divisions gravely depleted army reserves. During this period the loss in VI Corps exceeded the War Department replacement factor and theater reserve scale. However, all losses were not attributable to enemy action. The

79th Infantry Division on 23 January listed losses due to icy conditions of the roads which necessitated the destruction by our own troops of equipment, including small arms, tank destroyers, armored cars, and tracked vehicles, to prevent enemy recovery. Only by the most careful supervision by the Seventh Army Ordnance Officer were the needs of front line divisions in ammunition and weapons met at the end of January and during the following month.

## **Build-up For the Last Offensive**

From the time the Colmar Pocket was declared liquidated on 9 February until 15 March, emphasis was placed on the build-up of supplies to support a major offensive that was aimed to sweep the Germans out of the area west of the Rhine, establish bridgeheads across the Rhine, and exploit any breakthrough that might result after the crossing had been completed. It was this goal that the supply services sought to fulfill in developing a sufficient back-log of materiel; and, with the exception of certain classes of ammunition unavailable in base sections, the goal was reached in time to support the offensive.

Gasoline continued to be a critical item during the first few days of February. However, the necessity for rationing on the 75 percent basis was rescinded on 4 February since receipts were by this time higher than issues. The placing in operation of the pipeline between St. Jean De Losne and the La Forge installation at Sarrebourg during the first week in February realized a potential source of gasoline for army of 180,000 gallons per day. Increased shipments from Base Section during this same time removed gasoline from the short supply column. As shipments increased during late February, it was possible to shift the La Forge bulk storage plant to Base Section control. As a result army supply was held to a desirable level with a substantial supply available in Base Section for emergency needs. Warm weather, an important factor in increasing shipments from Base Section, also served to decrease the demand for diesel fuel and removed this item from the short supply status.

Rations flooded into Army dumps in ever increasing amounts, from five days supply in the last week of January to a surplus during

the latter part of February of over 16 days on hand in army installations. It became possible to make unrestricted issue of B rations completely balanced through sorting and re-issue. The flow from Base Section was



#### UNLOADING OF GASOLINE FROM TANK CARS

*" . . . Increased shipments from Base Section during this same time removed gasoline from the short supply column . . . "*

halted temporarily to bring the supply on hand down to the desired level of seven days. Fresh meat became more readily available, and through newly opened cold storage facilities at Dijon and Epinal front line troops were supplied. The relatively warm weather improved the quality of the bread, and increased issue was possible on full authorized allowances. Fresh fruits and vegetables were once again available to troops, as warmer weather made possible shipment of perishable items into army ration dumps.

As of 5 February ration dumps were operating at Hampont, Mackwiller, Saverne, Luneville, Sarrebourg and St. Die. At the conclusion of activity in the Colmar Pocket it was no longer necessary to

maintain the installation at St. Die, which was closed on 15 February. To facilitate the handling of supply from Base Section to Nancy a non-issuing installation was maintained at Chateau-Salins. The 3rd Infantry Division while operating as SHAEF reserve drew rations and gasoline directly from base installations at Nancy. To furnish the closest possible support for the 15 March offensive rations dumps were opened in the forward areas of the XXI and XV Corps.

The third of the three "must" classes of supply, ammunition, was the most serious item during the period of build-up. Partially because of the heavy expenditures during January and the continued heavy firing to eliminate the Colmar Pocket, allocations were very limited. This was necessary to achieve reserve stockage for the impending offensive. With the exception of a limited offensive in the Saarbruecken-Forbach area by the XXI Corps, expenditures were light. Average daily issues at Army amounted to 39 percent of the receipts, or approximately 534.6 long tons. Compared to the average daily issue of 1,200 long tons during the Colmar Pocket fighting, the decrease in the expenditure may be seen.

An ammunition analysis by Sixth Army Group on 1 February indicated the status of ammunition in relation to anticipated expenditures by Seventh Army and the development of sufficient resources for the future major offensive.

There will be insufficient ammunition available to properly support a major offensive by Seventh Army until at least 30 days after the elimination of the Colmar Pocket. Then the ammunition available in the heavy calibers will be insufficient unless augmented from outside Sixth Army Group. Operations during the saving period must not require ammunition more than one-half of SHAEF's rate.

Seventh Army was issued the SHAEF rate for the period 1 February to 10 March but established its own build-up at army supply points. In compliance with the wishes of the Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, Seventh Army limited its daily expenditure of artillery ammunition to 50 percent of the daily quantity allocated for the period. The limitation did not apply to ammunition for the 3-inch gun, 75mm howitzer, and 75mm tank gun. For the month of February tonnage increased from 26,000 to 48,000 tons as a result of increased

shipments from Base Section and stringent restrictions on expenditures. With the exercise of great care, Seventh Army finally was able to consider its ammunition supply sufficient for the 15 March offensive.

The physical delivery of materiel, although not as difficult as during January, was impeded by extensive thaws in Seventh Army area which resulted in road deterioration. In January French civilian highway engineers had assured the Seventh Army Engineer that roads in the army area were not subject to thaw damage, and army highway maintenance plans had been based on the necessity only for normal repair. Preliminary information was found to be in error. Rapid disintegration of the road nets required major repairs and the use of all available engineer troops to keep truck supply operative. On 9 February the Army Engineer advised General Patch that it would be some time before appreciable improvement could be expected. Regulations issued by Seventh Army in February eliminated all unnecessary traffic, set the speed limit at 25 miles per hour, reduced the 100 percent overloading of vehicles to the rated capacity, and required a maximum use of rail transportation. These restrictions, which helped bring to a halt road deterioration, were lifted on 26 February.

The burden of carrying the bulk of Seventh Army supply was absorbed by rail as the result of the partial highway breakdown. Steady build-up of supplies in all installations was possible in spite of extremely heavy troop movements that included the return of attached divisions to other armies. Restrictions were placed on movements by infantry divisions, which usually required two trains for vehicles and from four to five trains for personnel and equipment, and by armored divisions which required approximately 12 trains. These inter-army troop movements were scheduled from railheads that would not interfere appreciably with the movement of army maintenance supplies.

Expansion of the rail network was held to a minimum during the build-up period, since most of the available engineer troops were employed on highway repair. Operative lines, however, had not been greatly affected with the retrograde movement in January. The two main rail lines ran from Nancy through Hampont and Haboudange to Sarralbe, and from Luneville through Sarrebourg to Sarralbe, although



the latter line was not in operation between Sarrebourg and Sarralbe until 1 March because of damaged bridges and track north of Fenetrange. Work was then continued on the line from Sarralbe to Sarreguemines, since it was contemplated that the offensive would be in this direction and that the line would be needed to carry the bulk of Seventh Army supply. The proximity of the front line to Sarreguemines did not permit reconnaissance beyond this point.

On 28 January there were 61,995 long tons of all classes of supply on hand in Seventh Army. The highest point for materiel on hand was attained on 24 February when the total amounted to 113,886 long tons. At this time shipments from Base Section of those supplies which army possessed in excess were curtailed to effect a more evenly balanced figure in all classes of supplies. During February rail and truck transport had increased proportionately. Beside the movement of supplies five divisions were moved out of and three divisions into the Seventh Army area during February. There were 187 other units moving to different locations. By 15 March all classes of supply had been brought up to a satisfactory army reserve, although signal and ordnance equipment were the last to be considered adequate. Table of Equipment shortages of medium tanks had been replaced by the middle of February, but accessories had in many cases been lost in transit prior to arrival in the army area. It was at times necessary to cannibalize deadlined tanks to put the new tanks into operation.

Preparation for the Rhine River crossing by DD-tanks created singular problems of supply. Special rubberized canvas shrouds for tanks, manufactured in Paris and delivered to Luneville, were received only a very short time before they were needed. Seventeen DD-tanks were processed for the crossing. Tests were conducted with cargo carrying DUKW's to determine what loads could be safely carried. Preparations were made to supplement the facilities of army depot companies supporting the operation by the addition of Continental Advance Section units should they be required.

The addition in February of five SHAEF divisions had made the problem of service troops very acute. It was necessary to shift available service units to handle urgent requests, until appropriate ser-

vice troops to support the newly attached divisions were received in the army area. Reshifting was again necessary when these divisions were returned to the Twelfth Army Group and the supporting service troops detached from Seventh Army control. With the addition to Seventh Army of three divisions, prior to the 15 March offensive, the supporting service units were closed in the army area at an earlier date. A number of service units were permanently assigned to Seventh Army during this supply build-up period, and were the culmination of long-standing requests for such units. Ten quartermaster truck companies received during the week the offensive began were needed to facilitate army movement of troops and supplies to support any extended advance. Rear installations were being operated by an increasing number of civilian personnel to free army troops for the operation of supply installations inside Germany.

## Operation Undertone and Supply Services

Engineer troops with combat divisions played a significant part in breaking through the Siegfried defenses and in the crossing of the Rhine River. The requirements of explosives for breaching the Siegfried Line were calculated in advance by the army engineer, and troops were supplied with the necessary materiel between 15 and 20 March. Preliminary planning for the crossing of the Rhine River had included a long program of training for engineer troops. It was apparent from the speed of the river that mechanical equipment and trained personnel would be needed for the assault crossing. It was also necessary to devise substantial anchors for ponton bridges and some form of mine barrier capable of standing up in a fast current. So well trained were engineer personnel that of the 400 motors in assault craft started simultaneously the morning of the crossing only one known failure occurred. River crossing equipment had been assembled and the assault carried through according to plan.

In order to transport enough pontons for the construction of a heavy ponton bridge which would support medium tanks, a quartermaster truck company equipped with ten-ton trailers was attached to each heavy ponton battalion. In this way 132 pontons were transported

in one trip. The motor column of each river-crossing group comprised about 600 vehicles, was 35 miles long, and required over nine hours to pass any given point in column.

One part of the over-all engineer plan included the long-term logistical support of the army after the crossing had been completed. To insure the necessary timber needed for bridging and rail reconstruction, procurement plans had been formulated in October, and by the time of the *Undertone* offensive sufficient materiel was on hand. Plans for bridging the Rhine had been carefully laid in advance. First priority was given to the construction of a highway bridge to be started between D plus 4 and D plus 10 and to be completed by D plus 24 or D plus 30. Second priority was given to a railroad bridge to be started upon completion of the highway span and to be finished by D plus 40. Additional structures planned in advance included a second railroad bridge. At a later date another highway bridge, the responsibility of Communications Zone, was to be built. Construction of a Bailey bridge on barges, as an interim measure, was considered feasible and a design approved on 19 March.

In addition to the crossing equipment provided by the two engineer groups, sufficient treadway units were distributed to XV Corps, making the crossing, to permit the construction by corps troops of a treadway bridge behind each assault division.

The crossing of the Rhine on 26 March focused attention on the necessity for a close follow-up of supply installations. Support for army in its rapid forward movement was essential. Adequate supply had been developed within army, and there were no shortages of major items of equipment existing that would hinder the tactical plan. Rations, gasoline, and ammunition were sufficient to support the offensive operation. However, at the end of March the quartermaster Class II and IV dump was still located in Sarrebourg and the engineer Class II and IV dump in Luneville. The long haul between divisions operating east of the Rhine and supply installations heavily burdened transportation units. Motorized movement of troops jeopardized the haul of supplies, since it was necessary to use army transportation as well as corps and division trucks to maintain the pressure on the disorganized German army.

Once the Rhine was reached the physical crossing became the responsibility of the engineers. The crossing was made on a front of a little over nine miles. Although overall opposition was not strong, at points of concentration it did considerable damage to the storm and assault boats. During one regimental crossing every boat received at least one bullet or shrapnel hole, and another regimental crossing resulted in the loss of two-thirds of the boats involved. In the first 30 minutes of the crossing, eight assault battalions were ferried to the east bank of the Rhine, and the assault regiments were across one hour later. Field artillery battalions crossed the river three and one half hours after H-Hour, and all the artillery of the assault regiments had been crossed by H plus 10 hours. During the first 24 hours after H-Hour rafts transported over 1,000 vehicles across the river, including 50 tanks. The reserve regiment of one division was completely across the river by H plus 11 hours and the reserve regiment of the other division by H plus 15 hours.

The heavy ponton and treadway bridges were constructed in good order, the first being finished by the middle of the afternoon of D-Day, a construction time of nine hours and 12 minutes, believed to be the shortest construction time for any floating bridge ever put across the Rhine River. The first tank crossed the bridge at 1515 hours of D-Day. During the next ten days 38,923 vehicles used the bridge. The two assault divisions were completely across the river by H plus 22 hours. All Seventh Army divisions, excepting those in army reserve, approximately 350,000 men with supporting vehicles, were across the river in less than a week. Army headquarters crossed on D plus 7 days. On 28 March two dummy heavy ponton bridges were constructed at Mannheim over which crossed several divisions of the First French Army. A total of 30,670 vehicles used this bridge the first week it was in operation.

Previous long-term logistical planning for the support of Seventh Army had included two timber highway bridges, a Bailey bridge on barges, and two railroad bridges to be built for the main supply routes. Materials and equipment for the construction of the first four bridges had been assembled as close behind the front lines as

possible, prior to the assault on the Siegfried Line. The first highway bridge constructed was 1,048 feet long, 30 feet wide, and had a capacity of 70 tons. Work was started on D plus 3 and completed ten days later. Erected from materials procured locally, including 340 piles that had been cut during the winter in the Vosges by Seventh Army personnel, it was a two-way, timber pile-bent, steel stringer bridge. Materials and equipment were transported entirely on engineer organic vehicles 85 miles from the assembly area to the site of the crossing. The heavy equipment, including two 70-ton pile-driving rigs, was routed over backroads so as not to interfere with the essential supply convoys of ammunition, gasoline, and rations.

Opening the rail line to the Rhine was also an engineer function. Two routes were to be finished at the same time the rail bridge across the Rhine was ready for use. The route from Pfaffenhofen, near Haguenau, through Wissembourg to Worms followed the drive of the VI Corps. The second route from Sarreguemines through Kaiserslautern to Worms followed the XV Corps push. Single-track rail facilities were completed on both sections by 3 April. The first rail bridge over the Rhine at Mannheim was completed on 23 April and a second at Karlsruhe on 28 April. Construction was completed in 15 days and 10 days respectively.

In the construction of the Bailey bridge on barges, the engineers took advantage of existing bridge conditions. Immediate reconnaissance had disclosed that many barges near the crossing had been sunk. Plans were then made to utilize the still-smouldering remains of a German military trestle bridge near Frankenthal, three miles north of Ludwigshafen. The German bridge originally consisted of trestle approaches with floating navigation bays totalling approximately 400 feet. Although 300 feet of the superstructure of the trestle bridge had been destroyed, many of the pile-bents were still usable. All navigation bays had been sunk or were missing. By cutting and recapping existing bents and by driving additional bents as required it was possible to erect a continuous double-single Bailey bridge to span the gap. The 820 foot continuous Bailey bridge was started on D plus 2 and completed on D plus 13.

Transportation continued to be the key to the supply availability for Seventh Army with Base Section resources adequate for army requirements. A short time after the offensive was begun, combat units had progressed so rapidly that existing railheads were no longer far enough forward. Completion of the rail bridge across the Sarre River at Sarralbe made it possible to open a railhead at Sarreguemines. This new railhead with another nearby at Sarreinsming handled 31,024 tons of supplies during the first seven days of operation. Rear installations at Epinal and in the Chateau-Salins sector were turned over to CONAD, permitting the use of army regulating personnel at forward locations and releasing additional service troops for new supply points. Some 125,000 tons of supply were moved into the army area by rail during the period from 15 March to the end of the month.

Although repair of rail facilities was accomplished as rapidly as possible, army was nevertheless forced to depend on truck operations,



**NUREMBERG MARSHALLING YARDS AFTER AERIAL BOMBARDMENT**

*" . . . repair of rail facilities was accomplished as fast as possible . . . "*

as the forward supply installations were extended to the Rhine River. The turn-around time was increased to nearly 24 hours and appreciably decreased the potential lift. To increase the supply haulage capacity six truck companies were attached to Seventh Army, making it possible to use a daily average of 1,253 trucks for over-the-road hauling. Troop movements, which included the additional divisions returned to army control to support the offensive, and small unit moves resulted in a total of 46,168 vehicles moving in convoy over the road network during the month.

## Beyond the Rhine

Once the Rhine had been crossed and the assault divisions had pushed east, distances for supply transportation lengthened accordingly. The consumption of gasoline increased, as three armored divisions spearheaded the advance. A shortage in five-gallon gas containers required conservation measures to insure the availability of packaged gasoline. During the last week in March an average issue of 647,752 gallons of gasoline was made. During the remainder of the campaign daily issues were consistently over the 600,000 gallon mark with a peak average issue being made during the week of 29 April to 5 May of 690,000 gallons. An emergency measure during the first week in April resupplied gasoline by air at Wertheim, 28 miles west of Wuerzburg, for the advance of combat troops. A total of 721,443 gallons was brought in by this method over a four-day period.

Construction of a 10,000 barrel storage tank was completed early in April at Sarreguemines, an extension having been completed of three four-inch lines from the La Forge installations at Sarrebourg. Along the Rhine captured storage facilities at Frankenthal and Ludwigshafen were repaired, with 30,000 barrels capacity at the former and 4,800 tons at the latter. A four-inch pipeline, strung across the Rhine on a Bailey bridge from Frankenthal to Sandhofen, was operating on 12 April with the gasoline feeding into a 5,000 barrel tank. By the end of the month the main pipeline from Sarreguemines was feeding into this same reservoir.

When the direction of Seventh Army attack was changed to the south toward the Swiss border, operations entered a sector that had not been given a thorough study by the Seventh Army Engineers. A hurried reconnaissance was made of the area, and rail and main supply routes were laid out from whatever information was available. Months of study had been devoted to the routes in what it had been supposed would be the Seventh Army axis of advance. The change of direction placed the engineers at a disadvantage until available maps of the area and other pertinent data could be compiled for supply planning. Rapid determination of the condition of bridges, rail and highway capacity, and alternate routes made it possible to keep the supply flow moving without interruption.

Before the rail line crossed the Rhine on 24 April, army and CONAD vehicles hauled from west of the river to forward areas. CONAD heavy vehicles (10-ton vans) carried supplies to the several



#### AN ARMY QUARTERMASTER TRANSFER POINT

*"... Army vehicles picked up their loads at these points ..."*



transfer points which had been set up at Ulm, Munich, and Augsburg. Army vehicles picked up their loads at these points and made redistribution to forward supply dumps. This arrangement materially aided the tonnage allotment of each supply agency through fixed commitments and specialization of cargo runs.

The first rail shipments over the Rhine were made to Heilbronn on 24 April. Forward elements of army, however, were operating in the Munich area by this date and were dependent on truck shipments for supply. A secondary line was placed in operation on 1 May for VI Corps troops from Kleinkotz-Krumbach to Schongau. This line moved approximately 300 to 600 tons daily of Class I and II supplies. Upon completion of the rail bridge at Ulm and the opening of an additional line from Augsburg to Garmisch-Partenkirchen, this secondary line to Schongau was closed.

Troop movements were exceptionally high in the army area during April, 11 divisions being moved, exclusive of the forward progress of units in combat. These 11 moves accounted for 14,906 vehicles on the army road network. In addition, 385 other convoys moved into or within the army area. A scheduled rail movement of the 2nd French Armored Division was cancelled and a recommendation made that the unit not be sent to the Seventh Army until such a time as the supply and transportation situation made it feasible. This recommendation was necessary since the allocation of available rail tonnage for critical Class I, III, and V supplies left only 100 tons per day for combat vehicles, spare parts, bridging, hospital trains, replacements, and other transportable items. Movement of the division would have required about 37 trains of 450 tons each which would have seriously hampered the movement of necessary supplies.

There was one tactical movement that was blunted because the main supply route was not adequately maintained. The breakthrough of the 10th Armored Division in the Crailsheim area left the division stranded in Crailsheim without a flow of supply. The Neckar and Jagst River bridges had been blown and temporary bridges were under enemy fire. Although the airfield was under enemy fire, it was possible to deliver by air 20,000 gallons of gasoline, 7,000 rations, 1,000

rounds of 105mm and 100,000 rounds of small arms ammunition with the loss of only one C-47, destroyed as a result of a direct hit from enemy artillery. A later breakthrough into this area was maintained through the expedient of motorizing one RCT of the 44th division which kept pace with the armor and guarded the critical points along the main supply route. The fanatical defense in the Heilbronn area during the early part of April also threatened to upset supply delivery. As a result of enemy artillery action, it was impossible to maintain a treadway bridge over the Neckar River at this location; and a general re-routing of supplies was made through Mosbach.

Air re-supply was used again for VI Corps near Goeppingen, which had Class I, III, and V installations. On 26 and 27 April, 400,000 gallons of gasoline and 150,000 rations were delivered by air. Cargo planes, 280 C-47's, were used to make the deliveries. Under the provisional supply set-up, corps quartermaster could deliver only 100,000 gallons of gas by truck, which was approximately 65 percent of corps requirements. The balance was delivered by air shipments until truck transportation was available. Bad weather made uncertain the regularity of air supply, which, however, fulfilled the emergency need.

The issue of rations during the period following the Rhine crossing was relatively good. With the exception of the period 15-21 April, B rations were readily available in army ration dumps. During the above period, however, the on-hand supply dropped to 0.5 days. The feeding of Allied prisoners of war who had been liberated by the army advance, German prisoners, and many displaced persons created new problems for the army. Planning prior to the movement into Germany offered some precedence for the method of handling.

Since the feeding and clothing of displaced persons would normally be taken care of through military government channels, it was difficult to determine how long divisions over-running such camps would need to supply them from division stocks. An unanticipated drain on army and division reserve supply was the result. Vast numbers of German prisoners in army stockades, estimated at 150,000 on 1 May, made the collection and re-distribution of captured enemy food stocks a major problem. Feeding and evacuating prisoners did not reach a

critical stage until the end of April. Evacuation by supply trucks making the return run to railheads became insufficient because of the large number of prisoners. Special enclosures had to be built and personnel had to be fed, until evacuation could be made.

The seriousness of the food supply within the German Army at the time of its capitulation is illustrated by an analysis contained in a Seventh Army radio message to ETOUSA, dated 11 May, outlining the problem of feeding German prisoners:

It is difficult to comprehend the manner in which the German Army supplied itself from such meager reserves even to the extent of short supplies of grain for bread. In view of the shortages of food supplies the army has initiated action to establish a basic emergency menu built around bacon, bread (German), and fresh potatoes. There is apparently an appreciable quantity of fresh potatoes stored in the ground but they are in small quantities and in isolated places and are difficult to locate.

Air evacuation of Allied prisoners of war was made whenever the health of the soldiers would permit. Displaced persons were segregated and became the responsibility of the G-5 section. Seventh Army continued to supervise and guard the defeated German Army, and through a central collection point all available food supplies were exploited.

Although there were some shortages in food and gasoline during the final phase of the war in Germany, the supply of ammunition was not termed critical at any time following the beginning of the operation on 15 March. Two reasons account for this: the tremendous build-up that had been accomplished prior to the major offensive, and the general disintegration of the German defense. At the beginning of the offensive the daily expenditures were in excess of current allocated daily rates but remained within the overall accumulated credits and savings of the army. Rapid advance by the Seventh Army once the Rhine had been crossed reduced the necessity for heavy expenditures, although individual towns and cities offered resistance and were heavily shelled.

The original plan for ammunition supply points was to establish one near each corps with a main supply point for army in the vicinity of the railhead. When the change in direction of Seventh Army

attack was made, it was necessary to consolidate all stock in one army supply point from which the three corps had to draw. Ammunition shortage in individual units was usually restricted to the lighter types of shell and did not indicate an army shortage but merely non-availability at forward supply points. Expenditures of 75mm and 76mm tank ammunition were heavy, since tanks were often used as artillery support for infantry troops. The period 8-21 April marked the last major resistance on the part of the German Army and materially increased ammunition expenditures. Shipments in the latter part of April were reduced, and by 1 May only replacement of actual expenditure was being made by Base Section.

Shortages in certain items of ordnance equipment became apparent as the period of army operations drew to a close. Many vehicles were deadlined because of the lack of replacement parts. The replacement of combat vehicles and weapons was temporarily held up, but sufficient shipments were received by the middle of April to make essential replacements. The full-time use made of all general purpose vehicles, however, accelerated the rate of deterioration and continued to deplete the reserve stocks available in army. Shortages of tires and tubes were somewhat relieved by the use of captured German rubber, which was substituted on front wheels and spares.

Signal and medical supplies were adequate during this last phase of operations. Medical organizations had been well-equipped prior to the 15 March offensive and were in a position to maintain operations without resupply for a 10 to 20 day period. Recovery of German medical equipment made it possible to utilize captured supplies for over-run German hospitals and relieve any strain on army reserve.

The problem confronting the service troops assigned to army increased with the lost working time which resulted from the necessity for close follow-up of the rapid advance of the combat units and the consequent loss of time involved in frequent moving. Guarding and handling captured enemy materiel further depleted the available manpower. Some relief of personnel shortages was secured through the hiring of displaced civilians, although the ETOUSA ruling that French civilian labor would not be moved into Germany made

necessary employment readjustments and the hiring of many Poles, Russians, and Italians.

## Campaign Review

The cessation of hostilities on the Seventh Army front did not eliminate the supply problems that had confronted the army during the final phase of fighting in southern Germany. Of the three critical items, ammunition was the only one that could be removed from the overall picture. Food and gasoline were needed in great quantities. But the transition period from operations to occupation must remain as a separate period of historical interest. Some review of the Seventh Army campaign through France and Germany is more appropriate to a report of operations.

While the German Army still opposed Seventh Army in France and Germany the emphasis of supply was upon the bullets and shells to be directed against the enemy. Statistics of the entire Seventh Army campaign include a total ammunition tonnage issued to combat troops of 233,585.7 long tons. A proper figure for the handling of tonnage would be to multiply this figure by three to include the receipt, issue, and the second unloading within the army area. The tonnage issue figure does not equal the total amount received since this included 12,670.5 tons on hand in army supply points at the end of the fighting and credits available for the army of approximately 90,000 tons from ammunition turned over to Base Section as the army moved forward. During the campaign several new types of ammunition were introduced and employed. All issues to troops were for replacement of basic load ammunition. Seventh Army did not have an established basic load for units but left determination of the amount to unit commanders based on the carrying capacity of available transportation. This proved to be a most satisfactory method, since in many instances it allowed combat units to continue fighting during critical periods without exposing troops making deliveries.

To summarize the participation of supply agencies in the campaign it is necessary to return to the pre-planning days in December of 1943 in Algiers and Oran when operation ANVIL was still a paper

project awaiting final authorization from higher headquarters. Lack of decision tended to confuse the necessary logistical planning. The actual operation, changed in name to DRAGOON, was a successful Army-Navy landing operation in the harbor areas adjacent to Marseille. German destruction of the harbor of Marseille had made this large port entirely unusable at the date of its capture; however, two months later, berths for 29 Liberty ships were available as well as coaster berths, tanker berths, and LST berths. Coincidental in time, the harbors of Du-Bouc, Toulon, Cannes, and Nice were reopened, each involving clearing of mines, removing wrecked hulks, and rebuilding the extensive facilities. During the last two weeks of the Seventh Army campaign, the port of Marseille was operating at a capacity of 25,000 tons per day. During the entire campaign some 2,500,000 tons of cargo, 180,158 vehicles, and 491,000 personnel had passed through its facilities.

The tremendous problem of transportation was the focal point throughout the Seventh Army's campaign. Directly integrated with all tactical moves, the movement of supply hinged first on Base Section availability and secondly on the rail and truck services delivering the necessary quantities of materiel within the time factor allowed by the operational movement of the army. It was necessary for army to support itself by truck hauls supplemented by air-drops until the capture of Grenoble, 172 miles inland. Rail rehabilitation commenced as soon as the troops moved inland from the beaches with the first locomotive going into operation on 23 August, eight days after the landing. Rail service was opened into Lyon, Dijon, and Besancon by 21 September; and a system of 1,166 miles of line was open for operation by 1 November serving both the First French Army and the Seventh Army at the time the tactical situation had stabilized itself in the Vosges Mountains.

The rapid forward movement of Seventh Army had been retarded in October as the result of three related causes. Transportation was unable to place sufficient supplies in Seventh Army installations to insure a safe margin in the event an offensive operation met expected stiffening resistance. The German retreat had been precipitous but, nevertheless organized, and had placed the enemy in advantageous

defensive positions. Finally, the condition of men and equipment of the Seventh Army showed the strain of the rapid advance and soon would require rest. The month of October and the first part of No-



#### RAILROAD USED BY SEVENTH ARMY

*"... a system of 1,166 miles of line was open for operation by 1 November serving both the French First Army and the Seventh Army . . ."*

vember became a period of build-up of all classes of supply to support the November offensive that was aimed at clearing the area west of the Rhine and exploiting a possible Rhine crossing should the opportunity present itself. Transportation facilities met the requirements of the army for the desired level of supply and, subject to physical limitation in Base Sections, had sufficient reserve to maintain the Seventh Army drive.

Winter weather was first experienced in October in the High Vosges where deep snow and damp, cold weather produced a non-combatant casualty loss. The successful penetration through the Vosges in November and to the Alsatian Plain in December was halted by the German counter-offensive against another Allied front. An adjustment

of fronts was made between the Third and Seventh Armies which enabled Third Army units to be employed in the Ardennes sector. When an expected secondary thrust by the German Army against the Seventh Army front called for defensive measures that included a planned retrograde movement of supply, Luneville and Epinal became the main rear installations and Saverne and Sarrebourg the forward dumps, with St. Die opened for support of troops fighting in the Colmar Pocket area.

The transfer of supply in January from forward points to the rear and from Base Section to rear caused a concentration of materiel within army not readily available to the using troops. As a result of the long distances involved and unsatisfactory road nets a serious condition existed in all classes of supply. Army was able to contain the German thrust with relatively little loss of tactical ground and assumed a static defensive role that included a closely controlled expenditure of ammunition. Future offensive planning required supply to build substantial reserves as well as to fill all Table of Equipment shortages of combat units. On 15 March Seventh Army mounted a major offensive aimed at Germany.

During the first 11 days of the last major offensive up to the Rhine crossing, supply had been able to move forward in relatively close support. Following the crossing, the distances between combat units and supply points became relatively greater. Rail was of practically no assistance within the army area for the movement of supplies from the Rhine eastward until late in April. Trucks of CONAD and army were coordinated to keep the level of supply sufficient to maintain the army drive.

At the end of hostilities on the Seventh Army front on 8 May, a distance of over 1,000 miles had been travelled, that included the opening Rhone Valley push and the closing thrusts into the last points of resistance in the Austrian Alps. Supply had been sufficient to maintain all the operations mounted by army, even though in some cases such operations might have been delayed until a satisfactory supply build-up could be attained. Service troops, from the medical ward attendant in a rear hospital to the signal corps linesman laying wire under shell fire, had supported combat divisions to the full extent of their drives.





# ANNEXES



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## **ANNEX A**

### ***D-DAY TROOP LIST***



# D-DAY TROOP LIST (US)

## VI CORPS

Hq & Hq Co, VI Corps

## DIVISIONS

3rd Infantry Division

45th Infantry Division

36th Infantry Division

## COMBAT COMMAND

Combat Command Sudre lere  
Division Blindée

Det, 661/2 Cie De Reparation  
Engines Blindée

Attached:

66e Cie de Munitions (-)

lere Cie, 9e Regt Chasseurs d'Afrique

Det, 705 Cie de Ravitaillement  
en Essence

## FIELD ARTILLERY

Hq & Hq Btry, VI Corps Arty

93rd FA Bn (105 How SP)

Hq & Hq Btry, 6th FA Gp

141st FA Bn (155 How)

Hq & Hq Btry, 35th FA Gp

634th FA Bn (155 How)

Hq & Hq Btry, 36th FA Gp

937th FA Bn (155 How)

2nd FA Obsn Bn

938th FA Bn (155 How)

36th FA Bn (155 Gun)

976th FA Bn (155 Gun)

59th FA Bn (105 How SP)

977th FA Bn (155 Gun)

69th FA Bn (105 How SP)

## ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

Hq & Hq Btry, 35th AAA Brig  
& 35th AAOR

895th AAA (AW) Bn (Mbl)

Hq & Hq Btry, 5th AAA Gp

68th AAA Gun Bn (Mbl)

Hq & Hq Btry, 68th AAA Gp

72nd AAA Gun Bn (Mbl)

Hq & Hq Btry, 105th AAA Gp

108th AAA Gun Bn (Mbl)

106th AAA (AW) Bn (SP)

216th AAA Gun Bn (Mbl)

441st AAA (AW) Bn (SP)

102nd AAA Barrage Balloon

443rd AAA (AW) Bn (SP)

Btry (VLA)

107th AAA (AW) Bn (Mbl)

103rd AAA Barrage Balloon

433rd AAA (AW) Bn (Mbl)

Btry (VLA)

451st AAA (AW) Bn (Mbl)

104th AAA Barrage Balloon

534th AAA (AW) Bn (Mbl)

Btry (VLA)

## ARMORED FORCE

191st Tank Bn

753rd Tank Bn

756th Tank Bn

## TANK DESTROYER

601st TD Bn

636th TD Bn

645th TD Bn



## CAVALRY

117th Cav Rcn Sq

## CHEMICAL WARFARE

2nd Cml Bn Mtz. (-1 Co)  
3rd Cml Bn Mtz  
83rd Cml Bn Mtz (-1 Co)  
6th Cml Dep Co

11th Cml Maint Co  
21st Cml Decon Co (-3 plats)  
(Smoke Troops)

## ENGINEER

343rd Engr GS Regt  
344th Engr GS Regt  
Co C, (Bailey Bridge), 378th Engr  
Bn (Sep)  
Co D, (Treadway Bridge), 378th Engr  
Bn (Sep)

1st Plat 424th Engr DT Co.  
Contact Plat, 469th Engr Maint Co  
Survey Plat, 661st Engr Topo Co  
6617th Engr Mine Clearance Co

## MILITARY POLICE

206th MP Co

## MEDICAL

2nd Au Surg Gp  
14 Gen Surg Teams  
3 Shock Teams  
1 Gas Team  
3 Orthopedic Teams  
2 Thoracic Teams  
2 Neuro Teams  
3 Dental Prosthetic Teams  
2 Maxial Facial Teams

10th Field Hospital & 6703rd Blood  
Transfusion Unit  
(Fwd Disb Sec)  
11th Field Hospital  
11th Evac Hospital (SM) (400 bed)  
93rd Evac Hospital (SM) (400 bed)  
95th Evac Hospital (SM) (400 bed)

## ORDNANCE

Hq & Hq Det, 43rd Ord Bn  
(w/atchd Med)  
Hq & Hq Det, 44th Ord Bn  
(w/atchd Med)  
Hq & Hq Det, 45th Ord Bn  
(w/atchd Med)  
14th Ord MM Co  
45th Ord MM Co  
46th Ord MM Co  
87th Ord HM Co (FA)  
261st Ord MM Co (AA)

3406th Ord MAM Co  
3408th Ord MAM Co  
3432nd Ord MAM Co  
64th Ord Amm Co  
66th Ord Amm Co  
680th Ord Amm Co  
143rd Ord Bomb Disp Sq  
144th Ord Bomb Disp Sq  
145th Ord Bomb Disp Sq  
146th Ord Bomb Disp Sq

## QUARTERMASTER

46th QM GR Co (-1 Plat)

Plat, 549th QM Laundry Co 3426th QM Truck Co

## SIGNAL

1st Signal Center Team	3201 SIS Det
57th Signal Bn	4 Dets, 163rd Signal Photo CO
Det A 117th RI Co	

## NAVAL

3 Naval Combat Intel Teams	Naval Gunfire Liaison Personnel
15 Naval Shore Fire Control Parties	

The following listed Regimental Beach Groups with units listed, or similar units, will be attached VI Corps for the assault phase of the Operation ANVIL.

### 3RD INFANTRY DIVISION BEACH GROUP

36th Engr C Regt	Det, 977th Ord Dep Co
1st Naval Beach Bn	3407th Ord Med Auto Maint Co
72nd Sig Co (Spec)	(DUKW)
Det, 207 Sig Dep Co plus Det, 177th Sig Rep Co	Det, 6690th Regulating Co
Hq & Hq Det, 52nd Med Bn	Hq & Hq Det, 530th QM Bn
376th Med Coll Co	4133rd QM Serv Co
377th Med Coll Co	4134th QM Serv Co
378th Med Coll Co	4135th QM Serv Co
682nd Med Coll Co	4136th QM Serv Co
1st Plat & Hq Det, 616th Med Clr Co	3277th QM Serv Co
Det, Boat Guards	3357th QM Truck Co
157th MP PW Det	3634th QM Truck Co
706th MP PW Det	Hq & Hq Det, 52nd QM Bn (Mbl)
790th MP PW Det	3333rd QM Truck Co (DUKW)
Det, 377th MP Escort Guard Co	3334th QM Truck Co (DUKW)
Co A, 759th MP Bn	3335th QM Truck Co (DUKW)
1st Plat 21st Cml Decon Co	3336th QM Truck Co (DUKW)
(Smoke Troops)	3353rd QM Truck Co (DUKW)
Det, 63rd Cml Dep Co	3355th QM Truck Co (DUKW)
3rd Plat, 450th Engr Dep Co	Sec, 3856th QM Gas Sup Co
69th Ord Amm Co	1 Plat, 93rd QM Rhd Co
Det, 77th Ord Dep Co	332nd Air Force Beach Detail
	111th Beach Section, RAF

### 45TH INFANTRY DIVISION BEACH GROUP

40th Engr Combat Regt	389th Med Coll Co
4th Naval Beach Bn	390th Med Coll Co
71st Sig Co (Spec)	514th Med Clearing Co
Det, 207th Sig Dep Co + Det, 177th Sig Rep Co	2nd Plat, 616th Clearing Co
Hq & Hq Det, 58th Med Bn	Co B, 759th MP Bn
388th Med Coll Co	1 Sec, 377th PW Esct Guard Co
	Det, Boat Guards

133 Prow PW Det  
 175 Prow PW Det  
 191 Prow PW Det  
 3rd Plat, 21st Cml Decon Co  
 (Smoke Troops)  
 Det, 63rd Cml Depot Co  
 2nd Pat, 450th Engr Dep Co  
 682nd Ord Amm Co  
 Det, 77th Ord Dep Co  
 Det, 977th Ord Dep Co  
 3487th Ord M Auto Maint Co (DUKW)  
 3633rd QM Truck Co  
 3425th QM Truck Co  
 Det, 6690th Regulating Co

Hq & Hq Det, 147th QM Bn (Mbl)  
 829th Amphibian Truck Co  
 830th Amphibian Truck Co  
 831st Amphibian Truck Co  
 832nd Amphibian Truck Co  
 1 Sec, 3894th QM Gas Sup Co  
 Hq & Hq Det, 240th QM Bn  
 3250th QM Serv Co  
 3251st QM Serv Co  
 3252nd QM Serv Co  
 3253rd QM Serv Co  
 4053rd QM Serv Co  
 Plat, 94th QM Rhd Co  
 Air Force Beach Detail  
 110th Beach Section, RAF

### 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION BEACH GROUP

540th Engr C Regt + (48th Engr C Bn)  
 8th Naval Beach Bn  
 74th Sig Co (Spec)  
 Det, 207th Sig Dep Co + 177th Sig  
 Rep Co  
 Hq & Hq Det, 56th Med Bn  
 885th Med Coll Co  
 886th Med Coll Co  
 887th Med Coll Co  
 891st Med Clearing Co  
 1st Plat, 638th Clearing Co  
 Co C, 759th MP Bn  
 1 Sec, 377th PW Esct Guard Co  
 Det, Boat Guards  
 192 Prov MP PW Det  
 601 Prov MP PW Det  
 Prov MP PW Det  
 3rd Plat, 21st Cml Decon Co  
 (Smoke Troops)  
 Det, 63rd Cml Depot Co  
 1st Plat, 450th Engr Dep Co  
 603rd Ord Amm Co  
 Det, 77th Ord Dep Co

Det, 977th Ord Dep Co  
 3405th Ord M Auto Maint Co (DUKW)  
 Det, 6690th Regulating Co  
 1 Sec, 3894th QM Gas Sup Co  
 2nd Plat, 94th QM Rhd Co  
 Hq & Hq Det, 53rd QM Bn (Mbl)  
 3337th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
 3338th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
 3339th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
 3340th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
 3354th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
 3356th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
 Hq & Hq Det, 259th QM Bn  
 3286th QM Serv Co  
 3287th QM Serv Co  
 3288th QM Serv Co  
 3289th QM Serv Co  
 3300th QM Serv Co  
 3299th QM Serv Co  
 3427th QM Truck Co  
 3360th QM Truck Co  
 Air Force Beach Detail  
 111th Brick Section, RAF

### 7TH ARMY

Det, Army Hq & Hq Co  
 & Special Troops

Det, Hq Seventh Army (For Beach  
 Control Hq)

### SPECIAL FORCES

1st Airborne Task Force:  
 Hq & Hq Co, AB Task Force

2nd British Independent Pchrt  
 Brigade (Gp)

517th Parachute Infantry  
 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion  
 550th Airborne Infantry Battalion  
 1st Battalion, 551st Parachute Inf  
 (Reinforced)  
 460th Parachute Field Artillery  
 Battalion  
 463rd Airborne Field Artillery  
 Battalion  
 602nd Glider Field Artillery  
 Battalion  
 596th Airborne Engineer Company  
 887th Engineer Company  
 512th Airborne Signal Company

Anti-Tank Co, 442nd Infantry  
 552nd Infantry Anti-tank Company  
 Company "A" 2nd Chemical Battalion  
 Company "D" 83rd Chemical Battalion  
 172nd D. I. D. British Hvy Aerial  
 Resupply Co  
 334th Quartermaster Depot Co,  
 Aerial Resupply (-)  
 3358th Quartermaster Truck  
 Company  
 Detachment, 3rd Ordnance  
 Company (MM)  
 Special Service Force (-)  
 French Groupe de Commandos (-)

#### ENGINEER

Co D (rem Map Plat) 378th Engr  
 Bn (Sep)  
 697th Engr Pet Dist Co + Mbl Lab,  
 701st Engr Pet Dist Co  
 Surv Plat, 649th Engr Topo Bn

Co A, Engr Cam Bn  
 1202nd Engr Fire Fighting Plat  
 1204th Engr Fire Fighting Plat  
 1711th Engr Map Dep Det

#### MILITARY POLICE

204th MP Co  
 372nd MP Escort Guard  
 377th MP Escort Guard Co (-3 Secs)

504th MP Bn (-2 Cos)  
 Hq & Hq Det, 759th MP Bn

#### MEDICAL

1st Adv Sec, 7th Med Depot Co

#### QUARTERMASTER

94th QM Rhd Co (-2 Plats)  
 138th QM Truck Co  
 144th QM Truck Co

Det 202nd QM Car Co (-)  
 Hq & Hq Det, 528th QM Bn  
 3357th QM Truck Co

#### SIGNAL

Army Sig Bn  
 Det, 163rd Sig Photo Co

226th Sig Opn Co  
 982nd Sig Serv Co

#### MISCELLANEOUS

Det 72nd Liaison Sqd  
 Special Service Staff (Office Strategic  
 Services)

11th Postal Regulating Unit  
 Twenty-eight Port Cos and Seven Bn  
 Hq Dets.

# D-DAY TROOP LIST (FRENCH)

## ARMEE "B"

E-M Armee "B" et Cie QG 162/27 (-)

## 2e CORPS D'ARMEE

QG CA et Cie QG CA 75

## DIVISIONS

1re Division de Marche d'Infanterie	1st Div Blindee (-2 CC)
3eme Division d'Infanterie Algeriene	2e Regt Spehis Algerienne (Rcn Btn)

## FIELD ARTILLERY

E-M du Groupement d'Artillerie No. 1	Det, 1st FA Obsn Bn (US)
1er Grpe du Regt d'Art Col du Levant	3e Grpe du 65e Regt d'Art

## ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

Det, Hq & Hq Btry, 34th AAA Brig (US)	62nd AAA Gun Bn (US)
Det, Hq & Hq Btry, 80th AAA Gp (US)	893rd AAA (AW) Bn (SM)

## TANK DESTROYER

7e Regt Chasseurs d'Afrique	8e Regt Chasseurs d'Afrique
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## ENGINEER

Cie Topographique du Genie No. 31	1011e Regt du Genie
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## MILITARY POLICE

521e Regulatrice Routiere	2e Cie du 11 Group de le Garde
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## MEDICAL

401e Hopital d'Evacuation	Organe de Reanimation et de Trans-
405e Hopital d'Evacuation	fusion No. 441/3
432e Bataillon Medical	451/1 Depot Avance
422e Hopital d'Campagne	

## ORDNANCE

E-M du 651e Bon de Reparation	Cie Moyene de Reparation Material
Cie Moyene de Reparation Auto	652/1
No. 651/3	64e Cie de Munitions
Cie Moyene de Reparation Auto	65e Cie de Munitions
No. 652/3	

### QUARTERMASTER

1er Bon du 8 Regiment de Tirgilleur  
Senegalais, Pioniers  
Gestion de Subsistance d'Etapes No. 323

Gestion de Subsistance d'Etapes No. 325  
Cie Mixte de Ravitaillement en Essence  
No. 704 (2 dets)

### SIGNAL

61e Bon de Transmission de CA  
3 Dets, 163rd Sig Photo Co (US)  
806 Bataillon de Construction  
Det, Parc de Transmission No. 810 &  
Det Cie Technique de Transmission  
No. 841

6693rd Sig Det (Prov) (US)  
Det, Trans Armee "B"  
(Cie d' Exploit 827/1)  
(Son Ecoutes 828)  
(Grp Tele Mil 829)

### TRANSPORTATION

11e Cie du Grp de Transport No. 501

The following units will be available to Army "B" on subsequent convoys:

9e Division d'Infanterie Coloniale      2 Groupes de Tabors      Supporting Units.

By Command of Major General PATCH:

A. A. WHITE,  
Brig. General, G.S.C.,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

JOHN S. GUTHRIE,  
Colonel, G.S.C.,  
A.C. of S., G-3



## **ANNEX B**

### **ORDER OF BATTLE**

- a) ALLIES**
- b) ENEMY**





# SEVENTH ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE

15 August-15 May

## A. VI CORPS, 15 August-15 May

1. Corps Hq & Hq Co	15 August-15 May
2. 3rd Infantry Division	15 August-15 December
3. 36th Infantry Division	15 August-5 December
	21 December-23 December
	19 January-29 March
	11 May-15 May
4. 45th Infantry Division	15 August-9 November
	5 December-18 February
	11 May-15 May
5. Combat Command 1 ("Sudre")	
1st Division Blindee, (French)	15 August-19 August
6. French Naval Assault Force	15 August-19 August
7. Group of Commandoes (French)	15 August-19 August
8. 1st Airborne Task Force	15 August-19 August
9. 100th Infantry Division	2 November-27 November
	25 March-24 April
10. 103rd Infantry Division	2 November-22 December
	17 January-29 March
	20 April-15 May
11. 14th Armored Division CCA only -	19 November-22 November
complete -	25 November-5 December
less CCA -	5 December-29 December
complete -	29 December-2 January
12. 2nd Division Blindee, (French)	2 January-1 April
	27 November-5 December
	11 May-15 May
	5 December-7 February
13. 79th Infantry Division	
14. Task Force Harris (Composed principally of Infantry Regiments of 63rd Infantry Division)	27 December-31 December
15. Task Force Herren (Composed principally of Infantry Regiments of 70th Infantry Division)	27 December-17 January
16. Task Force Linden (Composed principally of Infantry Regiments of 42nd Infantry Division)	27 December-27 January
17. 3rd Division Infantry Algerienne	5 January-7 January
	13 March-19 March
	6 January-22 February
18. 12th Armored Division	27 January-26 February
19. 101st Airborne Division	27 April-3 May
	17 February-25 March
20. 42nd Infantry Division	
21. Groupe Monsabert (incl. 3rd Division Infantry Algerienne)	19 March-26 March

22. 102nd Cavalry Group	15 March-29 March
23. 4th Infantry Division	20 March-25 March
24. 71st Infantry Division	25 March-29 March
25. 63rd Infantry Division	1 April-19 April
26. 10th Armored Division	1 April-15 May
27. 44th Infantry Division	17 April-15 May
28. 115th Cavalry Group	24 April-15 May

#### B. FRENCH ARMY "B", 15 August-15 September

1. Headquarters	15 August-15 September
2. II Corps	15 August-15 September
a. 1st DIM	15 August-15 September
b. 3rd DIA	15 August-1 September
c. 9th DIC	15 August-1 September
d. 1st DB	19 August-15 September
e. 2nd DIM	26 August-1 September
3. I Corps	5 September-15 September
a. 3rd DIA	5 September-15 September
b. 9th DIC	5 September-15 September
c. 2nd DIM	5 September-15 September
4. Army Troops	
a. 4th DMM	1 September-15 September
b. Groupe de Commandoes	19 August-15 September
c. 3rd DIA	1 September-5 September
d. 9th DIC	1 September-5 September
e. 2nd DIM	1 September-5 September

#### C. XV CORPS, 29 September-15 May

1. Corps Hq & Hq Co	29 September-15 May
2. 106th Cavalry Group	29 September-13 January
	25 January-15 May
3. 79th Infantry Division	29 September-5 December
4. 2nd Division Blindee	29 September-27 November
	30 December-20 January
	12 February-5 March
5. 44th Infantry Division	17 October-16 March
	23 March-9 April
6. 14th Armored Division	22 November-25 November
CCA only -	28 November-5 December
less CCA -	29 December-2 January
CCA only -	1 April-23 April
complete -	24 November-5 December
7. 45th Infantry Division	12 March-6 May
8. 100th Infantry Division	27 November-22 March
9. 12th Armored Division	5 December-27 December
	3 January-6 January
	10 February-28 February
	26 March-21 March

10. 87th Infantry Division	20 December-26 December
11. 103rd Infantry Division	22 December-13 January
12. Task Force Harris	31 December-1 February
63rd Infantry Division	1 February-28 February
	21 March-26 March
13. 36th Infantry Division	3 January-19 January
14. 10th Armored Division CCB only -	20 January-25 January
complete -	25 January-10 February
15. 101st Airborne Division	21 January-26 January
	11 May-15 May
16. 35th Infantry Division	23 January-31 January
17. Task Force Herren	25 January-3 February
70th Infantry Division	3 February-25 February
18. 101st Cavalry Group	7 February-28 February
19. 6th Armored Division	8 March-23 March
20. 71st Infantry Division	9 March-22 March
21. 3rd Infantry Division	12 March-21 April
	28 April-6 May
	8 May-15 May
22. 42nd Infantry Division	19 April-15 May
23. 20th Armored Division	23 April-15 May
24. 86th Infantry Division	2 May-14 May

#### D. XXI CORPS, 27 December-25 January

17 February-15 May

1. Corps Hq & Hq Co	27 December-25 January
	17 February-15 May
2. 101st Cavalry Group	28 February-15 May
3. 12th Armored Division	27 December-30 December
	28 February-17 March
	24 March-26 March
	31 March-5 May
	12 May-15 May
4. 36th Infantry Division	27 December-30 December
	27 April-11 May
5. 106th Cavalry Group	13 January-25 January
6. 103rd Infantry Division	13 January-17 January
7. Task Force Herren	17 January-25 January
8. 10th Armored Division complete -	17 January-20 January
less CCB -	20 January-25 January
complete -	23 March-1 April
9. 70th Infantry Division	25 February-22 March
10. 63rd Infantry Division	28 February-21 March
	26 March-1 April
	19 April-30 April
	12 May-15 May
11. 71st Infantry Division	22 March-25 March
12. 100th Infantry Division	22 March-25 March
	12 May-15 May

13. 4th Infantry Division	25 March-2 May
14. 42nd Infantry Division	25 March-19 April
15. 3rd Infantry Division	23 April-28 April
16. 2nd Division Blindee	1 May-9 May
17. 101st Airborne Division	3 May-11 May

#### E. ARMY TROOPS

1. Army Hq & Hq Co	15 August-15 May
2. French Naval Assault Force	15 August (only)
	19 August (only)
3. Groupe of Commandoes (French),	15 August (only)
	19 August (only)
4. 1st Special Service Force	15 August-21 August
5. 1st Airborne Task Force	15 August (only)
(including 1st Special Service Force after 21 August)	20 August-26 September
6. 45th Infantry Division	9 November-23 November
	18 February-12 March
	6 May-11 May
7. 14th Armored Division complete -	13 November-19 November
less CCA -	19 November-28 November
8. 12th Armored Division	2 December-5 December
	30 December-3 January
	22 January (only)
	5 May-12 May
9. Task Force Harris	19 December-27 December
10. 36th Infantry Division	23 December-27 December
	30 December-3 January
	29 March-27 April
11. Task Force Linden	24 December-27 December
42nd Infantry Division	27 January-6 February
	6 February-17 February
12. 101st Cavalry Group	16 January-7 February
13. 79th Infantry Division	7 February-17 February
14. 75th Infantry Division	11 February-16 February
15. 28th Infantry Division	14 February-18 February
16. 3rd Infantry Division	18 February-12 March
	21 April-23 April
	6 May-8 May
17. 101st Airborne Division	26 February-28 February
18. 4th Infantry Division	10 March-20 March
19. 44th Infantry Division	16 March-23 March
	9 April-17 April
20. 13th Armored Division	23 March-8 April
21. 70th Infantry Division	22 March-8 April
22. 71st Infantry Division	29 March (only)
23. 103rd Infantry Division	29 March-20 April
24. 100th Infantry Division	24 April-12 May
25. 63rd Infantry Division	30 April-12 May
26. 2nd Division Blindee	9 May-11 May

# ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

Corps	First contact	Last contact	Remarks
LXII	15 August	17 August	Captured
LXXV	21 August		
LXXXV	21 August		
IV GAF	21 August		
LXIV Reserve			
LXVI Reserve			
XLVII Panzer			
LVIII Panzer			
XIII SS			
LXXXIX	29 October		
XIV			

## NINETEENTH ARMY

15 Aug 44—4 Dec 44

242nd Infantry	15 Aug 44	28 Aug 44	(surrendered at Toulon)
148th Reserve	17 Aug 44	15 Sept 44	
189th Reserve (later 189 Inf)	17 Aug 44	15 Nov 44	
244th Infantry	18 Aug 44	28 Aug 44	(surrendered at Marseille)
198th Infantry	18 Aug 44	4 Dec 44	
338th Infantry	18 Aug 44	Early Nov	
11th Panzer	21 Aug 44	20 Sept 44	
157th Reserve	22 Aug 44	15 Sept 44	
5th Mountain	29 Aug 44	15 Sept 44	(in Italy)
90th Panzer Grenadier	29 Aug 44	15 Sept 44	(in Italy)
716th Infantry	30 Aug 44	4 Dec 44	
1st GAF Training	5 Sept 44	15 Sept 44	
159th Reserve (later 159th VG)	7 Sept 44	15 Sept 44	
16th Infantry (later 16th VG)	7 Sept 44	4 Dec 44	
30th SS Infantry (also called	10 Sept 44	15 Sept 44	
2nd Russian)	29 Nov 44	4 Dec 44	
34th Infantry	11 Sept 44	15 Sept 44	
708th Volks Grenadier	12 Nov 44	4 Dec 44	

Divisions	First contact	Last contact	Remarks
269th Infantry	3 Dec 44		
19th Army Training			(no contact in combat)
21st Panzer		12 Nov 44	

#### FIFTH PANZER ARMY

29 Sept 44—

15th Panzer Grenadier	29 Sept 44	Late Oct	
21st Panzer	29 Sept 44	Early Nov	
11th Panzer	29 Sept 44	27 Oct 44	
405th Administrative (Inf)			(no contact in combat)

#### FIRST ARMY

19th Infantry	(a) 23 Oct 44	Early Nov	(1 regt only)
	(b) 25 Dec 44		
553rd Volks Grenadier	16 Oct 44		
361st Volks Grenadier	30 Oct 44		
130th Panzer	23 Nov 44	10 Dec 44	
9th AA	24 Nov 44		
256th Volks Grenadier	25 Nov 44		
25th Panzer Grenadier	26 Nov 44		
245th Infantry	27 Nov 44		
11th Panzer	10 Dec 44	19 Dec 44	
21st Panzer	11 Dec 44	19 Dec 44	
257th Volks Grenadier	19 Dec 44		
17th SS Panzer Grenadier	21 Dec 44		
347th Infantry	28 Dec 44		
36th Infantry (VG)	1 Jan 45		
6th SS Mountain Division	2 Jan 45		
559th Volks Grenadier	1 Jan 45		
7th Parachute	14 Jan 45		

## **ANNEX C**

### ***FIELD ORDERS***





# HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY

APO 758

FO No. 1 (ANVIL)

29 July 1944

Maps: GSGS 2738 FRANCE 1/250,000, Sheets 37, 38, 42, 43.

1. a. Annex No. 2 (Intelligence)

b. (1) Seventh Army, supported by Western Naval Task Force and XII Tactical Air Command, will assault the South coast of FRANCE, secure a beachhead East of TOULON and then assault and capture TOULON.

(2) The Naval Commander, Western Task Force, will command the entire seaborne expedition from the time of sailing until the ground forces are firmly established ashore; thereafter command of ground operations passes to the Commanding General, Seventh Army.

(3) XII Tactical Air Command will support the operation. Additional air support by MATAF will be available to Commanding General, XII Tactical Air Command, on request.

2. a. Seventh Army will make a daylight seaborne and airborne assault on area shown (Annex No. 1) to seize and secure a beachhead for the assault and capture of TOULON.

b. "D" day, "H" hour to be announced later.

c. Troops: See Annex No. 3.

d. Shipping: See Annex No. 4.

3. See Annex No. 1 (Operations Overlay).

a. KODAK FORCE (VI US Corps):

Consisting of: ALPHA FORCE (3rd Inf Div reinf)

DELTA FORCE (45th Inf Div reinf)

CAMEL FORCE (36th Inf Div reinf)

Combat Command SUDRE (1st Fr. Armd Div reinf)

(1) Make a daylight assault at "H" hour on "D" day on beaches between CAPE CAVALAIRE and AGAY.

(2) Destroy enemy beach defenses, advance rapidly inland and contact RUGBY and ROMEO Forces.

(3) RUGBY Force attached KODAK Force when contact is made.

(4) ROMEO Force attached KODAK Force at "H" hour.

(5) Capture LE MUY on "D" day.

(6) Extend the beachhead rapidly to the Blue Line (Annex No. 1): THEOULE SUR MER — BAGNOLS EN FORET — TRANS EN PROVENCE — LE CANNET DES MAURES — COLLOBRIERES — CAPE DE LEOUBE. After reorganization, continue advance to the West and Northwest.

(7) Secure airfield sites in the ARGENS Valley (See Operations Instructions No. 1), between FREJUS and LE LUC from ground-observed enemy Artillery fire.

(8) Protect the right flank of the Army.

(9) Be prepared to release Combat Command SUDRE (1st French Arm'd Div), RUGBY Force, and ROMEO Force to Army control on Army order.

(10) After passage of lines by GARBO Force (see para 3 e), continue the advance within zone.

(11) Boundary between KODAK Force and GARBO Force: COLLOBRIERES (to GARBO Force) — CARNOULES (to KODAK Force) — FORCALQUEIRET (to GARBO Force) — TOURVES (to KODAK Force). Road: CARNOULES — ST. ANASTASIE — FORCALQUEIRET — BRIGNOLES, all to KODAK Force.

(12) Beach groups will be released from attachment to VI Corps and will be placed in support of VI Corps at "H" Hour.

b. RUGBY Force (1st Airborne Task Force):

(1) Land in LE MUY area starting about first light, "D" day.

(2) Prevent movement of enemy forces into the assault area from the direction of LE MUY and LE LUC.

(3) Attached to KODAK Force when contacted by KODAK Force.

(4) Assemble glider pilots in vicinity of Force CP for evacuation from assault area. Notify Seventh Army when pilots are assembled.

c. SITKA FORCE (1st Special Service Force):

(1) Assault the Islands of PORT CROS and LEVANT under cover of darkness the night of D-1/D day.

(2) Destroy enemy coastal battery on East end of LEVANT before 0600 "D" day.

(3) Destroy all enemy defenses on the islands prior to "H" hour.

(4) Turn over garrison of the islands to French garrison force on or about D + 2, evacuate prisoners to vicinity of Beach 259, and withdraw to the mainland under Army control.

(5) See Annex No. 13. (Special Instructions for SITKA and ROMEO Forces.)

d. **ROMEO FORCE** (French Groupe de Commandos):

- (1) Land in the vicinity of **CAPE NEGRE** under cover of darkness on the night of D-1/D day.
- (2) Destroy all enemy coastal defenses on **CAPE NEGRE**.
- (3) Block the coastal highway vicinity of **CAPE NEGRE**.
- (4) Seize and hold high ground in vicinity of **BISCARRE** (3 km North of **CAPE NEGRE**.)
- (5) Attached to **KODAK Force** at "H" hour.
- (6) See Annex No. 13. (Special Instructions for **SITKA** and **ROMEO Forces**.)

e. **GARBO FORCE** (II French Corps):

- (1) Debark rapidly over secure beaches in the **ST TROPEZ — CAVAILAIRE** area upon arrival in the transport area.
- (2) Assemble and organize in the area shown (see Annex No. 1).
- (3) Upon Army order, be prepared to pass through elements of the **KODAK Force** in zone, and attack **TOULON**.
- (4) Maintain contact with **KODAK Force** on the right.
- (5) After capture of **TOULON**, be prepared to continue the advance in zone to the West and Northwest.

f. **ARMY RESERVE**:

- (1) Following units revert to Army control on Army order:
  - (a) **RUGBY Force**.
  - (b) **ROMEO Force**.
  - (c) **SITKA Force**.
  - (d) **Combat Command SUDRE** (1st Fr Armd Div)

g. **I FRENCH CORPS**:

- (1) Be prepared to embark when ordered so as to arrive in the target area on the following schedule:
  - 2nd (Fr) Moroccan Inf Div (2 DIM) (reinf) from **NAPLES** by D + 20.
  - 4th (Fr) Mountain Div (4 DMM) (reinf) from **NAPLES** by D + 30.
  - 5th (Fr) Armored Div (5 DB) (reinf) from **ORAN** by D + 40.

h. **ARMY TROOPS**:

- (1) (Annex No. 3.) Units will land over **ALPHA**, **DELTA**, and **CAMEL** beaches as indicated in Annex No. 4.

i. **WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE:**

(1) Naval Gunfire Support Plan (Annex No. 12).

j. **MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCES:**

(1) D-1 and D day Bombardment (Annex No. 5).

x. (1) A demolition party, French Naval Assault Groupe, will land in the vicinity of POINTE DES TRAYAS on the night of D-1/D day with the mission of executing demolitions on the CANNES—ST RAPHAEL and CANNES—FREJUS roads. This party will then fall back on Army north flank. Further details will be included in operations instructions.

(2) All commanders will insure that prior to "H" hour, "D" day, all troops receive sufficient information of the operation to enable them to execute their duties effectively. The minimum essential instruction only will be issued prior to 4 hours after last touching shore (See Letter, Hq Seventh Army, 15 July 44, "Security of Operation "ANVIL" (Mounting)").

(3) All watches will be synchronized with ships time prior to debarkation.

(4) All personnel will be cautioned that American and British parachute and glider troops will be operating inland from the beaches. A glider shuttle is scheduled in the area at about 0800 and a subsequent shuttle at 1800 "D" day. All Troop Carrier Aircraft will be painted with BLACK and WHITE stripes on wings and fuselage. Gliders will **not** be painted with these BLACK and WHITE stripes. (See Operations Instructions No. 3.)

(5) Yellow smoke identifies friendly ground troops to friendly aircraft.

(6) Prior to final embarkation for the target area, CG GARBO Force (II French Corps) will establish necessary liaison with CG KODAK Force (VI US Corps) to effect coordination of the landing, assembly, and organization of GARBO Force and passage of VI Corps lines. (See Operations Instructions No. 2.)

4. See Adm Order No. 1.

5. a. Annex No. 8 (Signal).

b. Succession of command: Ashore: Major General A. M. PATCH  
Major General L. K. TRUSCOTT  
Major General J. E. DAHLQUIST

At Sea: In case the USS CATOCTIN is rendered inoperative, command will be assumed by the Deputy Army Commander, Brig. Gen. A. A. WHITE, aboard the SS HENRICO, until command channels with all headquarters are re-established.

- | c. Command Posts             | Afloat | Ashore           | Axis               |
|------------------------------|--------|------------------|--------------------|
| (1) Seventh Army SS HENRICO  |        | ST TROPEZ        | ST TROPEZ - TOULON |
| (Advance CP) USS CATOCTIN    |        |                  |                    |
| (2) KODAK Force USS CATOCTIN |        | ST MAXIME LE LUC | BRIGNOLES          |
| (Alternate) BARNETT          |        |                  |                    |
| (3) GARBO Force BATORY       |        | COGOLIN          | LA LONDE - TOULON  |

PATCH,  
Commanding.

WHITE,  
C/S.

OFFICIAL:

S/Guthrie  
GUTHRIE,  
G-3.

#### ANNEXES:

- No. 1 — Operations Overlay
- No. 2 — Intelligence Plan
- No. 3 — Troop List
- No. 4 — Convoy Plan — To be issued separately
- No. 5 — Air Support Plan — To be issued separately
- No. 6 — Signal Orders
- No. 7 — Antiaircraft Plan — Published as Corrected Annex, 25 July, to "ANVIL" Outline Plan, 13 July.
- No. 8 — Engineer Plan — Published as Annex No. 11 to "ANVIL" Outline Plan, 13 July.
- No. 9 — Beach Operations Plan
- No. 10 — Chemical Plan — To be issued separately.
- No. 11 — Artillery Plan — To be issued separately.
- No. 12 — Naval Gunfire Support Plan — To be issued separately.
- No. 13 — Special Instructions, SITKA and ROMEO Forces — To be issued separately.

FO No. 2 (DRAGOON)

1200B, 19 August 1944

Maps: EUROPE (Air), 1/500,000, Sheets LYON, TORINO, MARSEILLES, NICE.

1. a. See current G-2 Periodic Reports (Intelligence).
2. Seventh Army continues the advance to the West and North, captures and secures TOULON and MARSEILLES. Boundary between VI Corps and II French Corps: Highway No. 7, BRIGNOLES — AIX — SENAS — AVIGNON

(all to VI Corps). For boundaries, zones of action, and axes of advance, see Annex 1 (Operations Overlay).

3. a. II Fr Corps:

Attached: French Groupe de Commandos (par 2, x (3))

One (1) Hq Hq Btry FA Group (Annex 3)

One (1) FA Bn (155 How, M1) (Annex 3)

One (1) FA Bn (155 Gun, M1) (Annex 3)

(1) Move attached units arriving over beaches to forward assembly areas without delay.

(2) Relieve VI Corps units in zone along the general line LA ROQU-BRUSSANE — SOLLIES PONT — LES SALINS D'HYERES (Annex 1) by 1200B, 20 August.

(3) Capture and secure TOULON without delay, capture MARSEILLES, and prepare to continue the advance on Army order.

b. VI Corps:

(1) Reconnoiter in force to DIGNE and CASTELLANE, contact French Forces of the Interior, and continue reconnaissance to the North.

(2) Alert one (1) Infantry division to advance toward GRENOBLE on Army order.

(3) Seize and secure AIX.

(4) Seize SISTERON and crossings over the DURANCE River in zone.

(5) Release CC SUDRE to control II French Corps at MEOUNES at 2100B, 19 August.

(6) Prepare to continue the advance on Army order.

c. 1st Airborne Task Force:

Attached: 1st Special Service Force (par 2, x (5))

One (1) TD Company (with Rcn Plat atchd) (Annex 3)

One (1) Hq Hq Btry, FA Group (Annex 3)

One (1) FA Bn (155 How, M1) (Annex 3)

One (1) TD Company (with Rcn Plat atchd) (Annex 3)

(1) Relieve VI Corps units in zone by 2000B, 20 August.

(2) Establish and hold defensive flank along the general line FAYENCE — LA NAPOULE; protect Army right (East) flank.

(3) Reconnoiter to the general line SERANON — GRASSE — CANNES.

(4) Prepare to release 2nd (Br) Prcht Brigade to Army control on Army order.

x. (1) Anti-aircraft — Annex 2.

(2) Artillery — Annex 3.

(3) Effective at once the French Groupe de Commandos is released from attachment to VI Corps and is attached to II French Corps.

(4) Effective 2400B, 19 August, the 1st Airborne Task Force is released from attachment to VI Corps and reverts to Army control.

(5) Upon arrival in AGAY area 1st SSF is assigned 1st Airborne Task Force.

(6) Upon Army order, 2nd British Prcht Brigade will assemble for shipment to ITALY.

4. Army assumes supply responsibilities at 2400B, 20 August. See Administrative Order No. 2.

5. a. Command Posts:

Seventh Army — St TROPEZ.

VI Corps — To be reported.

II Fr Corps — To be reported.

1st A/B Task Force — St RAPHAEL.

b. Axes of signal communications:

Seventh Army — ST TROPEZ — BRIGNOLES — AIX.

II (Fr) Corps — COGOLIN — TOULON — MARSEILLES.

VI Corps — BRIGNOLES — AIX.

PATCH,  
Commanding.

WHITE,  
C/S.

OFFICIAL:

GUTHRIE,  
G-3.

#### ANNEXES:

No. 1 — Operations Overlay

No. 2 — AAA

No. 3 — Artillery

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Fo No. 3 (DRAGOON)

1800B, 25 August 1944

Maps: EUROPE (Air), 1/500,000, Sheets: LYON, TORINO, MARSEILLES, NICE.

1. a. See current G-2 Periodic Reports (Intelligence).

2. Seventh Army secures MARSEILLES and TOULON, destroys enemy forces in zone EAST of the RHONE, seizes crossings over the RHONE, and prepares to continue the advance to the North. For boundaries and zones of action see Annex 1 (Operations Overlay).



**3. a. Army B:**

(1) Secure ports of MARSEILLES and TOULON, and bulk fuel installations at PORT DE BOUC.

(2) Continue the advance, and destroy enemy forces East of the RHONE and South of the DURANCE.

(3) Seize crossings over the RHONE in the vicinity of ARLES and reconnoiter in force to NIMES, REMOULINS and North along the West bank of the RHONE.

(4) Garrison the MARSEILLES — TOULON — PORT DE BOUC area and protect the left (West) flank of the Seventh Army in zone.

(5) Be prepared to move to the North on orders of CG Seventh Army, after accomplishing the above missions (paragraphs 3 a (1), (2), and (4)).

(6) Be prepared to relieve VI Corps units from East to West along the general line LARCHE PASS (exclusive) — BRIANCON — LES ECHELLES — LYON and continue operations to the North.

(7) Upon their arrival in FRANCE, to be prepared to assemble the I French Corps in the TOULON — MARSEILLES area prepared for future operations.

**b. VI Corps**

(1) Destroy enemy forces in zone East of the RHONE.

(2) Block the RHONE Valley in the MONTELIMAR — LIVRON area.

(3) Seize and hold the line: LARCHE PASS (exclusive), BRIANCON, LES ECHELLES, and LYON until relieved by Army B. (par 3 a (6)).

(4) Reconnoiter on the axes: LYON — ROANNE, and MONTELIMAR — LE MUY, and secure the crossings of the RHONE at those points.

**c. 1st A/B Task Force:**

(1) Seize and hold the West bank of the VAR in zone.

(2) Protect the right (East) flank of Seventh Army along the general line: LARCHE PASS (incl) — TOULON — West bank of the VAR River to its mouth.

(3) Reconnoiter to NICE.

**x. (1) Artillery: Annex 2.**

(2) CG Army B and CG VI Corps will establish and maintain necessary liaison to effect relief of VI Corps units (par 3 a (6)).

(3) Signal wire installation, radio, and messenger vehicles, designated as such by unit commanders, have priority on all roads.

**4. See Administrative Order No. 3.**

5. a. Command Posts:

Seventh Army : BRIGNOLES  
Army B : AIX  
VI Corps : ASPRES  
1st A/B Task Force: GRASSE

b. Axes of Signal Communications:

Seventh Army : BRIGNOLES — ASPREMONT — GRENOBLE  
Army B : To be designated later  
VI Corps : ASPRES — GRENOBLE  
1st A/B Task Force: To be designated later.

PATCH,  
Commanding.

WHITE,  
C/S.

OFFICIAL:

GUTHRIE,  
G-3.

ANNEXES:

- No. 1 — Operations Overlay
  - No. 2 — Artillery
- 

FO No. 4

1800B, 28 August 1944

Maps: EUROPE, 1:1,000,000.

1. a. See current G-2 Periodic Reports (Intelligence).
2. Seventh Army continues the advance to the North. Boundary: see Annex No. 1 (Overlay).
3. a. Army "B":
  - (1) Send reconnaissance force to MONTPELLIER, NARBONNE, which will advance thereafter rapidly North along the West bank of the RHONE and assist in the capture of LYON. This force will establish and maintain liaison with VI Corps.
  - (2) Advance to the North on the axis: SISTERON — GRENOBLE — BOURG — BESANCON.
  - (3) Relieve immediately VI Corps units guarding passes through the ALPS and protect the right (East) flank North of LARCHE (exclusive). Maintain contact with 1st A/B Task Force at LARCHE.
  - (4) Be prepared to relieve 1st ABTF on Seventh Army order.

933

b. VI Corps

- (1) Advance to the North on the axis: LYON — BEAUNE — DIJON.
- (2) Destroy enemy forces in zone.
- (3) Capture LYON.

c. 1st A/B Task Force:

- (1) Protect the right (East) flank along the general line: LARCHE PASS (incl) TOUDON — West bank of the VAR River to its mouth.
- (2) Maintain contact with Army "B" at LARCHE after relief of VI Corps units by Army "B".

x. CG Army "B" and CG VI Corps will establish and maintain liaison to effect the relief of VI Corps units (para. 3 a (3)).

4. See Administrative Order No. 3.

5. a. Command Posts:

Seventh Army: BRIGNOLES  
Army "B" : AIX  
VI Corps : ASPRES  
1st A/B TF : GRASSE.

b. Axes of Signal Communications:

Seventh Army : BRIGNOLES — GRENOBLES — LYON.  
Seventh Army Rear: ST TROPEZ — MARSEILLES.  
Army "B" : AIX — SISTERON — GRENOBLE.  
VI Corps : ASPRES — CREST — ROUSSILLON — LYON.  
1st A/B TF : GRASSE.

PATCH,  
Commanding.

WHITE,  
C/S.

OFFICIAL:

GUTHRIE,  
G-3.

**ANNEXES:**

No. 1 — Operations Overlay.

FO No. 5

0900B, 14 September 1944

Maps: FRANCE, 1:500,000.

1. a. See current G-2 Periodic Reports (Intelligence).
2. Seventh Army continues the advance to the North and Northeast, at the same time consolidating Army "B" on the right of the VI Corps. Effective at

once, all existing boundaries and directions of attack heretofore issued are rescinded. Boundary: see Annex No. 1 (Overlay).

3. a. Army "B"

(1) Move elements, now West of the SAONE River, to the BELFORT sector. The following routes are available to Army "B" for this movement:

(a) CHALON (or VILLEFRANCHE) — LONS LE SAUNIER — PONTARLIER — BAUME LES DAMES.

(b) AUXONNE (effective completion of bridge 16 September) — DOLE — BESANCON — BAUME LES DAMES.

(c) PORT SUR SAONE — VESOUL — LURE.

(2) Relieve the 45th US Division with 1st DMI, completing relief by 17 September.

(3) Capture BELFORT and clear the West bank of the RHINE in zone.

(4) Protect the right (East) flank North of LARCHE Pass (inclusive). Maintain contact with 1st Airborne Task Force at BARCELONETTE.

b. VI Corps

(1) Advance to the North on the axis: VESOUL — ST DIE — STRASBOURG.

(2) Establish and maintain contact with Third Army on the North.

(3) Capture STRASBOURG.

c. 1st A/B Task Force:

(1) Protect the right (East) flank along the general line: LARCHE PASS (excl) — SALVATORE — MENTON.

(2) Maintain contact with Army "B" at BARCELONETTE.

x. (1) CG Army "B" and CG VI Corps will establish and maintain liaison to effect the relief of the 45th Div (para 3 a (2)).

(2) This headquarters will coordinate movement of Army "B" units from West of the SAONE to the BELFORT area.

Army Traffic Control Posts: DOLE — AUXONNE — VESOUL — PORT SUR SAONE.

(3) Contact points for contact with Third Army: BAIGNEAUX (N-7491); EPINAL.

(4) From EPINAL to the East, VI Corps is responsible for protection of Seventh Army left flank.

4. Administrative Order to be issued separately.

5. a. Command Posts:

Seventh Army: LONS LE SAUNIER  
Army "B" : MACON  
VI Corps : SORAMES LES BREURY  
1st A/B TF : NICE

b. Axis of Signal Communication:

Seventh Army: LONS LE SAUNIER — VESOUL  
Army "B" : DIJON — BESANCON  
VI Corps : VESOUL — LUXEUIL — REMIREMONT

PATCH,  
Commanding.

WHITE,  
C/S.

OFFICIAL:

GUTHRIE,  
G-3.

ANNEXES:

No. 1 — Operations Overlay.

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FO No. 6

0001A, 29 September 1944

Maps: FRANCE, 1:250,000.

1. a. See current G-2 Periodic Reports (Intelligence).

b. First French Army on the right is completing preparations for the assault on BELFORT, and will protect the South flank of and maintain contact with Seventh Army. Twelfth Army Group on left is holding in present positions until the supply situation permits the resumption of the offensive.

2. a. Seventh Army:

(1) Continues the offensive to the Northeast, protects the right flank of Twelfth Army Group (Third Army) and destroys enemy forces West of the RHINE in zone.

(2) Captures STRASBOURG (STRASSBURG) in conjunction with First French Army.

(3) Prepares to cross RHINE and breach SIEGFRIED Line.

b. Boundaries:

(1) Between Sixth Army Group and Twelfth Army Group: CHAUMONT (Z-0749) — DAMELEVIERES (V-0096) — HUDIVILLER (Q-0101) — South

bank MARNE RHINE Canal — HEMING (Q-4310) — SARREBOURG (SAARBURG) (Q-5015) — LANDAU (R-2866) — HEIDELBERG (R-7090) (All inclusive to Sixth Army Group).

(2) Between XV Corps and VI Corps: EPINAL (V-0453) — RAMBERVILLERS (V-1872) — BACCARAT (V-2683) — BADONVILLER (V-3789) — WANGENBOURG (WANGENBURG) (Q-6802) (All inclusive to VI Corps except WANGENBOURG to XV Corps).

(3) Between Seventh Army and First French Army: LURE (K-1206) — MELISEY (K-1814) — LE THILLOT (K-3129) — (V-6260) (all to First French Army) — ERSTEIN (V-9480) — OFFENBURG (W-1585) (Both to Seventh Army).

c. Troops:

VI Corps

3rd Infantry Division (US)

36th Infantry Division (US)

45th Infantry Division (US)

Supporting Troops

XV Corps (to Seventh Army 0001A, 29 September 1944)

2nd Armored Division (DB) (French)

79th Infantry Division (US)

Supporting Troops

3. a. VI Corps:

(1) Continue the advance on the axis: ST DIE — MOLSHEIM (V-8293) — STRASBOURG.

(2) Capture STRASBOURG. Be prepared, on Army order, to adjust South boundary to permit First French Army to participate in capture of STRASBOURG.

b. XV Corps:

(1) Advance to the Northeast in zone protecting right of Third Army by securing in turn, the following objectives: (See Annex No. 1)

(a) AVRICOURT — RECRICOURT (AVRICOURT — RIXINGEN)

(b) HEMING — LORQUIN (HEMING — LORCHINGEN)

(c) SARREBOURG.

(2) Assist VI Corps to capture RAMBERVILLERS (V-1872), BACCARAT (V-2683), and BADONVILLER (V-3789).

4. See Administrative Order No. 9.

5. a. Command Posts:

Seventh Army: VESOUL

VI Corps : K-0944

XV Corps : CHARMES

b. Axes of Signal Communications:

Seventh Army: VESOUL — EPINAL  
VI Corps : K-0944 — BRUYERES — ST DIE  
XV Corps : CHARMES — LUNEVILLE — BLAMONT.

PATCH,  
Commanding.

WHITE,  
C. S.

OFFICIAL:

GUTHRIE,  
G-3.

ANNEXES:

No. 1 — Operations Overlay.

FO No. 7

1900A, 2 December 1944

Maps: France and Germany 1:100,000 (Spelling of place names as shown on this map)

1. a. See current G-2 Periodic Reports (Intelligence).

b. Third Army on the left in continuing the attack toward the northeast. First French Army on the right, continues destruction of enemy forces in ALSACE, south of Strasbourg.

2. a. Seventh Army:

(1) Captures Selestat and clears area north of that town and west of the Ill River.

(2) Attacks to the north in zone, making main effort initially on the left, and assists Third Army in breaching the SIEGFRIED Line.

(3) Protects right flank of Third Army.

b. Boundaries:

(1) Between Seventh Army and Third Army no change.

(2) Between XV Corps and VI Corps: (effective at a date and hour to be announced): DANNE ET QUATRE VENTS (Q-6818) to XV Corps — ERKARTS-WILLER (Q-7230) to XV Corps — WIMMENAU (Q-7634) to VI Corps — BAERENTHAL (Q-8442) to XV Corps — PHILIPPSBOURG (Q-8742) to VI Corps — NEUNHOFEN (Q-9146) to XV Corps — OBERSTEINBACH (Q-9648) to XV Corps — FISCHBACH (Q-9854) to XV Corps — Hill 514 (R-0158) to VI Corps — DAHN (R-0361) to VI Corps.

(3) Between Seventh Army and First French Army (effective at a date and hour to be announced): West of Le Clerjus (J-9736) no change — JARMENIL (V-1346) — Bruyeres (V-2457) St Die (V-4265) Grandontaine (V-5788) Obephaslach (V-7094) Molsheim (V-8293) Plobsheim (9985) Offenburg (W-1585) all to First French Army.

c. Troops:

XV Corps:

44th Infantry Division  
100th Infantry Division  
12th Armored Division (attached to XV Corps at 0001A, 5 December 1944 in present location)

VI Corps:

3rd Infantry Division  
14th Armored Division (with all current attachments) attached to VI Corps effective 1800A, 4 December 1944.  
45th Infantry Division (with all current attachments) attached to VI Corps effective 1800A, 4 December 1944.  
79th Infantry Division (with all current attachments) attached to VI Corps effective 1800A, 4 December 1944.  
103rd Infantry Division.

3. a. XV Corps

- (1) Continue the advance North and breach SIEGFRIED line in zone.
- (2) Assist the advance of and protect right flank of Third Army.

b. VI Corps

(1) Capture Selestat (V-7962). Clear area north of Selestat and west of Ill River by converging action of 2nd French Armored Division and 36th Infantry Division.

(2) Continue attack to south with 2nd French Armored Division and 36th Infantry Division (with all its current attachments). Prepare to pass these units to control of First French Army on order from this Headquarters.

- (3) Advance north and breach the Siegfried Line in zone.
- (4) Protect the right (East) flank along the Rhine.

x. (1) 36th Infantry Division and attachments will continue to be supplied and administered by Seventh Army.

(2) Units now in support of, or attached to divisions will remain in that status. Adjustment will be made in order to be published later.



5. a. Command Posts:

Seventh Army: Saverne — opens 7 December.

VI Corps : to be reported.

XV Corps : Sarrebourg.

b. Axes of Signal communications: To be reported.

PATCH,  
Commanding.

WHITE,  
C/S.

OFFICIAL:

GUTHRIE,  
G-3.

ANNEXES:

No. 1 — Operations Overlay.

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FO No. 8

2200A, 21 December 1944

Maps: France and Germany. 1:100,000.

1. a. Enemy opposing Seventh Army West of Rhine consists of XIII SS and LXXXIX Corps, comprising elements nine divisions (256, 21 Pz., 245, 361, 25 PGD, 257, 17 SS PGD, 36 and 347 Divs). Equivalent strength is estimated at 18 - 20 battalions infantry and 60 tanks and SP's. In reserve, in addition to Fortress units presumably manning Siegfried positions, there appears to be one unit of divisional size. Strategic reserves available to the enemy appear to be concerned primarily with the situation in the north. The enemy's overall attitude in Seventh Army sector is defensive. Counterattacks have been limited in objective and have not exceeded a battalion in strength. For further details, see current G-2 Reports and G-2 estimate No. 6.

b. Third Army on the left is conducting operations to halt the current enemy offensive. First French Army on the right continues attack on enemy forces in Colmar area.

2. a. Seventh Army:

(1) Relieves Third Army elements in that portion of Third Army area enclosed by new boundaries prescribed herein.

(2) Halts present offensive operations at once. Organizes and defends ground now held. (see Engineer Annex).

b. Boundaries:

(1) Between Seventh Army and Third Army: COMBASLE (U-9803) — CHATEAU SALINS (Q-1025) — BARONVILLE (Q-1738) — FAULQUEMONT

(Q-1750) ST AVOLD (A-2556) — CARLING (Q-2563) HUSS (SAAR) (Q-3276) (all to Third Army). NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-6083) LANDSTUHL (Q-8790) — KAISERSLAUTERN (R-0293). (All to Seventh Army).

(2) Between Seventh Army and First French Army: No change from FO No. dated 2 December 1944.

(3) Between XV Corps and VI Corps: DANNE et QUATRE VENTS (Q-6818) — WIMMENAU (Q-7734) — LEMBERG (Q-7445) — BITCHE (Q-7850) — WALSCHBRONN (8161) — PIRMASENS (Q-9066) (all to XV Corps). Limiting Points: Outpost: RJ at (Q-775490). Main Battle Position: Lemberg (Q-7445).

(4) Between VI Corps and XXI Corps: MUNCHHOUSE (R-3035) (to VI Corps) — Seltz (R-2732) — SOUFFLENHEIM (R-1625) road SOUFFLENHEIM to HAGUENAU (R-0424) (all to XXI Corps) Haguenau (to Seventh Army). Limiting Point: Munchhouse.

c. Troops:

(1) XV Corps:

87th Infantry Division, with certain attached and supporting troops (See annexes 1 and 2). (To Seventh Army per verbal agreement, CG Third Army).

103rd Infantry Division

44th Infantry Division

100th Infantry Division

12th Armored Division

(2) VI Corps

45th Infantry Division

79th Infantry Division

14th Armored Division

(3) XXI Corps (upon arrival)

Task Force HERREN (Elements of 70th Infantry Division)

Task Force HARRIS (Elements of 63th Infantry Division)

Task Force LINDEN (Elements of 42nd Infantry Division (To Seventh Army per verbal agreement CG, Third Army)

36th Infantry Division (reinforced)

3. a. (1) XV Corps:

(a) Relieve 35th Infantry Division in zone by 1800 A, 22 December 1944.

(b) Relieve Task Force Pickett 6th Cav GP (reinf) in zone as soon as possible.

(c) Complete relief of remainders of Third Army units in zone as soon as possible.

- (d) Organize and defend on ground now held within new boundaries.
- (e) By 1800A, 23 December, establish a Corps reserve of at least one Infantry Division. This division will be committed only by authority of CG Seventh Army.

(2) VI Corps:

- (a) Relieve units of XV Corps in new VI Corps sector as soon as possible.
- (b) Organize and defend on ground now held, within new boundaries.

(3) XXI Corps: (becomes operational on order from this headquarters)

- (a) Protect Army right (east) flank along West bank of Rhine, from Munchhouse (R-3035) (exclusive to Army South boundary).
- (b) Maintain contact with First French Army on the right.
- (c) (1) Be prepared to release 36th Infantry Division to Army control upon Army order.
- (2) One RCT (less Arty) from 36th Infantry Division with 1 Bn tanks and 1 Bn TD attached will be prepared to move to Saverne (Q-7215) area on Army order.

b. Artillery: Following units attached to XV Corps per verbal agreement between CG Seventh Army and CG Third Army

Hq & Hq Btry, 33 FA Brigade  
 738 FA Bn (8" How)  
 741 FA Bn (8" How)  
 278 FA Bn (240mm How)

c. Armored:

691 Tank Destroyer Bn (Twd)  
 771 Tank Bn.

d. Engineer: Disposition of bridging material will be such that it can be readily employed in an attack across the Rhine north of Strasbourg. (See annex No. 1).

e. Antiaircraft: (See Annex No. 2).

x. (1) Seventh Army and Third Army have joint use of Highway N 74 between Dombasle (U-9803) and Buss Saar (Q-3276).

(2) Third Army will have joint use of necessary roads in Seventh Army zone until Third Army troops and supply installations have moved out.

(3) Overlays showing defensive organization down to include Infantry regiments and artillery battalions will be forwarded to this headquarters in duplicate as soon as defensive positions have been established.

(4) Pending arrival of XXI Corps Seventh Army will retain command of troops listed above and responsibility for sector assigned above. See pars. 2 b (4), 2 c (3), 3 a (3).

4. Administration: See current Administrative Orders.

5. a. Command Posts:

Seventh Army: Saverne (Q-7215)  
XXI Corps : Brumath (Q-9814)  
All others to be reported.

b. Axes of Signal communication: to be reported.

PATCH,  
Commanding.

WHITE,  
C/S.

OFFICIAL:

GUTHRIE,  
G-3.

No. 1 — Operations Overlay

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FO No. 9

0900A, 30 December 1944

Maps: France and Germany: 1:100,000.

1. a. See current G-2 reports and G-2 estimate No. 6.

b. Third Army on the left is limiting the enemy offensive and is preparing to counterattack. French First Army on the right contains the enemy forces in the Colmar area and prepares defensive positions in depth.

a. Seventh Army:

- (1) Continues organization and defense of present positions.
- (2) Completes reconnaissance and organization of rearward positions.

See Overlay.

b. Boundaries and Limiting Points:

(1) Between Seventh Army and Third Army: No change from FO No. 8 dated 21 December 1944.

(2) Between Seventh Army and First French Army: West of Jarmenil (V-1446) no change. Jarmenil — Bruyeres (V-2557) Rouges Eaux (V-3163) St Die (V-4266) point (V-5484) Rothau (V-6184) (all to First French Army) — Obernal (V-8184) (to Seventh Army) Plobsheim (V-9986) Offenburg (W-1686), both to First French Army. Limiting Point Obernal (V-8184).

(3) Between XV Corps and VI Corps: See Overlay.

c. Troops:

(1) XV Corps:

103rd Infantry Division  
44th Infantry Division  
100th Infantry Division  
2nd French Armored Division (DB) (upon arrival)  
Task Force HARRIS (less 1 regiment)

(2) VI Corps:

45th Infantry Division  
79th Infantry Division  
14th Armored Division (less 1 CC)  
Task Force Herren  
Task Force Linden

(3) XXI Corps:

Corps troops upon arrival

(4) Army Reserve:

36th Infantry Division  
12th Armored Division

3. a. XV Corps:

(1) Continue improvement of present defensive position.

(2) Complete reconnaissance and organization of rearward defensive position along the general trace shown on overlay.

(3) Prepare plans for counterattack, based on following assumptions:

(a) Only troops listed in par 2,c (1) available to XV Corps

(b) Part or all of the following elements also available to XV Corps:

36th Infantry Division (reinf)  
12th Armored Division (reinf)

(4) Employment of regiments of Task Force Harris to reinforce infantry division in defensive roles is authorized.

(5) First French Army has been ordered to move 2nd French Armored Division to the Sarrebourg area as follows:

(a) One combat command no later than 0700A, 31 Dec

(b) Remainder of Division no later than 0700A, 3 Jan

b. VI Corps:

(1) Continue improvement of present defensive positions.

(2) Complete reconnaissance and organization of rearward defensive positions along the general trace shown on overlay.

(3) Counterattack plans will include a plan for attacking in a North-westerly direction to threaten flank of major enemy attack in XV Corps sector.

(4) Employment of elements of Task Force Herren to reinforce infantry divisions in defensive role is authorized.

c. XXI Corps:

(1) Complete assembly and organization of Corps troops.

(2) Be prepared on Army order to assume command of 12th Armd Div (reinf) and 36th Inf Div (reinf) and to move on twelve (12) hours notice to a location to be designated.

d. Artillery: Upon arrival in the Seventh Army area from First French Army the following units are attached as indicated.

XV Corps (to arrive vicinity of SARRALBE by 0700A, 31 Dec)

Hq and Hq Btry, 17th FA Group

975th FA (155mm how)

977th Fa Bn (155mm gun)

VI Corps (to arrive vicinity of SOULTZ by 0700A, 31 Dec.)

93rd Armd FA Bn (105mm How) (SP)

e. Engineer:

(1) All engineer combat and general service units will be prepared for possible use as combat reserves.

(2) Army engineers will assist in defensive preparations on request of Corps.

(3) Plans for the demolition of all installations of possible value to the enemy will be prepared, and necessary work completed to accomplish demolition as required. Highway demolitions will be ordered only by the Corps concerned, but other demolitions will be executed without specific order from this headquarters.

(4) Maximum use will be made of mines to strengthen defensive positions, but minefields will be carefully marked and charted. Areas normally impassable to armor, but which are now frozen, should receive particular attention.

f. ARMY RESERVE.

36th Infantry Division (reinf)

12th Armored Division (reinf)

(1) Maintain liaison with CG XV Corps, and with CG XXI Corps.

(2) Execute planning, reconnaissance, and minor changes of location as directed by CG XV Corps.

(3) Be prepared to move on Army order on twelve (12) hours notice, under CG XXI Corps.

x. (1) Organization of Maginot Line and Vosges positions have first and equal priority. Intermediate delaying positions, selected by Corps commanders, second priority.

4. Administration: Administrative instructions will be issued separately.

5. a. Command Posts: To be reported.

b. Axes of Signal communications, No change.

PATCH,  
Commanding.

WHITE,  
C/S.

OFFICIAL:

GUTHRIE,  
G-3.

ANNEXES:

No. 1 — Operations Overlay.

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FO No. 10

1200A, 11 March 1945

Maps: FRANCE and GERMANY, 1:250,000 (Spelling of place names as shown on maps: FRANCE and GERMANY, 1:100,000).

1. a. See G-2 Estimate of Enemy Situation No. 8, dated 7 March 1945.

b. (1) Third Army protects Northwest flank of Seventh Army and assists attack of Seventh Army with an offensive launched Southeast from the MOSELLE.

(2) First French Army defends in sector and protects right flank of Seventh Army.

(3) 1st Tactical Air Force and XII Tactical Air Command support Seventh Army attack with medium and fighter bombers.

2. a. Seventh Army:

(1) Attacks on D Day at H Hour from present positions, destroys enemy in zone and seizes the West bank of the RHINE.

(2) Crosses the RHINE between MANNHEIM and MAINZ and establishes a bridgehead in preparation for a subsequent advance to the Northeast.

b. D Day and H Hour: Later.

c. Boundaries:

(1) Between Seventh Army and Third Army (Sixth Army Group — Twelfth Army Group): CONFLANS (U-6564) (to Seventh Army) — BUSS

(SAAR) (Q-3175) — LEBACH (Q-4091) — THOLEY (Q-4998) — NOHFELDEN (L-5710) (all to Third Army) — thence along railroad along NAHE River to BINGEN (M-1152) (to Third Army).

(2) Between Seventh Army and First French Army (boundary North of MODER River effective on passage of command to First French Army as directed in para. 3 a (5)): West of OBERHOFFEN-SUR-MODER (R-0920) inclusive, no change. SCHIRRHEIN (R-1222) — SOUFFLENHEIM (R-1625) — KOENIGSBRUCK (R-2029) — Road Junction 126 (R-222303) — NIEDERROEDERN (R-2234) — WINTZENBACH (R-2737) — Road Junction 125 (R-309417) — LAUTERBOURG (R-3242) — LAUTER River to confluence with RHINE River at R-382425 (all to First French Army).

(3) Between XXI Corps and XV Corps: See Overlay.

(4) Between XV Corps and VI Corps: See Overlay.

d. Troops:

VI Corps

- 36th Infantry Division
- 42nd Infantry Division
- 103rd Infantry Division
- 3rd Algerian Infantry Division (DIA) (reinf)
- 14th Armored Division

XV Corps:

- 3rd Infantry Division
- 44th Infantry Division (to Army Reserve D-1)
- 45th Infantry Division
- 71st Infantry Division
- 100th Infantry Division
- 6th Armored Division

XXI Corps:

- 63rd Infantry Division
- 70th Infantry Division
- 12th Armored Division

Army Reserve:

- 4th Infantry Division
- 44th Infantry Division (on D-1)
- 13th Armored Division.

3. a. VI Corps:

(1) Attack on D Day at H Hour, seize and secure the BITCHE — HAGUENAU road and the MAGINOT positions in zone.

(2) Continue the attack on the general axis HAGUENAU — PIRMASENS, penetrate the SIEGFRIED Line and capture the high ground East and Northeast of PIRMASENS (see Overlay).



(3) Assist the advance of XV Corps, capture LANDAU and NEUSTADT and destroy enemy in zone.

(4) See para. 3 b (5).

(5) Upon closing on the RHINE as far North as the LAUTER River, pass the 3rd Algerian Inf Div (DIA) (reinf) to control of First French Army, at which time the boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army (see Overlay) becomes effective North of the MODER River and responsibility for the sector passes to First French Army.

**b. XV Corps**

(1) Attack on D Day at H Hour.

(a) Main effort on the axis: RIMLING — ZWEIBRUCKEN, penetrate the SIEGFRIED LINE and capture ZWEIBRUCKEN, HOMBURG and KAISERSLAUTERN (see Overlay).

(b) Capture BITCHE, CAMP DE BITCHE, and secure the BITCHE — HAGUENAU road in zone.

(2) Continue the attack and seize the West bank of the RHINE in zone.

(3) On Army order, cross the RHINE North of MANNHEIM and secure a bridgehead for further operations toward the Northeast.

(4) Release the 44th Inf Div (less Div Arty) to Army Reserve on D-1, and be prepared to release the Div Arty to Army control on six (6) hours notice.

(5) Be prepared on Army order to pass one (1) infantry division to the VI Corps in the vicinity of PIRMASENS.

**c. XXI Corps:**

(1) Attack on D Day at H Hour. Capture SAARBRUCKEN, NEUNKIRCHEN and ST WENDEL.

(2) Advance to the RHINE in zone and protect the Army left flank.

(3) Maintain contact with Third Army on the left.

(4) Be prepared to employ one (1) infantry division from Army reserve in the NEUNKIRCHEN area (para. 3 d (2)).

**d. Army Reserve:**

(1) 4th Infantry Division

13th Armored Division

Remain in present areas prepared to move on twenty-four (24) hours notice on Army order. Establish and maintain liaison with this headquarters immediately.

(2) 44th Infantry Division

Upon release by XV Corps, on D-1, assemble in present area, prepared to move on twenty-four (24) hours notice on Army order to XXI

Corps. Establish and maintain liaison with this headquarters and with XXI Corps upon release by XV Corps.

x. (1) Secure any RHINE bridges found intact.

(2) Commanders will take all possible measures to attain tactical surprise.

(3) Spelling of place names in all orders and reports will conform to spelling on MAP: FRANCE and GERMANY, 1:100,000.

4. Administration: See current Administrative Order.

5. a. Command Posts:

Seventh Army: LUNEVILLE

VI Corps : SAVERNE

XV Corps : FENETRANGE

XXI Corps : MORHANGE

b. Axes of Signal Communication:

Seventh Army: LUNEVILLE — SARRALBE — ZWEIBRUCKEN —  
KAISERSLAUTERN — WORMS.

VI Corps : SAVERNE — NIEDERMODERN — WOERTH —  
SCHONAU — HINTERWEIDENTHAL — ANNWEILER  
LANDAU — SPEYER.

XV Corps : FENETRANGE — HERBITZHEIM — HORNBACK —  
HOMBURG — LANDSTUHL — ENKENBACH —  
GRUNSTADT — BENSHEIM — FRANKFURT.

XXI Corps : MORHANGE — ST AVOLD — FORBACH — SAAR-  
BRUCKEN — NEUNKIRCHEN — ST WENDEL —  
KUSEL.

PATCH,  
Commanding.

WHITE,  
C/S.

OFFICIAL:

GUTHRIE,  
G-3.

ANNEXES:

No. 1 — Operations Overlay

No. 2 — Artillery

No. 3 — Air Support



## **ANNEX D**

# **OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS**



# HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY

APO No. 758

U.S. Army

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 1

24 July 1944.

## AIRFIELD SITES

1. Attached as inclosure No. 1 are overlays showing the proposed locations for airfield sites to be constructed during the early stages of Operation ANVIL. The areas indicated include space required for landing strips, dispersed planes, supply stockpiles, equipment pools, and air corps and aviation engineer unit bivouacs.

2. The importance of the successful prosecution of this construction program, required to furnish adequate air support for the operation, cannot be over emphasized.

3. In order that possible interference be held to a minimum, it will be standard policy within the Army that the areas intended as sites for landing strips as shown in the inclosure be reserved for that purpose except where a tactical necessity rules otherwise. After the terrain has been taken and secured so that engineer units are able to initiate work, these areas will not be occupied by Divisional rear elements, Corps or Army troops, headquarters or supply installations.

4. In the case of sites "B" and "F" one or the other will be used. Ground reconnaissance will be undertaken immediately after the landing, and if site "F" proves to be satisfactory it will be utilized for a landing strip and the restrictions on site "B" removed. If "F" proves to be unsatisfactory, "B" will be used instead. All headquarters will be notified promptly when the decision is made.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PATCH:

ARTHUR A. WHITE,  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

s/John S. Guthrie  
JOHN S. GUTHRIE,  
Colonel, G.S.C.,  
A. C. of S., G-3.

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During the period 24 July 1944 to 10 May 1945, 152 additional Operations Instructions were issued, the contents of which are reproduced here:

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 2

27 July 1944

TO: Commanding General, French II Corps (thru: Army "B")  
Commanding General, VI (US) Corps.

1. In order to effect the landing of leading elements of French II Corps, as early as possible, and to pass the elements of French II Corps through the VI Corps sector with the least interference with operations, the instructions contained herein will govern.

2. Coordinating Agencies:

- a. Seventh Army will provide an officer to act as a coordinating agency between French II Corps and VI (US) Corps for the period that elements of French II Corps are passing through the VI Corps zone, and until the relief of VI Corps in the French II Corps sector is complete. This officer will contact both headquarters prior to the launching of the operation in order to become thoroughly familiar with the plans for landing French II Corps units and the relief of VI Corps units.
- b. The VI (US) Corps will establish a control point in the vicinity of COGOLIN to serve as an information center to VI Corps and French II Corps units. This control point will be established before the first French II Corps units come ashore and Seventh Army and French II Corps headquarters will be notified of its exact location. The Seventh Army coordinating officer will establish his headquarters at this control point. French II Corps and VI Corps will furnish liaison officers to coordinate with Seventh Army representative at the control point.

3. Landing Beaches:

- a. French II Corps units will land over beach 259, 260, and 262, starting on D + 1. Beach Group Commanders will notify French II Corps units when to land, and will control the movement over the beaches. Units will land as follows:

1st Fr Inf Div (DMI) over Beaches 259 and 260.

3rd Algerian Div over South end of Beach 262.

1st Fr Armored Div ( -2 CC) over North end of Beach 262.

This schedule subject to change in accordance with the situation at the time of landing.

- b. (1) Commanding General, French II Corps, will issue the necessary orders to insure the efficient and prompt use of landing points as they are made available and to expedite the movement of his forces from the beach area.

(2) French II Corps will furnish two (2) English-speaking officers for liaison with each of the ALPHA (36th Engr C Regt) and DELTA (40th Engr C Regt) beach groups. These officers will join the beach groups before sailing dates and will remain with the beach groups until French units are no longer scheduled to pass over beaches under control of the beach groups, or until their services are no longer deemed necessary by the Beach Group Commanders.

(3) Commanders of units crossing the beaches will be held responsible for their units clearing the beaches promptly and moving to assembly areas immediately upon coming ashore.

4. Assembly Areas (see overlay):

French II Corps units will assemble in the areas as shown on the attached overlays. French MPs to mark areas will accompany assault beach groups.

5. Roads:

Use of roads for movement of French units through VI Corps zone will be arranged by the coordinating agency in accordance with the situation existing at the time.

---

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 3

30 July 1944

1. Optimistic news announcements to assault troops, while aboard ship, with respect to political developments in the target area, have resulted in unfortunate and tragic consequences in past amphibious operations in this theatre.

2. The senior army officer aboard each troop carrying vessel in this operation will prevent the dissemination by any radio, newspaper, bulletin board, or personnel under the jurisdiction of the Army, of any "news" of a German capitulation or reports on the possibility of such a capitulation.

3. The Naval Commander is issuing similar instructions to Naval Commands.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 4

2 August 1944

WARNING INSTRUCTIONS — AIRBORNE OPERATION

1. Due to the landing of the 1st Airborne Task Force near LE MUY on D day, it is essential that the following instructions reach all troops taking part in the DRAGOON assault:



- a. Participating Troop Carrier Planes (C-47s and C-53s) and HORSAs and WACO gliders are planned to fly in a corridor approximately five miles wide, and north of a line running through NORTHERN TIP OF ELBA. — AGAY — LES ARCS. After dropping paratroops, planes will execute a right turn and return by a route North of and parallel to the corridor.
  - b. Formation will fly at 2000 feet altitude going in and 3000 feet returning. Formation: In a V of V's (9 airplanes).
  - c. All participating planes will be marked with the national markings for US Army planes. In addition, planes will be marked with prominent Black and White stripes on wings and fuselages. Gliders will not be marked with these stripes.
  - d. Firing at any transport type aircraft in or near the troop carrier corridor is forbidden at any time during D day.
  - e. The following general D day timetable will be followed:
    - (1) First paratroop lift  
360 aircraft in 9 or 10 serials; to arrive in target area between 0400 — 0530 hours.
    - (2) First glider lift  
71 aircraft and 71 gliders; to arrive in target area between 0800 — 0900 hours.
    - (3) Second glider lift  
373 aircraft and 332 gliders; to arrive in target area between 1800 — 1930 hours.
  - f. After D day, supply drops by the same aircraft will be made.
2. a. All troops will be informed and instructed in the general details of the airborne operation. This instruction and briefing will be carried out ONLY aboard ship after dropping the ship's pilot, or, if no pilot is aboard, four hours after sailing. Personnel aboard craft scheduled to stage in CORSICA will not be instructed until after leaving CORSICA.
  - b. After troops are scaled in staging areas, a team of parachutists dressed in British and American jump suits will visit divisions and corps reconnaissance units to familiarize such units with the appearance of parachutists.
  - c. Parachutists will be furnished same countersign as the rest of the assault force.
-

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 5

19 August 1944

AA DEFENSE OF AIRFIELDS

1. The following airfields will be occupied by XII TAC:

FIELD	COORDINATES	HOUR	DAY	MONTH	TYPE OF PLANES
Ramatuelle	U-505105	1600	20	Aug	Fighter
Frejus	U-506357	1000	23	Aug	Fighter
San Raphael	U-530353	1000	26	Aug	Fighter Bomber
Lehue	U-275287	1000	25	Aug	Fighter Bomber
Crash Strip	U-520343	No AAA required.			

2. AA Defense of each of the above fields will be established not later than the time of occupation by the Air Force.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 6

22 August 1944

1. Effective 240500B August, the boundary between Army "B" and VI Corps will be as follows:

Highway No. 7, LE LUC to ST MAXIMIN (to VI Corps) — Highway No. 7, ST MAXIMIN to AIX (to Army "B") — LE PUY (T5055) (to Army B) — DURANCE River to CHEVAL BLANC (T1870) (to VI Corps).

2. Army "B" will be responsible for protecting the Seventh Army west (left) flank along the line: CHEVAL BLANC (T1870) — PORT DE BOUC.

3. Units of VI Corps operating in the area south of the boundary described in paragraph 1 will be relieved by Army "B" by 240500B August. Army "B" and VI Corps will effect the necessary coordination to allow Army "B" units to use Highway No. 7 in relieving VI Corps units in Army "B" zone.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 7

26 August 1944

Company "B", 52nd QM Bn (DUKW) is attached to Army "B" on arrival at SALON, 26 August 1944, for the purpose of moving units across the RHONE. Upon completion of mission, it will revert to Seventh Army control.

---

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 8

30 August 1944

1. Effective 0001B 31 August the boundary between Army "B" and VI Corps is extended as follows:

BOURG DE PEAGE — ST NAZAIRE EN ROYANS — ST ROMANS  
—ST QUENTIN SUR ISERE — MOIRANS (All to VI Corps): VOIRON  
— ROUTE N 75 including LES ABRETS — MORESTEL — AMBERIEU  
EN BUGHEY — BOURG EN BRESSE (All to Army "B") BAGE LE  
CHATEL — MACON (both to VI Corps) — thereafter SAONE River  
to CHALON.

2. Use of the ASPRES — GRENOBLE road by VI Corps to clear elements through GRENOBLE will be coordinated with CG Army "B".

3. Army "B" will provide the necessary road space to expedite the movement of VI Corps units from Army "B" zone.

4. After the capture of LYON, VI Corps will coordinate the movement of the Army "B" Reconnaissance Force (Groupe Du Vigier) through the VI Corps zone to Army "B" zone.

5. CG Army "B" and CG VI Corps will establish and maintain the necessary direct liaison to accomplish the movements listed in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 9

1 September 1944

1. Effective 1 September 1944 Commanding General, VI Corps and Commanding General Armee B are relieved from responsibility for the AA Defense of airfields except for Artillery Liaison Aircraft fields.

2. Effective 1 September 1944 Commanding General, 31 AAA Brigade, is charged with the responsibility, within the limits of available AAA, for the AA Defense of all airfields in the area under control of Seventh Army troops. Priorities and dates of occupancy or vacating of airfields will be agreed between Commanding General, MACAF and Commanding General, XII TAC and the Commanding General, 31 AAA Brigade advised as far in advance as operations permit.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 10

12 September 1944

1. Effective 2400 hours 13 September 1944, the Commanding General 34th AAA Brigade is assigned the AA defense of all airfields in the Seventh Army area north of an East-West line through the VALENCE Airfield (inclusive), vice the Commanding General, 31st AAA Brigade, relieved.

2. The Commanding General, 34th AAA Brigade will maintain Anti-aircraft Artillery Intelligence Service liaison with the Commanding General, 31st AAA Brigade, Commanding General, 35th AAA Brigade, and FTA Officer, Armee "B", and will furnish air warning to the latter whenever practicable.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 11

19 September 1944

1. Commanding General, VI Corps will furnish the following FA units to support 1st French Army in the attack on BELFORT GAP:

One (1) FA Group consisting of:

- One (1) Hq & Hq Battery FA Group
- One (1) Battalion 155 How M-1
- One (1) Battalion 155 Gun M-1
- One (1) Battalion 8" How

2. This group will remain under operational control of 1st French Army until relieved by Seventh Army order.

3. The Group Commander will report to the General Commanding the Artillery of I French Corps at MORTEAU without delay, for assignment of positions and mission.

4. Units will continue to draw ammunition from Seventh Army dumps.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 12

5 October 1944

1. Artillery Fires will be coordinated between VI Corps and XV Corps by mutual arrangement. Responsibility for artillery liaison, if desired, is from Right to Left.

2. The following information will be exchanged daily or more often when necessary.

- a. Locations and fire capabilities of Corps Artillery which can affect the action of the adjacent Corps.
  - b. Locations and zones of observation of principal CP's, sound and flash bases which can observe areas from which hostile fires can be delivered against the adjacent Corps.
  - c. Counterbattery information.
  - d. Information of front lines and limiting lines for the protection of friendly troops.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 13

6 November 1944

1. Confirming verbal agreements between commanders concerned, the boundary between VI and XV Corps in the BACCARAT area is adjusted to current operations in that area.

2. Effective immediately, the boundary between VI and XV Corps is as follows:

EPINAL	To VI Corps
RAMBERVILLERS	To VI Corps
BACCART	To VI Corps
BACCART — MERVILLER Road	To VI Corps
MERVILLER — BADONVILLER Railroad	To VI Corps
WANGENBOURG	To XV Corps
HAGUENAU	To XV Corps
KARLSRUHE	To VI Corps

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**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 14**

15 November 1944

1. The 45th Infantry Division will maintain the following alert status, beginning at 1800A, 16 November:
    - a. One Inf Regt prepared to move on twelve (12) hours notice, on Army order, using divisional transportation to a locality designated by the CG XV Corps.
    - b. The entire 45th Inf Div, with all attached units, prepared to move on twenty four (24) hours notice to an area designated by the CG XV Corps. Transportation for this move to supplement organic vehicles to be furnished by Seventh Army on twelve (12) hours notice from CG XV Corps.
  2. CG 45th Inf Div will establish liaison with CG XV Corps immediately in order to effect necessary prior plans to make either or both of the moves in paragraph 1, above.
- 

**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 15**

18 November 1944

1. Effective 0600A, 19 November 1944, Combat Command "A", 14th Armored Division, composed of the units listed below, is attached to VI Corps for operations:

Hq & Hq Co CCA, 14th Armd Div  
 25th Tk Bn  
 48th Tk Bn  
 62nd Armd Inf Bn  
 500th Armd FA Bn  
 Troop "B", 94th Cav Rcn Sq (Mecz)  
 Co "C", 125th Armd Engr Bn  
 Co "A", 84th Med Bn, Armd  
 Co "C", 136th Ord Maint Bn  
 Det, MP Platoon, 14th Armd Div  
 Det, 15th Sig Bn, Armd.

2. Supply and administration of CCA remains the responsibility of CG, 14th Armored Division.

3. Movement of CCA from present location will be coordinated with Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

4. Commanding Officer, CCA, 14th Armored Division will establish necessary liaison with CG, VI Corps, immediately.

---

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 16

19 November 1944

1. Instructions contained in Seventh Army Operations Instructions Number 14, 15 November 1944, are changed as follows:

"1. The 45th Infantry Division will maintain the following alert status, beginning immediately:

- a. One Inf Regt prepared to move on six (6) hours notice, on Army order, using divisional transportation to a locality designated by the CG XV Corps.
  - b. The entire 45th Inf Div, with all attached units, prepared to move on twelve (12) hours notice to an area designated by the CG XV Corps. Transportation for this move to supplement organic vehicles to be furnished by Seventh Army on twelve (12) hours notice from CG XV Corps."
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 17

22 November 1944

1. Effective immediately, Combat Command "A", 14th Armored Division, composed of the units listed below, is released from operational attachment to VI Corps, and is attached for operations to XV Corps in present location:

Hq & Hq Co CCA, 14th Armd Div  
25th Tk Bn  
48th Tk Bn  
62nd Armd Inf Bn  
500th Armd FA Bn  
Troop "B", 94th Cav Rcn Sq (Mecz)  
Co "C", 125th Armd Engr Bn  
Co "A", 84th Med Bn, Armd  
Co "C", 136th Ord Maint Bn  
Det, MP Platoon, 14th Armd Div  
Det, 154th Sig Bn, Armd.

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2. CG, 14th Armored Division, retains responsibility for supply and administration.

3. Commanding Officer, CCA, 14th Armd Div, will establish necessary liaison with CG, XV Corps, immediately.

---

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 18

3 November 1944

BOUNDARY BETWEEN CORPS

1. Effective immediately, the boundary between VI and XV Corps is extended as follows:

WANGENBOURG	(Q-6802)	To XV Corps
COSSWILLER	(Q-7503)	To XV Corps
MARLENHEIM	(Q-8202)	To XV Corps
ITTENHEIM	(Q-8900)	To XV Corps
WOLFISHEIM	(V-9598)	To VI Corps

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 19

24 November 1944

1. Effective 0600A, 25 November 1944, the units listed below will be prepared to move on six (6) hours notice to an area or areas designated by CG VI Corps:

a. 540th Engr Regt (C), with the following attached units:

85th Engr Bn (Hvy Ponton)  
424th Engr Dump Truck Co  
Co "A", 84th Engr Bn (Cam) (- Det)  
69th Chem Smoke Gen Co

b. 40th Engr Regt (C), with the following attached units:

1553rd Engr Bn (Hvy Ponton)  
Co "D", 378th Engr Bn (Sep) (DT)  
78th Chem Smoke Gen Co  
Det, Co "A", 84th Engr Bn (Cam)

c. Hqs & Hqs Det, 147th QM Bn (Mb1) with the following attached units:

829 Amphibious Trk Co  
830 Amphibious Trk Co  
831 Amphibious Trk Co  
832 Amphibious Trk Co  
3340 QM Trk Co (DUKW)

2. Movement of all units from Seventh Army area to XV Corps area will be coordinated by Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

3. Commanders of 540th Engr Regt, 40th Engr Regt, and 147th QM Bn will establish necessary liaison with this headquarters, in order to make the move directed in para. 1, above.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 20

25 November 1944

1. Effective upon contact by elements of VI Corps, Combat Command "A", 14th Armored Division is released from operational attachment to XV Corps and is attached for operations to VI Corps.

2. Operations Instructions No. 19, this Headquarters, dated 24 November 1944, placing the 40th Engr Regt, 540th Engr Regt, 147th QM Bn and all attached units on an alert status is hereby rescinded.

---

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 21

26 November 1944

1. The following units will be relieved and assembled in the RAON L'ETAPE area, and commence movement by motor to XV Corps zone by 0800A 27 November:

100th Infantry Division (with 898 AA AW Bn and 824 TD Bn attached)

2. Above units will move to the SARREBOURG area on 27 November. Three (3) QM Truck Cos now operating under XV Corps will be furnished 100th Infantry Division by 1800A 26 November.

3. Effective upon arrival in the XV Corps zone, all units in par. 1, above, are relieved from attachment to VI Corps and are attached to XV Corps for operations. Commanding General, 100th Infantry Division will establish liaison with CG, XV Corps, by 1800A, 26 November.

4. Movement will be coordinated by Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

5. Upon arrival in SARREBOURG area, additional transportation furnished for the move (3 QM Truck Cos) will return immediately to parent units. Trucks may be used to evacuate prisoners of war on return trip.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 22

26 November 1944

BOUNDARY BETWEEN CORPS

1. Effective immediately the boundary between VI Corps and XV Corps is changed as follows:



WANGENBOURG	(Q6803)	To XV Corps
MARLENHEIM	(Q8202)	To VI Corps
MUNDOLSHEIM	(Q9804)	To XV Corps
LA WANTZENAU	(R0606)	To XV Corps
Point on RHINE		
River at	(R078050)	To XV Corps

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**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 23**

26 November 1944

1. Seventh Army transportation furnished to move the 45th Infantry Division (paragraph 1 b, Operations Instruction No. 16, this headquarters, 19 November 1944), less the three (3) QM truck companies furnished to move the 100th Infantry Division, will be returned to parent units on 27 November 1944.

2. The three (3) QM truck companies furnished to move the 100th Inf Div (paragraph 2, Operations Instruction No. 21, this headquarters, 16 November 1944), will be returned to parent unit on 28 November.

3. The above transportation may be used to evacuate prisoners of war on the return trip.

4. XV Corps will report time of departure and ETA to this headquarters, attention Transportation officer.

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**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 24**

27 November 1944

1. a. The following units, presently attached to VI Corps, will move to XV Corps zone:

Hqs & Hqs Btry 405th FA Group  
935th FA Bn (4.5 Gun)  
938th FA Bn (155mm How)  
93rd Armd FA Bn (SP)

- b. Effective upon arrival in XV Corps zone, all units in paragraph 1(a), above, are relieved from attachment to VI Corps and are attached to XV Corps for operation. Corps commanders will coordinate details of the move.

- c. Any movement through Army area will be coordinated through Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

2. a. Pursuant to instructions contained in paragraph 3 x (1), Directive, this Headquarters, dated 27 November 1944, the following listed units are relieved from present attachments to XV Corps and are attached to VI Corps for operations:

59th FA Bn (105mm) (SP)  
250th FA Bn (105mm How)  
975th FA Bn (155mm How)

3. a. Effective upon release from First French Army and arrival in XV Corps zone, the following listed units are attached to XV Corps for operations:  
697th FA Bn (240mm How) w/Btry "A" 575th FA Bn (8" Gun) attached 2nd Cml Bn (Mtz).
  - b. Paragraph 3 c (2) Directive, this Headquarters, dated 5 November 1944, pertaining to the attachment of 83rd Cml Bn (less Co "B") to XV Corps after arrival in Corps area of 99th Cml Bn, is rescinded.
  - c. Effective upon arrival XV Corps area the 99th Cml Bn (Mtz) is attached to XV Corps for operations.
  - d. Effective upon the arrival of 99th Cml Bn (Mtz) in XV Corps area, Co "B", 83rd Cml Bn (Mtz) is relieved from attachment to XV Corps, is attached to VI Corps for operations and reverts to control of parent unit.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 25

28 November 1944

1. CG VI Corps will designate one (1) infantry battalion and one (1) engineer combat company to relieve the following units of XV Corps presently attached to "T" Force:

1st Bn, 313th Inf Regt  
Co A, 165th Engr Combat Bn

2. Commanders of units designated will report to Lt Col J. W. PUMPELLY, V. Werder Caserne, AM SCHIRMECKER RING, STRASBOURG. Relief will be completed not later than 1800A, 29 November 1944.

3. CG VI Corps will report to this Headquarters date and hour relief is completed, and designation of units making the relief.

4. XV Corps units will return to control of XV Corps upon completion of relief.

---

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 26

2 December 1944

1. Confirming VCOG, Seventh Army, units attached to "T" Force by VI Corps in compliance with Operations Instruction No. 25, Seventh Army, dated 28 November 1944, are relieved from attachment to "T" Force and revert to control of VI Corps effective 1600A, 1 December 1944.

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**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 27**

**3 December 1944**

1. In compliance with Letter of Instructions No. 4, Sixth Army Group, dated 2 December 1944, and as outlined in Seventh Army Field Order No. 7, dated 2 December 1944, the following units will pass to operational control of the CG, First French Army at 0001A, 5 December 1944:

2nd French Armored Division, with the following units attached:

22nd DCA Groupe, 40mm (AAA AW Bn) (French)

1st RBFM (TD Bn, SP) (French)

36th U.S. Infantry Division, with the following units attached:

753rd Tk Bn

636th TD Bn (SP)

83rd Cml Bn

443rd AAA AW Bn (SP)

2. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army, as outlined in Field Order No. 7, Seventh Army, dated 2 December 1944, becomes effective 0001A, 5 December 1944.

3. Field Order No. 7, Seventh Army, dated 2 December 1944, is changed as follows:

"Paragraph 2, c. Troops:

VI Corps:

3rd Infantry Division

14th Armored Division (with all current attachments) attached to VI Corps effective 0001A, 5 December 1944

45th Infantry Division (with all current attachments) attached to VI Corps effective 0001A, 5 December 1944

79th Infantry Division (with all current attachments) attached to VI Corps effective 0001A, 5 December 1944

103rd Infantry Division."

4. Boundary between XV Corps and VI Corps as outlined in Field Order No. 7, Seventh Army, dated 2 December 1944, becomes effective 0001A, 5 December 1944.

5. Effective 0001A, 5 December 1944 the following listed units are relieved from present attachment to XV Corps and are attached to VI Corps; movement to VI Corps Zone will be coordinated between commanders concerned:

463rd AAA AW Bn (Mb1)

106th AAA AW Bn (SP)

398th AAA AW Bn (SP)

191st Tk Bn  
93rd Armd FA Bn (SP)  
17th FA Bn (155mm How)  
938th FA Bn (155mm How)  
935th FA Bn (4.5 Gun)  
976th FA Bn (155mm Gun)  
698th FA Bn (240mm How)  
575th FA Bn (less Btries A & C) (8 Gun)  
Hq & Hq Btry, 405th FA Gp  
645th TD Bn  
813th TD Bn

6. Effective 0001A, 5 December 1944 the following listed units are relieved from present attachment to VI Corps and are attached to VI Corps. Movement to XV Corps Zone will be coordinated between commanders concerned:

781st Tk Bn  
250th FA Bn (105mm How)  
975th FA Bn (155mm How)

7. The 693rd FA Bn (105mm How), currently attached to 45th Inf Div, will remain under attachment to XV Corps upon relief and attachment of units directed in paragraph 3, above.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 28

4 December 1944

1. The three truck companies having reported to CG, VI Corps 3rd December to move 103rd Infantry Division will be returned to parent unit immediately upon completion of move and not later than 1200A 5 December.

2. VI Corps will report time departure and ETA to this headquarters, attention Transportation Officer.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 29

5 December 1944

1. Operations Instruction No. 27 this headquarters dated 3 December 1944 is amended to the following extent:

a. Paragraph I is rescinded and the following substituted therefore:

1. In compliance with Letter of Instructions No. 4, Sixth Army Group, dated 2 December 1944, and as outlined in Seventh Army Field Order No. 7, dated 2 December 1944, the following units will pass to operational control of the CG, First French Army at 0001A, 5 December 1944:

2nd French Armored Division, with the following units attached:

22nd DCA Groupe, 40mm (AAA AW Bn) (French)  
1st RBFM (TD Bn, SP) (French)

36th U.S. Infantry Division, with the following units attached:

753rd Tk Bn  
636th TD Bn (SP)  
83rd Cml Bn  
443rd AAA AW Bn (SP)  
Hq & Hq Btry 17th FA Gp  
977th FA Bn (155 Gun)  
141st FA Bn (155 How)  
1st Bn 36th Engr Regt

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 30

6 December 1944

1. XV Corps: Relieve forward elements of 4th Armored Division in position immediately, with a force of not less than one armored Combat Command or one infantry RCT. Unit will remain under command of CG XV Corps.

2. Direct arrangements between CG XV Corps and CG XII Corps (Third Army) are authorized as necessary.

3. No change in boundary between armies. Force relieving 4th Armored Div will be returned to Seventh Army zone on order of this headquarters.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 31

12 December 1944

1. Seventh Army prepares to relieve 36th Infantry Division and certain attached units now under operational control of First French Army.

2. a. VI Corps:

(1) Be prepared on Army order to relieve the following units now under operational control of First French Army in the SELESTAT — COLMAR area, with one (1) Inf Div reinforced by one (1) Tk Bn, one (1) TD Bn, one (1) AAA AW Bn:

36th Inf Div  
753rd Tk Bn  
636th TD Bn (SP)  
83rd Cml Bn (Mtz)  
443rd AAA AW Bn (SP)  
1st Bn, 36th Engr Regt (C).

- (2) The following units now attached to 36th Inf Div will, upon relief of that division, become attached to the relieving division at the date and hour of relief:

Hq & Hq Btry, 17th FA Gp  
977th FA Bn (155 Gun)  
141st FA Bn (155 How)

- (3) Upon relief, the 36th Inf Div (reinf) (para 1.a.(1)) will pass to control of VI Corps for employment in the STRASBOURG sector. Upon completion of relief, relieving units pass to operational control of First French Army.
- (4) Seventh Army will furnish three (3) truck companies to VI Corps for movement of units outlined in paragraphs 2.a.(1) and 2.a.(3), above.
- b. XV Corps: Be prepared on Army order to relieve the 83rd Cml Bn, now atchd 36th Inf Div, with one (1) Cml Bn (Mtz).
- c. 40th Engr Regt (C): Be prepared, on Army order, to relieve the 1st Bn, 36th Engr Regt (C) now attached 36th Inf Div, with one (1) Engr Bn (C).
3. Necessary liaison between commanders concerned is authorized.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 32

13 December 1944

1. a. Relief of units now operating in zone of First French Army as outlined in Operations Instruction No. 31, this Headquarters, dated 12 December 1944, will commence immediately. Upon completion of relief, attachments of units become effective as indicated.
- b. The 3rd Infantry Division is designated as the Infantry Division to relieve the 36th Infantry Division.
2. VI Corps, XV Corps and 40th Engr Regt (C) will each notify this Headquarters, attention A. C. of S., G-3, the unit designation of all relieving units, and time when relief has been completed.
3. Paragraph 2.,a.,(4), Operations Instruction No. 31 referring to three (3) truck companies to be furnished by Seventh Army is rescinded.
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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 33

14 December 1944

1. The following units will be prepared to assemble on four (4) hours notice on Army order as Army reserve:

40th Engr Regt (C) (less 1 Bn)  
540th Engr Rgt (C).

2. Commanders will report to this Headquarters, attention A. C. of S. G-3, when this alert status has been effected.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 34

18 December 1944

1. Effective 0001A, 19 December 1944, 540th Engr Regt (C) is attached to VI Corps for operations, and 48th Engr Bn (C) is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and reverts to control of Seventh Army. Relief of 48th Engr Bn (C) in present operations by 540th Engr Regt (C) will be coordinated by Headquarters VI Corps, and will be completed as soon as possible. CO, 540th Engr Regt (C) will establish liaison with CG, VI Corps, and CO, 48th Engr Bn (C) will establish liaison with CG, Seventh Army immediately.

2. Effective 0001A, 19 December 1944, 540th Engr Regt (C) is relieved from alert status prescribed in Operations Instruction No. 33, Seventh Army, dated 14 December 1944.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 35

20 December 1944

1. a. Effective 0001A, 23 December 1944, VI Corps is relieved of responsibility for security of the West bank of the RHINE River South of MUNCHHOUSE (R3035). Responsibility for same passes to the units listed below, operating initially under control of Seventh Army.
- b. For boundaries effective at 0001A, 23 December 1944, see Overlay attached.

2. a. VI Corps:

- (1) Release the following units to Seventh Army control effective 0001A, 23 December 1944:

36th Infantry Division, with attached:

752nd Tank Bn

636th TD Bn (SP)

443rd AAA AW Group

Hq & Hq Btry, 5th AAA Group

Batteries "B" & "D", 62nd AAA Gun Bn

533rd AAA AW Bn (less 2 Batteries).

- (2) Maintain contact with Task Force HARRIS on the right.

- b. 36th Infantry Division (less one (1) FA Bn, 105 How, and one (1) FA Bn, 155 How):

(1) Attached troops:

753rd Tank Bn (less 1 Med Tk Co)  
636th TD Bn (SP) (less 1 TD Co, and Plat, Rcn Co)  
443rd AAA AW Bn (SP)  
Hq & Hq Btry, 5th AAA Group  
Batteries "B" & "D", 62nd AAA Gun Bn.

(2) Mission: Protect Army right (east) flank in zone (see Overlay).  
Maintain contact with First French Army on the right.

c. Task Force HARRIS:

(1) Attached troops:

74th Signal Co (Special)  
533rd AAA AW Bn (less 2 batteries)  
1 FA Bn (105 How) (par. 2, b)  
1 FA Bn (155 How) (par. 2, b)  
1 Med Tk Co, 753rd Tk Bn (par. 2, b, (1))  
1 TD Co (with Plat, Rcn Co atchd), 636th TD Bn  
(par. 2, b, (1)).  
Other supporting troops to be attached upon Army order.

(2) Missions:

Relieve elements of VI Corps in assigned zone (see Overlay)  
by 0001A, 23 December 1944.  
Protect Army right (east) flank along the RHINE River in zone.  
Maintain contact with 36th Infantry Division on the right.  
Continue training and preparation for early offensive action.

x. (1) Direct liaison between commanders concerned is authorized.

(2) Units listed in paragraphs 2, b and c will be attached to XXI  
Corps upon its arrival.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 36

21 December 1944

Operations Instructions Number 36 has been omitted.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 37

21 December 1944

1. VI Corps will withdraw and assembly one (1) infantry division, prepared for movement to the XV Corps zone on Army order. Details will be published later.



2. XV Corps: Prepare to release one (1) tank battalion to VI Corps upon Army order. Designated battalion will be prepared to start movement to VI Corps zone on four (4) hours notice after 1800A, 21 December 1944.

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**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 38**

21 December 1944

1. Effective 0800A, 22 December 1944, 40th Engr Regt (C) is relieved from alert status prescribed in Operations Instruction No. 33, Seventh Army, dated 14 December 1944.

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**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 39**

22 December 1944

1. a. Effective 2359A, 24 December 1944, 36th Inf Div is relieved of responsibility of protecting the right (East) flank of Seventh Army in zone assigned by paragraph 2 b, Operations Instruction No. 35, this headquarters, dated 20 December 1944. Responsibility for same passes to the units listed below, operating initially under control of Seventh Army.
  - b. For new boundaries effective 2359A, 24 December, see Overlay attached.
2. a. Task Force LINDEN: (see letter, Hq Seventh Army, dated 21 December 1944, ref X-959)
  - (1) Attached troops (par 2 b (2) and 2 c (2)):
    - Hq & Hq Btry, 5th AAA Group
    - 62nd AAA Gun Bn (less Btries "A" and "C")
    - Two (2) Btries, 443rd AAA AW Bn (SP)
    - Hq & Hq Btry, 36th Inf Div Arty
    - One (1) TD Co, and Rcn Co (less 1 Plat), 636 TD Bn
    - One (1) Med Tk Co, 753 Tank Bn
    - Det, 74 Sig Co (Special)
  - (2) Missions: Relieve elements 36th Inf Div (less Div Arty) in assigned zone by 2359A, 24 December.
    - Organize and defend the Army right (East) flank along the RHINE River in zone (see Overlay).
    - Maintain contact with First French Army on the right.
    - Continue training and preparation for early offensive action.
- b. Task Force HARRIS: (see Operations Instruction No. 35)
  - (1) Attached troops:
    - 74th Sig Co (Special) (less Det)

- 533rd AAA AW Bn (less Btry "A") with Btry C, 431 AAA AW Bn atchd (par 2 d)  
 One (1) FA Bn (105 How) 36th Inf Div Arty  
 One (1) FA Bn (155 How) 36th Inf Div Arty  
 One (1) Med Tk Co, 753 Tk Bn  
 One (1) TD Co (with Plat, Rcn Co atchd), 636 TD Bn.
- (2) Release Det, 74 Signal Co (Special) to Task Force LINDEN prior to 2359A, 24 December 1944.
- (3) Missions: Relieve elements of 36th Inf Div (less Div Arty) in assigned zone (see overlay) by 2359A, 24 December 1944.  
 Organize and defend the Army right (East) flank along the RHINE River in zone.  
 Maintain contact with Task Force LINDEN on the right.  
 Continue training and preparation for early offensive action.
- c. 36th Inf Div (less 36 Inf Div Arty):
- (1) Attached troops:
- 753rd Tk Bn (less 2 Med Tk Cos)  
 636th TD Bn (less 2 TD Cos and Rcn Co)  
 443rd AAA AW Bn (SP) (less 2 Btries)
- (2) Release the following units to TF LINDEN prior to 2359A, 24 December:
- Hq & Hq Btry, 5th AAA Group  
 62nd AAA Gun Bn (less Btries "A" and "C")  
 Two (2) Btries, 443rd AAA AW Bn (SP)  
 Hq & Hq Btry, 36th Inf Div Arty  
 One (1) TD Co, and Rcn Co (less 1 Plat), 636 TD Bn  
 One (1) Med Tk Co, 753rd Tk Bn.
- (3) Missions: Assemble remainder of 36th Inf Div and attached units (par 2 c (1) above) in area West of STRASBOURG for rest, rehabilitation, and training in preparation for further operations. Prepare for movement to the SAVERNE — SARREBOURG area on Army order.
- d. VI Corps: Release 533rd AAA AW Bn (less Btry "A") with Btry "C", 431 AAA AW Bn atchd, to TF HARRIS prior to 2359A, 24 December.
- x. (1) Responsibility for command of present 36th Inf Div zone remains with CG, 36th Inf Div until all units of the 36th Inf Div (less Div Arty) have been relieved.
- (2) Commanders concerned will establish liaison immediately to effect the above relief.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 40

22 December 1944

1. Operations Instruction Number 39, dated 22 December is amended as follows:

- a. Change paragraph 1 b to read "Boundaries effective 2359A, 24 December are the same as those prescribed in Operations Instruction Number 35, Seventh Army, dated 20 December 1944."  
Boundaries indicated on overlay to accompany Operations Instruction Number 39 will be disregarded.
  - b. Change paragraph 2 a (1) by adding "222nd Infantry Regiment" to the list of troops attached to Task Force LINDEN.
  - c. Change paragraph 2 b (3) by deleting "Relieve elements of 36th Inf Div (less Div Arty) in assigned zone (See overlay) by 2359A, 24 December 1944."
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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 41

23 December 1944

1. Effective immediately, 69th Armd FA Bn (105mm How) (SP) is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and is attached to Task Force HARRIS in present location.

2. Direct liaison between commanders concerned is authorized.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 42

26 December 1944

1. Effective 0001A, 28 December 1944, Task Force HERREN assumes responsibility for defense of West bank of RHINE River in sector shown on attached overlay. Direct liaison between TF HERREN, TF HARRIS and TF LINDEN is authorized, beginning immediately, to coordinate relief of those units by Task Force HERREN in its sector.

2. An overlay showing the defensive organization of the sector of Task Force HERREN by regimental sub-sectors, and including artillery battalions, will be forwarded to this headquarters in duplicate as soon as defensive positions have been established.

3. Boundary between VI Corps and Task Force HARRIS as prescribed in Operations Instruction No. 35, dated 20 December 1944, is changed as shown on attached overlay.

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**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 43**

27 December 1944

1. Effective 1200A, 27 December 1944, 36th Infantry Division and 12th Armored Division are attached to XXI Corps in present positions.

2. The XXI Corps will:

- a. Assemble Corps troops in the PHALSBURG — SARREBOURG area as soon as possible, establishing Corps CP in PHALSBURG.
- b. Be prepared to move on short notice to an area to be designated by higher headquarters.

3. Elements of the following listed units attached to TF HARRIS and TF LINDEN by Operations Instructions Nos. 35 and 39, Seventh Army, and Movement Order, Seventh Army, dated 24 December 1944, will remain on that status and on present missions prepared to rejoin the Division in the SARREBOURG area on six (6) hours notice from CG, 36th Infantry Division:

753rd Tank Bn  
636th TD Bn (SP)  
443rd AAA AW Bn  
36th Infantry Division Artillery.

4. Direct liaison between commanders concerned is authorized.

5. All movements will be coordinated with Transportation Officer, Seventh Army. (Phone Seventh Army Rear 464).

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**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 44**

27 December 1944

1. VI Corps:

- a. Effective at 1800A, 27 December 1944, TF HARRIS (less one (1) Inf Regt), TF HERREN and TF LINDEN, with attached and supporting troops as listed in Attachment Order, this headquarters, dated 27 December 1944, are attached in present location to VI Corps. Alert status of certain supporting units listed in paragraph 3, Operations Instruction No. 43, this headquarters, dated 27 December 1944, remains in effect.
- b. Effective 1800A, 27 December 1944, sector occupied by VI Corps is extended to the South to include sectors now occupied by TF HARRIS, TF HERREN and TF LINDEN. (See Operations Instruction No. 42).
- c. One (1) Inf Regt, TF HARRIS, is attached to the 3rd Inf Div (currently under operational control of First French Army). Direct

liaison between commanders concerned is authorized. Use of this regiment in defensive role only is authorized except in emergency. Maximum available time for completion of necessary training will be provided.

2. All movements will be coordinated with Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

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**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 45**

27 December 1944

1. Field Order No. 8, Seventh Army, dated 21 December 1944, is changed as follows:
    - a. Delete paragraph 2 b (4). (See Opns Instr No. 44).
    - b. Delete paragraph 2 a (3). (See Opns Instr No. 43).
    - c. Delete paragraph 3 a (1) (e). (See Movement Orders, 87 Inf Div, dated 26 December 1944).
    - d. Delete paragraph 3 a (3). (See Opns Instr No. 43).
    - e. Change paragraph 2, Annex No. 1 to FO No. 8, Seventh Army, dated 22 December by deleting the portion that reads:

"XXI Corps  
40 Engr Combat Regt (less 1 Bn) (Attached upon arrival of XXI Corps)."
    - f. Delete paragraph 5, Annex No. 2 to FO No. 8, Seventh Army, dated 22 December 1944.
- 

**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 46**

28 December 1944

1.
  - a. VI Corps will move one (1) Combat Command, 14 Armored Division, to XV Corps zone.
  - b. Effective upon arrival in XV Corps zone, this Combat Command is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and is attached to XV Corps for operations.
  - c. Movement of armored elements will be made under cover of darkness.
2.
  - a. XV Corps will move 436 AAA AW Bn to VI Corps zone.
  - b. Effective upon arrival in VI Corps zone 436 AAA AW Bn is relieved from attachment to XV Corps and is attached to VI Corps for operations.

3. Details of movement will be arranged between commanders concerned. Corps will report completion of movements to this headquarters.

4. All movements will be coordinated with Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

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**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 47**

30 December 1944

1. Each Corps will submit weekly reports showing progress of defensive organization to this headquarters.

2. Reports to reach this headquarters by 1200A each Sunday, to include work accomplished as of 1200A each Saturday.

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**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 48**

31 December 1944

1. Effective 0001A, 1 January 1945, VI Corps will be prepared to furnish two (2) engineer battalions (either combat or general service), on twelve (12) hours notice, to this headquarters for employment as Army reserve.

2. VI Corps is responsible for all normal engineer function in the Army zone East of the line SAVERNE — OBERNAI both inclusive.

---

**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 49**

1 January 1944

1. 141st RCT, 36th Infantry Division attached to XV Corps 1600A, 1 January 1945, in present location.

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**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 50**

1 January 1944

1. The 48th Engineer Battalion (C) is attached to the 68th AAA Group effective 1900A, 1 January 1945.

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**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 51**

2 January 1944

1. VI Corps:

a. Complete withdrawal to the Main VOSGES Position, delaying on the following general lines:

977

1st Position, MAGINOT LINE, by daybreak 2 January  
2nd Position, BICHE — NIEDERBRONN — BITCHWEILLER, on order

3rd Position, BITCHE — DIGWEILLER — STRASBOURG, on order  
Main VOSGES Position, on order. Main VOSGES Position will be selected so as to keep enemy beyond medium artillery range of SAVERNE and MOLSHEIM Passes.

- b. Counter-attack to restore position in the BITCHE — NIEDERBRONN sector.
- c. Target date for completion of withdrawal is 5 January.

2. XV Corps:

- a. Hold present position and complete organization of MAGINOT LINE, switch position and rearward battle position. (See FO No. 9 and letter, this headquarters, dated 31 December 1944, Subject, "Directive".)

---

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 52

4 January 1944

1. Previous instructions contained in Field Order No. 9, Headquarters Seventh Army, dated 30 December 1944, and in Operations, Instruction No. 51 pertaining to withdrawal rear of the MAGINOT Line are rescinded.

2. VI Corps:

- a. Defend along the MAGINOT Line in sector (Overlay) and hold STRASBOURG.
- b. Continue counterattack with all available means to restore DAMBACH-BITCHE position in sector (Overlay).
- c. Continue organization of secondary position (Overlay).

3. XV Corps:

- a. Defend along present positions in sector as prescribed in paragraph 3 a, Field Order No. 9, Seventh Army, dated 30 December 1944.
- b. Prepare to launch a strong counterattack on Army order against enemy penetrations Southeast or Southwest from the BITCHE area.
- c. 36th Infantry Division (less 141 RCT) and 12th Armored Division will not be committed except on Army order.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 53

5 January 1944

1. Effective 0001A, 6 January 1945, boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army is changed as follows: West of point V5484, no change —

GRANDFONTAINE (V5788) — OBERHASLACH (V6995) — MARLENHEIM (Q8202) — TRUCHTERSHEIM (Q9007) — OLWISHEIM (Q9611) — HOERDT (R0311) — GAMBSHEIM (R1110) — ACHERN (R2403) all to First French Army.

2. Details of relief and passage of command in the STRASBOURG sector will be as agreed between CG French II Corps and CG US VI Corps, and will be completed by 0001A, 6 January 1945. Prior to passage of command, elements of 3 DIA arriving in STRASBOURG area will be under operational control of CG VI Corps.

3. Effective 0001A, 6 January 1945, the 935th FA Bn (4.5 Gun) is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and is attached to First French Army for operations only, for the support of the STRASBOURG defensive sector. Supply and administration of this unit remain the responsibility of Seventh Army. Commanding Officer of this unit will report to CG, 3rd DIA at STRASBOURG to coordinate movement.

4. One (1) FA Bn (105mm How) is relieved from attachment to XV Corps and is attached in present location to VI Corps, effective 0001A, 6 January 1945. Details of movement will be coordinated by commanders concerned.

5. VI Corps units and installations will be removed from the new French sector as soon as tactical operations permit.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 54

6 January 1945

1. The 12th Armored Division with all present attachments is relieved from attachment to XV Corps and is attached to VI Corps in present location effective 1800A, 6 January 1945.

2. Commanding General, VI Corps, is authorized to move one (1) normal combat command and the 827th TD Bn from present location. Remainder of Division will not be moved except by authority of this Headquarters.

3. Movement will be coordinated with Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

---

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 55

6 January 1945

1. Effective 0001A, 7 January 1945, boundary between VI Corps and XV Corps is extended as follows:

LOHR (Q6328) to XV Corps — BUST (Q6325) — HANGVILLER (Q6223) — BERLING (Q6322) — VILSBERG (Q6420) (all to VI Corps).



OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 56

7 January 1945

1. Commanding General, VI Corps, is authorized to move the remainder of the 12th Armored Division from present position after 1230A, 7 January 1945.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 57

8 January 1945

1. To implement the pertinent points of SHAEF Air Defense Instruction No. 5, the following system of code words will be employed in all communications relative to movements of large numbers of friendly aircraft at night.

- a. AAOR's will be informed of the appearance of the friendly aircraft on the operations board at SOR by receiving the word "Dead Pan" from AALO. At this point IAZ restrictions to flying cease and guns will not fire unless an attack is in progress.
- b. The above restrictions will remain in effect until the word "Candy" is passed by AALO at which time friendly aircraft will have left the area and normal rules for IAZ will obtain.

2. The restrictions to firing indicated above refer only to movements of heavy bombers in strength at night.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 58

12 January 1945

1. Precise boundary between XV Corps and VI Corps is as shown on attached overlay.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 59

13 January 1945

1. Seventh Army regroups as follows:
  - a. One (1) RCT, 36th Inf Div from XV Corps to cover relief of 103rd Inf Div.
  - b. 103rd Inf Div (reinf) from XXI Corps to VI Corps.
  - c. Task Force HERREN (reinf) and one (1) normal armored combat command from VI Corps to XXI Corps.
2. a. XV Corps:
  - (1) Move one (1) RCT, 36th Inf Div to area designated by CG, XXI Corps. so as to close by 1200A, 14 January 1945. Upon closing

in XXI Corps sector, this RCT is relieved of attachment to XV Corps and is attached to XXI Corps.

- (2) Move one (1) AAA Bn (AW) to area designated by CG, XXI Corps, so as to close by 1200A, 14 January 1945. Upon closing in XXI Corps sector, this Bn is relieved of attachment to XV Corps and is attached to XXI Corps.

**b. XXI Corps:**

- (1) Immediately upon arrival of RCT, 36th Inf Div (para. 2 a, above) move the 103rd Inf Div with attached TD Bn and AAA Bn to area designated by CG, VI Corps, in accordance with the following schedule:

- (a) One (1) RCT to close in VI Corps sector by 0001A, 15 January.
- (b) Remainder of 103rd Inf Div (by RCT's) immediately upon relief by elements of Task Force HERREN.

Upon arrival in VI Corps sector, elements of 103rd Inf Div are relieved of attachment to XXI Corps and are attached to VI Corps.

- (2) Hold one (1) RCT, 36th Inf Div, in Corps reserve, to be committed only on Army order. After completion of relief of 103rd Inf Div by Task Force HERREN (reinf), move this RCT to area designated by CG, XV Corps, at which time it is relieved from attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to XV Corps.

**c. VI Corps:**

- (1) Move the following units to XXI Corps in accordance with the schedule outlined below:

- (a) One (1) regiment Task Force, HERREN  
One (1) FA Bn (105mm How) (SP)  
upon arrival of one (1) RCT 103rd Inf Div (See para. 2 b (1) (a) above).

- (b) One (1) regiment Task Force HERREN  
One (1) FA Bn (105mm How) (SP)  
One (1) normal armored combat command  
One (1) FA Group Hq or One (1) FA Brig Hq  
upon arrival in VI Corps sector of the second RCT, 103rd Inf Div.

- (c) Remainder of Task Force HERREN upon arrival of remainder of 103rd Inf Div.

- (2) Upon arrival in XXI Corps sector, the units listed in para. 2 c (1) above are relieved from attachment to VI Corps and are attached to XXI Corps.

- x. (1) Corps commanders will coordinate movements with the Transportation Officer, this Headquarters, and with each other in order to insure rapid reliefs and movement.
  - (2) Relief of 103rd Inf Div by Task Force HERREN will be completed not later than 1200A, 17 January 1945.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 60

16 January 1945

1. XV Corps: Assemble all elements of 2nd French Armored Division (DB) in XV Corps sector. Prepare to move division to the East on twelve (12) hours notice on Army order.

2. XXI Corps: Assemble the 10th Armored Division, upon arrival, in the DIEUZE — BENESTROFF area. Upon arrival, 10th Armored Division is attached to XXI Corps. Hold division in Corps reserve, to be committed only on Army order and prepared for rapid movement to the Northeast, East, or Southeast.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 61

17 January 1945

- 1. Confirming VOCCG, Seventh Army, the following is made of record:
    - a. VI Corps is authorized to retain until 0900A, 17 January 1945, two (2) batteries of the FA Bn (105mm How) (SP) as scheduled per paragraph 2 c (1) (b), Operations Instruction No. 59, this Headquarters, dated 13 January 1945, to accompany the second regiment of Task Force HERREN to XXI Corps.
    - b. VI Corps is authorized to retain until further notice the one (1) normal armored combat command scheduled per paragraph 2 c (1) (b), Operations Instruction No. 59, this Headquarters, dated 13 January 1945, to accompany the second regiment of Task Force HERREN to XXI Corps.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 62

17 January 1945

- 1. a. VI Corps:
  - (1) Confirming VOCCG, Seventh Army, VI Corps is authorized to retain the 274th Inf Regt (TF HERREN) until further notice.

b. XXI Corps:

- (1) Confirming VOGC, Seventh Army, move the 142nd RCT to rejoin its parent unit. Upon arrival, this unit is relieved from attachment to XXI Corps and reverts to 36th Inf Div.
- (2) Deploy one Combat Command of 10th Armored Division (reinf) in the general area vacated by the 142nd RCT upon its movement as directed above.
- (3) Employment of artillery of two combat commands, 10th Armored Division as reinforcing artillery is authorized.

c. XV Corps:

- (1) Confirming VOGC, Seventh Army, move 36th Inf Div - less 36th Rcn Tr, 141st RCT, one (1) Tk Co, one (1) TD Co, one (1) TD Rcn Plat and one (1) AAA AW Btry - with 636th TD Bn (-), 443rd AAA AW Bn (-) and 753rd Tk Bn (-) attached, to VI Corps sector. Bulk of movement will be routed over WINGEN — INGWILLER road.
- x. (1) Upon arrival in VI Corps sector, 36th Inf Div (less units listed in para. 1 c (1) is relieved from present attachment and is attached to VI Corps.
- (2) All movements will be coordinated between commanders concerned and with Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 63

19 January 1945

1. a. XV Corps:

- (1) Upon arrival, the 101st Airborne Division (with 807 TD Bn and 567 AAA Bn attached) is attached to XV Corps.
- (2) Thereafter relieve and move the 141st RCT (reinf) to VI Corps sector to a location designated by CG VI Corps. Upon arrival, this unit is attached to VI Corps.

b. VI Corps:

- (1) Assemble one (1) Armored division by 0700A, 22 January 1945 in the SAVERNE (Q7215) — WASSELONE (Q7904) — WALTENHEIM (Q9216) area. This Division reverts to Army control at the above hour and place.
- x. Commanders concerned will coordinate movements directed with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters, and with each other.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 64

20 January 1945

1. a. XXI Corps:

- (1) Move one normal combat command, 10th Armored Division, to area designated by Commanding General, XV Corps. Upon arrival in XV Corps sector this unit is relieved from attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to XV Corps.
- (2) Confirming previous telegraphic instructions, move 939th FA Bn (4.5 Gun) to area designated by Commanding General, VI Corps. Upon arrival this unit is relieved from attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to VI Corps.

b. XV Corps:

- (1) Confirming previous telegraphic instructions, move 693rd FA Bn (105mm How) to area designated by Commanding General, VI Corps. Upon arrival this unit is relieved from attachment to XV Corps and is attached to VI Corps.

- x. Movements directed will be coordinated with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 65

20 January 1945

1. Confirming VO CG, Seventh Army, this date, VI Corps is authorized to withdraw to the general line: RJ (Q758408) — ROTHBACH (Q8434) — NIEDER-MODERN (Q9127) — HAGUENAU (R0424) — BITCHWILLER (R0918) — WEYERSHEIM (R0513) at the discretion of the Corps commander.

2. Effective immediately, the following point is designated as a limiting point between VI and XV Corps:

Road junction 1 Km Northeast of ALTHORN at Q758408.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 66

21 January 1945

1. XV Corps:

- a. Movement of 141st RCT (reinf) to VI Corps as directed in Operations Instruction No. 63, Headquarters Seventh Army, dated 19 January 1945, will be initiated prior to 0001A, 23 January 1945.
-

**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 67**

21 January 1945

1. Effective at 0700A, 22 January 1945, the 12th Armored Division reverts to Army reserve in present location.

2. Commanding General, VI Corps, is authorized to employ the organic artillery of the 12th Armored Division, provided such employment does not prevent its assembly and movement on six (6) hours notice from this Headquarters.

3. 12th Armored Division will:

- a. Establish and maintain liaison with II French Corps.
  - b. Conduct road and terrain reconnaissance of areas to the East, Southeast and South.
  - c. Continue present program of rehabilitation and re-training.
- 

**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 68**

21 January 1945

1. Boundaries shown on attached overlay become effective at 2400A, 22 January 1945. Corps installations will be moved to conform to these boundaries as soon thereafter as practicable.

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**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 69**

23 January 1945

- 1. a. New boundary between VI and XV Corps as shown on attached overlay is effective 0001A, 25 January 1945.
- b. Relief of VI Corps units in area northwest of new boundary will be coordinated between Corps commanders.
- 2. a. Effective upon arrival in the XV Corps sector the 35th Infantry Division (less 1 RCT), (with 448th AAA AW Bn (less 1 Btry), and 654th TD Bn (SP) (less 1 Co) attached), are attached to XV Corps for operations.
- b. Unit will maintain radio silence until committed to action.

3. 101st Airborne Division will not be committed except by authority of this Headquarters. CG XV Corps is authorized to employ division artillery and attached TD and AAA Bns, provided that those units are prepared to move on six (6) hours notice.

---

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 70

24 January 1945

1. XV Corps:

Commencing 25 January 1945, move the 101st Airborne Division (with 807th TD Bn attached) to an area designated by CG, VI Corps. Upon arrival in VI Corps sector, the 101st Airborne Division and 807th TD Bn are relieved from attachment to XV Corps and are attached to VI Corps.

2. VI Corps:

Relieve and move the 79th Infantry Division (with 813th TD Bn and 463rd AAA AW Bn attached) to the CHATEAU SALINS area. Complete relief and move bulk of Division prior to 0001A, 28 January 1945. Upon arrival, the 79th Infantry Division and attached units are relieved from attachment to VI Corps and revert to Army Reserve.

x. Movements directed will be coordinated with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 71

24 January 1945

1. a. XXI Corps: In accordance with VOCG, Sixth Army Group, the following units are relieved from operational control of Seventh Army and are attached to First French Army for operations only:

Hq & Hq Co, XXI Corps  
Hq & Hq Btry, XXI Corps Arty  
65th Signal Bn  
449th MP Co  
4th Plt, 4223 QM Car Co

- b. XV Corps: Assume responsibility for present XXI Corps sector and command of all troops currently assigned to XXI Corps (with the exception of units listed in paragraph 1 a above) as expeditiously as possible.

- x. Actual date and hour of passage of command will be as agreed upon between CG XV Corps and CG XXI Corps.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 72

26 January 1945

1. Paragraph 2, Operations Instruction No. 70, dated 24 January 1945, is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

"VI Corps:

Relieve and move Task Force LINDEN to the CHATEAU SALINS area prior to 0001A, 28 January 1945. Upon arrival, Task Force LINDEN is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and reverts to Army Reserve."

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 73

29 January 1945

1. New boundary between VI and XV Corps as shown on attached overlay is effective 0600A, 30 January 1945.
  2. a. VI Corps:  
Relieve elements of the 35th Inf Div, within new boundary, by 0600A, 30 January 1945.
  - b. XV Corps:
    - (1) Relieve elements of the 35th Inf Div, within new boundary, by 0600A, 30 January 1945.
    - (2) Assemble and prepare to move the 35th Inf Div (with 448th AAA AW Bn (-) and 654th TD Bn (-) attached) to destination outside Seventh Army sector. Movement orders later.
  - x. (1) Exact time of passage of command and responsibility of extended VI Corps sector will be as agreed between CG XV Corps and CG VI Corps.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 74

3 February 1944

VI Corps:

Relieve and move the 79th Infantry Division (with 813th TD Bn and 463 AAA AW Bn attached) to the PONT-A-MOUSSON (U7735) area. Initiate movement of division by 0800A, 6 February 1945. Upon arrival, the 79th Division and attached units are relieved from attachment to VI Corps and revert to Army reserve. Coordinate movement with Transportation Officer, this headquarters.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 75

6 February 1945

1. XV Corps:
  - a. Upon arrival in the FAULQUEMONT Area, the 101st Cavalry Group is attached to XV Corps.



- b. Relieve the 106th Cavalry Group by the 101st Cavalry Group. 106th Cavalry Group reverts to Corps reserve and will be committed only by authority of this Headquarters.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 76

9 February 1945

1. XV Corps:

- a. Upon arrival in XV Corps area, the 12th Armored Division (reinf.) is attached to XV Corps.
  - b. Be prepared to move the 10th Armored Division (reinf.) by road to a destination outside the Army area. Movement order later.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 77

13 February 1945

1. a. 42nd Infantry Division:

- (1) Move to area designated by CG VI Corps beginning 16 February 1945 and closing by 0001A, 18 February 1945. Division transportation will be supplemented by Army Transportation.
- (2) Establish liaison with VI Corps immediately.

b. VI Corps:

- (1) Relieve the 45th Infantry Division. Be prepared to move Division to Army area to a destination to be announced later, as Army reserve.
  - (2) Instruct the 45th Infantry Division to establish liaison with this Headquarters upon relief.
  - x. (1) 42nd Infantry Division is attached to VI Corps upon arrival in the Corps sector.
  - (2) Coordinate movements directed with Transportation Officer this Headquarters (Cadet Rear 467).
  - (3) Radio Silence:  
42nd Inf Div: during movement; until released by VI Corps.  
45th Inf Div: during movement; until released by Army.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 78

13 February 1945

- 1. a. Boundary between First French Army and Seventh Army is changed as follows:

West of RAON SUR PLAINE (V5291) — No change.

RAON SUR PLAINE	To First French Army.
WASSELONE (Q7804)	To First French Army.
DURNINGEN (Q8709)	To First French Army.
BRUMATH (Q9814)	To Seventh Army.
WEITBRUCH (R0317)	To Seventh Army.
OBERHOFFEN (R0920)	To First French Army.
SOUFFLENHEIM (R1625)	To First French Army.
LAUTERBOURG (R3241)	To First French Army.

- b. New boundary effective on relief of Seventh Army units in new French sector. Relief has been directed by higher headquarters to be completed by 2400A, 20 February 1945.
- c. Limiting points: OBERHOFFEN (R0920) - forward position.  
Canal bridge at (Q965128) - intermediate position.  
WASSELONE (Q7804) - VOSGES position.

Precise limiting points as arranged between Commanding Generals VI Corps and adjacent French Corps.

---

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 79

15 February 1945

REFERENCE: Operations Instruction No. 77.

- 1. VI Corps:
    - a. Move the 45th Infantry Division (with 106th AAA AW Bn attached), upon relief, to area shown on overlay.
    - b. Upon arrival in Army area, 45th Infantry Division (reinf) is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and reverts to Army reserve.
    - c. Coordinate movement directed with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters (Cadet Rear 467).
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 80

18 February 1945

- 1. Seventh Army continue to defend in present position. Effective at a date and hour to be announced, 7th Army regroups with the XXI Corps on the left, XV Corps in the center, and VI Corps on the right.
- 2. a. Boundaries and limiting points: See Overlay.  
b. Troops:

(1) XXI Corps:

63rd Infantry Division  
70th Infantry Division  
12th Armored Division  
101st Cavalry Group

(2) XV Corps:

42nd Infantry Division  
44th Infantry Division  
100th Infantry Division  
2nd French Armored Division (DB)  
106th Cavalry Group

(3) VI Corps:

36th Infantry Division  
103rd Infantry Division  
101st Airborne Division (scheduled for early movement out  
of Army area)  
14th Armored Division

(4) Army Reserve:

45th Infantry Division  
3rd Infantry Division (AEF Reserve)

(5) Supporting Troops:

For changes in attachment of supporting troops, see attachment order, this Headquarters, dated 18 February 1945.

3. a. XXI Corps:

- (1) Assume command of sector and responsibility for its defense on army order. (See Overlay).
- (2) Coordinate defense with XX Corps, on the left.

b. XV Corps:

- (1) Assume command of new sector and responsibility for its defense on army order.
- (2) Move 254th Infantry Regiment to location designated by CG XXI Corps.

c. VI Corps:

- (1) Continue defense of sector.
- (2) Coordinate defense with French II Corps, on the right.

d. Army Reserve:

- (1) Continue training, rehabilitation and refitting.

- x. (1) Prior to time new boundaries go into effect, initiate regrouping of supporting and reserve units to conform to new sectors, consistent with operational requirements.
  - (2) Complete regrouping of supporting and reserve units as soon as practicable after new boundaries are effective.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 81

19 February 1945

1. Operations Instruction Number 80, this headquarters, dated 18 February 1945, is revised as follows:

- a. Boundary between VI Corps and XV Corps shown on overlay, Operations Instruction Number 80 will not take effect. Instead, present boundary between VI Corps and XV Corps will remain unchanged.
  - b. 42nd Infantry Division will remain attached to VI Corps.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 82

22 February 1945

1. VI Corps:

- a. Confirming VOCCG, Seventh Army, relieve and move the 101st Airborne Division to assembly areas vicinity SARREBOURG and SAVERNE. Complete assembly of division by 0600A, 26 February 1945.
  - b. Upon closing into assembly areas, the 101st Airborne Division is relieved of attachment to VI Corps and reverts to Army control.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 83

25 February 1945

1. a. XXI Corps:

Assume command of sector, as specified in Operations Instruction No. 80, by 1200A, 28 February 1945.

b. XV Corps:

Be prepared to move the 2nd French Armored Division (DB) to a destination outside the Army area. Movement order separately. Upon clearing the Army area, the 2nd French Armored Division (DB) is relieved from attachment to XV Corps and Seventh Army.

- x. (1) Exact time of passage of command of the new XXI Corps sector as agreed between CG XV Corps and CG XXI Corps.
  - (2) It is contemplated that the 12th Armored Division will be moved to a control location West of the VOSGES in Army reserve after the departure of the 2nd French Armored Division.
- 

**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 84**

1 March 1945

- 1. All orders and instructions, this Headquarters, requiring the organization and construction of defensive positions in rear of present forward positions are rescinded.
  - 2. Weekly defense progress reports are no longer required.
- 

**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 85**

8 March 1945

1. Effective at 0001A, 12 March 1945, the 3rd Infantry Division (with 601st TD Bn, 441st AAA AW Bn, 756th Tk Bn and Btry B (less 2nd Plat) 353rd AAA S/L Bn attached), and the 45th Infantry Division (with 645th TD Bn, 106th AAA AW Bn, 191st Tk Bn, and 1st Plat, Btry A, 353rd AAA S/L Bn attached) are attached to XV Corps for operations. These divisions will establish and maintain liaison with XV Corps immediately.

2. XV Corps:

- a. Schedule movement of 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions so as to permit completion of present training programs.
  - b. Move Btry B (less 2nd Plat), 353rd AAA S/L Bn (currently attached to 3rd Inf Div) on 14 March 1945 to destination designated by CG, XXI Corps. Upon arrival this unit is relieved of attachment to 3rd Inf Div and XV Corps, and is attached to XXI Corps.
  - c. Coordinate movement with Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.
  - d. Conduct movements with maximum secrecy.
- 

**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 86**

9 March 1945

- 1. The following Signal security measures are in effect for all units, Seventh Army, effective immediately and until removed by orders this headquarters.

- a. Units in reserve or moving in rear areas will:
    - (1) Maintain absolute radio silence until committed in the line and released by Corps Commanders.
    - (2) Transmit all messages below division level pertaining to troop movements by messenger only.
    - (3) Not employ partial measures such as low power or reduced antenna.
  - b. Units being relieved in the line will:
    - (1) Maintain normal radio communication until relieving unit is committed in the line, and at the same time, when considered necessary by Corps Commanders, furnish communication for the unit effecting relief. In either instance, the traffic passed should appear normal in all aspects to enemy intercept.
  - c. Units effecting relief of other units in the line will:
    - (1) Maintain absolute radio silence until committed in the line and until released by Corps Commanders.
    - (2) Not employ partial measures such as low power or reduced antenna.
    - (3) Site radio nets for future operations without breaking radio silence.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 87

10 March 1945

Boundary between XV Corps and XXI Corps is changed in accordance with attached overlay, and is effective 0600A, 13 March 1945. Relief of XXI Corps units and passage of command will be as agreed between CG XV Corps and CG XXI Corps.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 88

11 March 1945

1. Pursuant to instructions from CG, Sixth Army Group, the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division (Fr) (DIA) (with one TD Bn and one AAA AW Bn attached and supported by one combat command of 5th French Armored Division (DB), one Bn of 155mm Hows and one Bn 155mm Guns (M-1)) is attached to Seventh Army for operations only, effective 0600A, 13 March 1945, and is in turn attached to VI Corps for operations in present zone of First French Army only, effective same date and hour.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 89

12 March 1945

1. a. Effective 0600A, 15 March 1945, the 40th Engineer Group (reinf) and the 540th Engineer Group (reinf) are attached to VI Corps for operations.
  - b. These groups are attached for the specific purpose of providing the means for crossing the RHINE River and to permit XV Corps to control their training and preparation of equipment for this mission. The 540th Engineer Group has undergone a period of combined training with the 3rd Infantry Division and is trained and equipped for the upstream crossing. The 40th Engineer Group has undergone a period of combined training with the 45th Infantry Division and is trained and equipped for the downstream crossing.
  - c. It is the intention of this Headquarters that these groups will remain attached to XV Corps for the purpose of maintaining the lines of communication across the RHINE River until such time as the rear boundary of the Corps passes to the East side of the river.
  - d. All moves of these groups will be made with maximum secrecy.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 90

14 March 1945

1. 4th Infantry Division:
    - a. Be prepared on twenty-four (24) hours notice to move on Army order to any point within the Army area.
    - b. See para. 2 b and 3, below.
  2. XXI Corps:
    - a. Be prepared to release the 776th TD Bn on twelve (12) hours notice to control of CG 44th Inf Div on Army order.
    - b. After 740th Tk Bn has closed in XXI Corps area, release the 70th Tk Bn to control of CG 4th Inf Div.
  3. VI Corps:

After 630th TD Bn has closed in VI Corps area, release 610th TD Bn to control of CG 4th Inf Div.
-

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 91

16 March 1945

1. 44th Infantry Division (with 895th AAA AW Bn attached)

Remain assembled in the WITTRING (Q5650) — HAMBACH (Q4851) — SARRALBE (Q4844) area, prepared to move on twenty-four (24) hours notice on Army order to any point within the Army area.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 92

16 March 1945

1. XXI Corps:

Be prepared on Army order to assemble and release to Army control the 12th Armored Division on twenty-four (24) hours notice. Employment of elements of the division by XXI Corps is authorized, provided such employment permits assembly of the division as specified.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 93

17 March 1945

Upon arrival, the Division Artillery, 13th Armored Division, is attached to XXI Corps for operations. XXI Corps will be prepared to release this artillery to parent unit on six (6) hours notice from this headquarters.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 94

18 March 1945

1. Effective 0001A, 19 March 1945, the 72nd AAA Gun Bn and the 108th AAA Gun Bn are relieved from present attachments and revert to operational control of Seventh Army. The Commanding Officers of these units or their representatives will report immediately to this Headquarters for instructions. Until further orders, these units will be employed on Military Police duty.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 95

19 March 1945

1. XXI Corps:

4th Division Artillery is relieved of attachment to XXI Corps and reverts to control of parent unit immediately.



2. 4th Infantry Division:

Assemble the division, (with 610th TD Bn, 377th AAA AW Bn, and 70th Tk Bn attached), and be prepared for movement on twelve (12) hours notice from this Headquarters. Establish liaison with VI Corps immediately.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 96

19 March 1945

1. a. XV Corps:

Move one (1) normal combat command of the 6th Armored Division to area designated by CG, XXI Corps. Upon arrival in XXI Corps zone this combat command is relieved of attachment to XV Corps and is attached to XXI Corps for operations.

b. XXI Corps:

Be prepared to pass the above combat command to XV Corps in the HOMBURG area on Army order.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 97

19 March 1945

1. Groupement MONSABERT, composed of:

3rd Algerian Inf Div (Fr) (DIA) (reinf with one TD Bn and one AAA AW Bn)

5th French Armd Div (DB) reinf with one TD Bn and one AAA AW Bn)

One (1) Bn 155mm Hows

One (1) Bn 155mm Guns

Necessary Engineers and supporting troops

is attached to Seventh Army at 1800A, 19 March 1945, and is in turn attached to VI Corps at the same date and hour, for operations only. This attachment continues until Seventh Army advances as far as the ERLÉN River, at which time Groupement MONSABERT reverts to control of First French Army, which then assumes responsibility for the defense of the RHINE, South of the ERLÉN River.

2. VI Corps:

a. Establish liaison with II French Corps immediately to coordinate action directed in paragraph 1 above. Previous attachment orders in conflict with the above are rescinded.

b. VI Corps is responsible for the defense of the RHINE, North of DRUSENHEIM (excl) until Groupement MONSABERT reverts to First French Army (see paragraph 1 above).

3. 44th Infantry Division:

Be prepared to move on twelve (12) hours notice on Army order to any point within the Army area.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 98

19 March 1945

1. The 4th Infantry Division (with 70th Tk Bn, 610th TD Bn and 377th AAA AW Bn attached) is attached to VI Corps effective 0600A, 20 March 1945. Coordinate movement with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters.

2. XV Corps will not be required to pass one (1) infantry division to VI Corps in the vicinity of PIRMASENS as specified in paragraph 3 b (5), FO No. 10, this Headquarters.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 99

20 March 1945

1. Boundaries:

a. (1) Boundary between Seventh Army and Third Army is changed as follows: West of BUSS (SAAR) (Q3175) no change — BUSS — NEUNKIRCHEN (Q5982) — JAGERSBURG (Q7085) — RAMSTEIN (Q8794) — LANGMEIL (M1007) — WORMS — all to Third Army.

(2) Third Army units operations across new boundary have been instructed to yield priority to Seventh Army units upon contact.

(3) Local commanders will ensure that such Third Army units are permitted road space for withdrawal as early as practicable.

b. Boundary between XXI Corps and XV Corps is changed as follows: South of OMMERSHEIM (Q5869) no change — OMMERSHEIM — KIRKEL (Q6376) — HOMBURG (Q7180) — JAGERSBURG (Q7085) all to XXI Corps. Joint use of roads in HOMBURG to XXI Corps and XV Corps.

2. XXI Corps:

a. Destroy enemy in zone and then assemble units prepared for further action on Army order.

b. Confirming VOGC Seventh Army, pass CCA, 6th Armd Div to control of CG XV Corps on contact vicinity HOMBURG.

c. Move the 776th TD Bn to area designated by CG 44th Inf Div. Upon closing in 44th Inf Div area, this Bn is relieved from attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to 44th Inf Div.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 100

20 March 1945

13th Armored Division:

Be prepared to move on twenty-four (24) hours notice on Army order to any point within the Army area.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 101

21 March 1945

1. Boundaries. (See overlay).
  2. XXI Corps:
    - a. Pass control of 63rd Inf Div with present attachments to XV Corps.
    - b. Assemble 70th Inf Div with present attachments in SAARBRUCKEN area. Upon assembly 70th Inf Div reverts to Army reserve.
    - c. Assume command of new zone (see overlay) and of 71st and 100th Divs. Capture PIRMASENS, NEUSTADT, LUDWIGSHAVEN and destroy enemy in zone. Assist to the utmost the advance of VI Corps.
    - d. Establish new CP at BITCHE.
  3. XV Corps:
    - a. Pass control of 71st and 100th Inf Divs with present attachments to XXI Corps.
    - b. Assume command of 63rd Inf Div with present attachments.
    - c. Destroy enemy in zone, and seize west bank of RHINE.
  4. VI Corps:
    - a. Continue to exert maximum pressure on enemy in zone.
  5. Army Reserve :
    - a. 70th Inf Div:
      - (1) Establish immediate liaison with this Headquarters.
      - (2) Continue present mission of mopping up SAARBRUCKEN area.
    - b. 44th Inf Div: Establish and maintain liaison with XV Corps.
    - x. Movement of XXI Corps troops, and supporting units to new Corps zone will be coordinated with CG, XV Corps. XV Corps units have road priority.
-

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 102

22 March 1945

1. 70th Infantry Division:

- a. Mop-up in detail and patrol the area: DERLEN (Q3477) — GUCHENBACH (Q4278) — NEUNKIRCHEN (Q5983) — ST ING-BERT (Q5476) — BREBACH (Q4968) — DIFFERTEN (Q3072) — All inclusive.
  - b. Be prepared to assemble in the SAARBRUCKEN area on twelve (12) hours notice on Army order for movement to any part of the Army area.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 103

22 March 1945

1. a. Boundary between XV Corps and XXI Corps is changed as follows: TRIPPSTADT (R0284) — LAMBRECHT (R2486) — DEIDES-HEIM (R3290) — MAUDACH (R4695), all to XXI Corps — RR Junction at (R509983).
- b. Boundary between XXI Corps and VI Corps is changed as follows: SIEBELDINGEN (R2368) — LANDAU (R2766) — SCHWEGEN-HEIM (R4274) — SPEYER (R5180), all to XXI Corps.

2. VI Corps:

Commit the 4th Infantry Division only by authority of this head-quarters.

3. XXI Corps:

12th Armd Div has been ordered to assemble in the SPEYER area, where it will pass to Seventh Army control, attached to XXI Corps on contact.

- x. Commanders will endeavor to secure intact all floating equipment including barges and particularly tugs located in zones.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 104

23 March 1945

1. Effective 1800A, 23 March 1945, temporary boundary, between Third Army and Seventh Army is changed as follows: SAARBRUCKEN (Q4671) — NEUNKIRCHEN (Q5983) — KUSEL (L7504) — ROCKENHAUSEN (M0614),

all to Third Army — KIRCHHEIM BOLANDEN (M1918) point use — ALZEY (M2727), to Third Army — GIMBSHEIM (M4531), to Seventh Army.

2. XV Corps:

- a. 6th Armd Div (with 777th AAA AW Bn, 603rd TD Bn SP, 3803rd QM Trk Co, and 642 QM Trk Co attached) is relieved of attachment to XV Corps and Seventh Army, and is attached to Third Army, effective 1800A, 23 March 1945.
- b. 10th Armd Div, assembling in the NEUSTADT area, with one AAA AW Bn, one TD Bn SP, and two QM Trk Cos. attached, is attached to Seventh Army at 1800A, 23 March, and is in turn attached XV Corps effective same date and hour.
- c. Conduct immediate relief of all Third Army units in zone holding west bank of RHINE.

3. XXI Corps:

- a. 12th Armd Div (with current attachments) is attached to Seventh Army in the SPEYER area at 1200A, 24 March, and is in turn attached to XXI Corps same date and hour.

4. VI Corps:

Complete the destruction of the enemy in zone.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 105

23 March 1945

1. Paragraph 2 b, Operations Instruction No. 104, this headquarters, dated 23 March 1945, is rescinded.

2. XXI Corps:

The 10th Armd Div (with one AAA AW Bn, one TD Bn SP and two QM Truck Companies attached) is attached to Seventh Army at 1800A, 23 March 1945, and is in turn attached to XXI Corps same date and hour.

3. XV Corps:

The 44th Inf Div (895th AAA AW Bn, 776th TD Bn, and 772nd Tk Bn attached) is attached to XV Corps effective 1800A, 23 March 1945.

4. 70th Infantry Division:

Move the 772nd Tk Bn to location designated by CG, 44th Inf Div. Upon arrival this battalion is relieved of attachment to 70th Inf Div and is attached to 44th Inf Div.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 106

24 March 1945

1 70th Infantry Division

13th Armored Division

- a. Garrison, police and support Military Government in areas in GERMANY as shown on overlay.
  - b. Movement to areas will not begin prior to 0001A, 25 March 1945 or later than 1000A, 25 March 1945. Movement will be made on routes other than Main Supply Roads and will be coordinated with the Transportation Officer this Headquarters.
  - c. Remain in Army reserve prepared for movement on thirty-six (36) hours notice from this Headquarters.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 107

24 March 1945

1. Boundaries effective 1200A, 25 March 1945. (See Overlay).
2. VI Corps:
  - a. Pass 42nd Inf Div (with present attachments) and 4th Inf Div (with present attachments) to control of XXI Corps effective 1200A, 25 March 1945. Coordinate movements with CG XXI Corps.
  - b. Assume control of 71st Inf Div (with present attachments less 749th Tk Bn) and 100th Inf Div (with present attachments) effective 1200A, 25 March 1945 and responsibility for West bank of RHINE in zone as shown on overlay.
  - c. Assist RHINE crossing of XV Corps by vigorous patrolling across RHINE in zone, and a feint, supported by artillery and smoke demonstrations in the SPEYER — GERMERSHEIM area in conjunction with XV Corps crossing (see para. 4 below).
  - d. Maintain one infantry division in Corps reserve, prepared to move on twenty-four (24) hours notice on Army order.
3. XXI Corps:
  - a. See para. 2, a and b, above. Coordinate movements with CG VI Corps.
  - b. Be prepared to pass through bridgehead of XV Corps (see para. 4, below) and assist in exploitation of bridgehead on Army order.
4. XV Corps:
  - a. Force a crossing of the RHINE in zone under Plan "UNDERTONE PHASE TWO", exclusive of the Airborne phase ("CHOKER TWO"). "D" Day, "H" Hour to be announced.

- b. Maintain contact with Third Army units West and East of the RHINE.
  - b. Be prepared to extend the bridgehead on Army order.
  - d. See para. 3, b, above.
5. Army Reserve:
- a. 13th Armored Division:  
70th Infantry Division:  
Continue missions assigned in Operations Instruction No. 106.
6. See attachment order, this headquarters, dated 24 March 1945 (attached).
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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 108

24 March 1945

1. a. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army is changed as follows, and is effective upon passage of command of sector to CG First French Army: West of BRUMATH (excl) no change — BRUMATH (to First French Army) — HAGUENAU — thence along Highway N-63 to SOULTZ (R1137) — thence along railroad from SOULTZ to ALTENSTADT (R1748) — thence along railroad to ERLÉN River at (R284560) — thence along ERLÉN River to its junction with the RHINE at (R4658) all to Seventh Army.
  - b. First French Army has running rights of not to exceed 200 vehicle trips one-way daily along Highway N-63 between BRUMATH and WISSENBOURG and on the road between WISSENBOURG and the Army boundary at (R244510).
2. VI Corps:
- a. Pass Groupement MONSABERT and responsibility of First French Army sector North of DRUSENHEIM to First French Army by 1200A, 26 March 1945.
  - b. Exact time of passage of command will be as agreed between CG VI Corps and CG II French Corps.
  - c. Withdraw all VI Corps units and installations from new First French Army sector as soon as practicable.
3. Upon passage of command as directed in para. 2, a, above, Groupement MONSABERT is relieved of attachment to VI Corps and Seventh Army.
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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 109

25 March 1945

Units will not expend explosives in destroying SIEGFRIED Line fortifications recently passed through or captured, except as necessary to mop up isolated resistance.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 110

25 March 1945

Temporary boundary between Seventh Army and Third Army is extended as follows, effective 0001A, 26 March 1945: West of GIMBSHEIM (M4631) no change — GIMBSHEIM — ROSSDORF (M7340) — DIEBURG (M7945) — BABENHAUSEN (M8752) — ASCHAFFENBURG (N0154), all to Seventh Army with running rights to Third Army on road ROSSDORF — ASCHAFFENBURG.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 111

25 March 1945

Reference paragraph 4 a, Operations Instruction No. 107, this headquarters, dated 24 March:

“D Day: 26 March 1945  
H Hour: 0230A.”

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 112

26 March 1945

1. Effective immediately the 12th Armored Division (with 572nd AAA AW Bn, 3659th QM Tk Co attached) is relieved of attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to XV Corps.

2. Effective immediately, the 63rd Infantry Division (with 436th AAA AW Bn, 822nd TD Bn, 740th Tk Bn attached) is relieved of attachment to XXI Corps.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 113

27 March 1945

1. a. Army bridgehead: See overlay.
- b. Future boundary between XV and XXI Corps East of RHINE, effective on Army order: See overlay.



2. Readjustment of Troops (Effective immediately)
    - a. XV Corps: 3rd, 45th, 44th Inf and 12th Armd Divs.
    - b. XXI Corps: 4th, 42nd, 63rd Inf and 10th Armd Divs.
    - c. VI Corps: 36th, 100th, 103rd Inf and 14th Armd Divs.
    - d. Army Reserve: 70th, 71st Inf and 13th Armd Divs (To pass to SHAEF control).
  3. Missions:
    - a. XV Corps:
      - (1) Extend Corps bridgehead to include MANNHEIM and crossings over NECKAR River and advance to Army bridgehead.
      - (2) Exploit on multiple routes toward WURZBURG (N5835) and SCHWEINFURT (N7964).
      - (3) Contact and relieve elements of the Third Army in zone.
    - b. XXI Corps:
      - (1) On Army order assume command of new zone and continue advance to Army bridgehead.
      - (2) Be prepared to exploit with armor South of the NECKAR toward HEILBRONN (S0861) and BRUCHSAL (R6258).
    - c. VI Corps:
      - (1) Continue present mission and support with all available means the attack on MANNHEIM.
      - (2) Orders for future operations East of the RHINE, will be issued later.
    - x. (1) Allocation of supporting troops will be adjusted after XXI Corps becomes operational East of the RHINE.
    - (2) Upon closing of 63rd Inf Div East of the RHINE, Army assumes responsibility for bridge maintenance and traffic control in the crossing area.
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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 114

27 March 1945

1. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army:

Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army, effective 0001A, 30 March 1945, is changed as follows: PHALSBOURG — SAVERNE (both to First French Army) — HAGUENAU — thence along highway N-63 from HAGUENAU to SOULTZ — thence along railroad from SOULTZ to WISSENBURG — thence along railroad to LANDAU — thence along railroad to

EDENKOBEN (R2876) (all to Seventh Army) — GEINSHEIM (3878) — HANHOTEN (R4480) — SPEYER (R5180) — HEILBRONN (S0862) (all to First French Army). Unrestricted running rights to Seventh Army over highway N-4 from PHALSBOURG to SAVERNE, over highway N-421 from SAVERNE to BRUMAH and over highway N-63 from BRUMATH to HAGUENAU. Running rights to First French Army over highway N-63 from BRUMATH to its junction with highway N-272 North of LANDAU.

2. XXI Corps:

Move the XXI Corps East of the RHINE in accordance with the following instructions:

a. Order of Movement:

- (1) 10th Armd Div and 63rd Inf Div (in the order listed or simultaneously).
- (2) XXI Corps Headquarters and essential Corps troops.
- (3) 4th Inf Div and 42nd Inf Div (in the order listed or simultaneously).

b. Begin movement as soon as practicable following the 12th Armd Div.

c. Establish liaison with XV Corps immediately to coordinate the movement directed in paragraph 1 a (1) above.

d. Coordinate movements directed in paragraph 1 a (2) and (3) above with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 115

29 March 1945

1. Boundary between XV Corps and XXI Corps East of the RHINE, as delineated in para. 1, b, Operations Instruction Number 113, this Headquarters, is effective 1200A, 29 March 1945.

2. Effective 1200A, 29 March 1945, Army assumes control of the crossing area and the following units are relieved from attachment to XV Corps and revert to Army control:

44th AA Ops Det  
34th AAA Gp Hqs  
62nd AAA Gun Bn  
214th AAA Gun Bn  
910th AAA AW Bn (less Btry C)  
798th AAA AW Bn  
353rd AAA S/L Bn (less Btry A)  
78th Cml SG Co  
69th Cml SG Co

3. 44th AAA Brigade:

- a. Effective 1200A, 29 March 1945, the Antiaircraft and Chemical units listed in para. 2, above, are attached to the 44th AAA Brigade for operations.
- b. Protect the crossing area against air attack.
- c. Furnish illumination on request of Engineer unit commanders engaged on bridge and ferry operations.
- d. Furnish upon request to CO, 540th Engr Gp, necessary AAA weapons for anti-sabotage protection.
- e. Coordinate the antiaircraft defenses with the ground and anti-sabotage defenses of the crossing area.

4. a. VI Corps:

(1) (a) 36th Inf Div (443rd AAA AW Bn (SP) attached) and 103rd Inf Div (534th AAA AW Bn (M) attached) are relieved from attachment to VI Corps effective 1200A, 29 March 1945, and revert to Army control.

(b) Units will remain in present areas prepared for movement on Army order on 24 hours notice, and establish liaison with this Headquarters.

(c) 103rd Inf Div remain in present mission until relieved by Army order.

b. XXI Corps:

(1) (a) Relieve 44th Inf Div after capture of MANNHEIM and permit movement of unit to area designated by CG XV Corps.

(b) Relieve other XV Corps units in zone immediately.

(2) Continue exploitation of bridgehead South of the NECKAR River toward HEILBRONN (S0861) and BRUCHSAL (R6258).

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 116

29 March 1945

1. Temporary boundary between Seventh Army and Third Army is changed as follows, effective immediately: West of ALZEY (M2727), no change — ALZEY — OPPENHEIM (M4439) — GROS GERAU (M5347) — MORFELDEN (M5953) — LANGEN (M6754) — DIETZENBACH (M7457) — HAINHAUSEN (M8161) — RR bridge at (M8668) — RR track to GELNHAUSEN (N0479) — (all to Third Army).

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2. XV Corps:

Relieve Third Army units South of new Army temporary boundary as soon as practicable and not later than 1800A, 31 March 1945.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 117

30 March 1945

1. VI Corps:

3rd Bn, 398th Infantry, is relieved of attachment to Sixth Army Group "T" Force and reverts to control of parent unit effective immediately.

2. a. XXI Corps:

2nd Bn, 254th Inf, is attached, effective immediately, to Sixth Army Group "T" Force for operations in MANNHEIM and HEIDELBERG.

b. 103rd Inf Div:

Deploy one (1) rifle company in LUDWIGSHAFEN in accordance with instructions to be issued by Sixth Army Group "T" Force.

x. Commanding Officers or their representatives will report to Colonel PUMPELLY, Sixth Army Group "T" Force at (M554012), NORTH MANNHEIM immediately.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 118

30 March 1945

1. XXI Corps:

- a. The 63rd Inf Div (with 436th AAA AW Bn, 822nd TD Bn attached) is designated as the infantry division referred to in paragraph 3, b, (2), FO No. 11, this Headquarters, dated 2200A, 29 March 1945.
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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 119

31 March 1945

1. 36th Infantry Division:

Reference: Paragraph 3 d (1) (a), FO No. 11, this Headquarters, dated 2200A, 29 March 1945.

- a. Garrison assigned area as it is vacated by 70th Inf Div and 13th Armd Div.

- b. Move by organic transportation, on roads West of LANDAU, commencing after the 42nd Inf Div clears LANDAU.

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- c. Direct communication with 70th Inf Div and 13th Armd Div is authorized.
  - d. Coordinate movement with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters.
  - e. Advance parties, down to include battalion parties, are authorized.
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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 120

1 April 1945

103rd Infantry Division:

Garrison area assigned in para. 3 d (1) (a), FO No. 11, this Headquarters, dated 2200A, 29 March 1945, commencing 0600B, 2 April 1945.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 121

2 April 1945

- 1. a. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army has been changed as follows, effective immediately: West of SPEYER (no change) — SPEYER (to First French Army) — MICHELFELD (R7670) — HILSBACH (R8167) — LAUFFEN (S0354) (all to Seventh Army).
  - b. Contact points between Seventh Army and First French Army (VI US Corps and II Fr Corps): Main bridgehead force — HILSBACH Rcn force — LAUFFEN.
  - 2. Correct Operations Instruction Number 200, dated 1 April 1945, to read Number 120.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 122

4 April 1945

- 1. a. First French Army on the right secures the line KARLSRUHE — HEILBRONN and reconnoiters to the line LICHTENAU (R2014) — LUDWIGSBURG (S0734).
- b. Third Army on the left continues the advance toward LEIPZIG — DRESDEN.
- 2. Boundaries:
  - a. Present boundary between Seventh Army and Third Army is extended as follows: West of FULDA (H3819) no change — FULDA (to Seventh Army) — MEININGEN (H9022) — COBURG (O-3089) — BAYREUTH (O-7556) (all to Third Army).

- b. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army, effective immediately: BITCHE (Q7750) — EDENKOBEN (R2876) — SPEYER (R5180) — all to First French Army — MICHELFELD (R7670) — HILSBACH (R8267) — LAUFFEN (S0454) (all to Seventh Army) — thence along NECKAR River to STUTTGART (to First French Army) (see overlay). Unrestricted use of the main railroad from West of the VOSGES running through HAGUENAU and LANDAU to Seventh Army. Unrestricted running rights on the road PHALSBOURG — SAVERNE — BRUMATH — HAGUENAU — WISSEMBOURG — LANDAU — EDENKOBEN to Seventh Army.
- c. Boundary between Corps effective 0001B 6 April 1945:
  - (1) Between XV Corps and XXI Corps: See overlay.
  - (2) Between XXI Corps and VI Corps: See overlay.
3. a. VI Corps:
  - (1) Continue advance and secure objective shown on overlay.
  - (2) Maintain close liaison with First French Army.
- b. XXI Corps:
  - (1) Continue advance and secure objective shown on overlay, prepared for further advance to the Southeast on Army order.
  - (2) Prepare to employ one additional infantry division on Army order.
  - (3) See para. 3 c (1) (a), (b) and (c).
- c. XV Corps:
  - (1) (a) Complete rapidly present mission of clearing enemy from HOHE RHON hill mass, and occupying initial objective.
    - (b) Use of HANAU — FULDA road is authorized.
    - (c) Arrange as necessary with CG XXI Corps for passage of armored elements through zone of XXI Corps.
  - (2) Thereafter, continue advance to the Southeast and secure second objective shown on overlay.
  - (3) Be prepared to release one (1) infantry division to Army control on twenty-four (24) hours notice.
- d. 103rd Infantry Division:
 

Withdraw troops from area South of new Army boundary and continue present mission.
- x. (1) Corps will reconnoiter in strength to Reconnaissance Line (see overlay). Advance beyond line shown, only on authority of this headquarters.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 123

6 April 1945

1. a. 103rd Infantry Division (reinf)
    - (1) Move across the RHINE commencing at 1200B, 7 April 1945.
    - (2) Coordinate movement with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters.
    - (3) Garrison, police and support Military Government in area shown on overlay. No change in alert status.
  - b. 36th Infantry Division:

Commencing immediately, relieve 103rd Inf Div from garrison duty West of the RHINE River. New area of responsibility shown on overlay.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 124

7 April 1945

1. XV Corps:

Move the 44th Inf Div (with 895th AAA AW Bn, 776th TD Bn, 772nd Tk Bn attached) to an assembly area vicinity GROSSRINDERFELD (N4420), 8 April 1945. Upon arrival in the GROSSRINDERFELD area, the 44th Inf Div (reinf) is relieved from attachment to XV Corps and reverts to Army reserve. Coordinate movement with XXI Corps.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 125

7 April 1945

1. 44th Infantry Division:

Move the 324th RCT (reinf) to VI Corps zone. Effective upon arrival in VI Corps zone, 324th RCT (reinf) is attached to VI Corps for operations.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 126

8 April 1945

1. 103rd Infantry Division:
  - a. Area assigned in Operations Instruction No. 123, this Headquarters, dated 6 April 1945, is extended as shown on overlay.
  - b. Confirming VCG Seventh Army, relieve the 44th Inf Div on security targets in the extended area, and relieve Co C, 1269th Engr Bn on security targets in HEIDELBERG (R6890).

2. a. 44th Infantry Division:

- (1) Be prepared to move on twenty-four (24) hours notice on Army order.
- (2) Move two (2) Btrys 895th AAA AW Bn to area designated by CG, XXI Corps. Upon arrival, these Btrys are relieved from attachment to 44th Inf Div and are attached to XXI Corps.

b. XXI Corps:

- (1) See para. 2, a, (2), above.
  - (2) Be prepared to release these units to parent unit on twelve (12) hours notice by this Headquarters.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 127

9 April 1945

1. a. 36th Infantry Division:

- (1) Assume complete responsibility in assigned area for:
  - (a) Insuring the security of Army supply installations by supplementing as necessary the installation guards and coordinating security measures.
  - (b) Insuring the security of the operating railroads, main supply roads and petroleum pipe lines.
  - (c) The control of displaced persons.
  - (d) Disarming and police of the civilian population.
  - (e) Establishing a Prohibited Frontier Zone between FRANCE and GERMANY, and enforcing Military Government Law No. 161.
  - (f) Support of Military Government.
- (2) Relieve Seventh Army Security Command guards now committed in division area.
- (3) Be prepared to initiate movement out of the Army area on twenty-four (24) hours notice by this Headquarters.

b. Seventh Army Security Command.

Establish liaison immediately with the 36th Infantry Division to coordinate relief of guards currently posted in the division area.

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**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 128**

10 April 1945

1. Confirming VOGC Seventh Army, the following is made of record:
    - a. Effective 1500B, 10 April 1945, 324th RCT (reinf) is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and is attached to XXI Corps.
    - b. Objective assigned XXI Corps in Operations Instruction No. 122, this Headquarters, dated 4 April 1945, is extended to the following general line: BLAUFELDEN (S6280) — SCHROZBERG (S6385) — MUNSTER (S6696) — CREGLINGEN (S6699) — WALDMANNSHOFEN (N6806) — GEISSLINGEN (N7114) — MARKTSTEFT (N7324).
    - c. Major elements VI Corps in advance of general line: KUPFERZELL (S4271) — LANGENBURG (S5475) — BLAUFELDEN (S6280) will be withdrawn.
- 

**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 129**

11 April 1945

1. Effective immediately, two (2) Rcn Platoons of Hq & Hq Co, 648th TD Bn are attached to the 36th Infantry Division.
  2. 36th Infantry Division:

Be prepared to release two (2) Rcn Platoons of Hq & Hq Co, 648th TD Bn to parent unit on twenty-four (24) hours notice from this Headquarters.
- 

**OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 130**

11 April 1945

1. 44th Infantry Division:

Effective immediately, 44th Inf Div Artillery (less 220th FA Bn) is attached to the XXI Corps.
  2. XXI Corps:
    - a. See paragraph 1, above.
    - b. Be prepared to release 44th Inf Div Artillery (less 220th FA Bn) to parent unit on twenty-four (24) hours notice from this Headquarters.
-

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 131

13 April 1945

1. a. Third Army continues to advance on Seventh Army left.  
b. First French Army continues advance toward STUTTGART.
  2. a. Seventh Army advance abreast of and protects right flank of Third Army.  
b. Boundaries:
    - (1) Between Armies: No change.
    - (2) Between Corps, effective 0600B, 14 April 1945: See overlay.
  3. a. XV Corps:
    - (1) Secure objective line shown on overlay.
    - (2) Maintain contact with and protect right flank of Third Army.
    - (3) Seize AUTOBAHN between BAYREUTH and NURNBERG and capture NURNBERG.  
b. XXI Corps:
    - (1) Secure objective line shown on overlay.
    - (2) Assist XV Corps in capture of NURNBERG.  
c. VI Corps:
    - (1) Secure objective line shown on overlay.
    - (2) Maintain contact with First French Army, and be prepared to assist in the capture of STUTTGART.  
x. (1) After securing objectives, Corps will reconnoiter to line shown on overlay and be prepared for further advance to the Southeast on Army order.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 132

14 April 1945

1. Third Army on the left is temporarily halted on the general line: ZWICKAU (K3546) — BAYREUTH (O-7556), prepared for further advance.
  2. XV Corps:  
Establish and maintain contact with Third Army (XII Corps) at RJ (O-778526).
- 

1013

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 133

16 April 1945

1. Effective immediately, the boundary between Seventh Army and Third Army is changed as follows: Point on FRANCO — GERMAN Border (Q4368) — SAARBRUCKEN (Q4671) — NEUNKIRCHEN (Q5983) — NOHFELDEN (L5710) — thence along the railroad along the NAHE River to OBERSTEIN (L7023) — MEISENHEIM (L9523) — ALZEY (M2727) — OPPENHEIM (M4540) (all to Third Army) — East of OPPENHEIM (M4540) — no change.

2. 36th Infantry Division:

Extend area of responsibility to boundary between Seventh Army and Third Army as designated in para. 1, above.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 134

17 April 1945

1. 44th Infantry Division:

Confirming VOGC Seventh Army, 44th Inf Div with attached units (less 324th RCT) is released from attachment for training to XXI Corps and is attached to VI Corps, effective immediately.

2. XXI Corps:

- a. See paragraph 1, above.
  - b. Effective immediately, 44th Div Artillery (less 220th FA Bn) is released from attachment to XXI Corps and reverts to control of parent unit.
  - c. Release the 324th RCT to VI Corps as soon as practicable.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 135

18 April 1945

1. 103rd Infantry Division (534th AAA AW Bn, 614th TD Bn attached):

- a. Upon relief from Security duty, move to area designated by CG VI Corps.
  - b. Upon arrival in VI Corps area, 103rd Inf Div (reinf) is attached to VI Corps.
  - c. Establish liaison with VI Corps immediately.
  - d. Coordinate movement with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters (Telephone Cadet Rear 467).
  - e. Additional transportation of two (2) QM Truck Companies (DUKW) will be furnished for movement by this Headquarters.
-

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 136

20 April 1945

1. XV Corps:

Upon the capture of NURNBERG, the 3rd Infantry Division (with 601st TD Bn, 756th Tk Bn and 441st AAA AW Bn attached) is relieved from attachment to XV Corps and reverts to Army control.

2. 3rd Infantry Division (reinf):

- a. Garrison NURNBERG until relieved by Third Army units.
  - b. Be prepared to move to an assembly area in the vicinity of CRAILS-HEIM on Army order.
  - c. Establish liaison with this Headquarters.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 137

21 April 1945

1. Effective immediately, the boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army is changed as follows: North and West of STUTTGART (inclusive) (no change) — thence along the NECKAR River to junction with the FILS River — thence along the NECKAR River to ROTTWEIL (W6652) (exclusive) (all to Seventh Army) — ROTTWEIL — SIGMARINGEN (X1144) (both to First French Army).

2. VI Corps:

So much of para. 3 c (1) FO No. 12 as directs an advance beyond the line: ROTTWEIL — SIGMARINGEN, is revoked.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 138

22 April 1945

1. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army is changed as follows, effective immediately: North of SUTTGART (inclusive) no change — thence along the NECKAR River to PLIEZHAUSEN (X0896) — PLIEZHAUSEN — REUTLINGEN (X0989) — ENGSTINGEN (X1477) — GAMMERTINGEN (X1062) — SIGMARINGEN (X1043) — all to First French Army.

2. Boundary between VI Corps and XXI Corps is changed as follows, effective immediately: North of GEISLINGEN, no change — GEISLINGEN (S5505) — WESTERSTETTEN (X6393) — BEIMERSTETTEN (X6689) — RJ (X694868) — PFAFFENHOFEN (X7975) — BIBERACH (X8368) — KRUMBACH (X9564), all to VI Corps.

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23 April 1945

1. Boundaries:

- a. Between Seventh Army and First French Army (effective at a date and hour to be announced): West of LAUFFEN (S0354) no change — LAUFFEN — railroad to ASPERG (S0235) — Autobahn to junction at (R938211) — Autobahn to RJ at (S0911), (all to Seventh Army) — METZINGEN (X1494) — DETTINGEN (X1993) — MUNSINGEN (X3080) — EHINGEN (X4766) — REINSTETTEN (X6448), (all to First French Army) — KEMPTEN (X9306), (to Seventh Army).

Joint use of the KARLSRUHE — HEILBRONN and KARLSRUHE — STUTTGART railroads and equal running rights on all roads North of the KARLSRUHE — STUTTGART Autobahn inclusive. Equal running rights to First French Army on Autobahn between Autobahn junction West of STUTTGART and BERNHAUSEN.

- b. Between Seventh Army and Third Army: No change.
- c. Between VI Corps and XXI Corps: See overlay.
- d. Between XXI Corps and XV Corps: See overlay.

2. a. VI Corps:

- (1) Advance rapidly and seize Corps objective.
- (2) After the capture of STUTTGART, be prepared on Army order to relieve First French Army in the STUTTGART area, employing the 100th Inf Div.

b. XXI Corps:

- (1) Advance rapidly in zone and capture MUNICH.
- (2) Be prepared on Army order to pass one (1) Inf Div to control of XV Corps in the area West of MUNICH.

c. XV Corps:

- (1) Advance rapidly in zone and capture MUNICH.
- (2) Employing mobile forces, exploit in the INN River valley with utmost speed (see overlay).
- (3) See para. 2 b (2) above.

- x. Each Corps will prepare plans for the employment of mobile task forces to penetrate rapidly the mountain passes in zone and establish secure routes to the INNSBRUCK — BRENNER area.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 140

23 April 1945

1. Upon arrival in the BLAUFELDEN area, the 3rd Inf Div (with 441st AAA AW Bn, 601st TD Bn and 756th TD Bn attached) is attached to XXI Corps.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 141

23 April 1945

1. Confirming verbal agreement between CG Seventh Army and CG Third Army, the following is effective at 1200B, 23 April 1945:
    - a. 14th Armd Div (with 398th AAA AW Bn, 4380th QM Trk Co and 395th QM Trk Co attached) is relieved of attachment to Seventh Army and XV Corps and is attached to Third Army.
    - b. 20th Armd Div (with 468th AAA AW Bn, 399th QM Trk Co and 666th QM Trk Co attached) is relieved from attachment to Third Army and is attached to Seventh Army and is further attached to XV Corps.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 142

23 April 1945

1. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army as delineated in para. 1 a, Operations Instruction No. 139, this Headquarters, dated 23 April 1945, is in effect at 0001B, 25 April 1945.
  2. The 101st Airborne Division (with 813th TD Bn (SP) attached) is attached to VI Corps, on arrival in the MERCHINGEN (S2890) area.
  3. XV Corps:

Be prepared, prior to the attack on MUNICH, to furnish three (3) battalions of infantry or engineers and one cavalry troop to Sixth Army Group "T" Force for operations in the MUNICH area. Prior to that time, Commanding Officers of designated units will report to Colonel PUMPELLY, "T" Force, for briefing.
  4. VI Corps:

Move the 100th Inf Div to STUTTGART, commencing 25 April 1945. Upon closing in STUTTGART, the 100th Inf Div is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and reverts to Army reserve.
  5. 100th Infantry Division:
    - a. Relieve First French Army units in STUTTGART and establish local security in the general area: NECKAR River on the East and the Autobahn to the Northwest and Southwest.
    - b. Establish liaison with this Headquarters.
-

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 143

25 April 1945

1. 36th Infantry Division:

- a. Upon arrival in the KUNZELSAU (S4277) — CRAILSHEIM (S7062) area, the 36th Inf Div (with 443rd AAA AW Bn attached) is attached to XXI Corps.
- b. Establish liaison with XXI Corps.

2. XXI Corps:

Effective 0001B, 28 April 1945, the 63rd Inf Div (with 436th AAA AW Bn attached) is relieved from attachment to XXI Corps and reverts to Army reserve.

3. 63rd Infantry Division:

- a. Establish liaison with this Headquarters.
- b. Further orders will be issued separately.

4. 100th Infantry Division:

Assemble in the STUTTGART area, prepared for movement on Army order on twenty-four (24) hours notice.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 144

26 April 1945

Amend Operations Instruction No. 143, this Headquarters, dtd 25 April 1945, as follows:

Delete paragraph 2 and substitute therefor:

“2. XXI Corps:

Effective 0001B, 30 April 1945, the 63rd Inf Div (with 436th AAA AW Bn attached) is relieved from attachment to XXI Corps and reverts to Army reserve. Release one (1) RCT by 0001B, 28 April 1945.”

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 145

28 April 1945

1. Boundary between Seventh Army and Third Army is changed as follows, effective immediately: Northwest of FREISING, no change, FREISING (Y9585) (to Third Army) — EDLING (Z3049) — PRIEN (Z4428) (both to Seventh Army) — ST JOHANN (E5391) — KITZBUHEL (E5182) — BRAMBERG (E4863) — HINTEREGG (rV8726) (all to Third Army).

2. Seventh Army continues the advance into AUSTRIA, captures INNSBRUCK blocks the BRENNER Pass and pushes strong reconnaissance to

LANDECK (rV3944) and WARTH (C8554) to assist First French Army in blocking RESIA Pass.

3. a. VI Corps:

- (1) After securing objective assigned in Operations Instruction No. 139, continue the attack in zone with utmost speed through all possible avenues of approach to INN River valley.
- (2) Capture INNSBRUCK and block the BRENNER Pass (see para. x).
- (3) Extend strong reconnaissance to LANDECK and WARTH (C8554) and assist First French Army to capture these objectives.

b. XXI Corps:

- (1) Upon securing objectives assigned in Operations Instruction No. 139, continue the attack in zone with utmost speed through all possible avenues of approach to INN River valley.
- (2) Capture INNSBRUCK and block the BRENNER Pass (see para. x).
- (3) Extend strong reconnaissance to the East down the INN River valley to establish contact with XV Corps.
- (4) 2nd French Armored Division attached upon arrival.
- (5) One Division will be attached to XV Corps in MUNICH on Army order.

c. XV Corps:

- (1) After the isolation of MUNICH, attack with strong mobile forces on the axis ROSENHEIM (Z2827) — WORGL (E2685) — STRASS (E0874), and extend reconnaissance to the East.
- (2) Be prepared to assist Third Army units in their advance towards SALZBURG.
- (3) Garrison MUNICH after its capture.

- x. The Corps first reaching INNSBRUCK will coordinate action with the adjacent Corps in the INNSBRUCK area. Further instructions later.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 146

28 April 1945

1. Effective immediately the 3rd Inf Div (with 441st AAA AW Bn, 601st TD Bn and 756th Tk Bn attached) is relieved of attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to XV Corps.

2. Effective immediately temporary boundary between XV and XXI Corps is rescinded.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 147

29 April 1945

1. a. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army is changed as follows, effective immediately: West of LAUFFEN (S0633) — no change — LAUFFEN — thence along Railroad to LUDWIGSBURG (S0633) and KORNWESTHEIM (S0630) (including LUDWIGSBURG, KORNWESTHEIM and marshalling yards) — MUHLHAUSEN (S0928) — WALBLINGEN (S1526) (all to Seventh Army) — PLOCHINGEN (S2313) (to First French Army) — thence Southwest along NECKAR River to its junction with present boundary at (S125020) — thereafter no change.
- b. Unrestricted running rights to Seventh Army of the following roads and railroads: Autobahn from ASPERG (S0235) to RJ at (R9321) to stream crossing at (S2009). Railroad from KORNWESTHEIM to WALBLINGEN and PLOCHINGEN. Highway number 10 from junction with Autobahn at (S0129) to PLOCHINGEN. Highway number 27 from KORNWESTHEIM to junction with Highway number 10 at (S0526). Highway number 14 from junction with Highway number 10 at (S0824) to WALBLINGEN. Highway East of and parallel to NECKAR River from RJ at (S098240) to PLOCHINGEN.
- c. Seventh Army will retain joint use of Roads and Railroads North of and including Autobahn from KARLSRUHE to STUTTGART.
2. 100th Inf Div (with 898th AAA AW Bn attached)
  - a. Move to the following assembly area: LORCH (S4324) — DONZDORF (S5211) — AUENDORF (S4303) — KIRCHHEIM (S2607) — REICHENBACH (S2714) — SCHORNDORF (S3124) (all inclusive), as soon as practicable.
  - b. Establish command post in GOPPINGEN (S4113) and coordinate movement with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters (Telephone CADET Rear 467).

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 148

1 May 1945

1. a. Boundary changes effective immediately: See overlay.
- b. Boundary between Seventh Army and Fifteenth Army: RHINE River between OFFENHEIM and SPEYER (both exclusive).
2. a. VI Corps:
  - (1) Move the 101st Airborne Division (with 813th TD Bn, 774th Tk Bn, 397th QM Trk Co and 53rd QM Bn (DUKW) attached)

to area designated by CG XXI Corps by 0001B, 4 May 1945. Upon arrival in XXI Corps zone, the 101st Airborne Division (reinf) is relieved of attachment to VI Corps and is attached to VI Corps and is attached to XXI Corps.

- (2) Capture LANDECK (V3944) and block the RESIA Pass.
- (3) After capturing INNSBRUCK send strong reconnaissance through the BRENNER Pass.

b. XXI Corps:

- (1) Mission assigned in para. 3 b, Operations Instruction No. 145, dated 28 April 1945, is rescinded.
- (2) Enter and clear the INN River Valley in zone and establish contact with VI Corps.
- (3) Extend strong reconnaissance to ST JOHANN (E5391), KITZBUHEL (E5182) and BRAMBERG (E4863) and be prepared for further advance to the East on Army order.
- (4) Be prepared to release the 4th Inf Div (reinf), for movement to area of Twelfth Army Group commencing on 4 May 1945.
- (5) Be prepared after 5 May to release the 12th Armored Division (reinf) to Army control for security duty. Further instructions later.

c. XV Corps:

- (1) Mission assigned in para. 3 c (1), Operations Instruction No. 145, dated 28 April 1945, is rescinded.
- (2) Complete the destruction of the enemy in the MUNICH area.
- (3) Cross the ISAR River.
- (4) Thereafter, rest units other than those necessary for security in preparation for further action. It is estimated that a two (2) day rest period will be possible.

d. 63rd Infantry Division:

Extend area of responsibility to include LUDWIGSBURG (S0633), KORNWESTHEIM (S0630) and area West of NECKAR River to Army right (West) boundary as delineated in Operations Instruction No. 147, dated 29 April 1945.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 149

2 May 1945

1. Boundary changes, effective immediately: See overlay.

1021

2. a. XV Corps:
    - (1) Capture SALZBURG.
    - (2) Destroy enemy in zone and maintain contact with Third Army on the left.
    - (3) Continue to garrison MUNICH until further orders.
  - b. XXI Corps:
    - (1) Advance to the East in zone on all possible routes and capture BERCHTESGADEN.
    - (2) Block the passes South of the BRUCK (E8467) — RADSTADT (A3281) line.
    - (3) Complete the destruction of the enemy in the INN River valley in zone.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 150

3 May 1945

1. Confirming verbal agreement between CG Seventh Army and CG Third Army, the 86th Inf Div (with 807th TD Bn, 787th TK Bn and 839th AAA AW Bn attached) is attached to Seventh Army for operations effective at 1900B, 2 May 1945, and is further attached to XV Corps for operations at the same date and hour.

2. a. VI Corps:

Reconnoiter through BRENNER Pass as far as ITALIAN border to contact units of Fifteenth Army Group.

b. XXI Corps:

- (1) Assemble the 4th Inf Div (with 610th TD Bn, 70th TK Bn and 377th AAA AW Bn attached) by 4 May 1945, in preparation for movement to Third Army. Movement order later.
  - (2) Assemble the 12th Armd Div (with 572nd AAA AW Bn (SP), 3659th QM Trk Co and 3359th QM Trk Co attached). Upon assembly, division reverts to Army reserve. Division will establish liaison with this Headquarters immediately.
- 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 151

5 May 1945

1. Boundary changes, effective immediately: See overlay.

2. a. Effective at 1200B, 6 May 1945, German Army Group "G"

surrenders. This includes all German forces opposing Seventh Army except for those in the area indicated on overlay.

- b. All forward elements remain in present positions until after 1200B, 6 May 1945.

3. a. XV Corps:

- (1) Be prepared to enforce terms of surrender as far South as the line of the SALZACH River — ENNS River.
- (2) Assemble the 3rd Inf Div (with 601st TD Bn, 756th Tk Bn and 441st AAA AW Bn (SP) attached) in the SALZBURG area. Upon assembly, division reverts to Army reserve. Division will establish liaison with this Headquarters immediately. .
- (3) 45th Inf Div (with 106th AAA AW Bn, 645th TD Bn and 191st Tk Bn attached) reverts to Army reserve in the MUNICH area at 1800B, 6 May 1945. Division will establish liaison with this Headquarters immediately.
- (4) Running rights to Third Army on road: BAD ISCHL (V4118) — GOLSERN (V4110) — BAD AUSSEE (V5408).

b. XXI Corps:

- (1) Be prepared to enforce terms of surrender as far South as the line of the Salzach River.
- (2) Assemble 2nd French Armored Division in the DIESSEN (Y5133) area. Upon assembly Division reverts to Army reserve. Division will establish liaison with this Headquarters immediately.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS

8 May 1945

NUMBER 152

Effective 0900B, 8 May 1945, the 3rd Infantry Division (with 601st TD Bn, 756th Tk Bn and 441st AAA AW Bn (SP) attached) is attached to XV Corps.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS

10 May 1945

NUMBER 153

1. Seventh Army regroups and occupies present sector to the line: REZIA PASS — BRENNER PASS — SALZACH River — ENNS River.

- 2. a. Boundaries: See overlay, effective 1800B, 11 May 1945.

b. Troops:

VI Corps:

36th Inf Div

44th Inf Div

45th Inf Div  
103rd Inf Div  
10th Armd Div  
2nd French Armd Div (DB)

**XV Corps:**

3rd Inf Div  
42nd Inf Div  
86th Inf Div  
101st A/B Div  
20th Armd Div

**XXI Corps:**

63rd Inf Div (with 65th Inf (less Cos A and C) attached)  
100th Inf Div  
12th Armd Div.

**3. a. VI Corps:**

- (1) Assume command of sector (see overlay) at 1800B, 11 May 1945.
- (2) Establish Prohibited Frontier Zones along the AUSTRIAN — GERMAN Frontier, AUSTRIAN — SWISS Frontier and AUSTRIAN — ITALIAN Frontier in sector.
- (3) 45th Inf Div (with 645th TD Bn, 106th AAA AW Bn and 191st Tk Bn attached) is attached to VI Corps at 1800B, 11 May 1945.
- (4) 36th Inf Div (with 636th TD Bn, 443rd AAA AW Bn and 753rd Tk Bn attached) is relieved of attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to VI Corps, effective 1800B, 11 May 1945.
- (5) 2nd French Armd Div (DB) (with RBFM (TD Bn) attached) is attached to VI Corps, effective 1800B, 11 May 1945. Hold this division assembled in the DIESSEN area, pending further instructions from this Headquarters.

**b. XV Corps:**

- (1) Enforce the terms of surrender and occupy assigned sector (see overlay) as far South as the SALZACH — ENNS River Line.
- (2) Assume command of sector at 1800B, 11 May 1945.
- (3) 101st Airborne Div (with 774th Tk Bn, 813th TD Bn, 397th QM Trk Co and 53rd QM Bn (DUKW) (less 2 Cos) attached) is relieved of attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to XV Corps, effective 1800B, 11 May 1945.
- (4) Establish a Prohibited Frontier Zone along the GERMAN — AUSTRIAN Frontier in sector.
- (5) Be prepared on Army order to occupy the remainder of the sector within the borders of AUSTRIA.

- (6) Be prepared to move the 86th Inf Div (with 807th TD Bn, 787th Tk Bn and 839th AAA AW Bn attached) to the MANNHEIM area on Army order .

c. XXI Corps:

- (1) Until 1800B, 11 May 1945, continue to occupy and enforce the terms of surrender in present sector as far South as the SALZACH River line.
- (2) Upon relief in present sector, assume command of new sector (see overlay).
- (3) See paragraphs 3 a (4) and 3 b (3).
- (4) Effective 1800B, 12 May 1945, the following units are attached to XXI Corps:
  - 63rd Inf Div (with 65th Inf (less Cos A and C) attached)
  - 100 th Inf Div (with 898th AAA AW Bn attached)
  - 12th Armd Div (with 572nd AAA AW Bn attached).
- (5) See paragraph 3 b (6). Upon arrival, hold the 86th Inf Div assembled in the MANNHEIM area pending further instructions from this Headquarters. Unit will not be assigned an occupational mission.

- x. (1) Allocation and adjustment of Corps troops later.
- (2) Coordinate movement of Corps Command Posts with the Signal Officer, this Headquarters.
  - (3) Corps Commanders responsibilities in new sectors will include:
    - (a) Protecting supply installations, supplementing as necessary the installation guards and coordinating security measures.
    - (b) Insuring the security of railroads, main supply roads, petroleum pipe lines, and critical signal installations.
    - (c) Guarding and disposition of captured enemy materiel and supplies as directed by current Administrative Instructions.
    - (d) Disarming and police of the civilian population.
    - (e) Support of the Military Government.
    - (f) Disciplinary control of all troops in the area. This includes members of all Allied Forces whether under command of Seventh Army or not.

Inclosure:

1 — Operations Overlay (5 sheets)

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## **ANNEX E**

### ***CASUALTIES, D-DAY TO V-E DAY***





# CASUALTIES PROCESSED AT SEVENTH ARMY HEADQUARTERS

## SUMMARY BY MONTHS

	KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
August, 1944	123	881	0	192	1196	44
September, 1944	1226	5338	10	980	7554	1188
October, 1944	1254	5634	4	616	7508	2342
November, 1944	1928	7696	2	424	10050	2770
December, 1944	2211	8497	0	1405	12113	3712
January, 1945	1836	8623	31	4785	15275	4483
February, 1945	1587	5254	(8)	1145	7978	4122
March, 1945	1844	7462	2	504	9812	2398
April, 1945	2231	7325	5	275	9836	2296
May, 1945	804	1623	12	(267)	2172	2756
June, 1945	134	7	(1)	(133)	7	2050
July, 1945	93	2	0	(89)	6	366
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>15271</b>	<b>58342</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>9837</b>	<b>83507</b>	<b>28521</b>

15 August 1944 through 31 August 1944

1st Airborne Task Force						
	OFF	3	16	0	3	22
	EM	20	194	0	75	289
3rd Inf. Division						
	OFF	0	12	0	0	12
	EM	34	170	0	14	218
45th Inf. Division						
	OFF	3	10	0	5	18
	EM	37	274	0	65	376
Army Troops						
	OFF	2	10	0	0	12
	EM	24	195	0	30	249
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>123</b>	<b>881</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>1196</b>

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

Cumulative total  
through 2400 hours  
2 September 1944

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
*36th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	1	1	0
	EM	0	10	0	5	15	1

\* First report of 36th Division casualties was received on 2 September 1944

1 September 1944 through 30 September 1944

1st Airborne Task Force	OFF	10	43	0	(1)	52	17
	EM	113	545	0	(21)	637	245
3rd Inf. Division	EM	31	84	1	12	128	8
	EM	420	1473	1	186	2080	239
36th Inf. Division	OFF	25	110	3	15	153	20
	EM	343	1633	4	258	2238	363
45th Inf. Division	OFF	14	69	0	24	107	9
	EM	222	1162	0	375	1759	204
Army Troops	OFF	8	20	0	12	40	11
	EM	40	199	1	120	360	72
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1226</b>	<b>5338</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>980</b>	<b>7554</b>	<b>1188</b>

1 October 1944 through 31 October 1944

1st Airborne Task Force	OFF	4	15	0	(1)	18	27
	EM	54	266	0	(4)	316	311
3rd Inf. Division	OFF	18	65	0	6	89	28
	EM	402	1500	4	121	2027	587

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

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		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
36th Inf. Division	OFF	14	69	0	3	86	27
	EM	361	1690	0	208	2259	679
45th Inf. Division	OFF	13	73	0	15	101	22
	EM	265	1385	0	253	1903	535
Army Troops	OFF	9	42	0	15	66	15
	EM	114	529	0	0	643	111
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1254</b>	<b>5634</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>616</b>	<b>7508</b>	<b>2342</b>

1 November 1944 through 30 November 1944

1st Airborne Task Force	OFF	0	17	0	0	17	17
	EM	27	121	0	6	154	202
3rd Inf. Division	OFF	25	87	0	4	116	17
	EM	394	1753	0	97	2244	602
14th Armd. Division	OFF	0	5	0	0	5	0
	EM	17	88	0	2	107	1
36th Inf. Division	OFF	13	51	0	0	64	29
	EM	236	919	0	13	1168	553
44th AAA Brigade	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	2
	EM	4	8	0	(1)	11	21
44th Inf. Division	OFF	15	57	0	5	77	3
	EM	306	949	0	36	1291	130
45th Inf. Division	OFF	21	27	0	(11)	37	19
	EM	287	442	0	(95)	634	356
79th Inf. Division	OFF	14	54	0	3	71	22
	EM	234	909	0	79	1222	530

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
100th Inf. Division	OFF	6	47	0	10	63	1
	EM	81	802	0	197	1080	70
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	3	21	0	5	29	1
	EM	73	528	0	46	647	14
Army Troops	OFF	16	50	2	0	68	13
	EM	156	761	0	28	945	167
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1928</b>	<b>7696</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>424</b>	<b>10050</b>	<b>2770</b>

1 December 1944 through 31 December 1944

1st Airborne Task Force	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	1	(1)	0	0	0	11
3rd Inf. Division	OFF	12	33	0	0	45	31
	EM	145	559	0	(10)	694	640
12th Armd. Division	OFF	10	21	0	0	31	0
	EM	53	224	0	4	281	19
14th Armd. Division	OFF	10	13	0	0	23	1
	EM	73	312	0	36	421	50
36th Inf. Division	OFF	13	71	0	18	102	23
	EM	262	1149	0	451	1862	563
44th AAA Brigade	OFF	0	5	0	1	6	12
	EM	6	30	0	1	37	150
44th Inf. Division	OFF	15	51	0	14	80	19
	EM	268	955	0	207	1430	316
45th Inf. Division	OFF	6	65	0	6	77	33
	EM	198	961	0	126	1285	465

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	7	0	0	7	0
79th Inf. Division	OFF	13	46	0	8	67	31
	EM	299	1261	0	27	1587	608
87th Inf. Division	OFF	2	30	0	5	37	1
	EM	108	397	0	166	671	18
100th Inf. Division	OFF	13	31	0	(2)	42	9
	EM	373	909	0	51	1333	267
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	14	59	0	5	78	17
	EM	230	989	0	286	1505	172
Army Troops	OFF	9	27	0	(1)	35	19
	EM	78	293	0	6	377	236
TOTAL		2211	8497	0	1405	12113	3712

1 January 1945 through 31 January 1945

3rd Inf. Division	OFF	9	65	0	7	81	35
	EM	153	945	(1)	134	1231	667
12th Armd. Division	OFF	9	45	0	29	83	6
	EM	96	688	0	527	1311	132
14th Armd. Division	OFF	8	40	0	12	60	2
	EM	106	703	0	279	1088	135
36th Inf. Division	OFF	6	9	0	0	15	35
	EM	128	292	0	35	455	567
42nd Inf. Division	OFF	3	17	3	38	61	2
	EM	66	477	8	759	1310	20

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
44th AAA Brigade	OFF	1	2	0	0	3	9
	EM	7	45	0	1	53	129
44th Inf. Division	OFF	8	23	0	3	34	22
	EM	120	425	0	153	698	403
45th Inf. Division	OFF	18	46	0	33	97	20
	EM	195	823	0	581	1599	438
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	9	14	0	2	25	2
	EM	64	328	0	91	483	31
70th Inf. Division	OFF	19	41	0	14	74	2
	EM	240	827	12	375	1454	42
79th Inf. Division	OFF	6	45	0	39	90	36
	EM	149	938	0	950	2037	797
100th Inf. Division	OFF	5	18	0	8	31	18
	EM	53	359	0	296	708	349
101st Airborne Division	OFF	12	41	0	0	53	4
	EM	115	497	1	15	628	73
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	5	28	0	6	39	22
	EM	79	420	0	201	700	298
Army Troops	OFF	10	25	0	11	46	16
	EM	137	397	8	186	728	171
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1836</b>	<b>8623</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>4785</b>	<b>15275</b>	<b>4483</b>

1 February 1945 through 28 February 1945

3rd Inf. Division	OFF	23	54	1	2	80	31
	EM	396	1055	0	288	1739	598

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
12th Armd. Division	OFF	9	6	0	(7)	8	13
	EM	122	196	0	(64)	254	206
14th Armd. Division	OFF	0	5	0	0	5	11
	EM	23	64	0	1	88	201
36th Inf. Division	OFF	4	33	0	10	47	12
	EM	147	571	0	206	924	297
42nd Inf. Division	OFF	8	11	0	20	39	4
	EM	93	276	1	485	855	162
44th AAA Brigade	OFF	3	1	0	0	4	0
	EM	7	24	0	0	31	60
44th Inf. Division	OFF	4	15	0	0	19	9
	EM	95	263	0	(16)	342	247
45th Inf. Division	OFF	0	(1)	5	0	(1)	14
	EM	23	80	0	(19)	84	348
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	9	39	0	10	58	8
	EM	95	655	0	145	895	138
70th Inf. Division	OFF	10	66	0	9	85	6
	EM	205	1028	(12)	115	1336	232
79th Inf. Division	OFF	5	2	0	(2)	5	16
	EM	50	63	0	(44)	69	354
100th Inf. Division	OFF	1	1	0	1	3	11
	EM	36	137	0	3	176	218
101st Airborne Division	OFF	5	11	1	(2)	15	39
	EM	91	219	1	(26)	285	479

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.



		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	3	14	0	1	18	5
	EM	42	158	0	30	230	246
Army Troops	OFF	7	18	0	4	29	16
	EM	71	190	0	(5)	256	141
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1587</b>	<b>5254</b>	<b>(8)</b>	<b>1145</b>	<b>7978</b>	<b>4122</b>

1 March 1945 through 31 March 1945

3rd Inf. Division	OFF	13	55	0	9	77	13
	EM	204	924	1	269	1398	280
12th Armd. Division	OFF	5	24	0	2	31	4
	EM	73	311	0	11	395	123
13th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	0	0	2	2	0
14th Armd. Division	OFF	6	21	0	0	27	6
	EM	80	313	0	7	400	129
36th Inf. Division	OFF	14	56	0	0	70	16
	EM	232	864	0	55	1151	293
42nd Inf. Division	OFF	6	21	0	(1)	26	8
	EM	136	593	(1)	101	829	203
44th AAA Brigade	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	1	7	0	0	8	15
44th Inf. Division	OFF	0	10	0	0	10	6
	EM	28	202	0	(15)	215	91
45th Inf. Division	OFF	8	43	0	1	52	8
	EM	120	763	0	34	917	181

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	15	61	0	1	77	12
	EM	215	863	0	17	1095	228
70th Inf. Division	OFF	19	33	0	(4)	48	16
	EM	245	630	0	27	902	306
71st Inf. Division	OFF	4	6	0	0	10	1
	EM	39	95	0	0	134	1
100th Inf. Division	OFF	4	19	0	0	23	4
	EM	75	248	0	(30)	293	123
101st Airborne Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	2	12	0	(1)	13	10
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	12	48	0	2	62	12
	EM	160	766	0	20	946	160
Army Troops	OFF	15	27	0	0	42	13
	EM	113	447	2	(3)	559	135
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1844</b>	<b>7462</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>504</b>	<b>9812</b>	<b>2398</b>

1 April 1945 through 30 April 1945

3rd Inf. Division	OFF	10	28	0	3	41	7
	EM	199	726	0	18	943	270
4th Inf. Division	OFF	11	17	0	1	29	8
	EM	135	372	0	7	514	145
10th Armd. Division	OFF	10	19	0	1	30	2
	EM	129	396	0	11	536	65

Figures in parantheses represent deductions.

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
12th Armd. Division	OFF	20	59	0	7	86	11
	EM	212	741	0	115	1068	150
13th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	4	0	0	4	0
14th Armd. Division	OFF	9	21	3	1	34	7
	EM	93	322	2	13	430	91
36th Inf. Division	OFF	0	3	0	(1)	2	21
	EM	31	8	0	(29)	10	183
42nd Inf. Division	OFF	15	34	0	(5)	44	9
	EM	132	513	0	(22)	623	154
44th Inf. Division	OFF	11	24	0	(1)	34	4
	EM	142	399	0	(3)	538	105
45th Inf. Division	OFF	21	59	0	(2)	78	12
	EM	219	687	0	(18)	888	226
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	29	57	0	(2)	84	22
	EM	450	1208	0	10	1668	249
70th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	7
	EM	4	5	0	(5)	4	49
71st Inf. Division	OFF	1	8	0	1	10	0
	EM	7	99	0	7	113	2
100th Inf. Division	OFF	8	34	0	9	51	8
	EM	125	823	0	154	1102	169
101st Airborne Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	2
	EM	2	(1)	0	0	1	21

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	3	5	1	(1)	8	13
	EM	28	57	0	(23)	62	122
Army Troops	OFF	29	53	(1)	1	82	9
	EM	145	545	0	29	719	153
TOTAL		2231	7325	5	275	9836	2296

1 May 1945 through 31 May 1945

3rd Inf. Division	OFF	3	8	0	(1)	10	22
	EM	62	118	3	(43)	140	250
4th Inf. Division	OFF	1	4	0	(1)	4	4
	EM	16	72	0	(5)	83	32
10th Armd. Division	OFF	4	6	0	(2)	8	31
	EM	53	141	0	(20)	174	236
12th Armd. Division	OFF	2	4	0	0	6	12
	EM	45	63	0	(4)	104	172
20th Armd. Division	OFF	6	5	0	(1)	10	1
	EM	44	111	1	1	157	9
36th Inf. Division	OFF	0	5	0	0	5	6
	EM	28	66	0	(6)	88	135
42nd Inf. Division	OFF	11	18	0	(3)	26	18
	EM	57	182	0	(14)	225	191
44th Inf. Division	OFF	5	13	0	0	18	8
	EM	56	180	0	0	236	126
45th Inf. Division	OFF	6	10	0	0	16	27
	EM	67	154	2	(19)	204	330

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	2	(1)	0	(1)	0	26
	EM	34	17	0	(32)	19	407
86th Inf. Division	OFF	1	2	0	0	3	6
	EM	40	65	0	14	119	47
100th Inf. Division	OFF	8	0	0	(8)	0	7
	EM	104	6	0	(103)	7	238
101st Airborne Division	OFF	3	0	1	(3)	1	4
	EM	13	(13)	(1)	13	12	35
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	4	12	0	0	16	16
	EM	65	197	0	(9)	253	189
Army Troops	OFF	5	9	2	(2)	14	13
	EM	59	169	4	(18)	214	152
TOTAL		804	1623	12	(267)	2172	2750

1 June 1945 through 30 June 1945

2nd Armored Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	3
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	12
3rd Armd. Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	5
	EM	5	1	0	(6)	0	110
3rd Inf. Division	OFF	2	0	0	(2)	0	4
	EM	4	(1)	0	(7)	(4)	123
5th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	2
	EM	6	0	0	(5)	1	16
6th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	2
	EM	1	0	0	(1)	0	64

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
7th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	1	0	0	(2)	(1)	52
8th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	7	0	0	(7)	0	20
10th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	5
	EM	1	(1)	0	(1)	(1)	87
12th Armd. Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	8
	EM	6	0	0	(6)	0	133
20th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	3
28th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	7
29th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	8	0	0	(8)	0	8
30th Inf. Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	4
	EM	4	(3)	0	(7)	(6)	65
36th Inf. Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	6
	EM	11	(2)	0	(11)	(2)	52
42nd Inf. Division	OFF	0	(1)	0	0	(1)	6
	EM	1	1	0	(2)	0	72
44th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	7
	EM	2	0	0	(1)	1	165
45th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	5
	EM	1	1	(1)	(1)	0	75
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	5
	EM	12	2	0	(12)	2	213

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
69th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	3
	EM	2	0	0	(2)	0	63
70th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	3
	EM	5	1	0	(5)	1	24
75th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	(1)	0	0	(1)	2
76th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	6	1	0	(6)	1	54
78th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	4
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	123
84th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	1	0	0	(1)	0	55
86th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	11
87th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	12	0	0	(12)	0	26
89th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	2
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	0
95th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	2	0	0	(2)	0	0
100th Inf. Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	2
	EM	11	1	0	(7)	5	156
101st Airborne Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	4	(1)	0	(3)	0	11

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
102nd Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	2	0	0	(1)	1	30
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	4	1	0	(3)	2	26
104th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	1	0	0	(1)	0	24
Army Troops	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	3
	EM	6	8	0	(5)	9	84
TOTAL		134	7	(1)	(133)	7	2050

1 July 1945 through 31 July 1945

2nd Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	4	0	0	(5)	(1)	18
3rd Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	2	0	0	(2)	0	20
3rd Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	2
	EM	7	(1)	0	(5)	1	77
5th Armd. Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	0
	EM	5	0	0	(5)	0	5
6th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	1
7th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	22	1	0	(22)	1	18
12th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	3	0	0	(3)	0	25

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.



		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
29th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	5
	EM	5	(1)	0	(5)	(1)	11
30th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	12	0	0	(12)	0	0
35th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	2	0	0	(3)	(1)	1
36th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	2	0	0	(2)	0	4
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	2	0	0	(1)	1	19
69th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	1	0	0	(1)	1	29
70th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	1	0	0	1	2	10
76th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	1	0	0	(1)	0	0
78th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	3	1	0	(4)	0	9
84th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	1	0	0	0	1	26
87th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	15
100th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	3	3	0	(3)	3	13

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
102nd Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	13
106th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	9	0	0	(9)	0	1
Army Troops	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	2
	EM	7	(1)	0	(6)	0	32
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>93</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>(89)</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>366</b>

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.



**ANNEX F**

***D-DAY PERSONNEL,  
SEVENTH ARMY HEADQUARTERS***



# D-DAY PERSONNEL OF SEVENTH ARMY, HEADQUARTERS

## COMMANDING GENERAL

Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch

## AIDES-DE-CAMP (CG)

Lt. Col. John M. Warner  
Maj. Gordon G. Bartlett Jr.

## CHIEF OF STAFF

Major General Arthur A. White

## AIDE-DE-CAMP

1st Lt. Frederick D. Shepard

## DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

Col. Leo V. Warner

## SECRETARY GENERAL STAFF

Lt. Col. William K. Wyant, Jr.  
Maj. Ridgeway B. Knight  
Capt. James M. Benson

Capt. Harry L. Darden  
CWO Robert Clark

M/Sgt. Mark L. Heyrend  
M/Sgt. Andrew E. Jecker  
M/Sgt. Walter E. Sippel  
T/Sgt. Arthur B. Langenkamp

T/3 Armand A. Desorcy  
T/3 John M. Johnston  
S/Sgt. Harry W. Bower  
Sgt. Charles N. Boozer

## A. C. OF S., G-1

Colonel William H. Craig  
Lt. Col. William M. Fondren  
Lt. Col. Harold F. Priester  
Lt. Col. Harry Easton (attached)  
Major John W. Blackburn

Major Frank S. Givens  
Captain Andrew A. Ellenbogen  
Captain Warren Akin  
1st Lt. George F. Lowman  
WOJG Zeffro V. Gianetti

M/Sgt. Charles A. Parker  
T/Sgt. Loren E. Jester  
T/3 Simon Spira  
T/3 Charles E. Welsh  
T/4 Louis Conques  
T/4 Chester Kowalski

T/5 Cornelius O. Alig  
T/5 Robert E. Pope  
T/5 Sam Lapin  
T/5 Warren Rauch  
Pvt. Gordon W. Brown

# A. C. OF S., G-2

Colonel William W. Quinn	Captain John E. Giles
Lt. Col. Lewis E. Perry	Captain Donald C. Miller
Lt. Col. Raymond G. Osborn	Captain Marc M. Spiegel
Lt. Col. David Radam	Captain Rudolf G. Seelig
Lt. Col. Theodore R. Bruskin	1st Lt. Charles H. Brown
Major Henry V. Graham	1st Lt. Lloyd C. McKean
Major Alfred L. Howes	1st Lt. William Peebles
Major Ralph M. Luman	1st Lt. Carvel Busey
Major John C. Hindley	1st Lt. Armand F. Reny
Major Frederic J. Ogden	1st Lt. Marcos B. Roces
Major Marcus M. Staples	1st Lt. John P. Racine
Major Henri de Chizelle (Fr)	F/Lt. Richard W. Hey (Br)
Major James H. Quello	2d Lt. Robert E. Hoffacker
Captain Lee Felder	2d Lt. Walter J. Ksycki
Captain Carl D. Schubach	2d Lt. Curtis G. Ward
Captain Donald M. Bussey	2d Lt. William Beel
Captain James Boucher (Br)	2d Lt. John M. Lavigne
Captain George D. Gould	WO (j. g.) Anthony DeParis
<hr/>	
M/Sgt. John H. Eickemeyer	Cpl. Howard Nicholson
M/Sgt. Lawrence H. Wallenburn	Cpl. Robert J. Murphy
T/Sgt. Harold E. Skaar	T/5 Earl O. Heverly
T/Sgt. John A. Denny	T/5 Bryan J. Lynch
T/Sgt. Herbert R. Meyer	T/5 Louis Cardella
T/Sgt. Franz J. Bing	T/5 Walter Matzner
S/Sgt. Gale E. Smith	T/5 Melvin Gottschalg
S/Sgt. Oscar DeWille	T/5 Edward Walz
S/Sgt. Raymond O. Paulk	Pfc. John A. Greuling
T/3 Jeremiah C. Shea	Pfc. John J. Meyers
T/3 Robert L. Politzer	Pfc. Roy C. Nelson
T/3 Walter Koch	Pfc. Herber M. Chadderdon
T/3 Joseph S. Lowery	Pfc. John A. Carroll
Sgt. Pierre Journeau (Fr)	Pfc. Clarence Yon
T/4 Robert Q. Allen	Pfc. Daniel Segat
T/4 Charles W. Denny	Pvt. Leonard Katz
T/4 Franklin C. Jewell	Pvt. Jones L. Pruitt
T/4 Fred P. Pignato	Pvt. Berdell A. Beers
T/4 Michael J. Cox	Pvt. Joseph A. Piotrowicz
T/4 Norbert W. Bidwell	

# A. C. OF S., G-3

Colonel John S. Guthrie	Lt. Col. John M. Breit
Col. Clyde E. Steele	Lt. Col. Jean Garond (Fr)
Lt. Col. Joe F. Surratt	Maj. Harvey S. Browne III
Lt. Col. W. C. Baxter	Maj. Joseph A. Callahan
Lt. Col. John G. Berry	Maj. Daniel M. Lewis, Jr.
Lt. Col. William B. Goddard	Maj. William H. Merrill, Jr.
Lt. Col. Clarence E. Stuart	Maj. Howard C. Parker

Capt. Charles S. Cherry  
Capt. Harry E. Dean  
Capt. Kenneth F. Keller  
Capt. Robert A. Martin  
Capt. Walter B. Potter  
Capt. Albert E. Voelkel  
Capt. Curtis F. Yarbrough  
Capt. George D. Carter

Capt. Paul B. Sullivan  
Capt. L. S. Elliott  
1st Lt. H. S. Dolsey  
1st Lt. Peter McCadden  
1st Lt. Charles Stough, Jr.  
2d Lt. Joseph Barbecot (Fr)  
WO (jg) Joseph K. Coomes  
WO Francis F. Falco (Fr)

M/Sgt. Ernest W. Olliver  
M/Sgt. Chester A. Raasch  
T/Sgt. Edmund B. Wieczkowski  
S/Sgt. Vincent J. Sciafani  
S/Sgt. James C. Wadell  
T/3 George W. Holder  
Sgt. Elias E. Margoless  
Sgt. Samuel J. Steinmann, Jr.  
Sgt. Jacques Colmar (Fr)  
T/4 Robert H. Bright  
T/4 Dallas J. Deitz  
T/4 Charles W. Douglas  
T/4 Henry K. Ray  
Cpl. Paul E. Casseb  
T/5 Robert D. Dawley

T/5 Robert Oliver  
T/5 Robert W. Poole  
T/5 Eugene D. Pressly  
T/5 Ernest O. Rudin  
T/5 Elwood G. Roberts  
T/5 Ervin Tax  
Pfc. Alex J. Chavez  
Pfc. James R. Duffy  
Pfc. William M. Mus  
Pvt. Jack Copeland  
Pvt. Edward O. Hiner  
Pvt. Wilbur Joy  
Pvt. Rowland C. Leach  
Pvt. Homer M. Purvis  
Pvt. Ralph Schwartz

#### A. C. OF S., G-3, AIR

Col. John W. Hansborough  
Maj. George H. Walton  
Capt. James E. Bryan, Jr.  
Capt. George J. Kitto  
Capt. John C. P. Agnew  
Capt. Henry Hunley  
Capt. Barry W. League

Capt. Kenneth E. Rice  
Capt. Marvin E. Inge, Jr.  
Capt. Richard Kureth  
Capt. Paul Dickson  
Capt. James Lancaster  
Capt. Nathan Drier  
1st Lt. Otwell Brady

M/Sgt. Herbert J. Nowicki  
T/4 William A. Crist, Jr.  
T/4 Charles B. O'Conner  
Cpl. Horace S. Russell  
Cpl. Antonio Saenz  
T/5 Nicholas J. Damiani  
T/5 Hollis H. Harvell  
T/5 Charles F. Combs  
T/5 Will A. Foxell  
T/5 Paul D. O'Day

T/5 Raymond A. Hovis  
T/5 George Crossett  
T/5 William Atchison  
Pfc. Samuel R. Garcia  
Pvt. Samuel S. Caldwell  
Pvt. Archie L. Fisher  
Pvt. Joseph A. Silovich  
Pvt. Michael Chornack  
Pvt. Carl Sampson

#### A. C. OF S., G-4

Col. Oliver C. Harvey  
Lt. Col. Robert E. Holman

Lt. Col. Eldon H. Larecy  
Lt. Col. Daniel T. McCarty



Maj. Robert A. Bieber  
Maj. William J. Chalkley  
Maj. George D. Smith  
Capt. Louis Berger

Capt. Howard L. Oligher  
Capt. Jesse W. Short  
CWO Edward W. Powell

M/Sgt. William G. McGann  
T/Sgt. Arthur Holsinger  
S/Sgt. Bill J. Walker  
S/Sgt. John L. Ferguson  
T/3 Walter Bauer  
T/3 Alfred R. Burrell  
T/3 Samuel Sirdofsky  
Sgt. Ralph J. Butigig  
Sgt. Alphonse M. Para

T/4 Steven J. Boxa  
T/4 Almando D. Levato  
T/4 Joseph L. E. Perron  
T/4 Robert A. Sees  
T/5 Hugo Burdych  
Pfc. Robert N. Bishop  
Pfc. Robert W. Burns  
Pfc. Charles A. Nemes  
Pfc. Francis B. Marlatt (TD fr AFHQ)

#### A. C. OF S., G-5

Col. Harvey S. Gerry  
Maj. Sheldon D. Elliot

Maj. Robert H. Bennett  
Capt. William L. Batt, Jr.

M/Sgt. Harold W. Eells  
T/4 Joseph B. Patti  
Cpl. John P. Mortimer

Pvt. George Gross  
Pvt. Arnedor B. L'Heureux  
Pvt. Philip Martin

#### ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION

Col. William G. Caldwell  
Lt. Col. Charles Knowlton, Jr.  
Lt. Col. Thomas P. Flynn  
Lt. Col. Edward Fox  
Lt. Col. John E. Pederson  
Lt. Col. R. F. Daubigny (Br)  
Maj. Emanuel Combs  
Maj. Gordon Ewing  
Maj. Cyril Hanahoe  
Maj. Glenn Henry  
Maj. Howard A. Spohr  
Capt. Frederick H. Evans  
Capt. Raymond V. Fontaine  
Capt. Salvatore J. Franco

Capt. William S. Hart  
Capt. T. P. Hughes (Br)  
Capt. John D. Merwin  
Sub. Lt. H. J. Merlier (Fr)  
Aspt J. J. Maxwell (Fr)  
Sub. Lt. Ursula MacKay (Br)  
Aspt Robert Galula (Fr)  
1st Lt. Dan Herbuy  
1st Lt. Edward A. Griffin  
1st Lt. Oscar Paulsen  
2d Lt. J. A. Ducrot (Fr)  
2d Lt. Philip H. Rauch  
2d Lt. Elmer E. Rubac

M/Sgt. Russell E. Bert  
M/Sgt. Talmadge W. Crook  
M/Sgt. Thomas L. Farkas  
M/Sgt. Garnett E. McCollim  
M/Sgt. Roger M. Mussett  
M/Sgt. Ferrell L. Pettyjohn  
M/Sgt. Gerald L. Plante  
M/Sgt. William Reeves  
M/Sgt. Marlow R. Risberg

M/Sgt. Jack H. Wolfe  
T/Sgt. Jack B. Baker  
T/Sgt. James G. Clark  
T/Sgt. Tillman J. Danos  
T/Sgt. Andrew T. DeHanes  
T/Sgt. John Kenwell  
T/Sgt. Earl C. Hovden  
T/Sgt. Robert Levin  
T/Sgt. Donald C. O'Leary

T/Sgt. Edward A. Rogers  
 T/Sgt. Joseph J. Salach  
 T/Sgt. Louis J. Skiba  
 S/Sgt. Harold Avery  
 S/Sgt. Robert R. Bell  
 S/Sgt. Henry J. Castello  
 S/Sgt. Jack Geckelar  
 S/Sgt. Charles E. Hass  
 S/Sgt. Frederick Ingraham  
 S/Sgt. William J. Koltiska  
 S/Sgt. Theodore J. Letwink  
 S/Sgt. Seth M. Sterling  
 S/Sgt. Walter R. Vandaveer  
 S/Sgt. Raymond Wolverson  
 T/3 Orlando C. Ackerman  
 T/3 Aloysius G. Behl  
 T/3 Leo J. Burke  
 T/3 Clifford D. Ferguson  
 T/3 Charles Groat  
 T/3 Edward R. Hahnfeld  
 T/3 Loren D. Hubertz  
 T/3 Elton M. Jess  
 T/3 Ralph T. Lanum  
 T/3 Harry W. Larson  
 T/3 Harry A. Malone  
 T/3 Hugh V. Perkins  
 T/3 Howard W. Semons  
 T/3 Henry A. Tarver  
 T/3 Jack Toner  
 T/3 Robert B. Thomas

Sgt. John A. Smith  
 Sgt. Robert L. Yaple  
 Sgt. Richard H. Flynt  
 Sgt. Grady E. Wehunt  
 T/4 Henry Graves  
 T/4 Vincent Wheatcraft  
 T/4 Albert D. Bradley  
 T/4 Lewis A. Pozzini  
 T/4 Donald E. Field  
 T/4 William H. Griffey  
 T/4 Joseph W. Hardy  
 T/4 Henry T. Hostler  
 T/4 Raymond B. Klimek  
 T/4 Robert A. Krieger  
 T/4 Sydney R. Melton  
 T/4 Robert H. Krapf  
 T/5 Charles V. Tavender  
 T/5 Harold E. Hager  
 T/5 Harry J. Blanchard  
 T/5 Donald C. Dedrick  
 T/5 John A. Gort  
 T/5 Lionel Guignard  
 T/5 Irwin Kossay  
 T/5 Benjamin F. Smart  
 T/5 Glenn E. Speck  
 T/5 William J. Macari  
 T/5 Robert B. Pryor  
 T/5 Leonard A. Watt  
 Pfc. Theodore Jannuzzi

#### ANTIAIRCRAFT SECTION

Brig. Gen. Paul B. Kelly  
 Col. Merle R. Thompson  
 Lt. Col. S. S. Gregory, Jr.  
 Maj. James C. Dobbin  
 Capt. C. M. Drummond

Capt. Phillip R. Smith  
 Capt. Tal Hamilton (TDY)  
 1st Lt. Raymond Baer (TDY)  
 1st Lt. Brian B. Sullivan (TDY)

M/Sgt. Howard J. Butler  
 M/Sgt. Paul F. Pavlik  
 T/Sgt. John H. Dixon  
 T/Sgt. Henry A. Sulzycki  
 T/Sgt. Thomas J. Sloan  
 T/3 John A. Foddrill  
 T/3 Hanson S. Holmer

T/4 Albert J. Gaillardet  
 T/4 Carl Hyden  
 T/5 Leon L. Penrod  
 T/5 Elwood W. Koonce  
 T/5 Vernon F. Rossol  
 Pvt. Ernest Colton

#### ARTILLERY SECTION

Brig. Gen. J. F. Brittingham  
 Col. Francis T. Dodd

Col. Johnson Hagood, Jr.  
 Col. George E. Nichols

Lt. Col. L. Pennacchioni (Fr)  
 Maj. Thomas G. Carey  
 Maj. Robert E. Coffin  
 Maj. John H. Byrd  
 Maj. Claude L. Shephard, Jr.  
 Maj. Ernest T. Barco  
 Lt. Col. Edward C. Spaulding

Capt. Albert Darrow  
 Capt. Laverne W. Maxwell  
 1st Lt. Eugene W. Lange  
 1st Lt. George M. Repetti  
 1st Lt. Arthur B. White  
 WOJG Albert E. Sutcliffe, Jr.

M/Sgt. Frank A. Shum  
 M/Sgt. Edwin G. Preehan  
 T/Sgt. Frank C. Perry  
 T/Sgt. John F. Clements  
 T/Sgt. Edgar H. Moore  
 T/Sgt. Henry J. Sheehan  
 T/Sgt. Andrew J. Duncan  
 T/3 Henry R. Running  
 T/3 John T. Roberts  
 Sgt. Kenneth D. McKenzie, Jr.  
 T/4 Wade R. Gorman  
 T/4 John M. Winders

T/5 Libero Arcieri e  
 T/5 Ernest J. Chontos  
 Pfc. Virgil A. Latstetter  
 Pfc. Jack W. Kahle  
 Pfc. John J. Dwyer  
 Pfc. Henry M. Alsaker  
 Pfc. Robert R. Dugas  
 Pfc. John Spraklin (TDY)  
 Pfc. August G. Wagner  
 Pvt. Leon Lery (Fr)  
 Pvt. Green F. Simmons (TDY)

#### CHAPLAIN SECTION

Ch. (Col.) Clarence S. Donnelly  
 Ch. (Maj.) Earl S. Stone

Ch. (Capt.) Thomas J. Manley

S/Sgt. Ringert E. Jongewaard  
 T/3 Edmond G. St. Laurent

T/5 David H. Huff, Jr.  
 Pfc. Hobert L. Bost

#### CHEMICAL WARFARE SECTION

Lt. Col. Bruce T. Humphreville  
 Maj. James J. Heffner  
 Maj. Robert D. Myers  
 Capt. Elliot D. Becken

Capt. Albert Fribourg (Fr)  
 1st Lt. Henry T. Sprinkle  
 WOJG Clifford R. Smith

M/Sgt. Charles R. Gregory  
 M/Sgt. James L. Smith  
 T/Sgt. Harold R. Jewett  
 T/Sgt. Paul S. Kennedy  
 T/Sgt. Robert B. Neilson

T/4 Lawrence H. Carpenter  
 T/4 John P. Greblunas  
 T/4 James H. Koch  
 T/5 Henry H. Davis

#### ENGINEER SECTION

Brig. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson  
 Colonel John A. Chambers  
 Colonel Edwin C. Eller  
 Colonel George V. Gardes  
 Colonel Peter F. Gaynor, Jr.  
 Colonel Ralph D. King  
 Lt. Col. Frank J. Polich

Lt. Col. John E. Trygg  
 Major Howard B. Colman  
 Major Charles B. Gholson  
 Major William E. Harrison  
 Major James D. Hilleke  
 Major Frank P. Lazar  
 Major Bruce G. Packard

Major Montgomery L. Webster  
Major Richard L. Williams  
Captain Robert Blair  
Captain Bertil V. Carlson  
Captain Robert A. Rowland, Jr.

Captain Bernard J. Townsend  
Captain Harold J. Van Aken  
1st Lt. Troy J. Laswell  
1st Lt. Elmer L. Olem  
1st Lt. Herbert S. Robins

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M/Sgt. James J. Enright  
M/Sgt. Joseph Bauza  
T/Sgt. Carl A. Anderson  
T/Sgt. Felix F. Kiziukiewicz  
T/Sgt. Joseph W. Latour  
T/Sgt. William I. Matotan  
S/Sgt. Hubert E. Birk  
T/3 Notham F. Johnston  
T/3 David G. Anderson  
T/3 Lionel R. Sylvestre  
T/3 Aldo A. Berti  
T/3 Charles E. Garrett, Jr.  
T/3 Jack L. Goodey  
T/3 Harel E. Schou  
T/3 James F. Dugan  
T/4 Henry E. Grzesiak  
T/4 Robert Martin  
T/4 Robert H. Imrie  
T/4 Calvin G. Denesha  
T/4 John R. Markgraf

T/4 Maurice H. Bushey  
T/4 Nova H. Wallace  
T/4 Melvin E. Murphy  
T/4 Victor E. Jacoby  
T/4 Robert Frame  
T/4 Will C. Cox  
T/5 George A. Gillis, Jr.  
T/5 Alan A. Andrews  
T/5 Milan Barancek  
T/5 Harrison H. Jones  
T/5 Anthony E. Mandela  
T/5 Donald R. Edsall  
T/5 Russell W. Dickenson  
T/5 John C. Villari  
T/5 Frank Jakobs  
Pfc. Casimir J. Krolak  
Pfc. Charles J. Cole  
Pvt. James L. Fickinger  
Pvt. Harry Obernauer  
Pvt. Lester L. Kinkel

#### FINANCE SECTION

Col. J. P. Tillman  
Lt. Col. E. R. Brock

Capt. J. A. Dell Angelo  
WOJG F. A. Farmer

---

M/Sgt. Charles A. Wrennick  
T/Sgt. Howard E. Thunberg  
S/Sgt. Frank C. Rutzen  
T/3 William C. Moorhead  
T/3 Daniel P. Reimer  
T/4 Donald J. Kester  
T/4 Allen T. Roth  
T/4 Fredrick E. Struke  
T/4 Tarpe J. Tarpoff  
T/4 Dean G. Warner

T/4 Lyman H. Whittelsey  
T/5 Abraham Rothchild  
Pfc. Markus F. Cord  
Pfc. Charles T. Dunn  
Pfc. Raymond J. Gaisser  
Pfc. Frank C. Ghiotto  
Pfc. Steven J. Jacobs  
Pfc. Frank C. Sarabuchello  
Pfc. Clarence E. Schloemer  
Pfc. William Sumpf

#### HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Maj. James E. Sawtelle  
Capt. Emanuel Combs, Jr.  
Capt. Lawrence J. Rosner  
Capt. Walter Thompson  
1st Lt. Dean W. Nida

1st Lt. Vincent A. Suarez  
2d Lt. Richard O. Ball  
CWO. Robert E. Gerald  
WOJG. John R. Patterson  
WOJG. Reginald C. Rice

1/Sgt. Nicholas Beversluis, Jr.  
 T/Sgt. Joseph J. Albert  
 T/Sgt. William J. Blunt  
 T/Sgt. Lawrence M. La Fleur  
 T/Sgt. Alfred F. Morrocco  
 S/Sgt. Henry C. Cardoza  
 S/Sgt. Frank A. Cavaini  
 S/Sgt. George A. Drakos  
 S/Sgt. George Forester  
 S/Sgt. Franklin J. Kline  
 S/Sgt. Harold M. Leau  
 S/Sgt. William G. Reith  
 S/Sgt. Marceau Renaud  
 Sgt. Virgil P. Barbre  
 Sgt. Paul M. Burns  
 Sgt. John D. Elder, Jr.  
 Sgt. Ray W. Finch  
 Sgt. Richard H. Flynt  
 Sgt. William P. Gorisek  
 Sgt. Elwood L. Harding  
 Sgt. Charles E. Huff  
 Sgt. Frank M. Jackson  
 Sgt. Paul E. Rabe  
 Sgt. William R. Ruble  
 Sgt. Leo A. Schmelzer  
 Sgt. William B. Simpson  
 Sgt. Lamoine I. Yocum  
 T/4 Harry L. Borst  
 T/4 Leon Bullock  
 T/4 Corbit J. Burgess  
 T/4 Thomas J. Carlin  
 T/4 Gaston S. Enfinger  
 T/4 John J. Giannone  
 T/4 Harry J. Gland  
 T/4 Clarence E. Hall  
 T/4 Everett C. Hall  
 T/4 Chester L. Hardin  
 T/4 William S. Hartley  
 T/4 Kenneth A. Hunkler  
 T/4 Charles H. Kiper  
 T/4 Chester A. Le Zotte  
 T/4 Donald M. Leibundgut  
 T/4 John A. Millington, Jr.  
 T/4 Jessie B. Putman  
 T/4 Paul E. Risch  
 T/4 Howard W. Robbins  
 T/4 Charles H. Skuhr  
 T/4 Robert F. Smith  
 T/4 Edgar D. Stern  
 T/4 Earl W. Storey

T/4 George C. Venetis  
 T/4 Joseph E. Yunnone  
 Cpl. Cecil L. Clayton  
 Cpl. Jess B. Guy  
 Cpl. Chester Hicks  
 Cpl. Alton L. Howard  
 Cpl. Don A. Hoffman  
 Cpl. John J. Langan  
 Cpl. Merlin E. Moser  
 Cpl. Miller A. Moyer  
 Cpl. Walter A. Nabors  
 Cpl. Orval L. Roden  
 Cpl. James D. Wellons  
 Cpl. George J. Woerth, Jr.  
 Cpl. Frank S. Yinger  
 T/5 William G. Adair, Jr.  
 T/5 Barney F. Adams  
 T/5 Upson A. Andrews  
 T/5 James E. Ashe  
 T/5 Carl W. Bagwell  
 T/5 Edward G. Bostian, Jr.  
 T/5 Vernon L. Brigman  
 T/5 Jack R. Caldwell  
 T/5 George W. Campbell  
 T/5 Albert L. Chitwood  
 T/5 George A. Christmas  
 T/5 Walter Crobons  
 T/5 Arthur J. Covelle  
 T/5 Claude L. Crosson  
 T/5 John G. Delafe  
 T/5 James J. Devlin  
 T/5 Roscoe V. Dorsett, Jr.  
 T/5 William E. Drechsler  
 T/5 Joseph A. L. Duval  
 T/5 Cecil A. Elliot  
 T/5 Claude A. Flippo  
 T/5 Joseph L. Garibaldi  
 T/5 Harry Gasper  
 T/5 William E. Gersemehl  
 T/5 Joseph A. Gobus  
 T/5 Charles H. Hasecuster  
 T/5 Nolan A. Hayes  
 T/5 Robert E. Hill  
 T/5 Donald O. Hubbard  
 T/5 Newbern Jacobs  
 T/5 George E. Jerden  
 T/5 Stephen J. Lupyak, Jr.  
 T/5 William J. Mallory  
 T/5 Oder M. Martin  
 T/5 Clifford L. Mason

T/5 Michael R. Matass  
 T/5 Andy I. Mc Casland  
 T/5 Daniel P. Mc Cloud  
 T/5 Alexander Mc Queston  
 T/5 Carl G. Melaas  
 T/5 Edmond H. Melton  
 T/5 Lawrence Mitchell  
 T/5 Hugh O. Needham  
 T/5 Ralph E. Osmundson  
 T/5 Emanuel Packard  
 T/5 Albert L. Palmer  
 T/5 John E. Parsons  
 T/5 Joseph Povec, Jr.  
 T/5 William C. Sanger  
 T/5 Richard H. Schmidt  
 T/5 Otis E. Seago  
 T/5 William T. Sealy  
 T/5 Michael Soen  
 T/5 Glen F. Speck  
 T/5 Frank V. Stimmler  
 T/5 Franklin H. Todd  
 T/5 Marshall J. Todd  
 T/5 Robert M. Turner  
 T/5 George J. Uchtman, Jr.  
 T/5 Allen C. Ward  
 T/5 Grady E. Whunt  
 T/5 Raymond A. Wiltberger  
 T/5 Sidney Wolfberg  
 Pfc. Roger C. Alcorn  
 Pfc. Marion T. Allds  
 Pfc. Edward M. Andrski  
 Pfc. Daniel J. Baxter  
 Pfc. John M. Brawley  
 Pfc. Charles R. Brock  
 Pfc. Gilberto S. Camacho  
 Pfc. Michel des Caplani  
 Pfc. Edward J. Cassidy  
 Pfc. Paul R. Cawthorn  
 Pfc. Norman J. Coulombe  
 Pfc. Clarence C. Crawford  
 Pfc. Raymond W. Cummings  
 Pfc. Thenonie Davis  
 Pfc. Maurice L. Davis  
 Pfc. Harold E. Dodson  
 Pfc. James W. Donaldson  
 Pfc. Joseph F. Driscoll  
 Pfc. Epifamo C. Durano  
 Pfc. George J. Eberhardt  
 Pfc. Philipps Ellington  
 Pfc. Robert J. Evans

Pfc. Dale E. Forbes  
 Pfc. Benjamin F. Fow, Jr.  
 Pfc. Anthony Francisco  
 Pfc. Florian C. Ga Jeski  
 Pfc. Winthrop Gegenheimer  
 Pfc. Charles Griffith  
 Pfc. Daniel J. Harvey  
 Pfc. Philip J. Higdon  
 Pfc. John U. Hiter  
 Pfc. John W. Holt  
 Pfc. Harry G. Hough, Jr.  
 Pfc. Clyde W. Hughes  
 Pfc. Donald F. Joyce  
 Pfc. Vernon B. Juriga  
 Pfc. Alexander Karrell  
 Pfc. Melvin D. Keller  
 Pfc. Irvin Kossay  
 Pfc. Peter Kostiw  
 Pfc. John Kirzo, Jr.  
 Pfc. Hugh S. Kyle  
 Pfc. Henry J. Lafferty  
 Pfc. Alvin H. Lamb  
 Pfc. Carl W. Larson  
 Pfc. John P. Leach  
 Pfc. Joseph C. Lewis  
 Pfc. Joseph Lipp  
 Pfc. William E. Lawrence  
 Pfc. William J. Macari  
 Pfc. Gene W. Mc Clendon  
 Pfc. Donald B. Metheney  
 Pfc. Ray V. Mitchell  
 Pfc. Anthony J. Morris  
 Pfc. Jack D. Oakes  
 Pfc. Albert Oxford  
 Pfc. Rollin H. Oppel  
 Pfc. James S. Parks  
 Pfc. James H. Pinkston  
 Pfc. James G. Pino  
 Pfc. Earl B. Preston  
 Pfc. Robert B. Pryor  
 Pfc. Gustavo P. Ramos  
 Pfc. Guillermo O. Randes  
 Pfc. Morris Rosen  
 Pfc. John J. Schaeffer  
 Pfc. Norman W. Scherer  
 Pfc. Peter W. Schmidt  
 Pfc. Dietrich H. Schmieder  
 Pfc. Elio Scimimi  
 Pfc. Murray Siedman  
 Pfc. Antone M. Silvia

Pfc. Howard W. Smith  
 Pfc. William L. Stark  
 Pfc. Kenneth R. Story  
 Pfc. Gilbert C. Tipton  
 Pfc. Kenneth L. Ward  
 Pfc. Henry J. Wiedmeyer  
 Pfc. Franklin B. Yorgey  
 Pfc. Charles Yurman  
 Pfc. Norman Zaidberg  
 Pvt. James E. Abner  
 Pvt. Robert P. Akers  
 Pvt. Roxie Albano  
 Pvt. James E. Albert  
 Pvt. George C. Barker  
 Pvt. Lonnie T. Beaird  
 Pvt. Lawrence D. Blackmore  
 Pvt. John D. Boyce  
 Pvt. William F. Brooks  
 Pvt. Lloyd Buchman  
 Pvt. Henry L. Cada  
 Pvt. Joseph Cimino  
 Pvt. Henry B. Cisneros  
 Pvt. Kenyon Clore  
 Pvt. Luther B. Coleman  
 Pvt. Ernest Colton  
 Pvt. George W. Conaway  
 Pvt. Avery A. Cook  
 Pvt. Frank T. Cooper  
 Pvt. Rudolph G. Daniels  
 Pvt. Marvin K. Davis  
 Pvt. Peter H. De Simone  
 Pvt. Nicholas P. Del Campo  
 Pvt. Charles T. Dieter  
 Pvt. Denzil Dykes  
 Pvt. Thomas A. Ferraro  
 Pvt. Michael Frangello  
 Pvt. Steve W. Gasperosky  
 Pvt. Freerick J. Ghelfi  
 Pvt. Anthony N. Gulotta  
 Pvt. Carl D. Hackett  
 Pvt. Schander G. Hassan  
 Pvt. Harold A. Heaton  
 Pvt. Carl W. Henn, Jr.  
 Pvt. Ernest E. Hixenbaugh  
 Pvt. Wayne A. Jarvis

Pvt. Albert M. Johansen  
 Pvt. Paul H. Kriesak  
 Pvt. William Q. H. Lem  
 Pvt. William J. Longacre  
 Pvt. Noah R. Manning  
 Pvt. Orben C. Marple  
 Pvt. John F. Mc Carthy  
 Pvt. John F. Mc Laughlin  
 Pvt. Harold L. Mentzer  
 Pvt. Robert R. Morris  
 Pvt. Fred G. Mucci  
 Pvt. Kenneth W. Murphy  
 Pvt. Wesley E. Neary  
 Pvt. Juan A. Nino  
 Pvt. Robert Novgrad  
 Pvt. Joseph C. Pelly, Jr.  
 Pvt. Richard B. Pendergast  
 Pvt. Troy Perkins  
 Pvt. Russel J. Petrie  
 Pvt. Oran J. Pooty  
 Pvt. Jones L. Pruitt  
 Pvt. William B. Read, Jr.  
 Pvt. Forrest A. Reasoner  
 Pvt. James A. Ridenour  
 Pvt. Carroll S. Risdal  
 Pvt. Howard C. Schmidt  
 Pvt. David H. Sharp  
 Pvt. David Sherbowsky  
 Pvt. Stanley Siarkowski  
 Pvt. Richard P. Sitcer  
 Pvt. Edward T. Slonna  
 Pvt. Glenn B. Smith  
 Pvt. Roy E. Smith  
 Pvt. Isaac H. Smithy  
 Pvt. Bruce Specer  
 Pvt. Jack W. Stokes  
 Pvt. Clayton F. Taylor  
 Pvt. George Trent  
 Pvt. Ison S. Tyndall, Jr.  
 Pvt. Lonnie Upton  
 Pvt. Willie M. Urban  
 Pvt. Raymond F. Van Dusen  
 Pvt. Edward Varga  
 Pvt. Joseph Vercellone  
 Pvt. George L. Wilson

## HISTORICAL SECTION

Captain John A. Steel

### INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTION

Col. Carroll K. Leeper  
Lt. Col. Daniel M. Muth  
Lt. Col. Joseph M. Whitaker  
Lt. Col. John M. Arnfield

Maj. James B. Bratton  
Maj. Burney S. Dobbs, Jr.  
CWO. Andrew Weiss

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M/Sgt. James B. Grist  
T/Sgt. Houston D. Jones  
T/3 Leonard Miller  
T/3 Martin E. Gunther  
Sgt. Donald C. Gregg

T/4 William Jennings  
T/4 Ira L. Whealton  
T/5 George P. Bishop  
T/5 Roy R. Bjorklund

### JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL SECTION

Col. P. G. McElwee  
Lt. Col. C. A. Luckie  
Maj. G. C. St. Clair

Maj. L. D. Wallach  
1st Lt. Ben Baime

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M/Sgt. Herman Gottfried  
S/Sgt. William H. Wildes  
S/Sgt. Edward H. Hoy  
T/4 Herman Axelrod

T/4 Harold R. Latimer  
T/4 John F. Graca  
T/5 Walter P. Mazur

### MEDICAL SECTION

Col. Frank B. Berry  
Col. Robert J. Goldson  
Col. Webb B. Gurley  
Col. Norman E. Peatfield  
Col. Joseph Rich  
Col. Albert H. Robinson  
Col. Myron P. Rudolph  
Col. Daniel S. Stevenson  
Lt. Col. Stewart F. Alexander  
Lt. Col. James E. Flinn  
Lt. Col. Guy H. Gowen

Lt. Col. Charles Raulerson  
Maj. Edith F. Frew  
Maj. Henry C. Goss  
Maj. Alfred O. Ludwig  
Capt. Frank L. Dunsmoor  
Capt. Harry M. Krasnoff  
Capt. Erskine M. Livingstone  
1st Lt. Raymond J. Hoesch  
1st Lt. Harry W. Sorenson  
WOJG. Glen F. Morgan

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M/Sgt. William F. Cappel  
T/Sgt. William S. Brandon  
T/Sgt. Joseph A. Cardin  
T/Sgt. Joseph Epstein  
T/Sgt. Joe A. Petty  
S/Sgt. Alfred C. Guimond  
S/Sgt. John W. Loy  
S/Sgt. James M. McLaughlin  
S/Sgt. Robert Stark  
T/3 Henry Jaffe

T/3 Donald D. Mc Cune  
Sgt. William J. Anderson  
Sgt. George A. Dulya  
Sgt. Robert J. Geller  
Sgt. Paul W. Madden  
T/4 Frank J. Marsala  
T/4 John W. McConnel  
T/5 Helmut Meyerbach  
T/5 Jack Reppert



## ORDNANCE SECTION

Brig. Gen. Edward W. Smith Col. Harold E. Hopping Col. George L. Artamonoff Col. Charles P. West Col. Herbert P. Schowalter Col. Ambrose F. Johnston Lt. Col. Charles S. Hedrick Lt. Col. Robert E. Le Roy Maj. Claude A. Loflin, Jr. Maj. Kenneth O. Reed Maj. Robert A. Robinson, Jr.	Maj. John R. Liles Maj. Theodore P. Harper Maj. John W. Brown Capt. Harold W. Gear Capt. Robert M. Alfred Capt. Edward W. Dew Capt. Joseph Dandreto Capt. James O. Yates 1st Lt. Ernest J. Dimick CWO. William B. Speak Maj. Waldo B. Berryman
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M/Sgt. William D. Beard M/Sgt. Francis P. Leonard M/Sgt. Russel N. Mac Laren M/Sgt. John S. Sechrist M/Sgt. James S. Stank M/Sgt. Arthur W. Whalen T/Sgt. Robert D. Burns T/Sgt. Elmer W. Busick T/Sgt. Robert H. Eisen T/Sgt. George J. Goff T/Sgt. Donald H. Gurney T/Sgt. Richard K. Laurino T/Sgt. Earle D. Lewis T/Sgt. Emile C. Riendeau T/Sgt. William F. Rowland, Jr.	T/Sgt. Leslie L. Wells T/3 Kenneth W. Brueckner T/3 Edward F. Jett T/3 Ralph F. Raasch T/3 Eugene W. Reiter T/3 Kennedy G. Ward T/3 Melvin G. Webber Sgt. Robert D. Doherty T/4 Paul F. Deisher T/4 Tyton R. Key T/4 William J. Porter T/5 Edward H. Goodman T/5 Kurt Weiler T/5 John M. Winders
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## PROVOST MARSHALL SECTION

Lt. Col. R. C. Briggs Lt. Col. W. H. Dunn	Lt. Col. R. J. Hermann Lt. Col. R. H. Mc Intire
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M/Sgt. R. M. Morris T/Sgt. H. Hickson	S/Sgt. A. Kingsdorf T/4 P. Yankitis
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## SIGNAL SECTION

Brig. Gen. George F. Wooley, Jr. Col. Norman H. Saunders Col. John L. Leidenheimer Lt. Col. Carl W. Bartling Lt. Col. William H. Waldschmidt Lt. Col. Edwin O. Earl Lt. Col. Louis H. Spiegel Lt. Col. Philip W. Bierman Maj. Harold C. Wafler Maj. Alanson B. Dunn Maj. Bertram B. Dales, Jr.	Maj. Everett C. Smith Capt. Bernard Greenbaum Capt. Richard L. Blosser Capt. Frank W. Daykin Capt. John L. Seymour Capt. Franklyn K. Smale Capt. William C. Harrup Capt. Alvin C. Canepa 1st Lt. Richard H. Tarpley 1st Lt. Daniel W. Pettengill 1st Lt. Frank B. Wallis
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M/Sgt. Alvin Carlson  
 M/Sgt. Harold J. Cummings  
 M/Sgt. Theodore M. Meloy  
 M/Sgt. Neil B. Mitchell  
 M/Sgt. Howell H. Neel  
 M/Sgt. Stanley A. Ogden  
 M/Sgt. John H. Schumacher  
 M/Sgt. Edward M. Toth  
 M/Sgt. Earl B. Whitley  
 T/Sgt. Emmet W. Berkley  
 T/Sgt. Gerald B. Hall  
 T/Sgt. Theodore P. Lange  
 T/Sgt. Max A. Paquet  
 T/Sgt. Abraham A. Shlifer  
 T/3 Blanton K. Bagby  
 T/3 Joseph A. Binko, Jr.  
 T/3 Timothy J. Fitzgerald  
 T/3 Robert O. Harmon  
 T/3 Stephen H. Juniewicz  
 T/3 James D. Kelsh

T/3 Lawrence D. Diebel  
 Sgt. Christian A. Walters  
 T/4 George F. Bamberger  
 T/4 Evan E. Brown  
 T/4 Doyle A. Chisnell  
 T/4 Raymond W. Deacon  
 T/4 John P. Farley  
 T/4 Robert H. Gallagher  
 T/4 Arthur P. Georgudis  
 T/4 Joseph T. Hall  
 T/4 Louis B. Piscopo  
 T/4 Irving Saldin  
 T/4 4 Stanley E. Spaeth  
 T/4 Robert L. Stearns  
 T/4 Rudolph Sundquist  
 T/4 John J. Taafe  
 T/4 Arthur L. Eno, Jr.  
 T/4 Robert W. Carbaugh  
 T/5 Stewart J. Peacock  
 Pfc. R. Butler

#### PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION

Col. Henry L. Jones II  
 Maj. Harold W. Wellinger

1st Lt. Logan R. Shaw

#### QUARTERMASTER SECTION

Col. Clyde Massey  
 Col. James F. Tweedy  
 Col. John L. Dicks  
 Lt. Col. Gordon C. Gill  
 Maj. Samuel E. Graham  
 Maj. Ronald N. Throop  
 Maj. Joseph N. Tucker  
 Maj. William D. Pratt  
 Capt. Richard L. Nispel  
 Capt. Edward F. Braithwaite  
 Capt. George H. Garepy  
 Capt. Frank T. Heinemann

Capt. James E. Bowler  
 Capt. Ernest S. Johnson  
 Capt. Simon E. Stern  
 Capt. Henry R. McKee  
 1st Lt. James Glendinning  
 1st Lt. Henry A. Miller  
 1st Lt. Brendon T. Jose  
 1st Lt. Joseph P. Murphy  
 CWO. Adrian N. Winegarden  
 WO. Ross A. Jamieson  
 WOJG. Anthony Z. Cromwell

M/Sgt. Russell M. Hostetler  
 M/Sgt. Warren C. Fulton  
 M/Sgt. Marvin B. Katz  
 T/Sgt. Peter A. Jackson  
 T/Sgt. John R. Lee  
 T/Sgt. Thomas W. Motes  
 T/Sgt. Joseph J. Couwlier  
 S/Sgt. Paul Puskar  
 S/Sgt. William Dickson

T/3 Veryl W. Acker  
 Sgt. James A. Gannon  
 Sgt. Donald W. Smith  
 T/4 Joseph C. Borges  
 T/4 Leonard A. Peterson  
 T/4 Lawrence L. Hurley  
 T/4 John J. Galpin  
 T/4 Joseph B. Mann  
 Cpl. Richard J. Lutz

T/5 Leslie R. Shaw  
 T/5 Darrel L. Sornson  
 T/5 John K. Berglund  
 T/5 William D. Meila  
 T/5 Stephen Martin  
 T/5 August M. Thiede  
 T/5 Nick Defino  
 T/5 Thomas H. Kline  
 T/5 Bernard J. Quinn  
 Pfc. Joseph J. Weber  
 Pfc. John S. Davenport, Jr.  
 Pfc. Ronald W. Anderson

Pfc. Carlisle Brookbank  
 Pfc. Patsy DeGiorgio  
 Pfc. Lynwood D. Dolan  
 Pfc. Banks E. Campbell  
 Pfc. Judson Kernan  
 Pfc. Owen E. Morrison  
 Pfc. Otto W. Neumann  
 Pfc. David H. Payne, Jr.  
 Pfc. Harold F. Rauze  
 Pfc. Fred P. Russo  
 Pfc. Heinz H. Shwagerick

### SPECIAL TROOPS SEVENTH ARMY HEADQUARTERS SPECIAL TROOPS

Col. Hugh W. Stevenson  
 Maj. James V. Galloway  
 Maj. Lloyd P. Lowman  
 Maj. William H. Merrill  
 Maj. Abraham G. Eisner

Capt. William F. Ort  
 1st Lt. Alvin E. Anderson  
 2d Lt. Richard J. Danos  
 CWO. Robert E. Gerald  
 WOJG. Reginald C. Rice

T/Sgt. Druie M. Lee  
 T/Sgt. James R. Tallon  
 T/Sgt. Jack R. Caldwell  
 T/Sgt. Frank A. Matterson  
 S/Sgt. Henry C. Cardoza  
 S/Sgt. Harry J. Gland  
 S/Sgt. John E. Davis  
 S/Sgt. Edward J. Venavage  
 S/Sgt. Frank A. Cauaini  
 Sgt. John M. Feely  
 Sgt. James W. Sunstrom  
 Sgt. Glenn R. Ray  
 Sgt. Ray Norris  
 Sgt. Ray W. Finch  
 Sgt. George F. Brown  
 Sgt. Paul Rabe  
 Sgt. Reino Kahila  
 Sgt. Harry O. Barnes  
 Sgt. Thomas Cavins  
 Sgt. John O. Elder, Jr.  
 Sgt. Charles H. Kennedy  
 T/4 Charles F. Grover, Jr.  
 T/4 Robert F. Smith  
 T/4 Earl W. Storey  
 T/4 Robert M. Turner

T/4 George J. Worth, Jr.  
 T/4 Lawrence C. Marsh  
 T/4 John E. Lynch  
 T/4 William S. Hartley  
 Cpl. Miller A. Moyer  
 Cpl. Leonard A. Dyer  
 Cpl. Frank S. Yinger  
 Cpl. Leo J. Tetrault  
 Cpl. Robert H. Midkiff  
 Cpl. Frank Feinstein  
 T/5 Gene W. Mc Clendon  
 T/5 Emanuel Packard  
 T/5 Gustavo P. Ramos  
 T/5 Joseph P. Driscoll  
 T/5 Kenneth J. Goercke  
 T/5 Arthur E. Brown  
 T/5 Harold E. Farris  
 T/5 Artis W. Overton  
 T/5 Jose E. Romero  
 T/5 James K. Womack  
 T/5 Joseph A. Gobus  
 T/5 Lynn Lovvorn  
 T/5 Stephen J. Lupyak, Jr.  
 T/5 Clifford L. Mason  
 Pfc. Frank C. Sarabuchello

Pfc. Frank Condore  
Pfc. James A. Gee  
Pfc. Dewey L. Brown  
Pfc. Onorio Cerino

Pfc. Warren C. Puckett  
Pvt. Chester Hicks  
Pvt. John J. York

#### 115TH AGF BAND

WO. Olle G. R. Blomfelt

S/Sgt. Graydon R. Crawley  
T/4 Robert H. Abernathy  
T/4 John W. Barber  
T/4 Henry L. Conlin  
T/4 Harry Fleic  
T/4 Ben L. Niles  
T/4 Charles L. Paashaus  
T/4 John A. Reger  
T/5 Joseph K. Handfield  
T/5 John Hauer  
T/5 Robert Keeman  
T/5 Charles H. King  
T/5 Robert B. Stuart  
T/5 John R. Ware  
T/5 Foster L. Wycant  
Pfc. Richard H. Bollinger  
Pfc. Derea Dietterick

Pfc. Robert E. Franzl  
Pfc. Raymond E. Harrington  
Pfc. Stephen Kowalski  
Pfc. Albert Mogul  
Pfc. Donald A. Palmieri  
Pfc. Harold E. Skinner  
Pfc. Russell A. Whalen  
Pfc. William R. Whalen  
Pfc. George Zantuhos  
Pfc. Carl W. Henn, Jr.  
Pvt. Aaron R. Baer  
Pvt. Onorio Cerino  
Pvt. William Hussar  
Pvt. Matthew E. Jones, Jr.  
Pvt. Howard R. Jones  
Pvt. Frank L. Stein  
Pvt. John E. Trimmel

#### 114TH AGF BAND

WO. Thomas R. Porter

T/Sgt. Bruno A. Mazur  
S/Sgt. Merlin Wilson  
T/4 Vernon F. Donley  
T/4 John F. Homan  
T/4 Jack D. Krusenstjerna  
T/4 Lawrence C. Marsh  
T/4 Mitchell M. Pawloski  
T/4 Dick Vander Molen, Jr.  
T/4 Theodore Vlad  
Cpl. Don A. Hoffman  
T/5 Harold Bialk  
T/5 Leonard R. Davidson  
T/5 George M. Fisk  
T/5 William E. Lamb

T/5 Kenneth Pennycook  
T/5 William S. Purcell, Jr.  
T/5 William P. Sweeney  
Pfc. Watson J. Barber  
Pfc. Peter T. Gallina  
Pfc. Raymond Harrington  
Pfc. Charles Mann  
Pfc. Donald G. Montgomery  
Pfc. William T. Reinecke  
Pfc. Gordon W. Shunk  
Pfc. Richard H. Bollinger  
Pvt. Matthew E. Jones, Jr.  
Pvt. Frank L. Stein  
Pvt. John E. Trimmel

#### SPECIAL SERVICE SECTION

Lt. Col. Frederick E. Graef

Capt. Paul A. Twachtman

M/Sgt. Edward Colonna  
S/Sgt. Edward A. Dutton  
S/Sgt. Phil Maros

Sgt. Merritt Manahan  
T/4 A. W. Lausier  
T/4 Nicholas Shamas

## TRANSPORTATION SECTION

Col. Louis G. Zinnecker  
Lt. Col. Kirk A. Keegan  
Lt. Col. Donald I. Pattison  
Maj. Paul R. Heck  
Maj. Edward Krug  
Maj. Oscar M. Gunderson

Maj. Floyd B. Boyle  
Capt. Ralph Chavkin  
Capt. Colin McRea  
1st Lt. Stanley F. Evans  
1st Lt. Reuben R. Kasman  
1st Lt. Theodore Loveless

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T/Sgt. Raymond Hayes  
T/Sgt. James Stragea  
S/Sgt. John Dolan  
T/3 Warren L. Eckstein  
T/4 Daniel Zeller  
T/4 Henry Cairo  
T/4 Kenneth C. Creswell  
T/4 Gershon Hakim  
T/5 Howard Slotkin

T/5 William A. Matthews  
Pfc. Dallas I. Penny  
Pvt. Boyce M. Hoffman  
Pvt. Dean S. Brady  
Pvt. Louis M. Marks  
Pvt. Frank X. Byrns  
Pvt. Hubert Sandlin  
Pvt. Charles W. Dubbs

## 307TH CIC DETACHMENT


Maj. Kenneth G. Crowell  
Maj. Lucien L. Picard  
Capt. Alvie L. McDuff

Capt. Marion E. Porter  
Capt. Arthur H. Van Kirk  
Capt. John C. L. C. Schwarzwalders

---

M/Sgt. Bertel M. Sparks  
T/Sgt. Warren R. Anderson  
T/Sgt. Harold O. Barker, Jr.  
T/Sgt. William N. Bower  
T/Sgt. Keirn C. Brown  
T/Sgt. Alan F. Dinehart, Jr.  
T/Sgt. Robert G. Caldwell  
T/Sgt. Ashleigh D. McIntosh  
T/Sgt. Charles W. O'Connel  
T/Sgt. Edmond J. Tousignant  
T/Sgt. Francis B. Beaudette  
S/Sgt. Emmet R. Blake  
S/Sgt. Robert Brockmeier  
S/Sgt. Abraham W. Brussell  
S/Sgt. Raymond P. Daguerre  
S/Sgt. Thomas A. Emmet  
S/Sgt. Woodrow W. French  
S/Sgt. Marshall Haseltine  
S/Sgt. George A. LeFebvre  
S/Sgt. Philip A. O'Brien  
S/Sgt. Victor S. Guinzbourg  
S/Sgt. David S. Horner

S/Sgt. Milton W. Lipper  
S/Sgt. George T. Moseley  
S/Sgt. Origene J. Paquette  
S/Sgt. Peter Regis  
S/Sgt. Lewis V. Sevier  
Sgt. Victor C. Bergman, Jr.  
Sgt. Wells F. Chamberlain  
Sgt. Perry A. Devers  
Sgt. Honorat T. Gendron  
Sgt. Joseph C. Hutchinson  
Sgt. William C. Kandt  
Sgt. Herve R. LaChance  
Sgt. Phillipe G. Jacques  
Sgt. Edward Baraty  
Sgt. Scott D. Mc Coy  
Sgt. Albert N. Nickson  
Sgt. George A. Perper  
Sgt. Francis E. Powell  
Sgt. Robert R. Richards  
Sgt. Daniel J. Sullivan  
Sgt. Bradley W. Vaughn



# SUPPLY DUMPS , SEVENTH ARMY

JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1945

- ☾ QM CLASS I
- ⊡ QM CLASS II
- ▼ QM CLASS III
- Ⅳ QM CLASS IV

AMBERG  
17 Apr.

NURNBERG

Chateau Sal  
1 Feb.

Pfaffenhofen  
20 May

Enfeldbruck  
2 May

MUNICH

ing  
May

Garmish - Parten  
3 May

